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	<title>Derivative Liability Archives - Technology &amp; Marketing Law Blog</title>
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		<title>California Appeals Court Confirms That School Districts Can&#8217;t Sue Over Social Media Addiction</title>
		<link>https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/11/california-appeals-court-confirms-that-school-districts-cant-sue-over-social-media-addiction.htm</link>
					<comments>https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/11/california-appeals-court-confirms-that-school-districts-cant-sue-over-social-media-addiction.htm#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Goldman]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 19:47:10 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Content Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Derivative Liability]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://blog.ericgoldman.org/?p=29434</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>[I have so many topically related cases in my blogging queue, but I&#8217;ve accelerated coverage of this one because of its potential significance.] An entire financial and regulatory ecosystem has developed around the narrative that social media services illegally addict...</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/11/california-appeals-court-confirms-that-school-districts-cant-sue-over-social-media-addiction.htm">California Appeals Court Confirms That School Districts Can&#8217;t Sue Over Social Media Addiction</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org">Technology &amp; Marketing Law Blog</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[I have so many topically related cases in my blogging queue, but I&#8217;ve accelerated coverage of this one because of its potential significance.]</p>
<p><a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/internet-censorship-is-here.jpg"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class="alignright size-medium wp-image-22659" src="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/internet-censorship-is-here-200x300.jpg" alt="" width="200" height="300" srcset="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/internet-censorship-is-here-200x300.jpg 200w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/internet-censorship-is-here.jpg 500w" sizes="(max-width: 200px) 100vw, 200px" /></a>An entire financial and regulatory ecosystem has developed around the narrative that social media services illegally addict their users. This belief has become a dominant orthodoxy in most circles. But the thing is, much of this narrative is predicated on assumptions about the law that may not survive appellate review. If the appeals courts undermine some or all of the narrative, an entire ecosystem and an unquestioned orthodoxy could crumble.</p>
<p>In this case, the state trial court rejected several claims from school districts. The state appeals court affirms those rulings. The latest ruling doesn&#8217;t flip the lower court ruling, so it doesn&#8217;t itself change the litigation or regulatory ecosystem. However, the state appellate ruling does expressly conflict with some conclusions in the federal court case, which has already produced one bellwether settlement favoring a school district, with more bellwether trials on deck. One obvious possibility from this ruling is that the federal school district bellwether trials will fail on appeal, even if the juries side with the school districts before then. In other words, this ruling highlights a sliver of the unstable ground of the social media addiction litigation, just awaiting the inevitable appellate court review.</p>
<p><strong>Negligence</strong></p>
<p>The appellate court provided an overview of the negligence claims:</p>
<blockquote><p>Plaintiffs allege they suffered three general kinds of harm: (1) “incur[ring] significant financial costs” to address the youth mental health crisis allegedly created by Defendants’ platforms; (2) “frustrat[ion] [of their] pedagogical mission” in diverting staff time and resources from education to counter the disruptive effects of the crisis; and (3) property damage inflicted by students. In part V., we conclude Plaintiffs’ allegations their missions were frustrated do not state a cognizable negligence claim, and in part VI., we conclude Defendants have immunity from liability arising from Plaintiffs’ alleged property damage.</p>
<p>That leaves Plaintiffs with only alleged financial harms—which we conclude in parts II. through IV., post, are not recoverable in negligence in these circumstances under California, Rhode Island, or Florida law. Thus, Plaintiffs have not adequately pled any of the Defendants owed them a duty of care under the laws of their respective states. The trial court properly sustained Defendants’ demurrer to the negligence causes of action.</p></blockquote>
<p>In a footnote, the court adds: &#8220;Our conclusion likewise forecloses Plaintiffs’ argument Defendants owed a duty to warn them of harms posed by Defendants’ platforms. Defendants have no duty to warn of a purported peril they have no duty to prevent.&#8221;</p>
<p>The opinion explains why the school districts lose in more detail.</p>
<p><em>Economic Loss Rule&#8211;California</em></p>
<blockquote><p>the universe of entities who may have suffered (or will suffer) some sort of financial loss because of the platforms is virtually unlimited&#8230;there is no viable geographic (spatial) or temporal limitation on who could seek remedies for their economic losses&#8230;.</p>
<p>Even assuming San Diego is correct that Defendants’ knowledge of the effects of their platforms on schools shows the harm was foreseeable, this branch of the economic loss rule requires “more than mere foreseeability” to impose liability for purely economic loss.</p></blockquote>
<p>San Diego pointed to the federal social media addiction litigation, which let the school districts proceed. The court distinguishes that ruling with some strong critical remarks:</p>
<blockquote><p>that court focused largely on proximate cause and derivative injury arguments that are not at issue here. Its analysis of the economic loss rule was truncated, no doubt in part due to the court&#8217;s observation that the parties’ briefing on the topic was brief and provided “little more than case citations.” The court concluded neither of the two “ ‘recurring &#8230; circumstances’ ” in which the rule applied “is argued or appears to apply.” We do not find this analysis persuasive</p></blockquote>
<p>This is what I&#8217;m talking about. The federal district court decision emboldened hundreds/thousands of school district plaintiffs to bring negligence claims based on analysis that a state appeals court says is not persuasive. I am sure the defendants will be highlighting this ruling when the federal case goes up on appeal.</p>
<p><em>Economic Loss Rule&#8211;Rhode Island</em></p>
<blockquote><p>The question remains whether Rhode Island permits recovery for economic losses under a negligence theory in any other context. West Warwick points to no case outside of the contractual context in which a plaintiff was permitted to sue for purely economic injuries.</p></blockquote>
<p><em>Economic Loss Rule&#8211;Florida</em></p>
<blockquote><p>there was no “appreciable zone of risk” within which Defendants were obligated to protect third parties like Brevard from economic harms, and Brevard has no recognized special interest comparable to the unique commercial fishing exception&#8230;.</p>
<p>with the exception of Curd, Brevard cites no Florida cases recognizing any purely economic harms falling within a foreseeable zone of risk for purposes of a negligence cause of action. Instead, Brevard relies upon cases exclusively discussing physical harms within that zone.</p></blockquote>
<p><strong><a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/IMG_8558-scaled.jpg"><img decoding="async" class="alignright size-medium wp-image-20910" src="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/IMG_8558-300x139.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="139" srcset="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/IMG_8558-300x139.jpg 300w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/IMG_8558-1024x474.jpg 1024w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/IMG_8558-768x355.jpg 768w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/IMG_8558-1536x711.jpg 1536w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/IMG_8558-2048x948.jpg 2048w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a>Property Damage and the Challenge Videos</strong></p>
<p>The economic loss rule doesn&#8217;t bar the school districts&#8217; property damage-based negligence claims, but those fail on other grounds.</p>
<blockquote><p>Plaintiffs do not allege Defendants directly damaged their property; instead, they allege Defendants’ platforms influenced students to vandalize school property because the platforms showed them so-called “challenge videos,” created by third parties, that encouraged vandalizing school property</p></blockquote>
<p>The lower court dismissed this claim on Section 230 grounds. The appeals court agrees.</p>
<blockquote><p>[Plaintiffs] concede Defendants are providers of interactive computer services within the meaning of section 230. Plaintiffs do not appear to dispute the challenge videos are information provided by third parties&#8230;.</p>
<p>Plaintiffs’ causes of action premised on property damage inflicted by students who watched challenge videos arise from Defendants’ decision to publish those videos. As explained in Plaintiffs’ opening briefs, those claims crucially turn on the content of the third party challenge videos&#8230;The claims are not content agnostic; they do not remain the same regardless of the types of videos the students watched.</p></blockquote>
<p>The school districts tried a &#8220;but the algorithms&#8221; argument based on <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2024/08/bonkers-opinion-repeals-section-230-in-the-third-circuit-anderson-v-tiktok.htm">Anderson v. TikTok</a>. The panel repeats itself: &#8220;Plaintiffs’ negligence causes of action, to the extent they are premised on property damage inflicted as a result of challenge videos, turn on the content of those videos.&#8221; We&#8217;ll count this as another rejection of Anderson v. TikTok in California courts.</p>
<p>This ruling is a reminder that Section 230 plays a role in the social media addiction cases. Obviously many of the claims pled around Section 230 well enough to reach the jury, but some claims&#8211;like the school districts&#8217; challenge video claims in state court&#8211;never got that far because of Section 230. I think Section 230 should play an even greater role in screening out claims that the state and federal trial court judges did. That will continue to be tested on appeal.</p>
<p><strong>Public Nuisance</strong></p>
<p><em>Washington</em></p>
<blockquote><p>we reject Vancouver&#8217;s argument that conduct violating “the right to education” of a community amounts to a public nuisance&#8230;.</p>
<p>Vancouver failed to allege a public nuisance that “affects equally” the health of either of those “entire communit[ies].”</p>
<p>Nothing in Vancouver&#8217;s complaint suggests the health of the entire community of either “(1) [Vancouver&#8217;s] student users of Defendants’ platforms [or] (2) all of [Vancouver&#8217;s] students” was “affect[ed] equally” by the platforms. Rather, Vancouver alleged: (1) some young users of the platforms use them frequently or even compulsively; (2) some of those frequent or compulsive young users experience mental health problems as a result; (3) many of Vancouver&#8217;s students use the platforms, including some who use them compulsively; and (4) Vancouver&#8217;s counselors “have seen an increased number of students &#8230; struggling with anxiety and other social issues tied to social media.” But none of that suggests the mental health of the entire community of Vancouver&#8217;s student users was “affect[ed] equally” by the platforms, let alone the mental health of Vancouver&#8217;s entire student body (i.e., users and nonusers alike)&#8230;.</p>
<p>there are no similar allegations the mental health of the entire community of Vancouver&#8217;s student users has been affected by Defendants’ platforms. Instead, a generous reading of the complaint alleges some users were so affected. Without minimizing the harms to those students, that is not enough to state a claim for public nuisance under Washington law.</p>
<p>Nor did Vancouver allege Defendants’ platforms affected the health of its entire student body. That nonuser students were “impact[ed]” by students with mental health issues—which the complaint suggests was because school services for user students came “at the expense of the educational goals and experience for the larger student body”—does not mean the health of nonuser students was affected by the platforms, within the meaning of Washington public nuisance law.</p></blockquote>
<p>The court reaches the simple conclusion that social media users have heterogeneous reactions to social media (indeed, some users derive substantial <em>benefits</em> from social media). This is so obvious, yet the entire regulatory and financial ecosystem has been predicated on the false narrative that social media is always bad for everyone. When appellate courts probe that assumption, cases will fall apart.</p>
<p><em>Florida</em></p>
<p>&#8220;Brevard cites no cases finding a nuisance violating a public right to education–from Florida or any other jurisdiction.&#8221; The court continues:</p>
<blockquote><p>Brevard&#8217;s complaint does not allege the platforms have indiscriminately harmed the mental health of either. To be sure, the complaint alleges the “platforms can cause addiction, compulsive use, anxiety, depression, eating disorders, &#8230; and suicide,” and Brevard&#8217;s “counselors have seen an increased number of students &#8230; struggling with anxiety &#8230; tied to social media.” But while those injuries may be serious for some students, the complaint alleges it is a subset of young users of the platforms who can experience those mental health issues. As with the allegations in Vancouver&#8217;s complaint, Brevard&#8217;s complaint does not allege that the health of Brevard&#8217;s students, let alone of any broader community, was affected indiscriminately or generally by the platforms&#8230;.</p>
<p>In re Social Media Adolescent Addiction, at pages *13 through *14, did not cite Florida authority in its discussion, and In re JUUL, at pages 647 through 648 and footnotes 73 and 74, did not discuss Florida&#8217;s definition of “considerable number of persons.” We therefore do not find those federal cases helpful.</p></blockquote>
<p><em>California</em></p>
<p>California authorizes public agencies to bring nuisance claims only to abate the nuisance, and here the school district also sought damages. It could only sue for financial damages if it alleged property damage, which it did not properly do. &#8220;Any connection to property here is abstract at best. Accepting San Diego&#8217;s position would convert virtually any personal injury affecting a property owner into a nuisance.&#8221;</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>This ruling provides a reminder that the school district cases over social media addiction are likely overreaching, perhaps to the breaking point.</p>
<p>In particular, the court&#8217;s ruling repeatedly highlights one of the biggest concerns about treating social medias as a public nuisance to school districts: if that&#8217;s the case, there is no limit to what other entities could be sued for imposing administrative or financial burdens on the school districts; and there is no limit on what other government agencies might claim that private actors are increasing demand for government services. I honestly can&#8217;t believe the public nuisance claims have gone anywhere, yet the federal court greenlighted bellwether trials on that basis (and the social media services already paid millions of dollars to a school district as a result). I continue to believe that the public nuisance claims in the federal case will not survive appeal.</p>
<p>Despite the overall weakness of the public nuisance claim, I can see why the school districts would be frustrated with this ruling. Virtually every judgment call broke against them. Like every aspect of the regulatory and plaintiff endeavors against social media addiction, this ruling will surely be appealed.</p>
<p><em>Case Citation</em>: <a href="https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B340661.PDF">Social Media Cases: San Diego Unified School District v. Meta Platforms, Inc.</a>, 2026 WL 3347173 (Cal. App. Ct. Nov. 5, 2026). This opinion was authored by <a href="https://appellate.courts.ca.gov/district-courts/2dca/bio/anne-richardson">Justice Anne Richardson</a>.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/11/california-appeals-court-confirms-that-school-districts-cant-sue-over-social-media-addiction.htm">California Appeals Court Confirms That School Districts Can&#8217;t Sue Over Social Media Addiction</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org">Technology &amp; Marketing Law Blog</a>.</p>
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">29434</post-id>	</item>
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		<title>Ninth Circuit Easily Rejects (Most of) a &#8220;Predator Access&#8221; Lawsuit on Section 230 Grounds&#8211;Doe (KB) v. Facebook</title>
		<link>https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/11/ninth-circuit-easily-rejects-most-of-a-predator-access-lawsuit-on-section-230-grounds-doe-kb-v-facebook.htm</link>
