This case was part of a broad-based copyright owner litigation campaign that included Viacom v. YouTube and UMG v. Veoh. All of these lawsuits were designed to permanently shut down the video hosting category by finding a hole in the Section 512(c) online safe harbor so that copyright owners could sue UGC sites even if they didn’t send individual takedown notices. YouTube settled, Veoh went broke, and Vimeo soldiered on (and on and on…).

In January 2025, Vimeo scored a major win in the Second Circuit. When the dust settled, the court summarizes: “Vimeo ultimately achieved complete victory on all of Plaintiffs’ claims after many long, hard-fought years spent litigating this dispute.”

Vimeo sought a 505 attorneys’ fee shift for its $6 million in defense costs over 17 years. The court denies the request, but awards it a token $16,000 in costs.

The court summarizes its thinking:

As Vimeo itself has previously recognized, this case raised “many difficult or new” issues….An award of attorneys’ fees to Vimeo, however, would not serve the purposes of the Copyright Act. Plaintiffs asserted reasonable claims that raised novel, complex questions of law, and they litigated those claims reasonably and in good faith. This case also presents little need for either compensation or deterrence.

What were those novel issues?

This case raised many issues of first impression, including, but not limited to, the legal framework governing when a service provider is deemed to have actual or constructive (also called “red flag”) knowledge of infringement, the circumstances in which willful blindness is a proxy for knowledge, the factual showing necessary for a plaintiff to establish the foregoing, and whether the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions applied to sound recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972.

Those issues felt more novel back in 2009. The court acknowledges the case’s venerability, saying:

the legal standards governing, and the factual showing required to receive, DMCA safe harbor protection had not been addressed by the Second Circuit when Plaintiffs filed suit in 2009….

Even following Viacom, the evidentiary showing necessary to present or defeat a safe-harbor defense under the DMCA was not settled law, particularly with respect to the question of actual or red flag knowledge of infringement.

Vimeo pointed out that the record labels could have avoided this case entirely by sending proper 512(c)(3) takedown notices. The court is unmoved:

there is no statutory requirement that a plaintiff exhaust its notice-and-takedown remedies against a defendant before bringing suit under the Copyright Act….

As the Second Circuit noted, the notice-and-takedown provisions merely “augment[ed] the arsenal of copyright owners” by creating an alternative remedy. And because the limitation on liability conferred by the DMCA is qualified, rather than absolute, there remains a place for good-faith lawsuits under the Copyright Act to test whether a service provider is entitled to that immunity. From a rightsholder’s perspective, the two remedies are far from the same: unlike a claim brought under the Copyright Act, a DMCA takedown notice does not provide a rightsholder with monetary relief for past infringement or injunctive relief against future infringement, both of which Plaintiffs sought in this action. Penalizing a rightsholder for seeking a remedy available to it under the Copyright Act—without an exhaustion requirement—would not serve the Act’s purposes.

The court did award Vimeo $16k in costs because it prevailed in the most recent Second Circuit appeal.

* * *

Did the record labels really have colorable arguments when they first filed this lawsuit? Well, yes, in the sense that the DMCA is a long and complicated safe harbor filled with ambiguities. Major copyright owners planned to test all of the ambiguities–and are still working on that agenda nearly 30 years later.

However, the copyright owners’ real agenda was never to clarify the ambiguities in good faith. Instead, their goal is, and always was, to tacitly amend the DMCA safe harbor in court to secure terms they did not and could not get from Congress via legislative deal-making–most notably, to let copyright owners bypass the DMCA’s central notice-and-takedown architecture so that they could sue UGC services over user-caused copyright infringement without sending individual takedown notices. The copyright owners have been willing to risk many millions of dollars to obtain that backdoor amendment in court, and they really don’t care about the consequences for the defendants they steamroller or bankrupt in the process. To me, this is exactly why a 505 fee shift would have been the only fair outcome here. If the copyright owners are going to gamble some of their fortune on securing legislative amendments via impact litigation, they should bear the full costs of that strategy.

Instead, the fee shift denial implicitly legitimizes the copyright owners’ lawfare strategy against the DMCA online safe harbors. There is surely one or more lessons about the proper design of immunities and safe harbors buried in this case study somewhere.

Case Citation: Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 2026 WL 2606633 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2026)

The post After $6M and 17 Years Fighting the Record Labels’ Copyright Lawfare, the Court Awards Vimeo $16k in Costs–Capitol Records v. Vimeo appeared first on Technology & Marketing Law Blog.

I presume the plaintiff and many of the 44 defendants are Chinese entities. This case appears to be another example of how the SAD Scheme has become one of the U.S.’s most popular exports to China.

The plaintiff claims that the defendants infringed its copyright, including registration #VAu 1-517-249, titled “Black Castor Oil 1 and 3 Other Unpublished Works.”

As usual with SAD Scheme cases, the plaintiff initially obtained an ex parte TRO. Then, Shenzhen Moulis Electronic Co., Ltd., on behalf of 18 defendants (the “Aliver Defendants”), appeared in the case and started poking holes in the plaintiff’s assertions.

Following the preliminary injunction hearing, the plaintiff dismissed the defendants voluntarily with prejudice. Voluntary dismissals are a standard tactic when SAD Scheme cases become contested. From the plaintiff’s standpoint, it’s better to cut loose the squeaky defendants who might disrupt the entire case, so the plaintiff can keep squeezing the other defendants.

However, it is less typical for the plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss the defendants with prejudice. Normally that occurs only after a settlement, which did not happen here. The court calls the plaintiff’s dismissal with prejudice “unusual.”

The Aliver Defendants then sought a 505 attorneys’ fee shift of nearly $40k, which the court grants.

Did the Aliver Defendants Prevail?

When copyright plaintiffs are losing, a voluntary dismissal provides a way to reduce any residual exposure, because judges rarely order a fee shift for a defendant who is already out of the case. Also, at least in the 11th Circuit, a court doesn’t have the statutory authority to issue a fee shift to a defendant dismissed without prejudice.

But here, the plaintiff dismissed with prejudice, and the court treats the requested fee shift here as a novel question: “does a defendant prevail if the dismissal materially changes the relationship between the parties but the dismissal does not require judicial imprimatur other than a perfunctory order closing the matter?”

The court says yes: “Plaintiff sought damages and injunctive relief against the Aliver Defendants but obtained neither.” The court notes how badly the case was going for the plaintiff:

At the preliminary injunction hearing, the Aliver Defendants argued—and the Court agreed—that Plaintiff was unlikely to prevail on the merits of its copyright claim against the Aliver Defendants. The Court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief was based on multiple glaring issues with Plaintiff’s claim, including that Plaintiff failed to allege or provide evidence to support that the Aliver Defendants had access to or copied Plaintiff’s alleged copyrighted artwork and failed to rebut the other issues raised by the Aliver Defendants regarding Plaintiff’s creation, ownership, and publishing of the alleged copyrighted artwork.

It was only after the Court denied Plaintiff’s PI Motion, on the basis that Plaintiff was unlikely to prevail on the merits of its claim, that Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its claims against the Aliver Defendants with prejudice. The fact that Plaintiff’s notice of voluntary dismissal was with prejudice—as opposed to without prejudice—is persuasive here even if the dismissal did not require judicial imprimatur. A voluntary dismissal without prejudice generally leaves the parties as though the action had never been brought and does not prevent the plaintiff from refiling. By contrast, Plaintiff’s notice of voluntary dismissal with prejudice permanently barred Plaintiff from reasserting the same copyright claims against the Aliver Defendants….

here, the Court denied Plaintiff’s PI Motion on the ground that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits and identified on the record the specific deficiencies in Plaintiff’s allegations against the Aliver Defendants. In doing so, the Court effectively “rebuffed” Plaintiff’s claims.

Ultimately, the rights of the parties were conclusively resolved following the preliminary injunction ruling: Plaintiff’s subsequent voluntary dismissal with prejudice permanently barred re-litigation of the very claims the Court had already found deficient. The Court’s rejection of the viability of Plaintiff’s claims coupled with Plaintiff’s with-prejudice dismissal renders the Aliver Defendants prevailing parties

So, the big mystery of this case: why did the plaintiff choose to dismiss with prejudice? Occam’s razor suggests that it was an unforced error.

(To be clear, we should favor plaintiffs dismissing with prejudice rather than without. Dismissals without prejudice leave a Sword of Damocles hanging over the defendants’ heads, with associated inhibiting effects).

[UPDATE: a reader wrote to me: “defendants in this sort of case can put P’s in the position where dismissals MUST be with prejudice (or at least by stipulation or with court permission) by filing an answer or an MSJ.”]

Factors Supporting 505 Fee Shift

Having determined the defendants’ eligibility for a fee shift, the court decides it’s appropriate to issue a fee shift here because:

• “Aliver Defendants achieved complete success.”
• “Plaintiff’s copyright theory was objectively unreasonable. Plaintiff alleged infringement of unpublished works but did not adequately allege access, even after the Aliver Defendants identified that deficiency”
• “compensation and deterrence favor fees” because it encourages plaintiffs to scrutinize their claims (which they should be doing anyway)

This is a good reminder of why copyright owners have not embraced the SAD Scheme as thoroughly as trademark owners. While the copyright and trademark statutes both have attorneys’ fee shifting provisions, courts are more willing to grant fee shifts in copyright cases. As we’ve seen for decades, it’s hard to run a copyright-based online trolling campaign when fee shifts cause the profit meter to run in reverse.

Implications

In contrast to the resolution of many SAD Scheme cases, this case resolved comparatively favorably for the defense. The defendant got the claims dismissed and an award of their attorneys’ fees.

Great, but this outcome still isn’t good news. The court wrongly issued a TRO based on an apparently defective copyright claim. Worse, as the court itself described, the case had “multiple glaring issues”–but, I guess, not glaring enough for the court to catch them at the TRO stage? In other words, had the judge more aggressively policed the plaintiff’s ex parte requests, this case never should have proceeded against the Aliver Defendants. Further, the judge doesn’t acknowledge her complicity, order any further sanctions against the plaintiff, or even scold the plaintiff for extracting an undeserved TRO from her.

The court’s choices not to hold the plaintiff fully accountable or lament her role in the scheme is one of the reasons the SAD Scheme keeps perpetuating. In plaintiffs’ efforts to create SAD Scheme omelettes, they routinely and predictably break some eggs, and the courts don’t adequately impose consequences for the messes they make. #StopTheSADScheme.

Case Citation: XYZ Corp. v. Schedule A Defendants, 0:24-cv-61886-JB (S.D. Fla. Sept. 3, 2026)

SUPPLEMENT: Ningbo Jiaruisi E-Commerce Co., Ltd. v. WHAM-O Holding, Ltd., No. 1:26-cv-10701 (N.D. Ill. complaint filed Sept. 3, 2026). This lawsuit represents some of the fallout from the Seventh Circuit’s Kangol v. Hangzhou Silk decision, which rejected email service on many Chinese defendants. The complaint summarizes its purpose:

to obtain relief from default judgments and related orders entered in Northern District of Illinois “Schedule A” cases against mainland-China defendants who were incorrectly served via email pursuant to FRCP 4(f)(3) and not through the Hague Service Convention, did not appear, did not settle, and were subjected to default judgments, asset restraints and collection. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and equitable relief, including relief from void judgments, an accounting, restitution of funds collected under such judgments, taxable costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses to the extent authorized by law, including from any common fund or monetary benefit created, preserved, or restored through this action, prejudgment and post-judgment interest, and related relief necessary to restore the parties to the position they would have occupied absent the improper entry and enforcement of those judgments.

This case reinforces how judges don’t voluntarily clean up, or even acknowledge, any mistakes they made in past SAD Scheme rulings. Following Kangol, it’s now clear that a huge number of SAD Scheme defendants were not properly served, but what steps are the courts voluntarily taking to correct those due process violations? As far as I can tell, none. I’m not sure if this lawsuit is the right redress mechanism, but I hope the harmed defendants find some relief.

