512(f) Claim Sent to Trial (Which Didn’t Happen)–Leszczynski v. Kitchen Cube

September 18, 2025 · by Eric Goldman · in Copyright, Derivative Liability, E-Commerce, Licensing/Contracts

[My standard lament that Westlaw’s indexing of Central District of California cases is unusually laggy.]

Tomas Leszczynski claimed to have created the Bakercube Measuring Cube. He posted the 3D printing instructions for the cube to the Internet, subject to a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial No Derivatives License. He then objected to Amazon merchants selling the cube, so he targeted them with takedown notices to Amazon. The merchants counternoticed to Amazon per 512(g)(3). Leszczynski then sued the merchants.

I’ll focus only on the merchants’ 512(f) counterclaims for his takedown notices to Amazon. The court denies the merchants’ summary judgment motions for their 512(f) claims, greenlighting the matter to a trial.

The court summarizes: “there is very little evidence that Leszczynski knowingly misrepresented the status of his copyright or anything else in his take-down notices.”

The merchants pointed to the fact that the Copyright Office denied registration for his 3D printing instructions. However, that development took place after he sent the takedown notices, so the subsequent registration denial didn’t prove his state of mind at time of sending. The court excuses his failure to retract the takedown demands after the registration denial, saying 512(f) doesn’t require the sender to update their takedown notices in response to new developments.

Although the court is pretty clearly signalling that Leszczynski is likely to defeat the 512(f) claim, the court wasn’t ready to let Leszczynski off the hook. He initially claimed that he consulted an attorney about the merits of his copyright claim, but then this exchange took place in his deposition:

Q: [W]ithout telling me anything that you may have asked of or communications you received from any attorney, did you ever consult an attorney with respect to this case?

A: You have to define “consult.”

Q: Okay….Obviously you had a claim or claims and you decided to file the lawsuit. Prior to filing the lawsuit, did you discuss the substance of your claims in any meaningful detail with any attorneys? Just yes or no, please.

A: I don’t believe — in very rough terms. We are talking about two-minute conversations.

Q: Okay. So you had a brief conversation with an attorney, but nothing beyond that with regard to your potential case at that time?

A: That is correct.

Q: Okay. And did you ever hire that attorney?

A: No, I did not.

Q: Okay. Since filing the case, have you consulted with any attorneys about it?

A: No.

Q: Have you ever consulted with an attorney about any of your efforts to secure intellectual property protection? By that, I mean somebody to help you with trademark filing or copyright filings, or anything of that nature.

A: No.

The court says this exchange is enough to keep the 512(f) claim alive:

based on the fact that Leszczynski admits to have spoken (at least briefly) with an attorney, and that Leszczynski made statements about that conversation that could be described as inconsistent (as he initially stated that the attorney confirmed the validity of his claims, and later stated the conversation was only very brief and “rough”), a jury could conclude that Leszczynski either knew or was willfully blind to the fact that he was not the valid owner of a copyright

[Protip: if the call lasted 2 minutes and the attorney didn’t charge you for it, you did not “consult” an attorney. Two minutes of “free” information from an attorney shouldn’t count as legal advice.]

This ruling came out in April, so I’m sure you’re wondering if the trial happened and how it went. The parties settled the case soon after this ruling, so they wisely spared the expense of trial. However, that left unresolved the question of how a jury would have ruled on these facts. It’s impossible to say who “won” here, but this non-result ultimately ranks as another 512(f) case that didn’t succeed in court.