					<comments>https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/11/ninth-circuit-easily-rejects-most-of-a-predator-access-lawsuit-on-section-230-grounds-doe-kb-v-facebook.htm#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Goldman]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 21:40:53 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Content Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Derivative Liability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privacy/Security]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://blog.ericgoldman.org/?p=29421</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>This is a FOSTA-and-more claim against Instagram. As I previously summarized, the plaintiff claimed (1) Instagram is a “breeding ground” for sex trafficking, and (2) Instagram’s algorithms matched the  criminal with the victim. The plaintiff&#8217;s lawyers tried the full range...</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/11/ninth-circuit-easily-rejects-most-of-a-predator-access-lawsuit-on-section-230-grounds-doe-kb-v-facebook.htm">Ninth Circuit Easily Rejects (Most of) a &#8220;Predator Access&#8221; Lawsuit on Section 230 Grounds&#8211;Doe (KB) v. Facebook</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org">Technology &amp; Marketing Law Blog</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/drudge-siren.png"><img decoding="async" class="alignright size-medium wp-image-17012" src="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/drudge-siren-300x300.png" alt="" width="300" height="300" srcset="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/drudge-siren-300x300.png 300w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/drudge-siren-150x150.png 150w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/drudge-siren.png 400w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a>This is a FOSTA-and-more claim against Instagram. As I <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2024/06/instagram-defeats-lawsuit-claiming-it-was-a-breeding-ground-for-sex-traffickers-doe-v-backpage.htm">previously summarized</a>, the plaintiff claimed (1) Instagram is a “breeding ground” for sex trafficking, and (2) Instagram’s algorithms matched the  criminal with the victim. The plaintiff&#8217;s lawyers tried the full range of now-standard Section 230 workaround attempts, arguing everything from design defects to incomplete reporting mechanisms. The district court provided this recap of the case:</p>
<blockquote><p>Plaintiff Jane Doe alleges that she was a victim of horrific sex trafficking crimes on Instagram, a social media platform owned by Defendant Meta Platforms, Inc. (“Meta”), where she was repeatedly sold for unlawful sex acts over the course of a year. Her trafficker was later convicted in a criminal trial and sentenced to 40 years in prison. Doe now sues Meta, alleging that it facilitated and financially benefited from her sex trafficking, in violation of the federal civil sex trafficking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1595. Doe also asserts products liability claims for design defect and failure to warn, alleging that Meta defectively designed Instagram because it lacked identity verification procedures and adequate mechanisms to report sex trafficking, as well as failed to provide adequate warnings about the known danger of trafficking on Instagram</p></blockquote>
<p>On appeal, the Ninth Circuit&#8211;in a terse unpublished opinion that doesn&#8217;t even bother to summarize the case facts&#8211;emphatically rejects all of the Section 230 workarounds, except for the reporting mechanism claim. Because that claim is extremely likely to fail on remand, most likely this case is essentially over.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">* * *</p>
<p><em><a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/IMG_8558-scaled.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignright size-medium wp-image-20910" src="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/IMG_8558-300x139.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="139" srcset="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/IMG_8558-300x139.jpg 300w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/IMG_8558-1024x474.jpg 1024w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/IMG_8558-768x355.jpg 768w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/IMG_8558-1536x711.jpg 1536w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/IMG_8558-2048x948.jpg 2048w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a>1595 Claim</em>. &#8220;Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230, bars Doe’s Section 1595 claim&#8221;:</p>
<blockquote><p>First, Doe alleges that Meta did not “ban sex traffickers from using and posting on Instagram” or take “reasonable steps to abate human trafficking,” which created a “breeding ground” for sex trafficking on Instagram. Yet a failure to “review each user-created profile” to ensure it is not unlawful is “precisely the kind of activity for which Congress intended to grant absolution with the passage of [S]ection 230.”</p>
<p>Second, Doe alleges that Instagram uses “algorithms” that “generate targeted recommendations to its users” and “encourag[e] connections between sex traffickers and vulnerable persons on Instagram.” As the district court correctly explained, however, “Doe ‘cannot plead around Section 230 immunity by framing’ her claim as one involving Meta’s connection algorithms rather than the user-generated content that those algorithms facilitate.”</p></blockquote>
<p>In a footnote, the court rejects the <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2024/08/bonkers-opinion-repeals-section-230-in-the-third-circuit-anderson-v-tiktok.htm">Anderson v. TikTok</a> workaround: &#8220;Contrary to Doe’s assertion, the Supreme Court’s decision in <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4904497">Moody v. NetChoice, LLC</a>, 603 U.S. 707 (2024), did not overrule <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2019/08/a-significant-section-230-defense-win-in-the-ninth-circuit-dyroff-v-ultimate-software.htm">Dyroff</a>.&#8221;</p>
<p>(The lower court had explained: &#8220;That those moderation decisions are also protected by the First Amendment does not strip them of their Section 230 immunity. To hold otherwise would effectively render the core of Section 230 a nullity, contrary to Congress’s intent and the plain language of the statute.&#8221;)</p>
<p><em>Products Liability&#8211;Lack of Age Authentication</em>. &#8220;Doe alleges that Meta failed to include identity and age verification requirements as part of the account setup process. Such requirements implicate Meta’s role as a publisher.&#8221;</p>
<p>(The lower court explained: &#8220;A platform’s decision as to whether to allow anonymous speech, and the consequent effects on the content of the speech that proliferates on the platform, is a classic publication decision. It is a determination of who may speak, and thus, whose content may be barred on the platform.&#8221;)</p>
<p>In a footnote, the court adds:</p>
<blockquote><p>Doe’s reliance on <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2021/05/the-ninth-circuits-confusing-ruling-over-snapchats-speed-filter-lemmon-v-snap.htm">Lemmon v. Snap, Inc.</a>, is misplaced. 995 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2021). As we explained in <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2023/10/section-230-once-again-applies-to-claims-over-offline-sexual-abuse-doe-v-grindr.htm">Grindr</a>, the “duty to avoid designing a product that encouraged dangerous driving [in Lemmon] was fully independent of [the] defendant’s role in monitoring or publishing third-party content, and it did not seek to hold the defendant responsible as a publisher or speaker.” The same is not true here. Identity and age verification requirements are “not independent” of Meta’s “role as a facilitator or publisher of third-party content.”</p></blockquote>
<p><em>Products Liability&#8211;Inadequate Reporting Mechanisms</em>.</p>
<blockquote><p>Doe’s design-defects claim based on reporting requirements, however, survives Section 230. Doe alleges that Meta failed to provide “an adequate mechanism to report sex trafficking” or an “immediate response” tool through which Meta would “timely take[] action.” Meta’s Section 230 argument is foreclosed by our decision in <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2025/08/the-ninth-circuit-finds-two-new-ways-to-undermine-section-230-doe-v-twitter.htm">Doe 1 v. Twitter, Inc.</a>, 148 F.4th 635 (9th Cir. 2025). Because Meta’s “improvement of its reporting mechanism . . . would not necessarily require [Meta] to monitor third-party content,” Meta “is not immune from liability on this claim.”</p></blockquote>
<p>What? How could the speed of Meta&#8217;s response to the reports &#8220;not necessarily require Met to monitor third-party content&#8221;? As the lower court said, &#8220;the asserted duty is not only to create a mechanism by which third-party content may be reported, but to monitor and act on those reports as well. Accordingly, the justification for why Meta may be held liable springs from its failure to monitor, and moderate, the third-party content enabled by Instagram.&#8221;</p>
<p>This defective analysis started with Doe 1 v. Twitter, and that ruling&#8217;s flaws remain obvious here.</p>
<p>But what does getting around Section 230 do for the plaintiffs? This is the kind of typical Ninth Circuit switcheroo where the claim gets around Section 230 but will fail because there is no affirmative duty to provide a reporting mechanism for sex trafficking or some other kind of &#8220;immediate response tool.&#8221; So it seems like this claim will easily fail on remand.</p>
<p><em>Failure-to-Warn</em>.</p>
<blockquote><p>Section 230 bars Doe’s failure-to-warn claim. Doe alleges that Instagram “lacks any warnings that sex trafficking is rampant” on the platform, that “foreseeable product use included interactions with traffickers,” and that the use of fake accounts might facilitate sex trafficking. <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2023/10/section-230-once-again-applies-to-claims-over-offline-sexual-abuse-doe-v-grindr.htm">Grindr</a> is instructive. There, we determined that Section 230 barred a claim that Grindr “had a duty to warn Doe about the risks of child sexual exploitation on the [application]” because that duty was based on Grindr’s “role as a publisher of third-party content.” Like here, the plaintiff in Grindr did not allege that Grindr had “independent knowledge of a conspiracy.” Nor does a company’s “role as a publisher of third-party content” give it “a duty to warn users of a general possibility of harm resulting from the [application].” It follows that Section 230 bars Doe’s failure-to-warn claim here: Meta did not have a duty to warn Instagram users of the general possibility of harm resulting from users who might use Instagram for a criminal purpose.</p></blockquote>
<p>In general, the <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2014/09/9th-circuit-creates-problematic-failure-to-warn-exception-to-section-230-immunity-doe-v-internet-brands.htm">Internet Brands</a> and <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2016/09/unfortunate-expansion-of-failure-to-warn-exception-to-section-230-beckman-v-match.htm">Beckman</a> cases suggested that failure-to-warn claims should always get around Section 230. The Ninth Circuit has retrenched from that more absolutist position. In a footnote, the court adds:</p>
<blockquote><p>This is why Doe’s reliance on Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc. is misplaced. There, we determined that Section 230 did not bar a failure-to-warn claim where the defendant “failed to warn of a known conspiracy operating independent of the site’s publishing function.”</p></blockquote>
<p style="text-align: center;">* * *</p>
<p><strong>Implications</strong></p>
<p>This is a memo decision, so it doesn&#8217;t set any precedent. Still, I think it&#8217;s a useful indicator of the status of the Ninth Circuit&#8217;s Section 230 jurisprudence.</p>
<p><em>Section 230 Still Matters in the Ninth Circuit</em>. The Ninth Circuit has swiss-cheesed Section 230 with so many exceptions, yet it still does important work for defendants. Here, several of the standard workarounds to Section 230 didn&#8217;t actually help, making this a pretty easy Section 230 ruling (with the reporting mechanism exception).</p>
<p><em><a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/?s=%22predator+access%22&amp;submit=Search">Predator Access</a> Cases</em>. The Ninth Circuit has consistently shut down claims that services provide too much access to sexual predators. Because this case was ultimately about predator access, it never had a real shot in the Ninth Circuit.</p>
<p><em>Section 230 and Age/Identity Authentication</em>. The panel says that age and identity authentication obligations violate Section 230 because &#8220;[s]uch requirements implicate Meta’s role as a publisher.&#8221; If the Ninth Circuit actually believes this, it would be a major blow for many laws and lawsuits pushing for greater age authentication.</p>
<p><em>Section 230 and Design Defects</em>. The age/identity authentication arguments were framed as design defects, which ran into the Section 230 wall anyway. To me, this is consistent with the Ninth Circuit&#8217;s frequent rejection of design defects as Section 230 workarounds, Lemmon v. Snap notwithstanding. I think this decision provides more evidence that the social media addiction design defect arguments will not be well-received in the Ninth Circuit.</p>
<p><em>Section 230 and Failure-to-Warn</em>. Plaintiffs have assumed that failure-to-warn claims are a free pass around Section 230, even if they are inevitably losers on the prima facie elements. This decision is a reminder that maybe failure-to-warn isn&#8217;t the free pass plaintiffs have assumed.</p>
<p><em>The Anderson v. TikTok Workaround Failed</em>. The plaintiffs are very excited about how the Third Circuit repealed Section 230 in the Anderson v. TikTok case, but that line of thinking has not gone far outside the Third Circuit. This opinion is another rejection of it.</p>
<p><em>The First Amendment Reinforces These Outcomes</em>. The court didn&#8217;t address the First Amendment, but even if the plaintiffs got around Section 230, they would likely hit the First Amendment wall. Simply put, as tragic as the plaintiffs&#8217; stories are, the legal relief they are seeking isn&#8217;t available.</p>
<p><em>The Reporting Mechanism Section 230 Workaround is Unhelpful and Pernicious</em>. The Doe 1 v. Twitter decision was wrong. Plaintiffs can always argue that better reporting systems would have prevented the harm. As a result, as this opinion illustrates, it&#8217;s become a reliable workaround to Section 230. If and when the remanded reporting mechanism cases start failing on prima facie grounds or for other reasons&#8211;but at higher expense to all parties&#8211;it will reinforce that the exception is just another of the Ninth Circuit&#8217;s Section 230 switcheroos.</p>
<p><em>The Wrongdoer Was Punished. </em>A reminder that the plaintiff&#8217;s &#8220;trafficker was later convicted in a criminal trial and sentenced to 40 years in prison.&#8221;</p>
<p><em>Case Citation</em>: <a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2026/11/03/25-2246.pdf">Doe (K.B.) v. Facebook, Inc.</a>, No. 25-2246 (9th Cir. Nov. 3, 2026)</p>
<p><strong>More SESTA/FOSTA-Related Posts</strong></p>
<p>* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/01/salesforce-still-cant-avoid-tertiary-liability-fosta-claims-gg-v-salesforce.htm">Salesforce Still Can’t Avoid Tertiary Liability FOSTA Claims–GG v. Salesforce</a><br />
* <a title="A Massive Roundup of Section 230 Decisions" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/01/a-massive-roundup-of-section-230-decisions.htm" rel="bookmark">A Massive Roundup of Section 230 Decisions</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2025/09/section-230-applies-to-surreptitiously-recorded-video-does-1-9-v-pornhub-and-xhamster.htm">Section 230 Applies to Surreptitiously Recorded Video–Does 1-9 v. Pornhub and xHamster</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2025/08/the-ninth-circuit-finds-two-new-ways-to-undermine-section-230-doe-v-twitter.htm">The Ninth Circuit Finds Two New Ways to Undermine Section 230–Doe v. Twitter</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2025/06/youtube-again-defeats-fosta-lawsuit-in-re-youtube-trafficking-litigation.htm">YouTube Again Defeats FOSTA Lawsuit–In re YouTube Trafficking Litigation</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2025/05/a-roundup-of-recent-section-230-decisions-involving-sex-abuse-or-csam.htm">A Roundup of Recent Section 230 Decisions Involving Sex Abuse or CSAM</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2025/02/ninth-circuit-says-section-230-preempts-defective-design-claims-doe-v-grindr.htm">Ninth Circuit Says Section 230 Preempts “Defective Design” Claims–Doe v. Grindr</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2025/02/section-230-immunizes-onlyfans-for-user-uploaded-video-again-doe-v-fenix.htm">Section 230 Immunizes OnlyFans for User-Uploaded Video (Again)–Doe v. Fenix</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2024/12/the-fifth-circuits-campaign-to-undermine-section-230-is-making-progress-ab-v-salesforce.htm">The Fifth Circuit’s Campaign to Undermine Section 230 Is Making Progress–AB v. Salesforce</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2024/12/omegle-defeats-lawsuit-over-users-capping-mh-v-omegle.htm">Omegle Defeats Lawsuit Over User’s “Capping”–MH v. Omegle</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2024/11/section-230-immunizes-onlyfans-for-user-uploaded-video-doe-v-fenix.htm">Section 230 Immunizes OnlyFans for User-Uploaded Video–Doe v. Fenix</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2024/09/five-decisions-illustrate-how-section-230-is-fading-fast.htm">Five Decisions Illustrate How Section 230 Is Fading Fast</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2024/07/section-230-preempts-fosta-claim-doe-v-webgroup-czech-republic.htm">Section 230 Preempts FOSTA Claim–Doe v. WebGroup Czech Republic</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2024/06/instagram-defeats-lawsuit-claiming-it-was-a-breeding-ground-for-sex-traffickers-doe-v-backpage.htm">Instagram Defeats Lawsuit Claiming It Was a “Breeding Ground” for Sex Traffickers–Doe v. Backpage</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2024/05/the-7th-circuits-section-230-jurisprudences-impact-on-fosta-cases.htm">The 7th Circuit’s Section 230 Jurisprudence’s Impact on FOSTA Cases</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2023/12/grindr-defeats-fosta-claim-doe-v-grindr.htm">Grindr Defeats FOSTA Claim–Doe v. Grindr</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2023/12/twitter-defeats-fosta-case-over-csam-doe-v-twitter.htm">Twitter Defeats FOSTA Case Over CSAM–Doe v. Twitter</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2023/07/dc-circuit-upholds-fostas-constitutionality-by-narrowing-it-woodhull-v-u-s.htm">DC Circuit Upholds FOSTA’s Constitutionality (By Narrowing It)–Woodhull v. U.S.</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2023/06/section-230-immunizes-snap-even-if-its-inherently-dangerous-l-w-v-snap.htm">Section 230 Immunizes Snap, Even if It’s “Inherently Dangerous”–L.W. v. Snap</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2023/05/the-ninth-circuits-fosta-jurisprudence-is-getting-clearer-and-more-defense-favorable.htm">The Ninth Circuit’s FOSTA Jurisprudence Is Getting Clearer (and More Defense-Favorable)</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2022/10/defendants-get-important-fosta-win-in-9th-circuit-doe-v-reddit.htm">Defendants Get Important FOSTA Win in 9th Circuit–Doe v. Reddit</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2022/10/more-evidence-that-fosta-benefited-no-one.htm">More Evidence that FOSTA Benefited No One</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2022/07/omegle-denied-section-230-dismissal-am-v-omegle.htm">Omegle Denied Section 230 Dismissal–AM v. Omegle</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2022/05/section-230-helps-craigslist-defeat-sex-trafficking-case-lh-v-marriott.htm">Section 230 Helps Craigslist Defeat Sex Trafficking Case–LH v. Marriott</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2022/05/section-230-helps-salesforce-defeat-sex-trafficking-lawsuit-gg-v-salesforce.htm">Section 230 Helps Salesforce Defeat Sex Trafficking Lawsuit–GG v. Salesforce</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2022/05/constitutional-challenge-to-fosta-fails-woodhull-v-us.htm">Constitutional Challenge to FOSTA Fails–Woodhull v. US</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2022/04/catching-up-on-a-fosta-case-ml-v-craigslist.htm">Catching Up on a FOSTA Case–ML v. Craigslist</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2022/04/facebook-loses-jurisdictional-ruling-in-texas-sex-trafficking-lawsuit-facebook-v-doe.htm">Facebook Loses Jurisdictional Ruling in Texas Sex Trafficking Lawsuit–Facebook v. Doe</a><br />