Prior Blog Posts on the SAD Scheme

• New York Judge Shuts Down a SAD Scheme TRO Request–CJB Global v. Schedule A Defendants
• Every SAD Scheme Opinion Is Weird In Its Own Way–Cai v. Chaozhoushi Yitong Dianzi Shangwu Youxiangongsi
• Federal Circuit Rebuffs SAD Scheme Plaintiff–Shenzhen Jisu v. Annex A Defendants
• Court Rebuffs Emojico’s SAD Scheme TRO Request
• Seventh Circuit Limits Email Service to Chinese SAD Scheme Defendants–Kangol v. Hangzhou Silk
• SAD Scheme Defendant Gets Damages Payout from the Bond–Bright Head v. Schedule A Defendants
• Judge Shopping & Schedule A (Guest Blog Post)
• SAD Scheme Plaintiff Gets Default Win But Blows the Layup on Damages–Shenzen Huajie v. Shenzen Leyibei
• SAD Scheme Copyright Plaintiff Must Compensate Defendants–Shenzhen Langmi v. Schedule A Defendants
• A “But They’re ‘Counterfeiters’!” Argument Doesn’t Clinch a SAD Scheme TRO–Emojico v. Schedule A Defendants
• New Article Alert: “SAD Scheme Standing Orders”
• Greer Burns Law Firm Sanctioned for “Willfully Abusive” and “Egregious” SAD Scheme Judge-Shopping
• Schedule A: Ten Notable Developments in 2025 (Guest Blog Post)
• Second Circuit Rejects Email Service on Chinese Defendants in Baby Shark SAD Scheme Case
• 11th Circuit Sidesteps the SAD Scheme’s Problems–Ain Jeem v. Schedule A
• Another Shill Article Tries to Normalize the SAD Scheme
• Court Sanctions Plaintiff’s Lawyer for Unverified Claims That the Defendant Was Hiding–Guangzhou Youlan Technology Co. Ltd. v. Onbrill World
• SAD Scheme Cases Are a Cesspool of IP Owner Overreaches–Nike v. Quanzhou Yiyi Shoe Industry
• District of New Jersey Adopts SAD Scheme Standing Order
• Court “Sanctions” SAD Scheme Judge Shopping—Crimpit v. Schedule A Defendants
• Chicago-Kent SAD Scheme Symposium TOMORROW
• Amicus Brief Urges Seventh Circuit to Award Attorneys’ Fees in SAD Scheme Case–Louis Poulsen v. Lightzey
• Court Rejects Schedule A Claims Against Sellers of Compatible Parts/Accessories (Cross-Post)
• Judge Kness: the SAD Scheme “Should No Longer Be Perpetuated in Its Present Form”–Eicher Motors v. Schedule A Defendants
• SAD Scheme Lawyers Sanctioned for Judge-Shopping–Dongguan Deego v. Schedule A
• Judge Ranjan Cracks Down on SAD Scheme Cases
• Because the SAD Scheme Disregards Due Process, Errors Inevitably Ensue–Modlily v. Funlingo
• SAD Scheme-Style Case Falls Apart When the Defendant Appears in Court—King Spider v. Pandabuy
• Serial Copyright Plaintiff Lacks Standing to Enforce Third-Party Copyrights–Viral DRM v 7News
• Another N.D. Ill. Judge Balks at SAD Scheme Joinder–Zaful v. Schedule A Defendants
• Judge Rejects SAD Scheme Joinder–Toyota v. Schedule A Defendants
• Another Judge Balks at SAD Scheme Joinder–Xie v. Annex A
• Will Judges Become More Skeptical of Joinder in SAD Scheme Cases?–Dongguan Juyuan v. Schedule A
• SAD Scheme Leads to Another Massively Disproportionate Asset Freeze–Powell v. Schedule A
• Misjoinder Dooms SAD Scheme Patent Case–Wang v. Schedule A Defendants
• Judge Hammers SEC for Lying to Get an Ex Parte TRO–SEC v. Digital Licensing
• Judge Reconsiders SAD Scheme Ruling Against Online Marketplaces–Squishmallows v. Alibaba
• N.D. Cal. Judge Pushes Back on Copyright SAD Scheme Cases–Viral DRM v. YouTube Schedule A Defendants
• A Judge Enumerates a SAD Scheme Plaintiff’s Multiple Abuses, But Still Won’t Award Sanctions–Jiangsu Huari Webbing Leather v. Schedule A Defendants
• Why Online Marketplaces Don’t Do More to Combat the SAD Scheme–Squishmallows v. Alibaba
• SAD Scheme Cases Are Always Troubling–Betty’s Best v. Schedule A Defendants 
• Judge Pushes Back on SAD Scheme Sealing Requests
• Roblox Sanctioned for SAD Scheme Abuse–Roblox v. Schedule A Defendants
• Now Available: the Published Version of My SAD Scheme Article
• In a SAD Scheme Case, Court Rejects Injunction Over “Emoji” Trademark
• Schedule A (SAD Scheme) Plaintiff Sanctioned for “Fraud on the Court”–Xped v. Respect the Look
• My Comments to the USPTO About the SAD Scheme and Anticounterfeiting/Antipiracy Efforts
• My New Article on Abusive “Schedule A” IP Lawsuits Will Likely Leave You Angry
• If the Word “Emoji” is a Protectable Trademark, What Happens Next?–Emoji GmbH v. Schedule A Defendants
• My Declaration Identifying Emoji Co. GmbH as a Possible Trademark Troll

The post SAD Scheme Plaintiff Must Pay $40k to Defendant–Guangzhou Tinpod v. Schedule A Defendants appeared first on Technology & Marketing Law Blog.

This lawsuit raises one of the venerable but surprisingly vexing copyright law questions: when is a price copyrightable? That might sound like a stupid question because “facts” aren’t copyrightable and a price seems like it should be characterized as a “fact.” And yet…the copyright law jurisprudence is littered with cases saying or implying that individual prices could be copyrightable (e.g., the abysmal CDN v. Kapes opinion), as wacky as that may seem. These cases have imperiled various important social activities, such as price comparisons.

This court, in contrast, treats the copyrightability of prices as the easy question I always thought it should be

Ideally, the clean lower court ruling would have finally ended the price copyrightability drama. Instead, the Second Circuit did a “well, actually….” and revives the case.

[A reminder that in this case, Nivoda never published Rapaport’s prices directly. Instead, Nivoda displays “percentages representing the difference between Nivoda’s price for the diamond and the price for that category of diamond in the Price List, not a display of the entire List itself.”]

The court summarizes its views on when numbers are facts:

Where the expression takes the form of a number, “[t]he question then becomes the possible range of that number.” Determining this range allows the court to assess whether the number is an “original creation[],” deserving of copyright protection, or merely a “pre-existing fact[],” free to be copied.

No, this makes no sense. How can a single number be expressed as a range of numbers???

What’s slowing down courts is when a number is the distillation of an estimator’s asset valuation. Valuations aren’t a precise science, so any numerical expression of a valuation isn’t a “fact” but an “opinion” and could very well be expressed as a range rather than a single number. Yet, as the lower court held, we can’t separate the estimator’s opinion from the fact that the estimator held this numerical opinion. That inseparability triggers copyright’s merger doctrine. This means anyone should be free to republish the estimator’s numerical “opinion” without copyright entanglements.

The Second Circuit, harvesting years of precedential doubt it has sowed on this point, cannot reach such a clean outcome:

Without evidence to establish how the Price List is created, however, the court lacked a basis for concluding that this idea is what is reproduced in the Price List. As pled, the Price List reflects Rapaport’s “opinion as to the market value of any diamond based on size, color, and clarity,” based on Rapaport’s “analysis and sophisticated expert industry opinion.” Rapaport does not allege, for example, that the List reflects nothing more than the average transaction prices for particular types of diamonds in a particular time span, based on an aggregation of reported sales. To the contrary, text accompanying printed versions of the Price List emphasizes that the List reflects Rapaport’s “opinion” of prices, which may differ “substantially” from “actual transaction prices.” Thus, for the limited purpose of our analysis, drawing all reasonable inferences in Rapaport’s favor based on the facts alleged in the complaint and other facts appropriately considered at this stage of litigation, we identify the “idea” at risk of merging with Rapaport’s expression, as “Rapaport’s opinion as to the value,” as opposed to the actual “market price” (meaning the price set by the market) of particular diamonds based on their size, color, and clarity….

No, this makes no sense. The process of manufacturing a number should be irrelevant to its copyrightability. Even if the valuation required the most creative process that has ever existed in human history, the estimator’s valuation becomes a fact about the estimator holding that opinion.

Still harvesting the decades-long bad precedent, the court continues:

In order to determine whether all possible expressions of a party’s opinion
regarding diamond price valuation are “substantially similar,” we must assess the possible range of these estimates. In doing so, we evaluate whether the number is better considered a “mechanical derivation[]” of a pre-existing fact, or an “original creation[],” resulting from “some minimal degree of creativity….

the values included in Rapaport’s Price List, as alleged, reflect Rapaport’s “opinion” as to hypothetical products meeting certain specifications, based on Rapaport’s “analysis and sophisticated expert industry opinion.” On appeal, Rapaport emphasizes that the values included in the Price List do not express the “actual market price of any-real world diamond,” but rather its “opinion as to what should be the sales prices for different classes of hypothetical diamonds.” Perhaps most relevant, unlike the actual market price of particular futures contracts (which the settlement prices in New York Mercantile aimed to capture mostly by reference to a fixed set of trading data), the value of a diamond—like that of a used car—may depend on any number of facts beyond current trading data, such as subjective considerations of personal opinion and aesthetic preference. Rapaport alleges in its complaint that it arrives at the values included in the Price List by reference to factors beyond raw trading data, such as its “extensive market research and proprietary knowledge,” and its “decades of knowledge, investment, and industry relationships.” At this stage of the litigation, we are obliged to take them at their word. Only discovery can tell whether the sources and processes used by Rapaport in fact more closely resemble those used by NYMEX to determine settlement prices, and not (as alleged) those used by the Red Book editors for used-car valuations.

Devastating. This is some seriously bad epistomology. Here’s a possibility: a number could be BOTH an opinion (a valuation estimation) and a fact (the estimator’s published belief) AT THE SAME TIME. If the court had entertained that possibility, this should have been an easy dismissal (as the lower court held).

And what goal does this hack philosophizing advance? It suggests that every copyright claim over single numbers will not be resolvable on a motion to dismiss (and maybe not on summary judgment either). That’s a lot of socially wasteful litigation.

The court addresses other policy matters in wholly unsatisfactory ways:

the List attempts to value hypothetical products whose ultimate value is tied, at least in part, to subjective preferences. We are therefore not persuaded that failing to apply the [merger] doctrine will “seriously impair the policy of the copyright law that seeks to preserve free public access to ideas.”…

Nivoda does not suggest, nor does the present record indicate, that Rapaport would still have an incentive to produce the Price List if it lost its exclusive rights over that publication. The Price List “is available by paid subscription only” and, Rapaport asserts, is the product of “significant time, resources and expense,” resulting from the company’s longstanding “industry and customer relationships.”  Accordingly, applying the doctrine appears unlikely, based on what we must assume to be true at this point in the proceedings, to serve copyright’s aim of encouraging the authorship of innovative works.

Feist eliminated sweat-of-the-brow justifications for copyright. Apparently the Second Circuit prefers a pre-1991 world. Oops, I’m not sure I can reference the number 1991. I might have infringed on someone’s copyright.

On remand, I hope the lower court embraces the full spectrum of ways this case should resolve in favor of the defense. Ultimately, I hope this opinion becomes another mockable tangent in courts’ decades-long quixotic quests to manufacture copyrights for single numbers.

Case Citation: Rapaport USA, Inc. v. Nivoda USA, LLC, 25-1065 (L) (2d Cir. Sept. 4, 2026). Judge Nardini, a Trump appointee, authored this opinion.

BONUS: The Construction Specifications Institute, Inc. v. Zerodocs.com, Inc., 2026 WL 2600412 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2026). The court summarizes the plaintiff’s work:

The work at issue in this copyright and trademark case—the CSI MasterFormat—is a classification system that has been, for decades, the national standard for identifying construction bids. CSI’s 2020 edition of its MasterFormat contains a taxonomy system for classifying and organizing technical information and project details in architectural, engineering, and construction projects. Specifically, each component of a project can be identified by a standardized six-digit number, which can be expanded to eight digits when greater detail is required, accompanied by a standard title that is usually a descriptive word or short phrase…

CSI’s MasterFormat Maintenance Task Team (the “MFMTT”) is tasked with conducting ongoing reviews of the MasterFormat, and the MFMTT has adopted a biennial revision process. Users of the MasterFormat can submit commentary and proposals to the MFMTT for review and approval. The MFMTT bases its approval and revision process on several broad, flexible criteria. The MFMTT draws on user feedback and proposals to make its revision and addition determinations. All proposals must pass through a two-stage process before they can be approved by the MFMTT.

The court’s description of the defendant’s activities:

Zerodocs distributed a product called “SimpleSpec” that is composed of a collection of pre-written word processing document templates. The SimpleSpec templates were created in 2017 to help users write bid proposals that comply with the MasterFormat classification system. Each SimpleSpec template is directed to one entry in CSI’s MasterFormat system.