* <a title="Justice Thomas Really, REALLY Wants Section 230 Repealed (Even If He Has to Do It Himself)" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2022/03/justice-thomas-really-really-wants-section-230-repealed-even-if-he-has-to-do-it-himself.htm" rel="bookmark">Justice Thomas Really, REALLY Wants Section 230 Repealed (Even If He Has to Do It Himself)</a><br />
* <a title="Section 230 Immunizes TikTok for User-Posted Videos–Day v. TikTok" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2022/03/section-230-immunizes-tiktok-for-user-posted-videos-day-v-tiktok.htm" rel="bookmark">Section 230 Immunizes TikTok for User-Posted Videos–Day v. TikTok</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2022/02/so-many-unanswered-empirical-questions-about-fosta.htm">So Many Unanswered Empirical Questions About FOSTA</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2022/02/another-problematic-fosta-ruling-doe-v-pornhub.htm">Another Problematic FOSTA Ruling–Doe v. Pornhub</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2022/01/catching-up-on-recent-fosta-developments-none-of-them-good.htm">Catching Up on Recent FOSTA Developments (None of Them Good)</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2022/01/section-230-preempts-claims-against-omegle-m-h-v-omegle.htm">Section 230 Preempts Claims Against Omegle–M.H. v. Omegle</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2021/09/to-no-ones-surprise-fosta-is-confounding-judges-j-b-v-g6.htm">To No One’s Surprise, FOSTA Is Confounding Judges–J.B. v. G6</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2021/09/fosta-claim-can-proceed-against-twitter-doe-v-twitter.htm">FOSTA Claim Can Proceed Against Twitter–Doe v. Twitter</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2021/01/fosta-survives-constitutional-challenge-us-v-martono.htm">FOSTA Survives Constitutional Challenge–US v. Martono</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2021/01/2h-2020-quick-links-part-4-fosta.htm">2H 2020 Quick Links, Part 4 (FOSTA)</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2020/12/justice-thomas-anti-section-230-statement-doesnt-support-reconsideration-jb-v-craigslist.htm">Justice Thomas’ Anti-Section 230 Statement Doesn’t Support Reconsideration–JB v. Craigslist</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2020/09/sex-trafficking-lawsuit-against-craigslist-moves-forward-ml-v-craigslist.htm">Sex Trafficking Lawsuit Against Craigslist Moves Forward–ML v. Craigslist</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2020/09/section-230-preempts-another-fosta-claim-doe-v-kik.htm">Section 230 Preempts Another FOSTA Claim–Doe v. Kik</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2020/08/section-230-protects-craigslist-from-sex-trafficking-claims-despite-fosta-jb-v-craigslist.htm">Section 230 Protects Craigslist from Sex Trafficking Claims, Despite FOSTA–JB v. Craigslist</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2020/04/facebook-still-cant-dismiss-sex-trafficking-victims-lawsuit-in-texas-state-court.htm">Facebook Still Can’t Dismiss Sex Trafficking Victims’ Lawsuit in Texas State Court</a><br />
* <a title="Craigslist Denied Section 230 Immunity for Classified Ads from 2008–ML v. Craigslist" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2020/04/craigslist-denied-section-230-immunity-for-classified-ads-from-2008-ml-v-craigslist.htm" rel="bookmark">Craigslist Denied Section 230 Immunity for Classified Ads from 2008–ML v. Craigslist</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2020/04/2h-2019-and-q1-2020-quick-links-part-3-fosta-backpage.htm">2H 2019 and Q1 2020 Quick Links, Part 3 (FOSTA/Backpage)</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2020/02/new-paper-explains-how-fosta-devastated-male-sex-workers.htm">New Paper Explains How FOSTA Devastated Male Sex Workers</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2020/01/fosta-constitutional-challenge-revived-woodhull-freedom-foundation-v-us.htm">FOSTA Constitutional Challenge Revived–Woodhull Freedom Foundation v. US</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2020/01/new-civil-fosta-lawsuits-push-expansive-legal-theories-against-unexpected-defendants-guest-blog-post.htm">New Civil FOSTA Lawsuits Push Expansive Legal Theories Against Unexpected Defendants</a> (Guest Blog Post)<br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2019/11/section-230-helps-salesforce-defeat-sex-trafficking-lawsuit-doe-v-salesforce.htm">Section 230 Helps Salesforce Defeat Sex Trafficking Lawsuit–Doe v. Salesforce</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2019/06/latest-linkwrap-on-fostas-aftermath.htm">Latest Linkwrap on FOSTA’s Aftermath</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2019/05/section-230-doesnt-end-lawsuit-claiming-facebook-facilitated-sex-trafficking-doe-v-facebook.htm">Section 230 Doesn’t End Lawsuit Claiming Facebook Facilitated Sex Trafficking–Doe v. Facebook</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2019/05/new-essay-the-complicated-story-of-fosta-and-section-230.htm">New Essay: The Complicated Story of FOSTA and Section 230</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2019/01/who-benefited-from-fosta-spoiler-probably-no-one.htm">Who Benefited from FOSTA? (Spoiler: Probably No One)</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/11/fostas-political-curse.htm">FOSTA’s Political Curse</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/10/fosta-doesnt-help-pro-se-litigants-defamation-claim-against-facebook.htm">FOSTA Doesn’t Help Pro Se Litigant’s Defamation Claim Against Facebook</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/10/constitutional-challenge-to-fosta-dismissed-for-lack-of-standing-guest-blog-post.htm">Constitutional Challenge to FOSTA Dismissed for Lack of Standing</a> (Guest Blog Post)<br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/08/an-update-on-the-constitutional-court-challenge-to-fosta-woodhull-freedom-v-us-guest-blog-post.htm">An Update on the Constitutional Court Challenge to FOSTA–Woodhull Freedom v. US</a> (Guest Blog Post)<br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/07/indianapolis-police-have-been-blinded-lately-because-they-shut-backpage-down.htm">Indianapolis Police Have Been “Blinded Lately Because They Shut Backpage Down”</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/07/constitutional-challenge-against-fosta-filed-woodhull-v-us-guest-blog-post.htm">Constitutional Challenge Against FOSTA Filed–Woodhull v. US</a> (Guest Blog Post)<br />
* <a title="Catching Up on FOSTA Since Its Enactment (A Linkwrap)" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/06/catching-up-on-fosta-since-its-enactment-a-linkwrap.htm" rel="bookmark">Catching Up on FOSTA Since Its Enactment (A Linkwrap)</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/04/more-aftermath-from-the-worst-of-both-worlds-fosta.htm">More Aftermath from the ‘Worst of Both Worlds FOSTA’</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/04/worst-of-both-worlds-fosta-signed-into-law-completing-section-230s-evisceration.htm">‘Worst of Both Worlds’ FOSTA Signed Into Law, Completing Section 230’s Evisceration</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/04/backpage-loses-another-section-230-motion-again-without-sesta-fosta-florida-abolitionists-v-backpage.htm">Backpage Loses Another Section 230 Motion (Again Without SESTA/FOSTA)–Florida Abolitionists v. Backpage</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/03/district-court-ruling-highlights-congress-hastiness-to-pass-worst-of-both-worlds-fosta-doe-1-v-backpage.htm">District Court Ruling Highlights Congress’ Hastiness To Pass ‘Worst of Both Worlds FOSTA’– Doe 1 v. Backpage</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/03/more-on-the-unconstitutional-retroactivity-of-worst-of-both-worlds-fosta-guest-blog-post.htm">More on the Unconstitutional Retroactivity of ‘Worst of Both Worlds FOSTA’</a> (Guest Blog Post)<br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/03/senate-passes-worst-of-both-worlds-fosta-linkwrap.htm">Senate Passes ‘Worst of Both Worlds FOSTA’ (Linkwrap)</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/03/why-fostas-restriction-on-prostitution-promotion-violates-the-first-amendment-guest-blog-post.htm">Why FOSTA’s Restriction on Prostitution Promotion Violates the First Amendment</a> (Guest Blog Post)<br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/03/sestas-sponsors-still-dont-understand-section-230-as-they-are-about-to-eviscerate-it.htm">SESTA’s Sponsors Still Don’t Understand Section 230 (As They Are About to Eviscerate It)</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/03/can-the-worst-of-both-worlds-fosta-be-salvaged-perhaps-and-you-can-help-urgent-call-to-action.htm">Can the ‘Worst of Both Worlds FOSTA’ Be Salvaged? Perhaps…and You Can Help (URGENT CALL TO ACTION)</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/02/congress-probably-will-ruin-section-230-this-week-sestafosta-updates.htm">Congress Probably Will Ruin Section 230 This Week (SESTA/FOSTA Updates)</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/01/whats-new-with-sestafosta-january-17-2018-edition.htm">What’s New With SESTA/FOSTA (January 17, 2018 edition)</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/12/new-house-bill-substitute-fosta-has-more-promising-approach-to-regulating-online-sex-trafficking.htm">New House Bill (Substitute FOSTA) Has More Promising Approach to Regulating Online Sex Trafficking</a><br />
* My testimony at the House Energy &amp; Commerce Committee: <a href="https://ssrn.com/abstract=3079193">Balancing Section 230 and Anti-Sex Trafficking Initiatives</a><br />
* <a title="How SESTA Undermines Section 230’s Good Samaritan Provisions" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/11/how-sesta-undermines-section-230s-good-samaritan-provisions.htm" rel="bookmark">How SESTA Undermines Section 230’s Good Samaritan Provisions</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/11/managers-amendment-for-sesta-slightly-improves-a-still-terrible-bill.htm">Manager’s Amendment for SESTA Slightly Improves a Still-Terrible Bill</a><br />
* <a class="broken_link" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/11/another-human-trafficking-expert-raises-concerns-about-sesta-guest-blog-post.htm">Another Human Trafficking Expert Raises Concerns About SESTA</a> (Guest Blog Post)<br />
* <a class="broken_link" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/10/another-sesta-linkwrap-week-of-october-30.htm">Another SESTA Linkwrap (Week of October 30)</a><br />
* <a class="broken_link" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/10/recent-sesta-developments-a-linkwrap.htm">Recent SESTA Developments (A Linkwrap)</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/10/section-230s-applicability-to-inconsistent-state-laws-guest-blog-post.htm">Section 230’s Applicability to ‘Inconsistent’ State Laws</a> (Guest Blog Post)<br />
* <a class="broken_link" title="An Overview of Congress’ Pending Legislation on Sex Trafficking (Guest Blog Post)" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/10/an-overview-of-congress-pending-legislation-on-sex-trafficking-guest-blog-post.htm" rel="bookmark">An Overview of Congress’ Pending Legislation on Sex Trafficking</a> (Guest Blog Post)<br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/09/the-dojs-busts-of-myredbook-rentboy-show-how-backpage-might-be-prosecuted-guest-blog-post.htm">The DOJ’s Busts of MyRedbook &amp; Rentboy Show How Backpage Might Be Prosecuted</a> (Guest Blog Post)<br />
* <a class="broken_link" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/09/problems-with-sestas-retroactivity-provision-guest-blog-post.htm">Problems With SESTA’s Retroactivity Provision</a> (Guest Blog Post)<br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/09/my-senate-testimony-on-sesta-sesta-hearing-linkwrap.htm">My Senate Testimony on SESTA + SESTA Hearing Linkwrap</a><br />
* <a class="broken_link" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/09/debunking-some-myths-about-section-230-and-sex-trafficking-guest-blog-post.htm">Debunking Some Myths About Section 230 and Sex Trafficking</a> (Guest Blog Post)<br />
* <a title="Congress Is About To Ruin Its Online Free Speech Masterpiece (Cross-Post)" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/09/congress-is-about-to-ruin-its-online-free-speech-masterpiece-cross-post.htm" rel="bookmark">Congress Is About To Ruin Its Online Free Speech Masterpiece (Cross-Post)</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/08/backpage-executives-must-face-money-laundering-charges-despite-section-230-people-v-ferrer.htm">Backpage Executives Must Face Money Laundering Charges Despite Section 230–People v. Ferrer</a><br />
* <a class="broken_link" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/08/how-section-230-helps-sex-trafficking-victims-and-sesta-would-hurt-them-guest-blog-post.htm">How Section 230 Helps Sex Trafficking Victims (and SESTA Would Hurt Them)</a> (guest blog post)<br />
* <a class="broken_link" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/08/senportmansestawrong.htm">Sen. Portman Says SESTA Doesn’t Affect the Good Samaritan Defense. He’s Wrong</a><br />
* <a class="broken_link" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/07/senates-stop-enabling-sex-traffickers-act-of-2017-and-section-230s-imminent-evisceration.htm">Senate’s “Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act of 2017”–and Section 230’s Imminent Evisceration</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/04/the-allow-states-and-victims-to-fight-online-sex-trafficking-act-of-2017-bill-would-be-bad-news-for-section-230.htm">The “Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017” Bill Would Be Bad News for Section 230</a><br />
* <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/03/warning-draft-no-immunity-for-sex-traffickers-online-act-bill-poses-major-threat-to-section-230.htm">WARNING: Draft “No Immunity for Sex Traffickers Online Act” Bill Poses Major Threat to Section 230</a><br />
* <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2287622">The Implications of Excluding State Crimes from 47 U.S.C. § 230’s Immunity</a></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/11/ninth-circuit-easily-rejects-most-of-a-predator-access-lawsuit-on-section-230-grounds-doe-kb-v-facebook.htm">Ninth Circuit Easily Rejects (Most of) a &#8220;Predator Access&#8221; Lawsuit on Section 230 Grounds&#8211;Doe (KB) v. Facebook</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org">Technology &amp; Marketing Law Blog</a>.</p>
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		<title>Section 230 Blocks Lawsuits That &#8220;Meddle&#8221; With Online Publishers&#8217; Editorial Decisions&#8211;Shared v. Meta</title>
		<link>https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/11/section-230-blocks-lawsuits-that-meddle-with-online-publishers-editorial-decisions-shared-v-meta.htm</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Goldman]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 14:51:57 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Content Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Derivative Liability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Licensing/Contracts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Marketing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trespass to Chattels]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://blog.ericgoldman.org/?p=29405</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The Ninth Circuit&#8217;s Section 230 jurisprudence has devolved into a drama-filled implosion, so it&#8217;s shocking (in a refreshing way) when the Ninth Circuit nowadays issues a normal, straight-down-the-middle Section 230 opinion without any caveats, tricks, or angst. I have a...</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/11/section-230-blocks-lawsuits-that-meddle-with-online-publishers-editorial-decisions-shared-v-meta.htm">Section 230 Blocks Lawsuits That &#8220;Meddle&#8221; With Online Publishers&#8217; Editorial Decisions&#8211;Shared v. Meta</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org">Technology &amp; Marketing Law Blog</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/IMG_8558-scaled.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignright size-medium wp-image-20910" src="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/IMG_8558-300x139.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="139" srcset="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/IMG_8558-300x139.jpg 300w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/IMG_8558-1024x474.jpg 1024w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/IMG_8558-768x355.jpg 768w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/IMG_8558-1536x711.jpg 1536w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/IMG_8558-2048x948.jpg 2048w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a>The Ninth Circuit&#8217;s Section 230 jurisprudence has devolved into a drama-filled implosion, so it&#8217;s shocking (in a refreshing way) when the Ninth Circuit nowadays issues a normal, straight-down-the-middle Section 230 opinion without any caveats, tricks, or angst. I have a blogging backlog of many other Section 230 cases that I hope to cover before year-end, but I&#8217;m fast-tracking this one because of its novelty.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">* * *</p>
<p>This is an account termination/content removal case, so you already know <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3911509">the plaintiff is going to lose</a>&#8211;the only question is how.</p>
<p>Shared allegedly “creates and publishes original, timely, and entertaining [online] content.” It ran Facebook pages that, at one point, had 25M followers. Shared heavily used Facebook&#8217;s self-service advertising, placing over 500,000 ads. Facebook rejected over 18,000 of those ads. The court says &#8220;Shared regularly relied on &#8216;scammy&#8217; ads and &#8216;blatant clickbait.'&#8221; Here is an example of one of their rejected ads:</p>
<p><a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/shared-ad.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="aligncenter wp-image-29406 size-medium_large" src="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/shared-ad-768x692.jpg" alt="" width="768" height="692" srcset="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/shared-ad-768x692.jpg 768w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/shared-ad-300x270.jpg 300w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/shared-ad.jpg 792w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 768px) 100vw, 768px" /></a></p>
<p>This ad showed Luke Wilson next to a serious car crash, baiting viewers to click on the ad to check whether he was OK. (<a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/luke-wilson-called-a-hero-in-deadly-los-angeles-crash/">He was</a>). Facebook rejected this ad based on its policy against “shocking or sensational content,” including photos that “depict violence.” Shared was upset that it got canned explanations for its ad rejections, rather than personalized roadmaps to correct any problems.</p>
<p>Ultimately, Facebook pulled the plug on Shared&#8217;s operations in October 2020. The court summarizes Shared&#8217;s claims:</p>
<blockquote><p>Shared sued Meta for, among other things, conversion and fraudulent inducement, claiming that Meta’s decision to “unpublish[] the Shared [Facebook] Pages” was a business “death sentence.” It based the conversion claim on Meta’s “unpublishing” the Shared Facebook Pages, over which Shared argued it had an exclusive property right.</p></blockquote>
<p>If none of this makes sense to you, join the club. Conversion is a chattel-based concept, so what is it doing here? It brought to mind the <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2024/01/web-page-framing-isnt-trespass-to-chattels-best-carpet-values-v-google.htm">Best Carpet Values v. Google</a> case, where the plaintiff unsuccessfully claimed that web page framing was a trespass to the chattels of intangible web pages. What is it with plaintiffs importing offline chattels-based doctrines into the intangible web?</p>
<p>The lower court dismissed the case. <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2022/09/another-example-of-how-notice-and-explanations-requirements-are-a-liability-trap-shared-v-facebook.htm">My prior blog post</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">* * *</p>
<p>In a published opinion, the Ninth Circuit dismisses the conversion claim on Section 230 grounds. &#8220;Shared’s conversion claim seeks to impose liability on Meta for “unpublishing” Shared’s Facebook pages.&#8221; Labeling the claim as &#8220;conversion&#8221; was unusual but not creative or productive. The court responds flatly: &#8220;Section 230 bars the conversion claim.&#8221;</p>
<p>Shared only contested the publisher/speaker element, arguing that the conversion claim was somehow not that. The court easily rejects that:</p>
<blockquote><p>Shared sued Meta because the latter exercised its publishing prerogative by removing third-party content—i.e., Shared’s Facebook pages. Such a decision to remove content and prevent someone from posting advertisements is a quintessential editorial decision protected under Section 230.</p></blockquote>
<p>Shared tried to end-run this obvious conclusion by invoking the <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2024/06/ninth-circuit-does-more-damage-to-section-230-calise-v-meta.htm">Calise</a>/<a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2024/08/when-it-comes-to-section-230-the-ninth-circuit-is-a-chaos-agent-estate-of-bride-v-yolo.htm">YOLO</a> line of promise-based Section 230 exceptions:</p>
<blockquote><p>Shared contends that its conversion claim effectively “seeks to hold Meta liable for failing to comply with its promise” not to remove Shared from Facebook “unless Shared ‘clearly, seriously, or repeatedly’ breached Facebook’s Terms or Policies,” which Shared claims it did not.</p></blockquote>
<p>If you read Calise and YOLO literally, Section 230 should fall away once the plaintiff cites any promise made by the defendant. That did not happen here.</p>
<p>First, the court expresses skepticism about whether any promise was made because the TOS &#8220;gives Meta unilateral authority to determine whether a business has breached the Community Standards.&#8221; However, that&#8217;s not a 230 defense, that would be a failure of the prima facie elements. I&#8217;ll note that plaintiffs routinely mine a defendant&#8217;s site disclosures to identify and overstate alleged promises that are anything but.</p>
<p><a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/MeddleCover.jpeg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignright size-medium wp-image-29407" src="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/MeddleCover-300x295.jpeg" alt="" width="300" height="295" srcset="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/MeddleCover-300x295.jpeg 300w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/MeddleCover-1024x1007.jpeg 1024w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/MeddleCover-768x755.jpeg 768w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/MeddleCover.jpeg 1220w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a>Second,</p>
<blockquote><p>Calise is of little help because Shared still seeks to meddle with Meta’s publishing discretion&#8230;.a contractual promise that reiterates the company’s inherent publishing authority still amounts to publishing activity protected by Section 230. [Cite to <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2021/11/another-online-account-termination-case-fails-king-v-facebook.htm">King v. Facebook</a>.] Indeed, it makes little sense to strip Meta of Section 230 liability defense simply because Facebook articulated its discretion as a publisher in its Terms of Service.</p></blockquote>
<p>The court distinguishes <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/06/ninth_circuit_h.htm">Barnes</a>: &#8220;Yahoo’s one-time promise to a specific user was beyond its typical publishing activity.&#8221; The court distinguishes Calise: &#8220;Facebook in Calise promised to curb advertisements that &#8216;defraud[] or exploit[]&#8217; for &#8216;money or property.&#8217; Such a contractual promise does not sound in editorial discretion but rather represents a business commitment to smoke out scammers.&#8221; Do those distinctions persuade you?</p>
<p>The court summarizes:</p>
<blockquote><p>a claim does not automatically fall outside the ambit of Section 230’s liability protection just because it is framed as a breach of contract. Instead, a court must evaluate a claim to determine whether it seeks to treat an interactive computer service as a publisher or speaker of third-party information. That task may include assessing the core theory of the complaint and the nature of the alleged injurious conduct. In our case, Shared’s claim hinges on Meta’s publishing authority, despite being dressed up in contractual garb. Section 230 thus bars Shared’s claim.</p></blockquote>
<p>In other words, Shared didn&#8217;t like having its account yanked, especially after all of the money it spent on Facebook ads, but it&#8217;s Facebook&#8217;s editorial prerogative to publish or not publish Shared&#8217;s content and ads. The net effect is straightforward: an account termination/content removal case fails even when a plaintiff tries the obtuse framing of conversion. No surprises there.</p>
<p>Yet, if you asked me to explain why Calise&#8217;s claim didn&#8217;t turn on Facebook&#8217;s editorial prerogative but Shared&#8217;s claim did, I couldn&#8217;t do it persuasively. Maybe one way to reconcile it is that Shared was publishing its own content on Facebook, while the plaintiffs in Barnes, Calise, and YOLO were suing based on someone else&#8217;s published content? That sure seems like a fine distinction, and the court didn&#8217;t make it clearly.  I imagine the Ninth Circuit will have plenty more opportunities to plumb its purported distinctions. I personally think this decision casts more doubt on the wisdom of both Calise and YOLO.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">* * *</p>
<p>In a separate unpublished opinion, the court rejects Shared&#8217;s misrepresentation claim on statute of limitations grounds. &#8220;Shared received thousands of ad-rejection messages with allegedly inadequate explanations starting in 2016. But it did not sue until six years later.&#8221; But also, &#8220;even if Shared’s fraud claims were timely, Shared waived its fraud claims through its course of conduct over multiple years&#8221; because it kept placing orders despite receiving allegedly defective ad rejections.</p>
<p><em>Case Citation</em>: The published opinion: <a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/10/30/25-2612.pdf">Shared Partnership v. Meta Platforms, Inc.</a>, 2026 WL 3266791 (9th Cir. Oct. 30, 2026)</p>
<p>The unpublished opinion: <a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/memoranda/2026/10/30/25-2612.pdf">Shared Partnership v. Meta Platforms, Inc.</a>, No. 25-2612 (9th Cir. Oct. 30, 2026)</p>
<p>Plaintiff&#8217;s lawyers were: Cook Alciati of Gardella Alciati, whose bio says he &#8220;specializes in intellectual property litigation with a particular emphasis on patent litigation,&#8221; and Seth Wiener of San Ramon.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/11/section-230-blocks-lawsuits-that-meddle-with-online-publishers-editorial-decisions-shared-v-meta.htm">Section 230 Blocks Lawsuits That &#8220;Meddle&#8221; With Online Publishers&#8217; Editorial Decisions&#8211;Shared v. Meta</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org">Technology &amp; Marketing Law Blog</a>.</p>
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		<title>After $6M and 17 Years Fighting the Record Labels&#8217; Copyright Lawfare, the Court Awards Vimeo $16k in Costs&#8211;Capitol Records v. Vimeo</title>
		<link>https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/09/after-6m-and-17-years-fighting-the-record-labels-copyright-lawfare-the-court-awards-vimeo-16k-in-costs-capitol-records-v-vimeo.htm</link>
					<comments>https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/09/after-6m-and-17-years-fighting-the-record-labels-copyright-lawfare-the-court-awards-vimeo-16k-in-costs-capitol-records-v-vimeo.htm#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Goldman]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 09 Sep 2026 15:21:27 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Copyright]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Derivative Liability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Internet History]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://blog.ericgoldman.org/?p=29254</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The record labels sued Vimeo for user-caused copyright infringement in 2009. The case is still ongoing in 2026. How old is this lawsuit? If it were a person, it would be GenZ and thus older than every Gen Alpha person...</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/09/after-6m-and-17-years-fighting-the-record-labels-copyright-lawfare-the-court-awards-vimeo-16k-in-costs-capitol-records-v-vimeo.htm">After $6M and 17 Years Fighting the Record Labels&#8217; Copyright Lawfare, the Court Awards Vimeo $16k in Costs&#8211;Capitol Records v. Vimeo</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org">Technology &amp; Marketing Law Blog</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The record labels sued Vimeo for user-caused copyright infringement in 2009. The case is still ongoing in 2026. How old is this lawsuit? If it were a person, it would be GenZ and thus older than every Gen Alpha person on earth.</p>
<p>This case was part of a broad-based copyright owner litigation campaign that included Viacom v. YouTube and UMG v. Veoh. All of these lawsuits were designed to permanently shut down the video hosting category by finding a hole in the Section 512(c) online safe harbor so that copyright owners could sue UGC sites even if they didn&#8217;t send individual takedown notices. YouTube settled, Veoh went broke, and Vimeo soldiered on (and on and on&#8230;).</p>
<p><a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/soup-nazi-fee-shift.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignright size-medium wp-image-29255" src="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/soup-nazi-fee-shift-240x300.jpg" alt="" width="240" height="300" srcset="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/soup-nazi-fee-shift-240x300.jpg 240w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/soup-nazi-fee-shift.jpg 500w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 240px) 100vw, 240px" /></a>In January 2025, Vimeo scored a <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2025/01/512c-helps-vimeo-defeat-the-record-labels-it-only-took-15-years-capitol-v-vimeo.htm">major win in the Second Circuit</a>. When the dust settled, the court summarizes: &#8220;Vimeo ultimately achieved complete victory on all of Plaintiffs’ claims after many long, hard-fought years spent litigating this dispute.&#8221;</p>
<p>Vimeo sought a 505 attorneys&#8217; fee shift for its $6 million in defense costs over 17 years. The court denies the request, but awards it a token $16,000 in costs.</p>
<p>The court summarizes its thinking:</p>
<blockquote><p>As Vimeo itself has previously recognized, this case raised “many difficult or new” issues&#8230;.An award of attorneys’ fees to Vimeo, however, would not serve the purposes of the Copyright Act. Plaintiffs asserted reasonable claims that raised novel, complex questions of law, and they litigated those claims reasonably and in good faith. This case also presents little need for either compensation or deterrence.</p></blockquote>
<p>What were those novel issues?</p>
<blockquote><p>This case raised many issues of first impression, including, but not limited to, the legal framework governing when a service provider is deemed to have actual or constructive (also called “red flag”) knowledge of infringement, the circumstances in which willful blindness is a proxy for knowledge, the factual showing necessary for a plaintiff to establish the foregoing, and whether the DMCA&#8217;s safe harbor provisions applied to sound recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972.</p></blockquote>
<p>Those issues felt more novel back in 2009. The court acknowledges the case&#8217;s venerability, saying:</p>
<blockquote><p>the legal standards governing, and the factual showing required to receive, DMCA safe harbor protection had not been addressed by the Second Circuit when Plaintiffs filed suit in 2009&#8230;.</p>
<p>Even following Viacom, the evidentiary showing necessary to present or defeat a safe-harbor defense under the DMCA was not settled law, particularly with respect to the question of actual or red flag knowledge of infringement.</p></blockquote>
<p>Vimeo pointed out that the record labels could have avoided this case entirely by sending proper 512(c)(3) takedown notices. The court is unmoved:</p>
<blockquote><p>there is no statutory requirement that a plaintiff exhaust its notice-and-takedown remedies against a defendant before bringing suit under the Copyright Act&#8230;.</p>
<p>As the Second Circuit noted, the notice-and-takedown provisions merely “augment[ed] the arsenal of copyright owners” by creating an alternative remedy. And because the limitation on liability conferred by the DMCA is qualified, rather than absolute, there remains a place for good-faith lawsuits under the Copyright Act to test whether a service provider is entitled to that immunity. From a rightsholder&#8217;s perspective, the two remedies are far from the same: unlike a claim brought under the Copyright Act, a DMCA takedown notice does not provide a rightsholder with monetary relief for past infringement or injunctive relief against future infringement, both of which Plaintiffs sought in this action. Penalizing a rightsholder for seeking a remedy available to it under the Copyright Act—without an exhaustion requirement—would not serve the Act&#8217;s purposes.</p></blockquote>
<p>The court did award Vimeo $16k in costs because it prevailed in the most recent Second Circuit appeal.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">* * *</p>
<p>Did the record labels really have colorable arguments when they first filed this lawsuit? Well, yes, in the sense that the DMCA is a long and complicated safe harbor filled with ambiguities. Major copyright owners planned to test all of the ambiguities&#8211;and are still working on that agenda nearly 30 years later.</p>