Zerodocs used CSI’s “CSI” mark on its website to refer to CSI’s MasterFormat, but it did so without CSI’s authorization. Those references accurately reflect the source of the standards to which the Zerodocs SimpleSpec templates were written—the MasterFormat standard…

Zerodocs has adopted the structural style of MasterFormat into its Vendor Specs, and it uses CSI’s MasterFormat framework. Specifically, Zerodocs’s SimpleSpec offers at least 457 templates organized in the MasterFormat framework. CSI further identifies that, in March 2024, Zerodocs’s website displayed at least 199 SimpleSpec specifications that are identical to the 2020 edition of CSI’s MasterFormat. CSI shows that SimpleSpec contains templates that use specific number and title combinations from the MasterFormat—e.g., “03 30 00—Cast-In-Place Concrete.”

Though Zerodocs copied something, there was no copyright infringement. The “divisions, numbers, and titles of the MasterFormat are short phrases, and, therefore, they are not protected elements.”

The taxonomy isn’t copyrightable either:

CSI’s descriptions are factually concise, and they identify “specific work results and construction practices.” For example, in the section for Concrete, there is no room for creative expression because CSI must necessarily be as concise as possible and identify the specific work result—i.e., Concrete. In describing the sections and title of the taxonomy, CSI is “knuckling under” to facts about materials used or jobs performed in construction projects. Furthermore, whether a description is updated or adopted by the MFMTT’s revision process is a rote, four-step process that asks if the new description better defines the subject matter, is more useful, or is more appropriate. Those are utilitarian queries, not creative endeavors. Even if the MFMTT wanted to change a description, it prioritizes established industry terms and introduces new terms only when necessary. No “blood is shed” in the MFMTT’s revision process…

CSI assigns descriptors as concisely as possible by using words that best describe the subject.

I don’t think knuckles or blood have a lot to do with the copyrightability of taxonomies, but it might make a good Netflix series. Also, I’m not sure an author’s utilitarian aim dictates whether a work is expressive. Still, this court is at least doing better than the Rapaport court.

Zerodocs argued Baker v. Selden resolved the case. I do love topical citations in the 2020s to the nineteenth century classic, but the court points to rogue decisions from the 3rd and 7th Circuit that found taxonomies copyrightable despite the Selden case. Instead, “the Court is unpersuaded that CSI’s MasterFormat is wholesale uncopyrightable simply because it is a system. Rather, as previously discussed, the Court concludes that CSI’s MasterFormat did not meet the threshold for copyrightability of a taxonomy, as guided by American Dental and Southco.”

The court dismisses the trademark claims due to the nominative use doctrine.

The post Courts Still Can’t Let Go of the Possibility that Individual Prices are Copyrightable–Rapaport v. Nivoda appeared first on Technology & Marketing Law Blog.

if all of plaintiff’s requested ex parte relief were to be granted, plaintiff would at the outset be entitled to broad discovery with serious consequences to defendants. Plaintiff would first be authorized to serve expedited discovery on the Financial Institutions, who would be obligated to provide all known e-mail addresses and mailing addresses for defendants, as well as information relating to defendants’ assets and accounts “regardless of the hosting platform or institution.” Having received that information, and still without notice to any defendant, plaintiff could then freeze the assets maintained in any of the accounts identified through expedited discovery of 100 different international defendants. Acknowledging that plaintiff’s request for an asset restraint is in no way cabined only to accounts through which defendants sell the allegedly infringing products, this restraint would presumably apply to all of defendants’ accounts and assets regardless of their relation to this case. Only after discovery has been provided and the assets frozen would plaintiff notify any of the defendants of the existence of this action, through a proposed procedure inconsistent with the requirements of international service under the Hague Convention.

Judge Buchwald wraps up this overview of the SAD Scheme with a conclusion that seems obvious to me but shockingly isn’t yet obvious to all judges: “It may not be an exaggeration to say that once plaintiff’s requested relief has been authorized, the case is effectively over.”

Given the tenor of this overview, unsurprisingly the judge rejects the case’s “merits.”

On the design patent claim, Judge Buchwald says the “plaintiff has failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits for the simple reason that plaintiff has chosen not to submit its own product nor a physical example of any of defendants’ products for comparison.” The plaintiff tried a standard SAD Scheme trick of placing orders, taking screenshots, and then canceling the orders. The screenshots aren’t enough for the judge to “make a meaningful comparison sufficient to support the ‘extraordinary and drastic’ relief that plaintiff seeks.” She explains why test buys are needed to satisfy the Egyptian Goddess standard:

any existing differences between the products sold by defendants and those sold by plaintiff are of paramount importance. In this context, particularly given that plaintiff asserts design patent claims against 100 separate defendants, the Court is unable to determine from screenshots alone that plaintiff has satisfied the ordinary observer test and is likely to succeed on its design patent claim against each of the 100 defendants.

Click on image to play the GIF

In a footnote, she adds some lemon juice to the paper cut: “The position in which plaintiff finds itself is a self-inflicted wound. Plaintiff made a conscious choice to cancel each of the orders it placed, thus depriving the Court of the ability to meaningfully compare the products.”

#TestBuysOrBust.

With respect to the copyright claim, the plaintiff claims copyrights in the marketing photos. However, due to the high volume of defendants, the case preparation appears suspect: “plaintiff’s exhibits reflect that 22 of the 100 defendants have not violated plaintiff’s copyright.” These errors are enough to inhibit the judge from granting any requested copyright relief.

In a footnote, she adds: “if the plaintiff’s concern was truly in protecting their copyright, the Digital Millenium Copyright Act contemplates that copyright holders may enforce their copyright directly through service providers like Amazon.” I’m not sure we should fully celebrate the DMCA’s remedial powers here, but the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown option highlights what the plaintiff is trying to do here. Is the plaintiff trying to stop the sale of infringing items, or is it running a trolling campaign? The SAD Scheme is a widely preferred tool of choice for the latter; DMCA takedowns, not so much.

Judge Buchwald also questions the standard SAD Scheme argument for joinder. She points out that “the fact that plaintiff placed 99 separate orders to the same address in Manhattan undercuts the idea that defendants are related because the use of a single purchasing address would have placed defendants on notice that litigation was forthcoming.” This assumes that the order details reach the defendants even if the orders are canceled–I’m not sure if that’s true. In any case, the judge doesn’t act on her joinder concerns yet, but it seems like that will be a hurdle for the plaintiff.

Plaintiff’s TRO request denied.

I didn’t check to see if this is Judge Buchwald’s first SAD Scheme case, but either way, her strong and negative reactions to the scheme are commendable and, I hope, persuasive to her judicial colleagues.

Case Citation: CJB Global Imports, Ltd. v. Schedule A Defendants, 2026 WL 2517616 (S.D.N.Y. August 26, 2026).

* * *

BONUS: The Galleon Guild, Ltd. v. Schedule A Defendants, 2026 WL 2495610 (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2026). As usual, the court initially granted the SAD Scheme plaintiff’s requested ex parte TRO and allowed email service, followed by preliminary injunctions. Then, the case got reassigned to a new judge (Judge K. Michael Moore), and the plaintiff’s good times stopped.

The new judge inquired about jurisdiction, and the plaintiff’s answers sucked. First, the court rejects the “on information and belief” framing for the plaintiff’s fact claims, saying that a judge:

need not accept allegations made on information and belief where there is insufficient factual support to make those allegations plausible rather than just conclusory. Given that Plaintiff’s Complaint is largely full of the sort of generalized, form allegations that appear in many Schedule A complaints, the Court is not inclined to give credence to allegations made on information and belief

Second, the judge isn’t impressed with the plaintiff’s standard presentation of evidence by screenshots: “Plaintiff provides screenshots of order screens (which show orders that were not actually placed, let alone shipped into Florida) showing only that it seemed possible to place orders with Defendants that would ship to Florida.” Instead, to satisfy the Florida long-arm statute, the plaintiff must show that the defendant “actually sells trademark-infringing goods to Florida residents through his website.” #TestBuysOrBust.

The court reinforces that evidence of sales in Florida also may be required to satisfy Constitutional due process: “Where a defendant has merely existed on a website and has not consummated a sale into Florida, or even tried making a sale into Florida, there is no personal jurisdiction….[the court] is not holding a single sale into Florida would be sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction, only that Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged such a sale has occurred.”

While this case has reached its logical denouement, remember that the plaintiff long ago got the ex parte TRO, alternative service, and a preliminary injunction. In other words, a case that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear nevertheless caused a whole lot of judicially authorized damage anyway.

Prior Blog Posts on the SAD Scheme

• Every SAD Scheme Opinion Is Weird In Its Own Way–Cai v. Chaozhoushi Yitong Dianzi Shangwu Youxiangongsi
• Federal Circuit Rebuffs SAD Scheme Plaintiff–Shenzhen Jisu v. Annex A Defendants
• Court Rebuffs Emojico’s SAD Scheme TRO Request
• Seventh Circuit Limits Email Service to Chinese SAD Scheme Defendants–Kangol v. Hangzhou Silk
• SAD Scheme Defendant Gets Damages Payout from the Bond–Bright Head v. Schedule A Defendants
• Judge Shopping & Schedule A (Guest Blog Post)
• SAD Scheme Plaintiff Gets Default Win But Blows the Layup on Damages–Shenzen Huajie v. Shenzen Leyibei
• SAD Scheme Copyright Plaintiff Must Compensate Defendants–Shenzhen Langmi v. Schedule A Defendants
• A “But They’re ‘Counterfeiters’!” Argument Doesn’t Clinch a SAD Scheme TRO–Emojico v. Schedule A Defendants
• New Article Alert: “SAD Scheme Standing Orders”
• Greer Burns Law Firm Sanctioned for “Willfully Abusive” and “Egregious” SAD Scheme Judge-Shopping
• Schedule A: Ten Notable Developments in 2025 (Guest Blog Post)
• Second Circuit Rejects Email Service on Chinese Defendants in Baby Shark SAD Scheme Case
• 11th Circuit Sidesteps the SAD Scheme’s Problems–Ain Jeem v. Schedule A
• Another Shill Article Tries to Normalize the SAD Scheme
• Court Sanctions Plaintiff’s Lawyer for Unverified Claims That the Defendant Was Hiding–Guangzhou Youlan Technology Co. Ltd. v. Onbrill World
• SAD Scheme Cases Are a Cesspool of IP Owner Overreaches–Nike v. Quanzhou Yiyi Shoe Industry
• District of New Jersey Adopts SAD Scheme Standing Order
• Court “Sanctions” SAD Scheme Judge Shopping—Crimpit v. Schedule A Defendants
• Chicago-Kent SAD Scheme Symposium TOMORROW
• Amicus Brief Urges Seventh Circuit to Award Attorneys’ Fees in SAD Scheme Case–Louis Poulsen v. Lightzey
• Court Rejects Schedule A Claims Against Sellers of Compatible Parts/Accessories (Cross-Post)
• Judge Kness: the SAD Scheme “Should No Longer Be Perpetuated in Its Present Form”–Eicher Motors v. Schedule A Defendants
• SAD Scheme Lawyers Sanctioned for Judge-Shopping–Dongguan Deego v. Schedule A
• Judge Ranjan Cracks Down on SAD Scheme Cases
• Because the SAD Scheme Disregards Due Process, Errors Inevitably Ensue–Modlily v. Funlingo
• SAD Scheme-Style Case Falls Apart When the Defendant Appears in Court—King Spider v. Pandabuy
• Serial Copyright Plaintiff Lacks Standing to Enforce Third-Party Copyrights–Viral DRM v 7News
• Another N.D. Ill. Judge Balks at SAD Scheme Joinder–Zaful v. Schedule A Defendants
• Judge Rejects SAD Scheme Joinder–Toyota v. Schedule A Defendants
• Another Judge Balks at SAD Scheme Joinder–Xie v. Annex A
• Will Judges Become More Skeptical of Joinder in SAD Scheme Cases?–Dongguan Juyuan v. Schedule A
• SAD Scheme Leads to Another Massively Disproportionate Asset Freeze–Powell v. Schedule A
• Misjoinder Dooms SAD Scheme Patent Case–Wang v. Schedule A Defendants
• Judge Hammers SEC for Lying to Get an Ex Parte TRO–SEC v. Digital Licensing
• Judge Reconsiders SAD Scheme Ruling Against Online Marketplaces–Squishmallows v. Alibaba
• N.D. Cal. Judge Pushes Back on Copyright SAD Scheme Cases–Viral DRM v. YouTube Schedule A Defendants
• A Judge Enumerates a SAD Scheme Plaintiff’s Multiple Abuses, But Still Won’t Award Sanctions–Jiangsu Huari Webbing Leather v. Schedule A Defendants
• Why Online Marketplaces Don’t Do More to Combat the SAD Scheme–Squishmallows v. Alibaba
• SAD Scheme Cases Are Always Troubling–Betty’s Best v. Schedule A Defendants 
• Judge Pushes Back on SAD Scheme Sealing Requests
• Roblox Sanctioned for SAD Scheme Abuse–Roblox v. Schedule A Defendants
• Now Available: the Published Version of My SAD Scheme Article
• In a SAD Scheme Case, Court Rejects Injunction Over “Emoji” Trademark
• Schedule A (SAD Scheme) Plaintiff Sanctioned for “Fraud on the Court”–Xped v. Respect the Look
• My Comments to the USPTO About the SAD Scheme and Anticounterfeiting/Antipiracy Efforts
• My New Article on Abusive “Schedule A” IP Lawsuits Will Likely Leave You Angry
• If the Word “Emoji” is a Protectable Trademark, What Happens Next?–Emoji GmbH v. Schedule A Defendants
• My Declaration Identifying Emoji Co. GmbH as a Possible Trademark Troll

The post New York Judge Shuts Down a SAD Scheme TRO Request–CJB Global v. Schedule A Defendants appeared first on Technology & Marketing Law Blog.

Plaintiff Channel 781 News (“Channel 781”) is a YouTube-based news outlet focusing on local affairs in Waltham, Massachusetts. Channel 781 posted clips from Waltham municipal government meetings that it believed to be newsworthy. Channel 781 took these clips without permission from recordings of the meetings produced by Defendant Waltham Community Access Corporation (“WCAC”) for the city’s public access channel. The clips Channel 781 posted were accompanied by titles and captioning but otherwise consisted entirely of excerpts from WCAC’s recordings.

In September 2023, WCAC sent three notices to YouTube asking YouTube to take down fifteen of Channel 781’s clip videos on the basis that they infringed WCAC’s copyrights. YouTube complied and temporarily deactivated Channel 781’s account. Channel 781 subsequently sued WCAC under 17 U.S.C. § 512(f), alleging that WCAC failed to adequately consider that Channel 781’s videos were fair use and, thus, knowingly misrepresented in its takedown notices that it had a good faith belief that the videos were infringing.

It seems weird that anyone could restrict Channel 781’s ability to clip-farm videos of local government meetings. However, the videographer WCAC is an independent contractor to the local government, not the local government itself. This contractual arrangement interposes copyright interests into coverage of government functions. Unsurprisingly, WCAC then essentially uses its copyright ownership to act as a censorship proxy for the local government. Sad, but entirely predictable.

In a prior ruling, the court said Channel 781’s 512(f) claim survived WCAC’s motion to dismiss. Now, on summary judgment, the court dismisses the 512(f) claim. This becomes yet another 512(f) case that gets a little traction and then predictably goes splat.

The court adopts the Rossi standard, which means WCAC is liable for a 512(f) violation only if it subjectively believed its takedown notices were unjustified.

(In a footnote, the court disgrees with the Moonbug decision, treating 512(f)’s scienter requirement as negligence, saying that standard “appears to be inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Rossi and Lenz”).

Applying this standard, the court holds that “no reasonable jury could find that WCAC failed to form a subjective good faith belief that the Channel 781 clip videos for which WCAC sent takedown notices did not constitute fair use.” The court explains:

Sheehan asked Wangler to assess whether Channel 781 had the right to post clips from WCAC’s recordings. To do so, Wangler read the email Kastorf sent to Sheehan about the fair use doctrine and watched a YouTube video on the same topic. He then emailed Sheehan that “[i]t’s possible [Channel] 781 … Zoom videos using short clips qualify as [f]air [u]se” but that “[w]hat does not qualify are the large number of videos taken directly from us and reproduced verbatim with zero editing or commentary.” He attached to his email a screenshot from the YouTube video he watched describing facts that make a use “less likely to qualify for fair use.” Wangler and Sheehan then agreed to send takedown notices only for the clip videos reproducing WCAC’s recordings with no editing or commentary except for the addition of a title. When Wangler later decided which videos to include in the takedown notices, he chose clip videos that consisted solely of excerpts from WCAC’s recordings, which he believed did not qualify for fair use protection. Given Wangler’s viewing of  YouTube video about fair use, his determination that some of Channel 781’s videos may have qualified as fair use while others did not, and the fact that WCAC only sent takedown notices for the latter set of videos, the record does not support a reasonable finding that WCAC failed to consider fair use or form a subjective good faith belief that the clip videos posted by Channel 781 were not fair use.

In light of Rossi, the fact that WCAC developed an overreaching fair use policy doesn’t support 512(f). “Channel 781’s arguments are a misguided effort to smuggle an objective reasonableness inquiry into the applicable subjective standard.” Per Lenz, WCAC did, in fact, consider fair use before sending takedown notices, so it satisfied the requirements:

Wangler expressly researched the fair use doctrine; made an effort to apply the doctrine to Channel 781’s clip videos; and determined before sending the takedown notices that the relevant videos were not fair use.

Channel 781 argued that WCAC took down its videos as part of a censorship agenda. The court says that motivation, even if true, would be irrelevant because WCAC properly considered the fair use considerations. The judge summarizes:

While Wangler’s fair use analysis may have been deficient, he did not intentionally fail to consider the possibility that Channel 781’s clip videos were fair use.

When I blogged the Lenz case over a decade ago, I wrote:

Let’s look at a hypothetical deposition transcript of a notice sender:

Q: Did you consider fair use?
A: Yes
Q: What steps did you take to evaluate the possibility of fair use?
A: I thought about it and decided it probably didn’t apply

Where does a 512(f) plaintiff go from here? It seems like the sender can legitimately claim that they considered fair use, albeit not in a “searching or intensive” way. 512(f) case apparently over.

This case is an excellent illustration of that hypothetical transcript and the inevitable futility of most 512(f) cases.

In my opinion, the secret “villian” is this story is the Waltham local government, which outsourced the videographing to a third-party rather than treating government transparency as a social value that should be funded by taxpayers.

Case Citation: Channel 781 News v. Waltham Community Access Corporation, 2026 WL 2409846 (D. Mass. Aug. 18, 2026)

BONUS: Parmar v. Google LLC, 2026 WL 2620416 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2026):

Parmar cannot show entitlement to an injunction under § 512(f) because that statute makes the defendants liable, if at all, only for “damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees.” It does not authorize injunctive relief. So § 512(f) cannot support a TRO.

Prior Posts on Section 512(f)

* Do DMCA Takedown Notices Need to Expressly Refer to the Lack of Fair Use?–Take-Two v. PlayerAuctions
* Does 512(f) Apply Differently to Counternotices Compared to Takedown Notices?
* It Takes a Lot for 512(f) Claims to Survive a Motion to Dismiss–Cordova v. Huneault
* Copyright Takedown Notices May Be Affecting Your Washing Machine Options–Ningbo Yituo v. GoPlus
* 512(f) Claim Sent to Trial (Which Didn’t Happen)–Leszczynski v. Kitchen Cube
* 512(f) Doesn’t Support Preliminary Injunction–BViral v. TheSoul
* In 512(f), the “F” Stands for “Futility”–Shaffer v. Kavarnos
* Does Anyone Still Care About NFTs? (Yuga Labs, LLC v. Ripps) — Guest Blog Post
* Viral DRM Awarded Damages for Its 512(f) Claims, But At What Cost?
* Big YouTube Channel Gets TRO Against Being Targeted by DMCA Copyright Takedown Notices–Invisible Narratives v. Next Level Apps
* The Competition Between Temu and Shein Moves Into a Courtroom–Whaleco v. Shein
* Copyright Battles Over City Council Videos
* Record Label Sends Bogus Takedown Notice, Defeats 512(f) Claim Anyway–White v. UMG
* Plaintiffs Make Some Progress in 512(f) Cases
* 512(f) Doesn’t Restrict Competitive Gaming of Search Results–Source Capital v. Barrett Financial
* 512(f) Once Again Ensnared in an Employment Ownership Dispute–Shande v. Zoox
* Surprise! Another 512(f) Claim Fails–Bored Ape Yacht Club v. Ripps
* You’re a Fool if You Think You Can Win a 512(f) Case–Security Police and Fire Professionals v. Maritas
* 512(f) Plaintiff Must Pay $91k to the Defense–Digital Marketing v. McCandless
* Anti-Circumvention Takedowns Aren’t Covered by 512(f)–Yout v. RIAA
* 11th Circuit UPHOLDS a 512(f) Plaintiff Win on Appeal–Alper Automotive v. Day to Day Imports
* Court Mistakenly Thinks Copyright Owners Have a Duty to Police Infringement–Sunny Factory v. Chen
* Another 512(f) Claim Fails–Moonbug v. Babybus
* A 512(f) Plaintiff Wins at Trial! –Alper Automotive v. Day to Day Imports
* Satirical Depiction in YouTube Video Gets Rough Treatment in Court
* 512(f) Preempts Tortious Interference Claim–Copy Me That v. This Old Gal
* 512(f) Claim Against Robo-Notice Sender Can Proceed–Enttech v. Okularity
* Copyright Plaintiffs Can’t Figure Out What Copyrights They Own, Court Says ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
* A 512(f) Case Leads to a Rare Damages Award (on a Default Judgment)–California Beach v. Du
* 512(f) Claim Survives Motion to Dismiss–Brandyn Love v. Nuclear Blast America
* 512(f) Claim Fails in the 11th Circuit–Johnson v. New Destiny Christian Center
* Court Orders Rightsowner to Withdraw DMCA Takedown Notices Sent to Amazon–Beyond Blond v. Heldman
* Another 512(f) Claim Fails–Ningbo Mizhihe v Doe
* Video Excerpts Qualify as Fair Use (and Another 512(f) Claim Fails)–Hughes v. Benjamin
* How Have Section 512(f) Cases Fared Since 2017? (Spoiler: Not Well)
* Another Section 512(f) Case Fails–ISE v. Longarzo
* Another 512(f) Case Fails–Handshoe v. Perret
* A DMCA Section 512(f) Case Survives Dismissal–ISE v. Longarzo
* DMCA’s Unhelpful 512(f) Preempts Helpful State Law Claims–Stevens v. Vodka and Milk
* Section 512(f) Complaint Survives Motion to Dismiss–Johnson v. New Destiny Church
* ‘Reaction’ Video Protected By Fair Use–Hosseinzadeh v. Klein
* 9th Circuit Sides With Fair Use in Dancing Baby Takedown Case–Lenz v. Universal
* Two 512(f) Rulings Where The Litigants Dispute Copyright Ownership
* It Takes a Default Judgment to Win a 17 USC 512(f) Case–Automattic v. Steiner
* Vague Takedown Notice Targeting Facebook Page Results in Possible Liability–CrossFit v. Alvies
* Another 512(f) Claim Fails–Tuteur v. Crosley-Corcoran
* 17 USC 512(f) Is Dead–Lenz v. Universal Music
* 512(f) Plaintiff Can’t Get Discovery to Back Up His Allegations of Bogus Takedowns–Ouellette v. Viacom
* Updates on Transborder Copyright Enforcement Over “Grandma Got Run Over by a Reindeer”–Shropshire v. Canning
* 17 USC 512(f) Preempts State Law Claims Over Bogus Copyright Takedown Notices–Amaretto v. Ozimals
* 17 USC 512(f) Claim Against “Twilight” Studio Survives Motion to Dismiss–Smith v. Summit Entertainment
* Cease & Desist Letter to iTunes Isn’t Covered by 17 USC 512(f)–Red Rock v. UMG
* Copyright Takedown Notice Isn’t Actionable Unless There’s an Actual Takedown–Amaretto v. Ozimals
* Second Life Ordered to Stop Honoring a Copyright Owner’s Takedown Notices–Amaretto Ranch Breedables v. Ozimals
* Another Copyright Owner Sent a Defective Takedown Notice and Faced 512(f) Liability–Rosen v. HSI
* Furniture Retailer Enjoined from Sending eBay VeRO Notices–Design Furnishings v. Zen Path
* Disclosure of the Substance of Privileged Communications via Email, Blog, and Chat Results in Waiver — Lenz v. Universal
* YouTube Uploader Can’t Sue Sender of Mistaken Takedown Notice–Cabell v. Zimmerman
* Rare Ruling on Damages for Sending Bogus Copyright Takedown Notice–Lenz v. Universal
* 512(f) Claim Dismissed on Jurisdictional Grounds–Project DoD v. Federici
* Biosafe-One v. Hawks Dismissed
* Michael Savage Takedown Letter Might Violate 512(f)–Brave New Media v. Weiner
* Fair Use – It’s the Law (for what it’s worth)–Lenz v. Universal
* Copyright Owner Enjoined from Sending DMCA Takedown Notices–Biosafe-One v. Hawks
* New(ish) Report on 512 Takedown Notices
* Can 512(f) Support an Injunction? Novotny v. Chapman
* Allegedly Wrong VeRO Notice of Claimed Infringement Not Actionable–Dudnikov v. MGA Entertainment

The post A 512(f) Case Survived a Motion to Dismiss. Guess What Happened Next–Channel 781 v. WCAC appeared first on Technology & Marketing Law Blog.