<p>However, the copyright owners&#8217; real agenda was never to clarify the ambiguities in good faith. Instead, their goal is, and always was, to tacitly amend the DMCA safe harbor in court to secure terms they did not and could not get from Congress via legislative deal-making&#8211;most notably, to let copyright owners bypass the DMCA&#8217;s central notice-and-takedown architecture so that they could sue UGC services over user-caused copyright infringement without sending individual takedown notices. The copyright owners have been willing to risk many millions of dollars to obtain that backdoor amendment in court, and they really don&#8217;t care about the consequences for the defendants they steamroller or bankrupt in the process. To me, this is exactly why a 505 fee shift would have been the only fair outcome here. If the copyright owners are going to gamble some of their fortune on securing legislative amendments via impact litigation, they should bear the full costs of that strategy.</p>
<p>Instead, the fee shift denial implicitly legitimizes the copyright owners&#8217; lawfare strategy against the DMCA online safe harbors. There is surely <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2013/04/designing_optim_1.htm">one or more lessons</a> about the proper design of immunities and safe harbors buried in this case study somewhere.</p>
<p><em>Case Citation: </em><a href="http://business.cch.com/ipld/CapitolRecordsVimeo20260903091026.pdf">Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC</a>, 2026 WL 2606633 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2026)</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/09/after-6m-and-17-years-fighting-the-record-labels-copyright-lawfare-the-court-awards-vimeo-16k-in-costs-capitol-records-v-vimeo.htm">After $6M and 17 Years Fighting the Record Labels&#8217; Copyright Lawfare, the Court Awards Vimeo $16k in Costs&#8211;Capitol Records v. Vimeo</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org">Technology &amp; Marketing Law Blog</a>.</p>
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		<title>Collaborators Using the &#8216;Instagram Collabs&#8217; Feature May Forego a Section 230 Defense&#8211;Winer v. Mohammed</title>
		<link>https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/08/collaborators-using-the-instagram-collabs-feature-may-forego-a-section-230-defense-winer-v-mohammed.htm</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Goldman]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 28 Aug 2026 15:18:45 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Content Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Derivative Liability]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://blog.ericgoldman.org/?p=29195</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>[I have so many Section 230 cases backlogged in my blogging queue, but this one is jumping the queue because of its comparative novelty.] This is a defamation case between a professor and a student in the Emory School of...</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/08/collaborators-using-the-instagram-collabs-feature-may-forego-a-section-230-defense-winer-v-mohammed.htm">Collaborators Using the &#8216;Instagram Collabs&#8217; Feature May Forego a Section 230 Defense&#8211;Winer v. Mohammed</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org">Technology &amp; Marketing Law Blog</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[I have so many Section 230 cases backlogged in my blogging queue, but this one is jumping the queue because of its comparative novelty.]</p>
<p>This is a defamation case between a professor and a student in the Emory School of Medicine. It is one of the countless lawsuits related to the Gaza war, Palestinian rights, and Zionism/anti-Zionism.</p>
<p>In this case, the student publicly and repreatedly criticized the professor for serving in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and in response the school suspended her. Her suspension became a cause celebre. Separately, the professor sued her and several outlets that amplified her remarks. It is a major proxy battle over its highly charged topics; about two dozen lawyers are litigating some aspect of this case.</p>
<p><a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/collabs.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignright size-medium wp-image-29196" src="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/collabs-300x282.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="282" srcset="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/collabs-300x282.jpg 300w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/collabs.jpg 492w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a>This post focuses on one corner of that larger litigation endeavor. Two defendants, CAIR Georgia and CAIR Foundation, used the Instagram Collabs feature to jointly post allegedly defamatory content involving the student&#8217;s story. Instagram describes the Collabs feature:</p>
<blockquote><p>Instagram Collabs allow you to co-author posts with other accounts, sharing the post with both sets of followers and listing both accounts as authors. To create one, tap Tag people and then Invite collaborator before publishing your post; the invited user must then accept the invite via their messages to be added.</p></blockquote>
<p>CAIR Foundation claimed that Section 230 protected it from liability for the collaborated post with CAIR Georgia. The court disagrees:</p>
<blockquote><p>it is apparent from the face of the Second Amended Complaint that CAIR Foundation served as a co-author of the IG Post and therefore cannot be considered a benign user under the CDA.</p></blockquote>
<p>(I&#8217;m not sure the &#8220;benign user&#8221; term improves the Section 230 jurisprudence, but it might make a good band name).</p>
<p><a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignright size-medium wp-image-28570" src="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022-300x300.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="300" srcset="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022-300x300.jpg 300w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022-1024x1020.jpg 1024w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022-150x150.jpg 150w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022-768x765.jpg 768w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022-1536x1529.jpg 1536w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022-2048x2039.jpg 2048w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a>The court describes Section 230&#8217;s limits:</p>
<blockquote><p>It is true that CDA immunity generally applies to reposting content, as many courts have concluded that private individuals reposting are “users.” See, e.g., <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/07/large-roundup-of-section-230-rulings.htm">Life Mastery Network LLC v. Haygarth</a>, 2026 WL 1622887, at *15-16 (D. Haw. May 22, 2026) (collecting cases). But the CDA does not immunize someone who posts original content, so “it makes sense that adding comments to something that is re-posted would not trigger CDA immunity.” As the Plaintiff pleads it, CAIR Foundation did not simply reshare the WSB-TV segment, nor was it just a tagged user in CAIR Georgia&#8217;s post. Instead, it co-authored and published a post to its own Instagram page. Even assuming, as CAIR Foundation alleges, that it did not contribute to authoring the post, it at minimum accepted the collaboration invitation from CAIR Georgia knowing it would be tagged as a collaborator with the post published on its own Instagram profile. Moreover, the IG Post did not “merely share” the WSB-TV segment, but included additional commentary in the caption, with comments from CAIR Georgia on the post sharing links.</p></blockquote>
<p>These factual allegations are enough to overcome a Section 230 defense now. The court says &#8220;a jury could find that CAIR Foundation was responsible in part for the creation or development of the IG Post, including the added commentary.&#8221;</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">* * *</p>
<p>I don&#8217;t use Instagram, so this is my first time encountering the Collabs feature (though I&#8217;ve occasionally experimented with analogous functionality on other services). It makes me wonder how extensively the Collabs tool is used. I did find one other case mentioning the Collabs tool: Kennedy v. Prime Hydration, LLC, 2026 WL 2018652 (W.D. Ky. July 13, 2026) (the facts are too complicated to cover here). However, I did a search in Westlaw&#8217;s Law Reviews and Journals database and found only one mention of Instagram Collabs in that literature (in the footnotes of a 2025 student note). Given the novelty of the Collabs angle, I think this case breaks some new ground.</p>
<p>At the same time, this is a reimagining of the issues I was trying to cover in my <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=898048">Co-Blogging Law</a> paper from over 20 years ago. The Internet enables new forms of joint or collaborative content creation and dissemination that overlay existing legal doctrines. In that paper, I wrote: &#8220;The law inevitably will blindside some of these co-bloggers. Bloggers may find unexpected liability for their co-bloggers’ posts or actions.&#8221; Here, the court says that CAIR Foundation may become a co-author of the Instagram post (at least for defamation purposes), even if CAIR Foundation did nothing other than accept the Collabs invitation and allow CAIR Georgia&#8217;s content to reach its audience. In that circumstance, Section 230 steps aside for the co-authored components, whether CAIR Foundation expected it or not. If you are considering using a Collabs functionality, be aware of these risks.</p>
<p>Still, I think Section 230 continues to cast a long shadow on the plaintiff&#8217;s allegations. Even though the Collabs feature presents the defendants as co-authors, they might still not be liable for each other&#8217;s contributions. It&#8217;s analogous to how an online publisher can extensively edit a third-party&#8217;s work and, per Section 230, still not become liable for the parts the publisher didn&#8217;t edit. In other words, the public-facing co-author characterization doesn&#8217;t end the inquiry.Thus, regardless of the labeling, the plaintiff will need to show that CAIR Foundation contributed to the creation or development of defamatory content. That kind of factual inquiry sounds like a typical jury question.</p>
<p><em>Case</em> <em>Citation</em>: <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-gand-1_25-cv-02329/pdf/USCOURTS-gand-1_25-cv-02329-2.pdf">Winer v. Mohammad</a>, 2026 WL 2523973 (N.D. Ga. August 26, 2026)</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/08/collaborators-using-the-instagram-collabs-feature-may-forego-a-section-230-defense-winer-v-mohammed.htm">Collaborators Using the &#8216;Instagram Collabs&#8217; Feature May Forego a Section 230 Defense&#8211;Winer v. Mohammed</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org">Technology &amp; Marketing Law Blog</a>.</p>
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		<title>Apple Defeats Liability for Not Scanning iCloud Items for CSAM, But the Judge Was Not Pleased&#8211;Amy v. Apple</title>
		<link>https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/07/apple-defeats-liability-for-not-scanning-icloud-for-csam-but-the-judge-was-not-pleased-amy-v-apple.htm</link>
					<comments>https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/07/apple-defeats-liability-for-not-scanning-icloud-for-csam-but-the-judge-was-not-pleased-amy-v-apple.htm#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Goldman]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 22:21:19 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Content Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Derivative Liability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Privacy/Security]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://blog.ericgoldman.org/?p=29058</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>This case involves Apple’s handling of user-uploaded files hosted in private iCloud storage. Instead of adopting PhotoDNA to scan hosted files for CSAM, Apple created its own proprietary alternative, NeuralHash, which apparently wasn’t as good. So Apple U-turned on its...</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/07/apple-defeats-liability-for-not-scanning-icloud-for-csam-but-the-judge-was-not-pleased-amy-v-apple.htm">Apple Defeats Liability for Not Scanning iCloud Items for CSAM, But the Judge Was Not Pleased&#8211;Amy v. Apple</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org">Technology &amp; Marketing Law Blog</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This case involves Apple’s handling of user-uploaded files hosted in private iCloud storage. Instead of adopting PhotoDNA to scan hosted files for CSAM, Apple created its own proprietary alternative, <a href="https://apple.fandom.com/wiki/NeuralHash">NeuralHash</a>, which apparently wasn’t as good. So Apple U-turned on its efforts to scan for CSAM in its cloud storage and encrypts iCloud files.</p>
<p>Apple&#8217;s manuevers confused the public and seemed like an embarrassing unforced error for Apple. It also ensured pressure from governments and plaintiffs, including CSAM victims, who preferred Apple&#8217;s more interventionist approaches, which Apple had voluntarily demonstrated it was willing to do.</p>
<p>This lawsuit represents a full-scale attack on Apple and Section 230. “Plaintiffs allege that Apple&#8217;s failure to implement any known CSAM detection is a design defect because Apple can safely implement readily available features to prevent the spread of known CSAM but has continuously failed to do so.” <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/01/a-massive-roundup-of-section-230-decisions.htm">Prior blog post</a>. The court dismisses the third amended complaint, which tees this case up for the Ninth Circuit, where (as usual) anything could happen.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">* * *</p>
<p><a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignright size-medium wp-image-28570" src="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022-300x300.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="300" srcset="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022-300x300.jpg 300w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022-1024x1020.jpg 1024w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022-150x150.jpg 150w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022-768x765.jpg 768w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022-1536x1529.jpg 1536w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022-2048x2039.jpg 2048w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a>The court reiterates that Section 230 applies to the plaintiffs&#8217; claims:</p>
<blockquote><p>First, Plaintiffs&#8217; claims treat Apple as a publisher or speaker of the CSAM content that animates Plaintiffs&#8217; injuries. Fundamentally, Plaintiffs contend that Apple has elected to permit users to disseminate and share third-party CSAM content when it could have—and, in their view, should have—used readily available technology to prevent the distribution of child pornography depicting the Plaintiffs in this putative class. The duties Plaintiffs seek to invoke “spring[ ] from the defendant&#8217;s status as publisher,” and consequently, “immunity applies.” Second, immunity also applies because “the means to avoid liability requires [Apple] to act as a publisher.” As a result, Apple is entitled to complete immunity under § 230.</p></blockquote>
<p>Citing <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/05/ninth-circuit-panel-goes-out-of-its-way-to-question-section-230-doe-v-meta.htm">Doe 1 v. Meta</a>, the court says:</p>
<blockquote><p>Plaintiffs&#8217; injuries are the direct result of the actions of third parties who used iCloud to share CSAM, a use Apple neither explicitly condones nor prevents (even assuming—as alleged in the TAC—that Apple was aware of the use of iCloud for this purpose)….though Plaintiffs allege that Apple knew that its tools were likely to be used to distribute child pornography (as confirmed by the internal Apple text messages at the center of this case), under the current state of the law, Apple is still entitled to immunity under § 230—irrespective of that general knowledge….</p>
<p>Plaintiffs cannot avoid the fact that a tool that detects CSAM must review CSAM to make such a determination. And while Apple could have taken steps to do so—as its competitors have done by using PhotoDNA—<a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2025/02/ninth-circuit-says-section-230-preempts-defective-design-claims-doe-v-grindr.htm">Grindr</a> confirms that § 230 bars claims arising from the design decisions Apple could have taken where those claims relate to Apple&#8217;s role facilitating the communication and content of others</p></blockquote>
<p>(A reminder that the defendant&#8217;s scienter is irrelevant to Section 230).</p>
<p>The plaintiffs tried to fit into the new Section 230 exceptions created in <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2025/08/the-ninth-circuit-finds-two-new-ways-to-undermine-section-230-doe-v-twitter.htm">Doe v. Twitter</a>, but the court rebuffs the move:</p>
<blockquote><p>This case does not concern or even discuss Apple&#8217;s content reporting systems; it concerns Apple&#8217;s “failure to implement industry-standard safeguards” against the dissemination of CSAM. Though reporting systems and CSAM safeguards may both be described as “defects,” the latter requires the Court to treat Apple as a publisher. Twitter “could fulfill its purported duty to cure reporting infrastructure deficiencies without monitoring, removing, or in any way engaging with third-party content”; Apple cannot fulfill a duty to institute CSAM safeguards without deploying a tool like NeuralHash or PhotoDNA. Both NeuralHash and PhotoDNA were built to monitor and report violative images uploaded to company servers. Yet just the decision regarding whether to deploy either tool is a choice related to content moderation.</p></blockquote>
<p>Also, Apple didn’t fail to satisfy any duty to report items to NCMEC if it never identified CSAM in the first place.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2021/05/the-ninth-circuits-confusing-ruling-over-snapchats-speed-filter-lemmon-v-snap.htm">Lemmon v. Snap</a> workaround fails: “all of Plaintiffs&#8217; claims here are inexorably linked to third-party content; Plaintiffs do not allege that Apple created content like a Snapchat filter that caused them harm.” The <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/04/roommatescom_de_1.htm">Roommates.com</a> workaround also fails: “Plaintiffs do not allege that Apple modified or augmented the CSAM on its servers in any way.”</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">* * *</p>
<p>The case reaches its inevitable denouement of a win for Apple. However, Judge Wise remains troubled about its implications. She expresses her uneasiness in stronger-than-normal terms:</p>
<blockquote><p>As it stands, nothing in the law prevents any company, including Apple, from utilizing available technology or creating new technology to identify and report child pornography stored and distributed on their traditional servers or through their cloud services. Conversely, there is no law that obligates companies to proactively do so. Undoubtedly any such legislation would come at a cost of at least some loss of privacy for millions of people. But if lawmakers expected that companies would take steps to prevent their products from being used for storing and distributing child pornography based on something short of a legal imperative, this case, like many others before it, demonstrates the inadequacy of that approach. If lawmakers want to ensure that Apple and other companies address their role in the dissemination of CSAM, they must require it under the law. In other words, lawmakers can fix this problem that is contributing to the exploitation of children.</p></blockquote>
<p>She goes through this framing pretty quickly, but we should slow it down. The “loss of privacy for millions of people” she briefly references deserves a little more care. The opinion downplays the encryption angle; it mentions encryption only twice, as if it&#8217;s an afterthought. However, encryption is the critical attribute underlying Apple&#8217;s moves. Apple was seeking to respect that what&#8217;s on people&#8217;s hard drives should remain their business, even if they choose to store some of it in the cloud. Forcing Apple to scan private files intended for iCloud storage creates a new and dangerous threat vector for bad actors, including governments seeking to control constituent behavior.</p>
<p>So yes, the &#8220;privacy loss&#8221; Judge Wise mentions indeed would be a major cost to everyone. Respecting the privacy of people&#8217;s files isn&#8217;t just some nice-to-have feature; it is one of the core planks of a technology architecture that keeps people safer.</p>
<p>Judge Wise continues:</p>
<blockquote><p>This Order does not turn on whether Apple&#8217;s decisions contributed to Plaintiffs&#8217; injuries. All Plaintiffs&#8217; claims are founded on Apple serving as a publisher of third-party content. It is that role as “publisher” that is dispositive on the issue of immunity. This does not mean that the existence of images and videos of the putative class members being sexually abused—content that they allege is regularly stored and disseminated on iCloud—has not caused Plaintiffs real and lasting harm…</p>
<p>the outcome also adds credence to claims that the Ninth Circuit “has expanded § 230(c)&#8217;s scope to provide functional immunity to internet companies, even when they are aware (or should be aware) of unlawful content on their websites.” The practical outcome is that the current state of the law prioritizes privacy—a laudable and critically important value given that in our modern world nearly all our most personal and intimate data (including financial and health records) are stored and transmitted online. But the law should not ignore how those who create, view, and distribute child pornography leverage privacy protections to avoid detection by law enforcement. In the current legal framework, there is no protection for members of the putative class—individuals who as children were photographed and filmed while being abused in the vilest ways imaginable, and who now are repeatedly victimized each time the intimate and tortured images of their trauma are distributed to others. Those children are the collateral damage of our ineffective legal landscape. They deserve better.</p></blockquote>
<p>Judge Wise isn&#8217;t well-situated to compare the relative strengths and limitations of the full range of potential anti-CSAM options, but a leading tool has always been and remains the government&#8217;s efforts to find and prosecute the creators, disseminators, and downloaders of CSAM. (Do you recall the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/jan/24/justice-department-cuts-child-sex-trafficking">federal government&#8217;s choices that leave children more vulnerable</a>?) Making sure the government is doing what it can should be the #1 priority.</p>
<p><em>Case Citation</em>: <a href="http://business.cch.com/plsd/AmyvApple7-13-26071426.pdf">Amy v. Apple Inc.</a>, 2026 WL 2031817 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2026). The <a href="https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Amy-et.-al.-v.-Apple-Case-24-cv-08832-Doc-1-Complaint-12-07-2024.pdf">complaint</a>.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/07/apple-defeats-liability-for-not-scanning-icloud-for-csam-but-the-judge-was-not-pleased-amy-v-apple.htm">Apple Defeats Liability for Not Scanning iCloud Items for CSAM, But the Judge Was Not Pleased&#8211;Amy v. Apple</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org">Technology &amp; Marketing Law Blog</a>.</p>
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					<wfw:commentRss>https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/07/apple-defeats-liability-for-not-scanning-icloud-for-csam-but-the-judge-was-not-pleased-amy-v-apple.htm/feed</wfw:commentRss>
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">29058</post-id>	</item>
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		<title>eBay Defeats Contributory Copyright Claim&#8211;Lee v. SBS</title>
		<link>https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/07/ebay-defeats-contributory-copyright-claim-lee-v-sbs.htm</link>
					<comments>https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/07/ebay-defeats-contributory-copyright-claim-lee-v-sbs.htm#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Goldman]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 11 Jul 2026 18:01:04 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Copyright]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Derivative Liability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[E-Commerce]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://blog.ericgoldman.org/?p=29026</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Lee is enforcing music copyrights against karaoke machine makers that allegedly include copyrighted songs. He sent numerous NOCIs to eBay targeting the machines. eBay apparently honored the NOCIs. However, Lee really wanted staydowns, which eBay did not do. Lee claims...</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/07/ebay-defeats-contributory-copyright-claim-lee-v-sbs.htm">eBay Defeats Contributory Copyright Claim&#8211;Lee v. SBS</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org">Technology &amp; Marketing Law Blog</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Lee is enforcing music copyrights against karaoke machine makers that allegedly include copyrighted songs. He sent numerous NOCIs to eBay targeting the machines. eBay apparently honored the NOCIs. However, Lee really wanted staydowns, which eBay did not do. Lee claims his NOCIs conferred sufficient knowledge of infringement to warrant the staydowns. In the wake of <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/04/u-s-supreme-court-narrows-secondary-liability-in-copyright-law-cox-v-sony-guest-blog-post.htm">Cox v. Sony</a>, Lee&#8217;s pro se lawsuit goes nowhere (plus the court warns Lee not to rely on generative AI without double-checking the outputs).</p>
<p><em>Contributory Infringement</em></p>
<p><em>Inducement to Infringe.</em> The court says it&#8217;s not inducement when &#8220;Plaintiff merely alleges that Defendant knowingly allowed listings of infringing TJ Karaoke devices to remain active on its website despite having the ability to remove the listings&#8230;.Nor has Plaintiff alleged facts giving rise to an inference that the &#8216;principal object&#8217; of Defendant’s online marketplace is the sale of infringing products. [cite to <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2005/06/grokster_suprem.htm">Grokster</a>]&#8221;</p>
<p><em><a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/copyright-tailor-v2.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignright size-medium wp-image-28734" src="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/copyright-tailor-v2-200x300.jpg" alt="" width="200" height="300" srcset="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/copyright-tailor-v2-200x300.jpg 200w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/copyright-tailor-v2-683x1024.jpg 683w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/copyright-tailor-v2-768x1152.jpg 768w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/copyright-tailor-v2.jpg 1024w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 200px) 100vw, 200px" /></a>Tailored to Infringement</em>. The plaintiff did not allege that &#8220;Defendant’s service is incapable of substantial or commercially significant noninfringing uses&#8230;.allegations that a service provider merely had &#8216;knowledge that a service will be used to infringe&#8217; or &#8216;fail[ed] to take affirmative steps to prevent infringement&#8217; are insufficient to state a claim for contributory infringement liability.&#8221; Given eBay&#8217;s scope, I don&#8217;t see how a plaintiff could allege that eBay is &#8220;incapable of substantial or commercially significant noninfringing uses.&#8221;</p>
<p><em>Vicarious Infringement</em></p>
<p>Citing <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2015/07/is-amazon-liable-for-ip-violations-by-its-marketplace-vendors-forbes-cross-post.htm">Milo &amp; Gabby</a>, the court says the &#8220;mere fact that Defendant had the ability to remove listings of infringing devices is not enough to establish that Defendant had both the legal right and the practical ability to stop the third-party sellers’ infringing conduct.&#8221; The court doesn&#8217;t discuss the direct financial interest prong, which poses a heightened challenge to eBay due to its commission structure.</p>
<p><em>Did Cox Make a Difference?</em></p>
<p>The Supreme Court&#8217;s Cox v. Sony decision didn&#8217;t address vicarious copyright infringement, so that part of the ruling wasn&#8217;t affected by the Cox case.</p>
<p>This court did apply the revised Cox standards for contributory copyright infringement, and the application of those factors makes this an even easier case. Lee made knowledge-based allegations, but&#8211;as the Cox court seemingly intended&#8211;Lee could not spin those allegations to satisfy an intent-based standard. It makes quick work for a defendant like eBay who has taken many steps to reduce copyright infringement.</p>
<p>(It remains to be seen if courts will (1) bend the standards in Cox to distill evidence of intent from knowledge-based allegations, or (2) bend the standards of direct or vicarious infringement to gapfill the narrowed contributory infringement standard. Fortunately, this court did neither. However, it was also a pro se case, not a full-scale assault to degrade the Cox standards that rightsowners will launch eventually).</p>
<p>However, I don&#8217;t think Lee&#8217;s claims would have gotten far with the pre-Cox jurisprudence either. Courts have routinely rejected staydown demands from plaintiffs. Also, eBay&#8217;s honoring of the NOCIs means that it would have likely qualified for the 512(c) safe harbor too. Still, those defenses might not have worked until summary judgment, at significant defense costs, while the Cox precedent easily and decisively ends this case on a motion to dismiss.</p>
<p><em>Case Citation</em>: <a href="https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3971&amp;context=historical">Lee v. SBS Corp.</a>, 2:26-cv-03144-MCS-E (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2026)</p>
<p>UPDATE: Lee v. SBS Corp., 2026 WL 2261023 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2026). The court granted Google/YouTube&#8217;s motion to dismiss.</p>
<blockquote><p>Plaintiff alleges no act of direct infringement attributable to <span id="co_term_46891" class="co_searchTerm">Google</span> aside from that “the <span id="co_term_46990" class="co_searchTerm">YouTube</span> platform [is] operated by” <span id="co_term_47094" class="co_searchTerm">Google</span> and <span id="co_term_47105" class="co_searchTerm">YouTube</span>. Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege that <span id="co_term_47365" class="co_searchTerm">YouTube</span> selected infringing works for upload or download or instigated any copying, storage, or distribution of the works&#8230;.</p>
<p>Plaintiff does not allege that <span id="co_term_52604" class="co_searchTerm">YouTube</span> induced infringement or that <span id="co_term_52641" class="co_searchTerm">YouTube </span>provided a service tailored to infringement. Rather, Plaintiff merely alleges that <span id="co_term_52744" class="co_searchTerm">Google</span> and <span id="co_term_52755" class="co_searchTerm">YouTube</span> “selective[ly] remov[ed]” infringing video content on its platform. Plaintiff has not alleged that <span id="co_term_52920" class="co_searchTerm">Google</span> and <span id="co_term_52931" class="co_searchTerm">YouTube</span> actively encouraged infringement through specific acts, such as by advertising an infringing use of its services. Nor has Plaintiff alleged facts giving rise to an inference that the principal object of <span id="co_term_54641" class="co_searchTerm">YouTube&#8217;s</span> online platform is the distribution of copyrighted videos&#8230;.</p>
<p>Plaintiff merely alleges that <span id="co_term_55791" class="co_searchTerm">Google</span> and <span id="co_term_55802" class="co_searchTerm">YouTube</span> “had both the ability and the opportunity to remove the infringing content, yet knowingly allowed certain infringing videos to remain on the platform while continuing to derive financial benefit from them,” not that <span id="co_term_56179" class="co_searchTerm">YouTube&#8217;s</span> service is incapable of substantial or commercially significant noninfringing uses&#8230;</p>
<p>The mere fact that infringing content existed on <span id="co_term_64092" class="co_searchTerm">YouTube</span> is insufficient to allege that <span id="co_term_64131" class="co_searchTerm">YouTube</span> attracted users specifically because of content that infringed Plaintiff&#8217;s copyrights.</p></blockquote>
<p>The post <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/07/ebay-defeats-contributory-copyright-claim-lee-v-sbs.htm">eBay Defeats Contributory Copyright Claim&#8211;Lee v. SBS</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org">Technology &amp; Marketing Law Blog</a>.</p>
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		<title>Large Roundup of Section 230 Rulings</title>
		<link>https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/07/large-roundup-of-section-230-rulings.htm</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Goldman]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 09 Jul 2026 15:11:47 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Content Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Copyright]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Derivative Liability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[E-Commerce]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Licensing/Contracts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Publicity/Privacy Rights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trademark]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://blog.ericgoldman.org/?p=28749</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>This blog post rounds up nearly 20 Section 230 cases (and adjacent cases), mostly from the past four months, that for whatever reason I didn&#8217;t cover in a standalone blog post. Section 230&#8217;s effects are waning overall, but this post...</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/07/large-roundup-of-section-230-rulings.htm">Large Roundup of Section 230 Rulings</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org">Technology &amp; Marketing Law Blog</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignright size-medium wp-image-28570" src="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022-300x300.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="300" srcset="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022-300x300.jpg 300w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022-1024x1020.jpg 1024w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022-150x150.jpg 150w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022-768x765.jpg 768w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022-1536x1529.jpg 1536w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022-2048x2039.jpg 2048w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a>This blog post rounds up nearly 20 Section 230 cases (and adjacent cases), mostly from the past four months, that for whatever reason I didn&#8217;t cover in a standalone blog post. Section 230&#8217;s effects are waning overall, but this post will show that Section 230 still efficiently resolves many routine and pro se cases.</p>
<p><strong>Coomer v. Lindell, 2026 WL 817370 (D. Colo. March 25, 2026)</strong></p>
<p><a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2024/04/section-230-applies-to-tweeted-links-to-defamatory-content-coomer-v-donald-j-trump-for-president.htm">Related post</a>. This is more fallout from the efforts to deny the 2020 presidential election results. MyPillows huckster Lindell publicly trashed Dominion Voting and and its president, Coomer. A jury held Lindell and Frankspeech liable for defamation and more. The defendants unsuccessfully tried to overturn the jury verdict post-trial.</p>
<p>Frankspeech invoked Section 230 for its liability for Lindell&#8217;s speech. The court disagrees:</p>
<blockquote><p>Mr. Lindell founded Frankspeech. He regularly acted as its corporate representative, including at trial. He hosted his own show on Frankspeech, broadcasted it through Frankspeech, and used the Frankspeech platform to make and publish statements about Dr. Coomer. There is no evidence that anyone other than Mr. Lindell exercised any meaningful degree of control over the Frankspeech entity. By all accounts, Frankspeech was Mr. Lindell&#8217;s corporate alter ego in this context&#8230;.for § 230 purposes, Frankspeech&#8217;s defamatory statements through its agent would plainly qualify as participation in the development of those statements.</p></blockquote>