• it’s in the Western District of Texas, not the more typical N.D. Ill.
• it’s a copyright claim rather than the more typical trademark claim
• it’s against a single defendant, not dozens or hundreds of defendants
• it’s filed by the Valley & Summit Law firm, a relatively new firm (formed 2024) I haven’t encountered before. The firm’s principal says in her bio: “Ms. Ouyang started her IP practice by helping cross-border e-commerce stores defend draconian IP lawsuits. Over the years, Ms. Ouyang accumulated abundant experience in the fun area of IP litigation.” Switching sides and bringing SAD Scheme lawsuits is my idea of “fun” too.
• it’s in front of a new judge, Judge Andrew Bray Davis, who just took the bench in April. I’ve previously suggested that recent judges tend to be more skeptical of SAD Scheme cases than judges who have rubber-stamped them for years, though I’m not sure this opinion supports that hypothesis.

Add all of these differences up, and the resulting decision reads a little differently than other SAD Scheme opinions I’ve seen.

TRO Against Infringement

The plaintiff has copyright registrations for “two-dimensional artistic works entitled ‘Bohemian Printing.'” Here is the registered work (left) and an allegedly infringing product (right):

The defendant’s version look similar or identical to the plaintiff’s version except that it omits the outer ring. Judge Davis says “a side-by-side comparison of Plaintiff’s designs and Defendant’s wares reveals little—if any—in the way of differences between the two designs.”

Judge Davis says the alleged infringement could cause irreparable harm because “damages fail to address loss of control—as well as damage to reputation and goodwill.” It’s troubling to see a copyright injunction predicated on concerns about the plaintiff’s goodwill, which normally should be the province of trademark law. Even the reputation concern is dubious. The judge further conflates this copyright case with trademark law when considering the public interest, saying the “public also has a clear interest in not being deceived or confused as to the origin, source, or sponsorship of copyrighted products.” Copyright law generally has little to say about products’ origin, source, or sponsorship.

Asset Restraint

The plaintiff requested an order restraining the defendant’s assets to preserve money to cover damages. Judge Davis rejects the request because “Plaintiff seeks to freeze all of Defendant’s assets without either showing that they are all profits or offering a way to separate the profits from the damages.” Citing Grupo Mexicano, Judge Davis says that asset restraints can only preserve “the availability of equitable relief in a final judgment.” In copyright cases, profit disgorgement is an equitable remedy, but actual damages are not. Here, the pleadings don’t make an adequate distinction between the two: “Plaintiff offers no evidence of even the rough proportion of Defendant’s assets attributable to infringement, and without it the Court cannot tether an asset freeze to the ultimate equitable relief Plaintiff seeks—the infringer’s ‘additional profits.'”

But…the judge has no visibility into how the online marketplaces like Amazon will process the infringement-based TRO. If Amazon suspends the account based on the TRO, the assets will be frozen despite the court’s legal distinction.

In a subsequent ruling (on July 16), the court orders the asset freeze anyway based on the following report the plaintiff obtained from Amazon (through expedited discovery):

Defendant has grossed $641,077.99 from 15,136 individual unit sales of 11 different allegedly infringing products over an unspecified time period. Defendant’s U.S. Amazon account held a balance of $1,092.69 when Plaintiff submitted her most recent motion to the Court

Sealing Request

Judge Davis temporarily accepted the sealing request. It was lifted on July 27, 2026, only after the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the defendant. This is what the sealed complaint looked like:

The post-dismissal unsealing is likely why I learned about the opinion only now.

Service Via Email

The Second and Seventh Circuits have limited email service to Chinese defendants. Nevertheless, based on Fifth Circuit precedent, Judge Davis says that email service is in his discretion, and he orders it. Sounds like a circuit split needs resolution?

It is unclear if/when service was ever effectuated. My guess is that the defendant learned of the lawsuit from Amazon’s asset freeze, and that triggered an extrajudicial settlement regardless of service.

Request for Expedited Discovery

Judge Davis grants that request too.

Bond

The judge approves a $5k bond, which seems quite low based on what the judge knew at the time. I’ve lamented before about the lack of guidelines for bond-setting in ex parte cases.

The “Addendum”

The opinion includes this unusual passage:

Cases like this one requesting ex parte restraint and expedited discovery under seal—often against numerous defendants listed on a “Schedule A”—are being filed at pace throughout the federal courts. See Eric Goldman, A Sad Scheme of Abusive Intellectual Property Litigation, 123 COLUM. L. REV. 183, 193–202 (2023) (dissecting the proliferation of Schedule A cases and their legal shortcomings). For good reason, some courts have found many of these requests to fall short of the clear letter of the law. See, e.g., Price v. Individuals, P’ships, & Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified on Schedule A., 821 F. Supp. 3d 1315 (M.D. Fla. 2026) (Mizelle, J.).

Because this specific case involves only a single defendant, it appears to avoid many of the pitfalls present in Schedule A cases. But it is difficult to be sure. “The whole point of our adversarial legal system is that the robust exchange of competing views helps ensure the discovery of truth and avoid error.” United States v. Quintanilla-Matamoros, 164 F.4th 366, 375 (5th Cir. 2026) (Ho, J., concurring) (cleaned up). Yet Plaintiff in this case, like the plaintiffs in the Schedule A cases, not only demands emergency relief outside of the adversarial process, but likely anticipates seeking a default judgment that is also outside the adversarial process. In these circumstances, it is imperative for courts not only to be vigilant that any relief awarded is lawful, but to be willing to reconsider—sua sponte if necessary—relief already awarded if that relief should not have been granted in the first place.

But what if the TRO causes the case to “settle” before the judge gets another crack at it to fix any past errors? The case settled on July 27, 11 days after the court approved the Amazon asset freeze.

I wasn’t quite sure what to make of this addendum. Was the judge issuing a warning to the plaintiff? Leaving a note to himself? Something else?

Also, the judge says courts must be “vigilant that any relief awarded is lawful” in ex parte proceedings. Does this opinion adequately demonstrate such vigilance?

Implications

Given the plaintiff and defendant are both in China, I didn’t see any clear reason why the case was filed in W.D. Tex. instead of alternative venues, such as California (where the plaintiff’s lawyers are based) or Illinois (where most SAD Scheme cases are litigated). This looks like forum-shopping, but why W.D.Tex.?

This is another SAD Scheme case between Chinese plaintiffs and defendants, taking place in US courts. The Chinese plaintiffs prefer the SAD Scheme because US courts will disregard the rule of law even more than Chinese courts would.

Given that this lawsuit was against a single defendant and was not a high volume operation like a typical SAD Scheme, I didn’t see any legitimate reason why the plaintiff chose the SAD Scheme template over the standard copyright infringement playbook. To me, it’s another datapoint illustrating how the SAD Scheme is functionally displacing all IP litigation. This is because plaintiffs get better outcomes via the SAD Scheme than than they would get from the standard package of rights actually conferred to them via IP and civil procedure law. As the maxim goes, plaintiffs will keep doing it so long as it works. In this case, despite the judge’s quirky addendum, the plaintiff got essentially everything they asked for. So why wouldn’t plaintiffs keep the good times rolling?

Reflecting the case’s novelty, at least to him, Judge Davis goes through most of the plaintiff’s arguments in greater-than-average detail. Yet, as is typical with ex parte proceedings, he ultimately sides with the plaintiff on most questions. Judge Davis correctly spotted some of the weak spots of the SAD Scheme, and yet arguably the scheme sucked him in anyway.

Case Citation: Cai v. Chaozhoushi Yitong Dianzi Shangwu Youxiangongsi, 2026 WL 2294410 (W.D. Tex. June 26, 2026).

Prior Blog Posts on the SAD Scheme

• Federal Circuit Rebuffs SAD Scheme Plaintiff–Shenzhen Jisu v. Annex A Defendants
• Court Rebuffs Emojico’s SAD Scheme TRO Request
• Seventh Circuit Limits Email Service to Chinese SAD Scheme Defendants–Kangol v. Hangzhou Silk
• SAD Scheme Defendant Gets Damages Payout from the Bond–Bright Head v. Schedule A Defendants
• Judge Shopping & Schedule A (Guest Blog Post)
• SAD Scheme Plaintiff Gets Default Win But Blows the Layup on Damages–Shenzen Huajie v. Shenzen Leyibei
• SAD Scheme Copyright Plaintiff Must Compensate Defendants–Shenzhen Langmi v. Schedule A Defendants
• A “But They’re ‘Counterfeiters’!” Argument Doesn’t Clinch a SAD Scheme TRO–Emojico v. Schedule A Defendants
• New Article Alert: “SAD Scheme Standing Orders”
• Greer Burns Law Firm Sanctioned for “Willfully Abusive” and “Egregious” SAD Scheme Judge-Shopping
• Schedule A: Ten Notable Developments in 2025 (Guest Blog Post)
• Second Circuit Rejects Email Service on Chinese Defendants in Baby Shark SAD Scheme Case
• 11th Circuit Sidesteps the SAD Scheme’s Problems–Ain Jeem v. Schedule A
• Another Shill Article Tries to Normalize the SAD Scheme
• Court Sanctions Plaintiff’s Lawyer for Unverified Claims That the Defendant Was Hiding–Guangzhou Youlan Technology Co. Ltd. v. Onbrill World
• SAD Scheme Cases Are a Cesspool of IP Owner Overreaches–Nike v. Quanzhou Yiyi Shoe Industry
• District of New Jersey Adopts SAD Scheme Standing Order
• Court “Sanctions” SAD Scheme Judge Shopping—Crimpit v. Schedule A Defendants
• Chicago-Kent SAD Scheme Symposium TOMORROW
• Amicus Brief Urges Seventh Circuit to Award Attorneys’ Fees in SAD Scheme Case–Louis Poulsen v. Lightzey
• Court Rejects Schedule A Claims Against Sellers of Compatible Parts/Accessories (Cross-Post)
• Judge Kness: the SAD Scheme “Should No Longer Be Perpetuated in Its Present Form”–Eicher Motors v. Schedule A Defendants
• SAD Scheme Lawyers Sanctioned for Judge-Shopping–Dongguan Deego v. Schedule A
• Judge Ranjan Cracks Down on SAD Scheme Cases
• Because the SAD Scheme Disregards Due Process, Errors Inevitably Ensue–Modlily v. Funlingo
• SAD Scheme-Style Case Falls Apart When the Defendant Appears in Court—King Spider v. Pandabuy
• Serial Copyright Plaintiff Lacks Standing to Enforce Third-Party Copyrights–Viral DRM v 7News
• Another N.D. Ill. Judge Balks at SAD Scheme Joinder–Zaful v. Schedule A Defendants
• Judge Rejects SAD Scheme Joinder–Toyota v. Schedule A Defendants
• Another Judge Balks at SAD Scheme Joinder–Xie v. Annex A
• Will Judges Become More Skeptical of Joinder in SAD Scheme Cases?–Dongguan Juyuan v. Schedule A
• SAD Scheme Leads to Another Massively Disproportionate Asset Freeze–Powell v. Schedule A
• Misjoinder Dooms SAD Scheme Patent Case–Wang v. Schedule A Defendants
• Judge Hammers SEC for Lying to Get an Ex Parte TRO–SEC v. Digital Licensing
• Judge Reconsiders SAD Scheme Ruling Against Online Marketplaces–Squishmallows v. Alibaba
• N.D. Cal. Judge Pushes Back on Copyright SAD Scheme Cases–Viral DRM v. YouTube Schedule A Defendants
• A Judge Enumerates a SAD Scheme Plaintiff’s Multiple Abuses, But Still Won’t Award Sanctions–Jiangsu Huari Webbing Leather v. Schedule A Defendants
• Why Online Marketplaces Don’t Do More to Combat the SAD Scheme–Squishmallows v. Alibaba
• SAD Scheme Cases Are Always Troubling–Betty’s Best v. Schedule A Defendants 
• Judge Pushes Back on SAD Scheme Sealing Requests
• Roblox Sanctioned for SAD Scheme Abuse–Roblox v. Schedule A Defendants
• Now Available: the Published Version of My SAD Scheme Article
• In a SAD Scheme Case, Court Rejects Injunction Over “Emoji” Trademark
• Schedule A (SAD Scheme) Plaintiff Sanctioned for “Fraud on the Court”–Xped v. Respect the Look
• My Comments to the USPTO About the SAD Scheme and Anticounterfeiting/Antipiracy Efforts
• My New Article on Abusive “Schedule A” IP Lawsuits Will Likely Leave You Angry
• If the Word “Emoji” is a Protectable Trademark, What Happens Next?–Emoji GmbH v. Schedule A Defendants
• My Declaration Identifying Emoji Co. GmbH as a Possible Trademark Troll

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Last month, while sitting at Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport, a passenger typed www.annefrankmanuscripten.org on her laptop to look up the website at issue in the latest judgment by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on geoblocking—the Anne Frank Fonds judgment. The retrieved webpage notified her that “due to copyright considerations,” the content, a scholarly edition of Anne Frank manuscripts, was not available to users connecting from the Netherlands.