<p>Frankspeech also claimed Section 230 for Clement&#8217;s remarks at a conference. The court responds: &#8220;Frankspeech—through Mr. Lindell and others—sponsored, promoted, and broadcasted the event&#8230;.a reasonable jury could conclude that Frankspeech&#8217;s conduct (including its conduct through Mr. Lindell) created actual or apparent authority for Mr. Clements and other presenters at the Cyber Symposium to act as agents of Frankspeech.&#8221;</p>
<p><strong>Murphy v. LinkedIn Corp., 2026 WL 881710 (N.D. Cal. March 30, 2026)</strong></p>
<p>Fraudsters approached Murphy via LinkedIn direct messages. The conversation switched over to WhatsApp, where the fraudsters effectuated their fraud. Murphy&#8217;s lawsuit against LinkedIn fails due to Section 230:</p>
<blockquote><p>Plaintiffs&#8217; claims for negligence, gross negligence, and product liability are premised on a purported duty to “monitor” users, “restrict the accounts of fraudulent actors,” and to suppress “fraudulent activities” by users of LinkedIn&#8217;s platform. These claims “necessarily implicate” LinkedIn&#8217;s role as a publisher of third-party content because “discharging the alleged duty would require [LinkedIn] to monitor third-party content and prevent” communications between fraudsters and legitimate LinkedIn users. Nor can Plaintiffs sue LinkedIn for breaching a “duty to warn.” LinkedIn&#8217;s “role as a publisher of third-party content does not give it a duty to warn users of ‘a general possibility of harm’ resulting from” using LinkedIn&#8217;s services.</p></blockquote>
<p>The plaintiffs unsuccessfully tried the defective design workaround:</p>
<blockquote><p>Plaintiffs argue that their claims are not based on LinkedIn&#8217;s role as publisher, but rather its role “as a product manufacturer and developer of defective algorithms” that facilitated communications between fraudsters and Plaintiffs. But the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly upheld dismissal of negligence and product liability claims framed in the same way. [cites to <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2025/02/ninth-circuit-says-section-230-preempts-defective-design-claims-doe-v-grindr.htm">Doe v. Grindr</a> and <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2019/08/a-significant-section-230-defense-win-in-the-ninth-circuit-dyroff-v-ultimate-software.htm">Dyroff</a>]</p></blockquote>
<p>A <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/04/roommatescom_de_1.htm">Roommates.com</a> workaround didn&#8217;t work either:</p>
<blockquote><p>Plaintiffs&#8217; claims are premised on LinkedIn&#8217;s neutral tools for connecting users, not on content that LinkedIn created or required users to provide as a condition of using its services. Indeed, LinkedIn expressly informs users that they “have choices about the information” on their profiles, and that users “don&#8217;t have to post or upload personal data” that may make them targets of fraud.</p></blockquote>
<p>To put a finer point on it, if the plaintiffs are complaining about LinkedIn direct messages, then those messages may be covered by the ECPA just like email, and LinkedIn may have had limited legal rights to monitor the conversations at all.</p>
<p>Finally, the plaintiffs tried a TOS-based workaround, poured into consumer protection laws. The court acknowledges that some breach of contract claims may not be preempted by Section 230, but</p>
<blockquote><p>These claims are premised on the same duties discussed above – duties to monitor, to design products in a different manner, and to warn – that fundamentally seek to hold LinkedIn liable for content created by the fraudsters. Styling these claims as different legal theories does not remove them from Section 230&#8217;s scope&#8230;.</p>
<p>Plaintiffs seek to hold LinkedIn liable solely based on its general monitoring policy and aspirations to remove fraudulent users from its platform. Moreover, LinkedIn expressly disclaims liability by notifying users that they “may encounter content or information that might be inaccurate, incomplete, delayed, misleading, illegal, offensive, or otherwise harmful,” and that LinkedIn “generally does not review content provided by [its] Members or others.”</p></blockquote>
<p><strong>McNeal v. Calvin, 2026 WL 879228 (E.D. Mo. March 31, 2026)</strong></p>
<p>This case relates to the TV show Love &amp; Marriage: Huntsville, shown on OWN (Oprah&#8217;s channel). The plaintiff, a lawyer (naturally), is one of the women featured in the show. She is upset about online comments about the show and sued many defendants pro se. The court says &#8220;Section 230 of the Communication Decency Act bars Plaintiff&#8217;s claims against YouTube, Google, and Tik Tok.&#8221; In particular, &#8220;The content uploaded by users cannot be attributed to internet service providers based on the theory that users are “agents” of the websites they use.&#8221;</p>
<p><strong>Shiva Ayyadurai v. U.S., 2026 WL 879409 (D.C.D.C. March 31, 2026)</strong>. My <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/10/message-board-operator-isnt-liable-for-highlighting-user-comments-ayyadurai-v-techdirt.htm">prior blog post</a> about a different litigation of his.</p>
<p>This is a jawboning case:</p>
<blockquote><p>Ayyadurai&#8217;s 75-page Complaint alleges that various Massachusetts state officials—none of whom are named as Defendants in this case—federal officials at the Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (“CISA”), and other government officials unknown to him have coordinated with private companies to regulate and censor his speech by “deplatforming” or “shadowbanning” him—that is, suspending his social media accounts or limiting the reach of his posts. Ayyadurai alleges that the Defendants took these actions in retaliation for posts in which he “articulat[ed] a government employee&#8217;s role in destroying the digital ballot images used to tabulate votes” in a prior election.</p></blockquote>
<p>With respect to the liability of the social media defendants who allegedly got jawboned, the court accepts the 230(c)(2)(A) defense:</p>
<blockquote><p>Ayyadurai&#8217;s Complaint fails to state a claim against the Social Media Defendants based on their content-moderation decisions because he does not plausibly allege that any of those decisions were made in the absence of “good faith” or that they were made for a purpose other than removing content that they “consider[ ] to be &#8230; objectionable.”&#8230;</p>
<p>conclusory allegations of bad faith are insufficient to state a claim against a platform based on activity within the reach of Section 230(c)(2).</p></blockquote>
<p>At the same time, the court struggled with applying to Section 230(c)(1) to the removal decisions. Incredibly, it says:</p>
<blockquote><p>only a few of the decisions restating this broad dictum [from Zeran] have grappled with its implications when the challenged conduct is a platform&#8217;s decision to remove objectionable content—such as a plaintiff&#8217;s own posts—rather than a decision to leave other objectionable content in place. Extending immunity under Section 230(c)(1) to cover direct challenges to the removal of user content is an uneasy fit with the language of the provision, which says only that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” A broad reading of Section 230(c)(1) that immunizes all content-removal decisions also risks “swallo[wing] the more specific immunity in (c)(2),” which applies only to content-moderation decisions that are made in “good faith.”</p></blockquote>
<p>Not this shit again. I have repeatedly explained how Section 230(c)(2) can apply to first-party filtering decisions, which leaves room for Section 230(c)(1) to protect against liability for third-party content. There are <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3911509">DOZENS of cases applying Section 230(c)(1) to removal decisions</a>, so for the court to think that it&#8217;s spotted something that all of those other courts have missed is laughable&#8230;and completely gratuitous&#8230;and ultimately inconsequential given that the court still tosses the case.</p>
<p>The court tries to justify its reluctance on Section 230(c)(1):</p>
<blockquote><p>There is little reason to strain the reach of the immunity in Section 230(c)(1) when, as in this case, the immunity in Section 230(c)(2) leads to the same result.</p></blockquote>
<p>NOOOO. There are several excellent reasons to apply both 230(c)(1) and 230(c)(2):</p>
<p>(1) 230(c)(1) doesn&#8217;t have a good faith prerequisite, which has mucked up 230(c)(2) jurisprudence and made 12(b)(6) dismissals much more difficult to obtain, jacking up the litigation costs for both sides and giving false hope to bogus claims. Indeed, because the court dismissed this case without prejudice, I&#8217;m sure an amended complaint will try again to manufacture bad faith sufficient to kick the case into very expensive discovery;</p>
<p>(2) removal and leave-up decisions are two sides of the same decision, i.e., every editorial decision about an item of third-party content is either a leave-up or removal decision, so they cannot be separated; and</p>
<p>(3) the statute and 25+ years of caselaw have established the principle that 230(c)(1) applies to removal decisions.</p>
<p>Sigh. In the end, this case ends up the same as <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3911509">all of the other content removal and account termination cases&#8211;dismissed</a>.</p>
<p><strong><span class="title-text">Gaughan v. Barounis, <span class="active-reporter">2025 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 17243 (N.Y. Supreme Ct. </span></span><span class="date">December 18, 2025)</span></strong><span class="active-reporter"> </span></p>
<blockquote><p>The Complaint alleges that the impersonating profile and pictures of plaintiff were posted by defendants Barounis and Viera. Plaintiff&#8217;s contention that the XVideo defendants are liable for refusing or failing to remove offending material prepared by a third party, or that they may be held responsible for allegedly defamatory postings made by third parties does not state a viable basis for liability. <span class="SS_RFCPassage_Deactivated" data-func="LN.Advance.ContentView.getCitationMap" data-docid="6JDC-JK43-RXT3-90R7-00000-00" data-rfcid="I08JX4CKW8S003MBBMF004W2" data-hlct="cases" data-rfctext="&lt;a id=&quot;I08JX4CKW8S003MBBMF004W2&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;The Complaint alleges that the impersonating profile and pictures of plaintiff were posted by defendants Barounis and Viera. Plaintiff's contention that the XVideo defendants are liable for refusing or failing to remove offending material prepared by a third party, or that they may be held responsible for allegedly defamatory postings made by third parties does not state a viable basis for liability (&lt;a id=&quot;I08JX4CKW8S003MBBMF004W1&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;SS_EmbeddedLink&quot; href=&quot;#&quot; data-func=&quot;LN.Advance.ContentView.getDocument&quot; data-docfullpath=&quot;/shared/document/cases/urn:contentItem:533B-FNR1-F04J-611W-00000-00&quot; data-pinpage=&quot;PAGE_288_3322&quot; data-contentcomponentid=&quot;9096&quot; data-priceplan=&quot;subscription&quot; data-pctpguid=&quot;urn:pct:30&quot;&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;SS_it&quot; data-housestyle=&quot;EMPHASIS_it&quot;&gt;Shiamili&lt;/span&gt;, 17 NY3d at 288-289&lt;/a&gt; [&quot;Read[ing] &lt;a class=&quot;SS_EmbeddedLink&quot; href=&quot;#&quot; data-func=&quot;LN.Advance.ContentView.getDocument&quot; data-docfullpath=&quot;/shared/document/statutes-legislation/urn:contentItem:8SDD-0NM2-8T6X-74J8-00000-00&quot; data-pinpage=&quot;&quot; data-docretrieveview=&quot;CITEDLAW_SECTION&quot; data-contentcomponentid=&quot;6362&quot; data-priceplan=&quot;subscription&quot; data-pctpguid=&quot;urn:pct:83&quot;&gt;section 230&lt;/a&gt; as generally immunizing internet service providers from liability for third-party content wherever such liability depends on characterizing the provider as a 'publisher or speaker' of objectionable material&quot;]; &lt;a id=&quot;I08JX4CKWT5003MBBMF004X0&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;SS_EmbeddedLink&quot; href=&quot;#&quot; data-func=&quot;LN.Advance.ContentView.getDocument&quot; data-docfullpath=&quot;/shared/document/cases/urn:contentItem:4SHW-GWX0-TXFX-71W8-00000-00&quot; data-pinpage=&quot;PAGE_418_1107&quot; data-contentcomponentid=&quot;6389&quot; data-priceplan=&quot;subscription&quot; data-pctpguid=&quot;urn:pct:30&quot;&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;SS_it&quot; data-housestyle=&quot;EMPHASIS_it&quot;&gt;Doe v. MySpace, Inc.&lt;/span&gt;, 528 F3d 413, 418 [5th Cir 2008]&lt;/a&gt; [&quot;Parties complaining that they were harmed by a Web site's publication of user-generated content have recourse; they may sue the third-party user who generated the content, but not the interactive computer service that enabled them to publish the content online&quot;]; &lt;a id=&quot;I08JX4CKWT5003MBBMF004X2&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;SS_EmbeddedLink&quot; href=&quot;#&quot; data-func=&quot;LN.Advance.ContentView.getDocument&quot; data-docfullpath=&quot;/shared/document/cases/urn:contentItem:6FYS-RY83-RRWN-40N7-00000-00&quot; data-pinpage=&quot;PAGE_636_3325&quot; data-contentcomponentid=&quot;9092&quot; data-priceplan=&quot;subscription&quot; data-pctpguid=&quot;urn:pct:30&quot;&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;SS_it&quot; data-housestyle=&quot;EMPHASIS_it&quot;&gt;Montanino v. New York City Dep't of Sanitation&lt;/span&gt;, 239 AD3d 635, 636 [2d Dept 2025]&lt;/a&gt; [The New York Department of Sanitation was not responsible for an alleged defamatory statement posted on its internal communication network messaging board by others since there was no allegation the City defendants authored the statement]). Nowhere in the Complaint does&lt;a href=&quot;#&quot; data-func=&quot;LN.Advance.ContentView.changeReporter&quot; name=&quot;PAGE_7322&quot; id=&quot;PAGE_30_7322&quot; class=&quot;SS_Pag_Active&quot; data-id=&quot;7322&quot;&gt;&amp;nbsp;[*30]&amp;nbsp;&lt;/a&gt; plaintiff allege that the XVideo defendants posted or created the impersonating profile themselves, altered or edited its contents, or encouraged, required, or otherwise induced defendants Barounis and/or Viera, or any other user, to create the profile or upload unlawful content. " data-highlevelcontenttype="urn:hlct:5">Nowhere in the Complaint does plaintiff allege that the XVideo defendants posted or created the impersonating profile themselves, altered or edited its contents, or encouraged, required, or otherwise induced defendants Barounis and/or Viera, or any other user, to create the profile or upload unlawful content. </span>To the contrary, plaintiff even alleges in her Complaint that Barounis and Viera allegedly making this impersonating profile goes against XVideo.com&#8217;s Terms and Agreements.</p>
<p>The Court also finds plaintiff&#8217;s argument that the XVideo defendants should be responsible for her alleged stolen identity, and that Section 230 does not apply in cases, unavailing.</p>
<p>It has also been held that &#8220;Sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Right Law sounds in privacy, not intellectual property, and thus does not fall within the intellectual property exceptions in Section 230.&#8221;</p>
<p>Equally, plaintiff&#8217;s contention that this immunity is lost because the XVideo defendants allowed the dissemination of plaintiff&#8217;s personal information and allowed discriminatory content (age, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, etc.) is unsuccessful.</p></blockquote>
<p><strong>Arana v. Molta, 2026 WL 1166348 (D. Mass. March 24, 2026)</strong></p>
<blockquote><p>Mr. Molta drafted the description of, and provided the photos for, the Dennis Property posted to WNAV&#8217;s website. WNAV did not review, revise, edit, or provide feedback on the Dennis Property listing that the Moltas posted to the WNAV website. WNAV is thus immune from liability for any of the statements or representations made by the Moltas in the Dennis Property listing.</p></blockquote>
<p><strong>Greer v. Moon, 2026 WL 1170015 (D. Utah. Feb. 11, 2026)</strong></p>
<blockquote><p>Mr. Greer&#8217;s only claims against Defendants are for contributory copyright infringement under federal law. Because those claims clearly “pertain[ ] to intellectual property,” they cannot be barred by section <span id="co_term_112795" class="co_searchTerm">230</span>. Defendants’ argument concerning section <span id="co_term_113035" class="co_searchTerm">230 </span>immunity fails.</p></blockquote>
<p><strong>Tufano v. Google LLC, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100789 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2026)</strong></p>
<p>&#8220;Plaintiff premises his claims on Google allegedly &#8220;filter[ing] out all negative reviews&#8221; of Dr. Taban, including Plaintiff&#8217;s negative review, which Google allegedly removed.&#8221; The court dismisses per Section 230: &#8220;First, Google&#8217;s review service is an interactive computer service. Second, Google publishes the reviews on which Plaintiff bases his claims. Third, third parties, and not Google itself, provide the reviews published by Google.&#8221; The plaintiff said Google didn&#8217;t act in good faith, but Google relied on 230(c)(1) where good faith is irrelevant, and the plaintiff didn&#8217;t provide any evidence of bad faith.</p>
<p><strong>Starship LLC v. Shein Distribution Co., 2026 WL 1455009 (C.D. Cal. March 20, 2026)</strong></p>
<p>This is a fast fashion enforcement lawsuit that includes both copyright and trademark claims. The direct infringement claims largely fail because Shein operates as a marketplace for online vendors. The contributory infringement claims failed because the plaintiff wanted a staydown in response to takedown notices. The vicarious infringement claims also fail.</p>
<p>Shein defended against the unfair competition claim based on Section 230. The court says:</p>
<blockquote><p>Plaintiff characterizes Shein as an information content provider because it “regularly markets and sells goods” and “is involved in almost all aspects of the marketplace&#8217;s distribution chain.” These conclusory assertions do not plausibly allege that Defendants are content providers. Plaintiff provides no factual basis to infer that Defendants materially contributed to the alleged infringement.</p></blockquote>