Using a VPN service, she connected through a server in Belgium. This time the content webpage appeared, asking her to confirm that she was located in one of the listed “public domain countries.” The page warned her that if she was not located in one of those countries, she was “circumventing protection measures” and possibly “infringing copyrights.”

Had she misrepresented her location and confirmed that she was connecting from Belgium, presumably she could have accessed the content, even though she was in the Netherlands, which is not one of the public domain countries of the publication. The content is still protected by copyright in the Netherlands, where the provider of the scholarly edition has no license to make the content available to the public.

The CJEU judgment in Anne Frank Fonds does not address the liability of the cyber-traveling passenger. Instead, it concerns the liability of other actors in the story—the providers of the content and, in the abstract, a VPN provider.

Given the trajectory of prior CJEU judgments that have discussed geoblocking, and the opinion of the Advocate General in this case, the CJEU’s holdings in Anne Frank Fonds are not surprising. Under EU law, a content provider is not liable for copyright infringement by communicating a work to the public in a country where the work is still protected by copyright and for which the provider has no license, if the provider uses an effective–meaning “state of the art”–geoblocking measure. In such a case, the provider is not communicating to the public in the geoblocked country, even if Internet users can circumvent the geoblocking measure with a VPN or similar service. If the geoblocking measure is not effective and therefore a copyright-infringing communication to the public does take place in the country where the work is still protected by copyright, that communication is attributable to the provider of the content and not to the provider of the VPN or similar service.

Several aspects of the Anne Frank Fonds judgment deserve thorough analysis. At the global level, the judgment might raise concerns that it signals the end of a free and open Internet, legitimizes the balkanization of the Internet, and marks a new era of territorialization of the Internet. But none of these trends are new or surprising. In fact, some commentators might argue the opposite. By clarifying how actors on the Internet may lawfully provide a work to users only in countries where the work is in the public domain or for which the actors hold a license, the judgment advances legal certainty for actors who seek to operate lawfully in cyberspace, thus ensuring that more content becomes available online in general.

Clarity about the ability of actors to geographically limit their conduct online might be an argument against the balkanization of the Internet. If access to content can be effectively regulated by content providers, no government intervention should be necessary to wall off the Internet in individual countries. Even the territorialization of the Internet is not new; the Internet has been subject to gradually increasing territorialization from its origins, and the end of the “Wild West era” of the Internet was inevitable.

Any comprehensive analysis of Anne Frank Fonds should be subject to further debate, but two aspects can be highlighted for now: the establishment of the knowledge standard, and the assessment of the effectiveness of geoblocking measures. Both of these aspects will be crucial for the future of the Internet under the legal regime that the judgment has created.

According to the CJEU, the “obligation to adopt effective technological measures to restrict access” to copyrighted content online falls on “any person who knows or ought reasonably to have known” that a work is protected by copyright in some EU member states, even though the work is in the public domain in other member states (par. 42). In the Anne Frank Fonds case, this knowledge standard presents no issue. The defendants clearly knew that the work was still protected by copyright in the Netherlands, as was confirmed by their deployment of geoblocking measures to prevent access from the Netherlands. But in many other cases, the reasonableness of having knowledge about foreign copyright protection might be debated. Will the expectation of knowledge be the same for corporate content providers, individual influencers, and occasional social media users? Imposition of an unreasonably high standard would translate into uneconomic costs that would deter speech, or at least some speech, on the Internet.

Cost considerations might also affect the standard of legal effectiveness of geoblocking measures. While some costs of doing business on the Internet are reasonable, a requirement that would result in unreasonable costs would negatively affect speech on the Internet. Geoblocking tools are not all created equal; their effectiveness varies. If the law is to rely on geoblocking, minimal technical standards must be set to identify geoblocking tools that meet any legal minimum. In the Anne Frank Fonds judgment, the CJEU confirmed, very sensibly, that a possibility of circumvention does not automatically render geoblocking measures ineffective for legal purposes (par. 51). However, the CJEU left it to the national court to decide whether the deployed measure was effective (par. 48).

The CJEU defined “a geo-blocking measure” as “a process that is aimed at enabling or preventing access to the work published on the website depending on the geographical location of the user in the light of the Internet Protocol address (‘IP address’) which he or she uses to connect to the website” (par. 44). We can only assume, and also hope, that by prefacing the court’s definition with the phrase “[i]n the present case,” the CJEU intended the wording not to be the legal definition of geoblocking measures, because newer geoblocking tools no longer rely solely on IP addresses. If the geoblocking measure deployed by the defendants in Anne Frank Fonds relied solely on IP addresses, the question whether the measure was “state of the art” might be warranted (par. 49).

The post CJEU Judgment on Geoblocking & Standards for Knowledge of Foreign Copyright Laws and Geoblocking Measures (Guest Blog Post) appeared first on Technology & Marketing Law Blog.

The Court Ruling

The court addresses Doe’s concerns via the “expectation of privacy” factor for considering subpoenas, which is a little tone deaf because there are other major social considerations at play beyond just privacy. In any case, those expectations of privacy depend on the case’s substantive merits, which in turn depends on copyright fair use. The court isn’t very sympathetic to Doe’s fair use arguments. It summarizes: “With the first and third factors clearly favoring Petitioner, the second factor only somewhat favoring Doe, and the fourth factor favoring Doe, the Court cannot find at this stage that Doe’s archive constitutes a fair use of Petitioner’s works.”

Nature of Use. Doe’s website had no hint of commerciality, and its linguistic tools were transformative. However, the archive was not transformative. The court points out how Google Books only displayed snippets, while the archive displayed full texts, so this was more like Internet Archive’s Free Digital Library. “[W]hile the material in the archive is plainly necessary for Doe’s non-infringing uses of the material, it does not follow that Doe’s publication of the entirety of that material online, separate and apart from Doe’s transformative commentary, is also a transformative use—especially because Doe’s analytic tools have continued functioning after the archive was taken down.”

Nature of Work. “Because the work at issue here is published and contains a mix of factual and expressive content, this factor—if it favors any side here—slightly favors Doe.”

Amount Taken. “the archive’s copying is not proportionate to Doe’s goals….Doe’s critical goals could have been achieved with more tailored disclosure of the works….Doe does not explain why the public disclosure of the full copyrighted work was necessary to retain credibility—Doe could have disclosed only parts of the works they directly compared or critiqued, or disclosed the full works only privately to Doe’s critics rather than the Internet writ-large.”

Market Effect. The Jehovah’s Witnesses “license copies of the materials included in the archive for research use…That is not inconsistent with Petitioner publishing the works free of cost: Petitioner may make the works publicly and freely available to read, but not to copy….the archive could, at least for some, supplant Petitioner’s own websites and archives, by becoming available to Internet users writ-large through search results.” But, the Jehovah’s Witnesses didn’t provide evidence that it charges for its licenses, so the archive may not have an economic impact on it. That tips this factor towards Doe.

In total, the court views the fair use factors as a mixed bag. As a result, the court says that Jehovah’s Witnesses is entitled to the unmasking subpoena because it meets the other qualifications for subpoena issuance, and the fair use defense wasn’t strong enough to flip that.

Implications

I imagine this case will be appealed to the Second Circuit. There are several good appealable angles, including how courts should consider the free speech implications of 512(h) subpoenas and whether the district court should have been more charitable to Doe’s fair use arguments.

The court opinion doesn’t acknowledge the greater context of how religious institutions use copyright law to target and suppress online critics. These scuffles are as old as the commercial Internet. For example, the seminal 1995 RTC v. Netcom case–which established the notice-and-takedown model that turned into the DMCA 512(c)–was a Church of Scientology enforcement action against an online critic. Earlier this year, Prof. Cathay Smith covered another case in this genre (“A Religious Organization is Suing its Critics, and the Weapon of Choice is Copyright—RRT v. Cheryl Bawtinheimer“). Also see my paper with Prof. Silbey on copyright as a memory hole.

Religious institutions are entitled to create and enforce copyrights just like everyone else, but their enforcement practices often look and feel different than most other copyright owners. For example, the opinion noted that the Jehovah’s Witnesses claim to have a licensing program for researcher copying of its materials, but there isn’t evidence that those licenses generate revenue. Instead, the copyright licensing scheme most likely advances non-financial interests–such as the suppression of criticism–that aren’t really what copyright law was designed to do. Indeed, even in this era of extraordinary transparency, some religious institutions still effectively prevent “outsiders” from knowing about–and thus potentially critiquing–their inner workings. Archives of religious texts are a crucial counterbalance to that secrecy and any associated avoidance of accountability. It would have been better if the court had engaged with this broader context, rather than essentially treat this as a routine one-off interaction between a religious institution and an unhappy member.

A reminder that 512(h) is a fast lane to unmask online actors, and it was written without adequate privacy safeguards. In this case, the Jehovah’s Witnesses can potentially impose a range of extrajudicial consequences on Doe once unmasked, such as excommunication. This expanded toolkit of extrajudicial remedies is another way that religious institutions’ copyight enforcements are different than other copyright owners. Troubingly, 512(h) hands them a powerful and dangerous tool for misuse and abuse.

Also, I was confused about Cloudflare’s status as the target of the 512(h) subpoena. The court glosses over the services Cloudflare provides to Doe. Courts have repeatedly said that 512(h) doesn’t apply to IAPs because they don’t host anything. Is Cloudflare more like a host or an IAP in this circumstance? Unless the court explains how Cloudflare qualifies as the website’s host, it would have been helpful for the court to consider the implications of applying 512(h) to website vendors.

Case Citation: In re: DMCA Subpoena to Cloudflare, Inc., 2026 WL 2110881 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2026). The CourtListener page.

EXTRA: In re DMCA Subpoena To Reddit, Inc., 2026 WL 1847873 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2026). In March 2025, a Reddit user with the username u/tiktoktruthseeker posted to the r/FavoritedRanksDrama subreddit a 27-second clip from one of Shafiei’s TikTok livestreams, accompanied by a paragraph of critical commentary. The clip depicts Shafiei speaking directly to the camera, using language such as “Your mom was a bitch” and “When you were in school you got fucked in the ass.” The post, titled “PBA: Weaponizing SA, Homophobia, and Moms for his Angry Rant,” received 42 upvotes.

Shafiei sent Reddit a takedown notice and got a 512(h) unmasking subpoena. Reddit dishonored the takedown notice, taking the position that the post was fair use, and resisted the 512(h) subpoena. Thank you, Reddit, for standing up for your users!

The court agrees with Reddit’s fair use determination:

• “Even though the Reddit user included an unaltered clip from Shafiei’s livestream, what matters is that the poster used it to express criticism of Shafiei’s rhetoric. As such, the Reddit user’s posting of the clip is a transformative fair use rather than infringement….where the post is best understood in the context of the video clip it directly criticizes, such use is justified.”
• “even if the post includes personal attacks, disparagement, no matter how rude, may still be transformative.” [See my Memory Hole paper for more on the overlaps between copyright and disparagement.]
• “the livestreamed video is primarily factual in that it is an informational presentation of Shafiei’s opinions.”
• “the use of a 27-second clip from someone who livestreams up to 16 hours per day is quantitatively insignificant.”
• “The Reddit user’s commentary within the post directly references statements made by Shafiei in the 27-second clip. Omitting this clip and instead referencing Shafiei’s livestream or providing a link to Shafiei’s account would be insufficient because it would not provide the full context for the user’s commentary.”
• “Shafiei’s arguments that the post’s criticism may suppress demand by making TikTok users aware of his behavior is not a cognizable copyright harm.”
• “It is also not clear that reproduction of a 27-second clip from a livestream has any value outside of the livestreamed context. The clip does not serve as a substitute for Shafiei’s daily presence on the platform for up to 16 hours at a time.”

EXTRA 2: Alireza Shafiei filed another lawsuit demanding the identity of a Reddit user, Vegetable_Lettuce450, over a 7-second clip from one of his livestreams. A different court also rejects the subpoena because of fair use:

• Nature of use. The clip is commentary/criticism.
• Nature of work. “Although the Court supposes that the livestream reflects some nominally creative choices, such as the framing of the video and the selection of emojis animating the screen, the video (which Reddit characterizes as a “stream- of-consciousness diatribe”) is hardly a work so creative to be at “the core of intended copyright protection.” Moreover, Mr. Shafiei posted his livestream publicly on TikTok, which “undermines” his right and ability to control subsequent distribution of the video.”
• Amount taken. 7 seconds from a guy who livestreams up to 16 hours a day.
• Market effect. “suppression of demand from criticism is not a cognizable copyright harm under factor four” and there’s no licensing market for short clips from an inveterate livestreamer.

In re DMCA Subpoena to Reddit Inc., 2026 WL 2187691 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2026)

Some Other Blog Posts on 512(h)

• Court Authorizes Unmasking Subpoena in Copyright Case–In re DMCA Subpoena to GoDaddy
• Internet Access Providers Aren’t Bound by DMCA Unmasking Subpoenas–In re Cox
• Court Quashes 512(h) Subpoena on First Amendment Grounds–In re 512(h) Subpoena to Twitter
• Court Quashes 512(h) Subpoena Submitted to YouTube–Watch Tower v. Kevin McFree
• Twitter Can’t Quash a 512(h) Subpoena
• Court Orders Unmasking Subpoena of Alleged Infringers–Baugher v. GoDaddy
• 2H 2019 and Q1 2020 Quick Links, Part 1 (Copyright, E-Commerce, Advertising)
• 512(h) Doesn’t Preempt Doe Unmasking Lawsuits–Strike 3 v. Doe
• eBay Must Disclose User Identities In Response To 512(h) Subpoenas
• Q2 2015 Quick Links, Part 1 (IP, Marketing and More)
• An Unmasking Effort Gets Gutted Some More – Art of Living Foundation v. Does
• Copyright Doe Defendant Can’t Quash Disclosure Subpoena Anonymously—Hard Drive Productions v. Does (Guest Blog Post)
• Spiritual Group’s Attempt to Unmask Online Critics Goes South–Art of Living Foundation v. Does
• Did a Court Eliminate 512(h) Subpoenas?–Maximized Living v. Google
• Co-Blogger Identity Isn’t Disclosed via 512(h), but Takedown Letters Are Copyrightable

The post Court Greenlights Jehovah’s Witnesses’ Unmasking of Online Critic–In re DMCA Subpoena to Cloudflare appeared first on Technology & Marketing Law Blog.

Contributory Infringement

Inducement to Infringe. The court says it’s not inducement when “Plaintiff merely alleges that Defendant knowingly allowed listings of infringing TJ Karaoke devices to remain active on its website despite having the ability to remove the listings….Nor has Plaintiff alleged facts giving rise to an inference that the ‘principal object’ of Defendant’s online marketplace is the sale of infringing products. [cite to Grokster]”

Tailored to Infringement. The plaintiff did not allege that “Defendant’s service is incapable of substantial or commercially significant noninfringing uses….allegations that a service provider merely had ‘knowledge that a service will be used to infringe’ or ‘fail[ed] to take affirmative steps to prevent infringement’ are insufficient to state a claim for contributory infringement liability.” Given eBay’s scope, I don’t see how a plaintiff could allege that eBay is “incapable of substantial or commercially significant noninfringing uses.”

Vicarious Infringement

Citing Milo & Gabby, the court says the “mere fact that Defendant had the ability to remove listings of infringing devices is not enough to establish that Defendant had both the legal right and the practical ability to stop the third-party sellers’ infringing conduct.” The court doesn’t discuss the direct financial interest prong, which poses a heightened challenge to eBay due to its commission structure.

Did Cox Make a Difference?

The Supreme Court’s Cox v. Sony decision didn’t address vicarious copyright infringement, so that part of the ruling wasn’t affected by the Cox case.

This court did apply the revised Cox standards for contributory copyright infringement, and the application of those factors makes this an even easier case. Lee made knowledge-based allegations, but–as the Cox court seemingly intended–Lee could not spin those allegations to satisfy an intent-based standard. It makes quick work for a defendant like eBay who has taken many steps to reduce copyright infringement.

(It remains to be seen if courts will (1) bend the standards in Cox to distill evidence of intent from knowledge-based allegations, or (2) bend the standards of direct or vicarious infringement to gapfill the narrowed contributory infringement standard. Fortunately, this court did neither. However, it was also a pro se case, not a full-scale assault to degrade the Cox standards that rightsowners will launch eventually).

However, I don’t think Lee’s claims would have gotten far with the pre-Cox jurisprudence either. Courts have routinely rejected staydown demands from plaintiffs. Also, eBay’s honoring of the NOCIs means that it would have likely qualified for the 512(c) safe harbor too. Still, those defenses might not have worked until summary judgment, at significant defense costs, while the Cox precedent easily and decisively ends this case on a motion to dismiss.

Case Citation: Lee v. SBS Corp., 2:26-cv-03144-MCS-E (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2026)

UPDATE: Lee v. SBS Corp., 2026 WL 2261023 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2026). The court granted Google/YouTube’s motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff alleges no act of direct infringement attributable to Google aside from that “the YouTube platform [is] operated by” Google and YouTube. Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege that YouTube selected infringing works for upload or download or instigated any copying, storage, or distribution of the works….

Plaintiff does not allege that YouTube induced infringement or that YouTube provided a service tailored to infringement. Rather, Plaintiff merely alleges that Google and YouTube “selective[ly] remov[ed]” infringing video content on its platform. Plaintiff has not alleged that Google and YouTube actively encouraged infringement through specific acts, such as by advertising an infringing use of its services. Nor has Plaintiff alleged facts giving rise to an inference that the principal object of YouTube’s online platform is the distribution of copyrighted videos….

Plaintiff merely alleges that Google and YouTube “had both the ability and the opportunity to remove the infringing content, yet knowingly allowed certain infringing videos to remain on the platform while continuing to derive financial benefit from them,” not that YouTube’s service is incapable of substantial or commercially significant noninfringing uses…

The mere fact that infringing content existed on YouTube is insufficient to allege that YouTube attracted users specifically because of content that infringed Plaintiff’s copyrights.

The post eBay Defeats Contributory Copyright Claim–Lee v. SBS appeared first on Technology & Marketing Law Blog.

Coomer v. Lindell, 2026 WL 817370 (D. Colo. March 25, 2026)

Related post. This is more fallout from the efforts to deny the 2020 presidential election results. MyPillows huckster Lindell publicly trashed Dominion Voting and and its president, Coomer. A jury held Lindell and Frankspeech liable for defamation and more. The defendants unsuccessfully tried to overturn the jury verdict post-trial.

Frankspeech invoked Section 230 for its liability for Lindell’s speech. The court disagrees:

Mr. Lindell founded Frankspeech. He regularly acted as its corporate representative, including at trial. He hosted his own show on Frankspeech, broadcasted it through Frankspeech, and used the Frankspeech platform to make and publish statements about Dr. Coomer. There is no evidence that anyone other than Mr. Lindell exercised any meaningful degree of control over the Frankspeech entity. By all accounts, Frankspeech was Mr. Lindell’s corporate alter ego in this context….for § 230 purposes, Frankspeech’s defamatory statements through its agent would plainly qualify as participation in the development of those statements.

Frankspeech also claimed Section 230 for Clement’s remarks at a conference. The court responds: “Frankspeech—through Mr. Lindell and others—sponsored, promoted, and broadcasted the event….a reasonable jury could conclude that Frankspeech’s conduct (including its conduct through Mr. Lindell) created actual or apparent authority for Mr. Clements and other presenters at the Cyber Symposium to act as agents of Frankspeech.”

Murphy v. LinkedIn Corp., 2026 WL 881710 (N.D. Cal. March 30, 2026)

Fraudsters approached Murphy via LinkedIn direct messages. The conversation switched over to WhatsApp, where the fraudsters effectuated their fraud. Murphy’s lawsuit against LinkedIn fails due to Section 230:

Plaintiffs’ claims for negligence, gross negligence, and product liability are premised on a purported duty to “monitor” users, “restrict the accounts of fraudulent actors,” and to suppress “fraudulent activities” by users of LinkedIn’s platform. These claims “necessarily implicate” LinkedIn’s role as a publisher of third-party content because “discharging the alleged duty would require [LinkedIn] to monitor third-party content and prevent” communications between fraudsters and legitimate LinkedIn users. Nor can Plaintiffs sue LinkedIn for breaching a “duty to warn.” LinkedIn’s “role as a publisher of third-party content does not give it a duty to warn users of ‘a general possibility of harm’ resulting from” using LinkedIn’s services.

The plaintiffs unsuccessfully tried the defective design workaround:

Plaintiffs argue that their claims are not based on LinkedIn’s role as publisher, but rather its role “as a product manufacturer and developer of defective algorithms” that facilitated communications between fraudsters and Plaintiffs. But the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly upheld dismissal of negligence and product liability claims framed in the same way. [cites to Doe v. Grindr and Dyroff]

A Roommates.com workaround didn’t work either:

Plaintiffs’ claims are premised on LinkedIn’s neutral tools for connecting users, not on content that LinkedIn created or required users to provide as a condition of using its services. Indeed, LinkedIn expressly informs users that they “have choices about the information” on their profiles, and that users “don’t have to post or upload personal data” that may make them targets of fraud.

To put a finer point on it, if the plaintiffs are complaining about LinkedIn direct messages, then those messages may be covered by the ECPA just like email, and LinkedIn may have had limited legal rights to monitor the conversations at all.

Finally, the plaintiffs tried a TOS-based workaround, poured into consumer protection laws. The court acknowledges that some breach of contract claims may not be preempted by Section 230, but

These claims are premised on the same duties discussed above – duties to monitor, to design products in a different manner, and to warn – that fundamentally seek to hold LinkedIn liable for content created by the fraudsters. Styling these claims as different legal theories does not remove them from Section 230’s scope….

Plaintiffs seek to hold LinkedIn liable solely based on its general monitoring policy and aspirations to remove fraudulent users from its platform. Moreover, LinkedIn expressly disclaims liability by notifying users that they “may encounter content or information that might be inaccurate, incomplete, delayed, misleading, illegal, offensive, or otherwise harmful,” and that LinkedIn “generally does not review content provided by [its] Members or others.”

McNeal v. Calvin, 2026 WL 879228 (E.D. Mo. March 31, 2026)

This case relates to the TV show Love & Marriage: Huntsville, shown on OWN (Oprah’s channel). The plaintiff, a lawyer (naturally), is one of the women featured in the show. She is upset about online comments about the show and sued many defendants pro se. The court says “Section 230 of the Communication Decency Act bars Plaintiff’s claims against YouTube, Google, and Tik Tok.” In particular, “The content uploaded by users cannot be attributed to internet service providers based on the theory that users are “agents” of the websites they use.”

Shiva Ayyadurai v. U.S., 2026 WL 879409 (D.C.D.C. March 31, 2026). My prior blog post about a different litigation of his.

This is a jawboning case:

Ayyadurai’s 75-page Complaint alleges that various Massachusetts state officials—none of whom are named as Defendants in this case—federal officials at the Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (“CISA”), and other government officials unknown to him have coordinated with private companies to regulate and censor his speech by “deplatforming” or “shadowbanning” him—that is, suspending his social media accounts or limiting the reach of his posts. Ayyadurai alleges that the Defendants took these actions in retaliation for posts in which he “articulat[ed] a government employee’s role in destroying the digital ballot images used to tabulate votes” in a prior election.

With respect to the liability of the social media defendants who allegedly got jawboned, the court accepts the 230(c)(2)(A) defense:

Ayyadurai’s Complaint fails to state a claim against the Social Media Defendants based on their content-moderation decisions because he does not plausibly allege that any of those decisions were made in the absence of “good faith” or that they were made for a purpose other than removing content that they “consider[ ] to be … objectionable.”…

conclusory allegations of bad faith are insufficient to state a claim against a platform based on activity within the reach of Section 230(c)(2).

At the same time, the court struggled with applying to Section 230(c)(1) to the removal decisions. Incredibly, it says:

only a few of the decisions restating this broad dictum [from Zeran] have grappled with its implications when the challenged conduct is a platform’s decision to remove objectionable content—such as a plaintiff’s own posts—rather than a decision to leave other objectionable content in place. Extending immunity under Section 230(c)(1) to cover direct challenges to the removal of user content is an uneasy fit with the language of the provision, which says only that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” A broad reading of Section 230(c)(1) that immunizes all content-removal decisions also risks “swallo[wing] the more specific immunity in (c)(2),” which applies only to content-moderation decisions that are made in “good faith.”

Not this shit again. I have repeatedly explained how Section 230(c)(2) can apply to first-party filtering decisions, which leaves room for Section 230(c)(1) to protect against liability for third-party content. There are DOZENS of cases applying Section 230(c)(1) to removal decisions, so for the court to think that it’s spotted something that all of those other courts have missed is laughable…and completely gratuitous…and ultimately inconsequential given that the court still tosses the case.

The court tries to justify its reluctance on Section 230(c)(1):

There is little reason to strain the reach of the immunity in Section 230(c)(1) when, as in this case, the immunity in Section 230(c)(2) leads to the same result.

NOOOO. There are several excellent reasons to apply both 230(c)(1) and 230(c)(2):

(1) 230(c)(1) doesn’t have a good faith prerequisite, which has mucked up 230(c)(2) jurisprudence and made 12(b)(6) dismissals much more difficult to obtain, jacking up the litigation costs for both sides and giving false hope to bogus claims. Indeed, because the court dismissed this case without prejudice, I’m sure an amended complaint will try again to manufacture bad faith sufficient to kick the case into very expensive discovery;

(2) removal and leave-up decisions are two sides of the same decision, i.e., every editorial decision about an item of third-party content is either a leave-up or removal decision, so they cannot be separated; and

(3) the statute and 25+ years of caselaw have established the principle that 230(c)(1) applies to removal decisions.

Sigh. In the end, this case ends up the same as all of the other content removal and account termination cases–dismissed.

Gaughan v. Barounis, 2025 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 17243 (N.Y. Supreme Ct. December 18, 2025) 

The Complaint alleges that the impersonating profile and pictures of plaintiff were posted by defendants Barounis and Viera. Plaintiff’s contention that the XVideo defendants are liable for refusing or failing to remove offending material prepared by a third party, or that they may be held responsible for allegedly defamatory postings made by third parties does not state a viable basis for liability. Nowhere in the Complaint does plaintiff allege that the XVideo defendants posted or created the impersonating profile themselves, altered or edited its contents, or encouraged, required, or otherwise induced defendants Barounis and/or Viera, or any other user, to create the profile or upload unlawful content. To the contrary, plaintiff even alleges in her Complaint that Barounis and Viera allegedly making this impersonating profile goes against XVideo.com’s Terms and Agreements.

The Court also finds plaintiff’s argument that the XVideo defendants should be responsible for her alleged stolen identity, and that Section 230 does not apply in cases, unavailing.

It has also been held that “Sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Right Law sounds in privacy, not intellectual property, and thus does not fall within the intellectual property exceptions in Section 230.”

Equally, plaintiff’s contention that this immunity is lost because the XVideo defendants allowed the dissemination of plaintiff’s personal information and allowed discriminatory content (age, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, etc.) is unsuccessful.

Arana v. Molta, 2026 WL 1166348 (D. Mass. March 24, 2026)

Mr. Molta drafted the description of, and provided the photos for, the Dennis Property posted to WNAV’s website. WNAV did not review, revise, edit, or provide feedback on the Dennis Property listing that the Moltas posted to the WNAV website. WNAV is thus immune from liability for any of the statements or representations made by the Moltas in the Dennis Property listing.

Greer v. Moon, 2026 WL 1170015 (D. Utah. Feb. 11, 2026)

Mr. Greer’s only claims against Defendants are for contributory copyright infringement under federal law. Because those claims clearly “pertain[ ] to intellectual property,” they cannot be barred by section 230. Defendants’ argument concerning section 230 immunity fails.

Tufano v. Google LLC, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100789 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2026)

“Plaintiff premises his claims on Google allegedly “filter[ing] out all negative reviews” of Dr. Taban, including Plaintiff’s negative review, which Google allegedly removed.” The court dismisses per Section 230: “First, Google’s review service is an interactive computer service. Second, Google publishes the reviews on which Plaintiff bases his claims. Third, third parties, and not Google itself, provide the reviews published by Google.” The plaintiff said Google didn’t act in good faith, but Google relied on 230(c)(1) where good faith is irrelevant, and the plaintiff didn’t provide any evidence of bad faith.

Starship LLC v. Shein Distribution Co., 2026 WL 1455009 (C.D. Cal. March 20, 2026)

This is a fast fashion enforcement lawsuit that includes both copyright and trademark claims. The direct infringement claims largely fail because Shein operates as a marketplace for online vendors. The contributory infringement claims failed because the plaintiff wanted a staydown in response to takedown notices. The vicarious infringement claims also fail.

Shein defended against the unfair competition claim based on Section 230. The court says:

Plaintiff characterizes Shein as an information content provider because it “regularly markets and sells goods” and “is involved in almost all aspects of the marketplace’s distribution chain.” These conclusory assertions do not plausibly allege that Defendants are content providers. Plaintiff provides no factual basis to infer that Defendants materially contributed to the alleged infringement.

King v. Jilin Province Detiannuo Safety Tech. Co. Ltd., 2026 Fla. Cir. LEXIS 295 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 17, 2026)

Plaintiff does not allege that eBay participated in the creation or development of Seller’s listing or allege that eBay played some role in handling or transmitting the airbag components. Plaintiff only alleges that eBay should have removed Seller’s listing and/or issued some censure to Seller for its alleged noncompliant listing….

The only way eBay allegedly could have prevented the harm was by reviewing the third-party listing, determining whether it complied with internal policies, and removing it. That conduct, i.e., deciding whether to publish or remove third-party content, is a paradigmatic editorial function protected by the CDA.

In re Apple Inc. App Store Simulated Casino-Style Games Litigation, 2026 WL 1552391 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2026)

The Court finds Defendants’ argument that Section 230 provides immunity from suit unavailing. Defendants point to the clause in Section 230 that states that “no cause of action may be brought” that is contrary to the statute. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). But the Tenth Circuit has held that Section 230 “provides immunity only from liability, not suit.” And the Ninth Circuit case Defendants themselves cite clearly states that Section 230 is designed “to protect websites against the evil of liability for failure to remove offensive content”; that case does not mention protection from suit. Thus, the Court concludes that Section 230 does not protect Defendants from suit.

Accardi v. CSC Holdings, LLC, 2024 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 83186 (N.Y. Supreme Ct. November 26, 2024)

The plaintiffs claim that defendants failing to follow their terms of service makes them liable to the plaintiffs, effectively negating the immunity provided by the Communications Decency Act. After a review of the papers submitted by the defendants and the plaintiffs, the Court finds that the immunity provided by Section 230 does apply to the defendants in this action and the plaintiffs have not proffered any compelling argument or evidence to negate this immunity. As such, the defendants motion to dismiss the third cause of action pertaining to the failure to remove posts on social media is granted.

Life Mastery Network LLC v. Haygarth, 2026 WL 1622887 (D. Haw. May 22, 2026)

Paula indisputably enjoys immunity under the CDA for reposting content. Many courts have included private individuals within the scope of a “user.” Thus, (1) Paula is a “user of an interactive computer service”; (2) the subreddit link is “based on information provided by another information content provider”; and (3) Plaintiffs’ claim would treat Paula “as the publisher or speaker of that information.” As such, and as Plaintiffs have conceded at the Hearing, Paula is immune from lawsuit for what she reposted from Reddit.

But because the CDA does not immunize someone who posts original content, it makes sense that adding comments to something that is re-posted would not trigger CDA immunity. While these cited cases are not directly on point, the Court concludes that Paula’s comments regarding what she reposted are not subject to CDA immunity.

Glazer v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 1:25-cv-01849-GLR (D. Md. June 12, 2026)

The Court agrees with Meta that Section 230 bars Plaintiffs’ claims….All three elements are satisfied here: Meta is an interactive services provider; Plaintiffs’ claims treat Meta as the publisher or speaker of information under Section 230 because they “seek ‘to hold [Meta] liable for . . . deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content’ provided by third parties”; and the content at issue here is that of third parties, and Plaintiffs “seek[] to hold Meta liable, not for providing that content, but for allowing third parties to do so.”

Related ruling.

Sidoli v. YouTube LLC. 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210953 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2025)

Plaintiff also seeks to treat YouTube as a publisher because she alleges that YouTube wrongfully demonetized, restricted, and removed her videos. Such conduct falls within a publisher’s traditional functions….

YouTube cited authority that which stand for the proposition that Section 230 immunizes internet service providers from suit for termination of a plaintiff’s entire channel as well as the content that the plaintiff posts on that channel. Such authority is persuasive. Thus, any claim Plaintiff brings which seeks to challenge YouTube’s decision to remove Plaintiff’s YouTube channel is also barred by Section 230.

Also, “Plaintiff’s constitutional claims cannot proceed as YouTube is a private forum, not a state actor.”

See also Sidoli v. YouTube LLC, 2026 WL 1480407 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2026), upholding YouTube’s TOS and forum selection clause: “Defendants provide evidence, which Plaintiff does not dispute, showing that she agreed to abide by the terms of service by clicking the “Create Channel” button when she started her YouTube page on June 21, 2021.”

Kennedy v. Vickery, 2025 Me. Super. LEXIS 108 (Me. Superior Ct. Sept. 10, 2025)

RFK Jr. lost a defamation lawsuit. As for Section 230:

Defendant posted on X, without comment, a link to an article, authored by thegrio.com, titled “Anti-vaxxer Robert F. Kennedy Jr. is harming black people—and his family legacy—with his vaccine misinformation campaign.”…

Under the Communications Decency Act, internet service users are not liable for repeating, without embellishment, third party content….

Exhibit A to the Amended Complaint supports Defendant’s assertion that he posted the third-party content without embellishment. Plaintiff denies Defendant posted the link without embellishment, but cites no admissible record evidence to support the denial. Thus, under the Communications Decency Act, Defendant is not liable to Plaintiff for this post.

Awoye v. Jones, 2026 WL 1847088 (D.N.J. June 26, 2026)

In Instagram posts, Jones claims that Awoye scammed her. Awoye sued her and brought Meta along for the ride, claiming it had violated his publicity rights. There isn’t any publicity rights violation here:

The core of Plaintiff’s allegations is that Jones spread allegedly false information about Plaintiff on Instagram. Jones was not selling a product or otherwise soliciting money from her followers. As such, neither was Instagram. Jones’ posts were the “dissemination of news or information” and not made for a commercial purpose.”

Norton v. Meta Platform, Inc., 2026 WL 1963120 (N.D. Cal. July 7, 2026)

In posts on Facebook, several third parties accused Norton of criminal activity and shared intimate images of him….

“Meta is an interactive computer service provider.” Second, Norton alleges that third parties, not Meta, created the Facebook posts at issue; the third parties, not Meta, are the “information content provider[s].” Third, each of Norton’s claims seek to treat Meta as a “publisher” of third-party content. “A claim that obliges the defendant to monitor thirdparty content to avoid liability … treats the defendant as a publisher.”

Norton argued “but the algorithms.” Citing Ligon, the court says the algorithms matter only if the algorithm creates content. Citing Roommates.com, the court adds: “Norton doesn’t allege that Meta required its third-party users to create or post any of the content at issue.”

Moore v. LogSat Software LLC, 2022 WL 23074273 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2022)

John Moore has never been accused of, arrested for, or convicted of any sex-related offense; yet, his name, picture, address, and other identifying information appear on LogSat Software LLC’s app, called “Sex Offenders Search”….

Mr. Moore was convicted in Indiana of voluntary manslaughter. Thus, he was required to register on a violent crime registry in Indiana. The violent offender and sex offender registries are the same in Indiana—in other words there are not two separate lists. Mr. Moore testified that he believed that there was no national violent offender registry, just a national sex offender registry and that he is on that because the Indiana Registry is reported to the National registry….

the alleged defamatory statement at issue is that Mr. Moore’s name, picture, address, and other identifying information appear on app called “Sex Offenders Search,” because he is not a sex offender and has never been accused of, arrested for, or convicted of any sex-related crimes. Mr. Moore does not allege that he was wrongfully included in the data set that LogSat purchased from FWD, or, for that matter, that he was wrongfully included on Indiana or the National registries.

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