<p><strong>King v. Jilin Province Detiannuo Safety Tech. Co. Ltd., 2026 Fla. Cir. LEXIS 295 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 17, 2026)</strong></p>
<blockquote><p>Plaintiff does not allege that eBay participated in the creation or development of Seller&#8217;s listing or allege that eBay played some role in handling or transmitting the airbag components. Plaintiff only alleges that eBay should have removed Seller&#8217;s listing and/or issued some censure to Seller for its alleged noncompliant listing&#8230;.</p>
<p>The only way eBay allegedly could have prevented the harm was by reviewing the third-party listing, determining whether it complied with internal policies, and removing it. That conduct, i.e., deciding whether to publish or remove third-party content, is a paradigmatic editorial function protected by the CDA.</p></blockquote>
<p><strong>In re Apple Inc. App Store Simulated Casino-Style Games Litigation, 2026 WL 1552391 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2026)</strong></p>
<blockquote><p>The Court finds Defendants&#8217; argument that Section 230 provides immunity from suit unavailing. Defendants point to the clause in Section 230 that states that “no cause of action may be brought” that is contrary to the statute. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). But the Tenth Circuit has held that Section 230 “provides immunity only from liability, not suit.” And the Ninth Circuit case Defendants themselves cite clearly states that Section 230 is designed “to protect websites against the evil of liability for failure to remove offensive content”; that case does not mention protection from suit. Thus, the Court concludes that Section 230 does not protect Defendants from suit.</p></blockquote>
<p><strong>Accardi v. CSC Holdings, LLC, 2024 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 83186 (N.Y. Supreme Ct. November 26, 2024)</strong></p>
<blockquote><p>The plaintiffs claim that defendants failing to follow their terms of service makes them liable to the plaintiffs, effectively negating the immunity provided by the Communications Decency Act. After a review of the papers submitted by the defendants and the plaintiffs, the Court finds that the immunity provided by Section 230 does apply to the defendants in this action and the plaintiffs have not proffered any compelling argument or evidence to negate this immunity. As such, the defendants motion to dismiss the third cause of action pertaining to the failure to remove posts on social media is granted.</p></blockquote>
<p><strong>Life Mastery Network LLC v. Haygarth, 2026 WL 1622887 (D. Haw. May 22, 2026)</strong></p>
<blockquote><p>Paula indisputably enjoys immunity under the CDA for reposting content. Many courts have included private individuals within the scope of a “user.” Thus, (1) Paula is a “user of an interactive computer service”; (2) the subreddit link is “based on information provided by another information content provider”; and (3) Plaintiffs’ claim would treat Paula “as the publisher or speaker of that information.” As such, and as Plaintiffs have conceded at the Hearing, Paula is immune from lawsuit for what she reposted from Reddit.</p>
<p>But because the CDA does not immunize someone who posts original content, it makes sense that adding comments to something that is re-posted would not trigger CDA immunity. While these cited cases are not directly on point, the Court concludes that Paula&#8217;s comments regarding what she reposted are not subject to CDA immunity.</p></blockquote>
<p><strong>Glazer v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 1:25-cv-01849-GLR (D. Md. June 12, 2026)</strong></p>
<blockquote><p>The Court agrees with Meta that Section 230 bars Plaintiffs’ claims&#8230;.All three elements are satisfied here: Meta is an interactive services provider; Plaintiffs’ claims treat Meta as the publisher or speaker of information under Section 230 because they “seek ‘to hold [Meta] liable for . . . deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content’ provided by third parties”; and the content at issue here is that of third parties, and Plaintiffs “seek[] to hold Meta liable, not for providing that content, but for allowing third parties to do so.”</p></blockquote>
<p><a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2025/10/section-230-applies-to-scammy-ads-glazer-v-facebook.htm">Related ruling</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Sidoli v. YouTube LLC. <span class="active-reporter">2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210953 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2025)</span></strong></p>
<blockquote><p>Plaintiff also seeks to treat YouTube as a publisher because she alleges that YouTube wrongfully demonetized, restricted, and removed her videos. <span class="SS_RFCPassage_Deactivated" data-func="LN.Advance.ContentView.getCitationMap" data-docid="6H2P-0843-RS52-Y2KW-00000-00" data-rfcid="I08H4J4V2GX003MCD8V0045B">Such conduct falls within a publisher&#8217;s traditional functions&#8230;.</span></p>
<p><span class="SS_RFCPassage_Deactivated" data-func="LN.Advance.ContentView.getCitationMap" data-docid="6H2P-0843-RS52-Y2KW-00000-00" data-rfcid="I08H4J4V2GX003MCD8V0045B">YouTube cited authority that which stand for the proposition that Section 230 immunizes internet service providers from suit for termination of a plaintiff&#8217;s entire channel as well as the content that the plaintiff posts on that channel. Such authority is persuasive. Thus, any claim Plaintiff brings which seeks to challenge YouTube&#8217;s decision to remove Plaintiff&#8217;s YouTube channel is also barred by Section 230.</span></p></blockquote>
<p>Also, &#8220;Plaintiff&#8217;s constitutional claims cannot proceed as YouTube is a private forum, not a state actor.&#8221;</p>
<p>See also Sidoli v. YouTube LLC, 2026 WL 1480407 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2026), upholding YouTube&#8217;s TOS and forum selection clause: &#8220;Defendants provide evidence, which Plaintiff does not dispute, showing that she agreed to abide by the terms of service by clicking the “Create Channel” button when she started her YouTube page on June 21, 2021.&#8221;</p>
<p><strong><span class="title-text">Kennedy v. Vickery, <span class="active-reporter">2025 Me. Super. LEXIS 108 (Me. Superior Ct. Sept. 10, 2025)</span></span></strong><i tabindex="0" aria-label="Press Enter for a list of available hotkeys"></i></p>
<p>RFK Jr. lost a defamation lawsuit. As for Section 230:</p>
<blockquote>
<p data-id="para_28">Defendant posted on X, without comment, a link to an article, authored by thegrio.com, titled &#8220;Anti-vaxxer Robert F. Kennedy Jr. is harming black people—and his family legacy—with his vaccine misinformation campaign.&#8221;&#8230;</p>
<p data-id="para_29"><span class="SS_RFCPassage_Deactivated" data-func="LN.Advance.ContentView.getCitationMap" data-docid="6H46-8BD3-S5F2-V562-00000-00" data-rfcid="I08H72JGWP6003MB9KK0036H"><span class="SS_RFCSection" data-rfcid="I08H72JGWP6003MB9KK0036K">Under the Communications Decency Act, internet service users are not liable for repeating, without embellishment, third party content&#8230;.</span></span></p>
<p data-id="para_30">Exhibit A to the Amended Complaint supports Defendant&#8217;s assertion that he posted the third-party content without embellishment. Plaintiff denies Defendant posted the link without embellishment, but cites no admissible record evidence to support the denial. Thus, under the Communications Decency Act, Defendant is not liable to Plaintiff for this post.</p>
</blockquote>
<p data-id="para_30"><strong>Awoye v. Jones, 2026 WL 1847088 (D.N.J. June 26, 2026)</strong></p>
<p data-id="para_30">In Instagram posts, Jones claims that Awoye scammed her. Awoye sued her and brought Meta along for the ride, claiming it had violated his publicity rights. <img src="https://s.w.org/images/core/emoji/16.0.1/72x72/1f644.png" alt="🙄" class="wp-smiley" style="height: 1em; max-height: 1em;" /> There isn&#8217;t any publicity rights violation here:</p>
<blockquote>
<p data-id="para_30">The core of Plaintiff&#8217;s allegations is that Jones spread allegedly false information about Plaintiff on Instagram. Jones was not selling a product or otherwise soliciting money from her followers. As such, neither was Instagram. Jones’ posts were the “dissemination of news or information” and not made for a commercial purpose.&#8221;</p>
</blockquote>
<p data-id="para_30"><strong>Norton v. Meta Platform, Inc., 2026 WL 1963120 (N.D. Cal. July 7, 2026)</strong></p>
<blockquote>
<p data-id="para_30">In posts on Facebook, several third parties accused Norton of criminal activity and shared intimate images of him&#8230;.</p>
<p data-id="para_30">“Meta is an interactive computer service provider.” Second, Norton alleges that third parties, not Meta, created the Facebook posts at issue; the third parties, not Meta, are the “information <span id="co_term_6225" class="co_searchTerm">content</span> provider[s].” Third, each of Norton&#8217;s claims seek to treat Meta as a “publisher” of third-party <span id="co_term_6604" class="co_searchTerm">content</span>. “A claim that obliges the defendant to monitor thirdparty <span id="co_term_6950" class="co_searchTerm">content</span> to avoid liability &#8230; treats the defendant as a publisher.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p data-id="para_30">Norton argued &#8220;but the algorithms.&#8221; Citing <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/05/meta-defeats-two-more-account-termination-content-removal-lawsuits.htm">Ligon</a>, the court says the algorithms matter only if the algorithm creates content. Citing <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/04/roommatescom_de_1.htm">Roommates.com</a>, the court adds: &#8220;Norton doesn&#8217;t allege that Meta required its third-party users to create or post any of the <span id="co_term_11341" class="co_searchTerm">content</span> at issue.&#8221;</p>
<p data-id="para_30"><strong>Moore v. LogSat Software LLC, 2022 WL 23074273 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2022)</strong></p>
<blockquote>
<p data-id="para_30">John Moore has never been accused of, arrested for, or convicted of any sex-related offense; yet, his name, picture, address, and other identifying information appear on LogSat Software LLC&#8217;s app, called “Sex Offenders Search”&#8230;.</p>
<p data-id="para_30">Mr. Moore was convicted in Indiana of voluntary manslaughter. Thus, he was required to register on a violent crime registry in Indiana. The violent offender and sex offender registries are the same in Indiana—in other words there are not two separate lists. Mr. Moore testified that he believed that there was no national violent offender registry, just a national sex offender registry and that he is on that because the Indiana Registry is reported to the National registry&#8230;.</p>
<p data-id="para_30">the alleged defamatory statement at issue is that Mr. Moore&#8217;s name, picture, address, and other identifying information appear on app called “Sex Offenders Search,” because he is not a sex offender and has never been accused of, arrested for, or convicted of any sex-related crimes. Mr. Moore does not allege that he was wrongfully included in the data set that LogSat purchased from FWD, or, for that matter, that he was wrongfully included on Indiana or the National registries.</p>
</blockquote>
<div class="co_paragraph">
<blockquote>
<div class="co_paragraphText">LogSat created the format of the actual app, the order the data is shown, which data retrieved from FWD is shown, how it is shown, the name of the app, and that “Sex Offenders Search” was listed on Mr. Moore&#8217;s profile page. Moreover, LogSat decided what data sets to include on its app. As FWD testified, LogSat subscribed to every data set that FWD provided, which included jurisdictions where the registry included other types of offenders. Therefore, LogSat is the “information <span id="co_term_49827" class="co_searchTerm">content</span> provider” as to, at the very least, the app&#8217;s name, the masthead on each profile, and the data sets that were selected. LogSat&#8217;s own acts—posting the data in conjunction with “Sex Offenders Search”—is entirely its doing and thus section <span id="co_term_50346" class="co_searchTerm">230</span> of the CDA does not apply to these acts. On the other hand, LogSat was not the information <span id="co_term_50453" class="co_searchTerm">content</span> provider for the actual data provided in FWD&#8217;s data sets.</div>
</blockquote>
<div>If I&#8217;m reading this correctly, LogSat ingests the Indiana data, which commingles sex offenders and violent criminals, and distributes the ingested data as if everyone in the Indiana registry is a sex offender, ignoring the possibility that they were listed as violent criminals. I&#8217;m not sure why Indiana commingled its database the way it did, but given that design, LogSat can&#8217;t ingest it verbatim. GIGO.</div>
</div>
<p>The post <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/07/large-roundup-of-section-230-rulings.htm">Large Roundup of Section 230 Rulings</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org">Technology &amp; Marketing Law Blog</a>.</p>
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">28749</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>YouTube Exits Copyright Lawsuit Over YouTubers&#8217; Videos&#8211;Barnes v. Sanchez</title>
		<link>https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/07/youtube-exits-copyright-lawsuit-over-youtubers-videos-barnes-v-sanchez.htm</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Goldman]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 05 Jul 2026 15:11:05 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Copyright]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Derivative Liability]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://blog.ericgoldman.org/?p=29011</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>This is a copyright infringement lawsuit among pro se litigants. The dispute sideswipes YouTube, but YouTube is able to exit on a motion to dismiss. The plaintiff claims a copyright in a book, Drug Lords of Oakland. The defendants operate...</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/07/youtube-exits-copyright-lawsuit-over-youtubers-videos-barnes-v-sanchez.htm">YouTube Exits Copyright Lawsuit Over YouTubers&#8217; Videos&#8211;Barnes v. Sanchez</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org">Technology &amp; Marketing Law Blog</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is a copyright infringement lawsuit among pro se litigants. The dispute sideswipes YouTube, but YouTube is able to exit on a motion to dismiss.</p>
<p>The plaintiff claims a copyright in a book, Drug Lords of Oakland. The defendants operate a YouTube channel, Evil Streets TV. The plaintiff says that the defendants posted 15 videos, each of which narrated a chapter from his book, plus some videos included copyrighted photos from the book. The court implies the dispute roughly followed a DMCA notice-and-takedown protocol: I believe the plaintiff submitted a 512(c)(3) notice, the uploaders counternoticed per 512(g), the plaintiff unmasked the uploaders through a 512(h) unmasking subpoena, and the plaintiff named the uploaders in the lawsuit.</p>
<p>The court allows the plaintiff&#8217;s direct copyright infringement claim against the YouTubers to proceed. In contrast, YouTube wins the motion to dismiss:</p>
<p><em>Direct Infrngement</em>. &#8220;Mr. Barnes fails to allege any facts showing YouTube&#8217;s control of or active involvement in the alleged infringement on the Evil Streets TV YouTube channel.&#8221;</p>
<p><em><a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/copyright-tailor-v2.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignright size-medium wp-image-28734" src="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/copyright-tailor-v2-200x300.jpg" alt="" width="200" height="300" srcset="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/copyright-tailor-v2-200x300.jpg 200w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/copyright-tailor-v2-683x1024.jpg 683w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/copyright-tailor-v2-768x1152.jpg 768w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/copyright-tailor-v2.jpg 1024w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 200px) 100vw, 200px" /></a>Contributory Infringement</em>. Per <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/04/u-s-supreme-court-narrows-secondary-liability-in-copyright-law-cox-v-sony-guest-blog-post.htm">Cox v. Sony</a>, &#8220;Mr. Barnes does not allege that YouTube intended that its service be used for infringement, that it induced infringement, or that it tailored its service to infringement. In addition, Mr. Barnes does not allege that YouTube has no use beyond its ability to host infringing content, nor could he plausibly make such allegations.&#8221;</p>
<p><em>Vicarious Infringement</em>. The plaintiff&#8217;s allegations about right and ability to control were too conclusory. With respect to YouTube&#8217;s direct financial interests in the alleged infringement:</p>
<blockquote><p>there are no allegations that YouTube profited because of the Sanchez defendants&#8217; alleged infringement. At most, Mr. Barnes alleges that YouTube generally profits by hosting and allowing people to view third-party content, including the Sanchez defendants&#8217; videos, and generally by operating the Partner Program according to its terms. The FAC is devoid of any allegations that any individuals sought out YouTube&#8217;s services “specifically because of the availability of the infringing material.”</p></blockquote>
<p>This was a pro se challenge to YouTube&#8217;s core business, so it was always doomed to fail. Note that YouTube won without relying on the 512(c) safe harbor.</p>
<p><em>Case Citation</em>: <a href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.452864/gov.uscourts.cand.452864.79.0.pdf">Barnes v. Sanchez</a>, 2026 WL 1912085 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2026). The <a href="https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/70809627/barnes-v-youtube-inc/">CourtListener page</a>.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/07/youtube-exits-copyright-lawsuit-over-youtubers-videos-barnes-v-sanchez.htm">YouTube Exits Copyright Lawsuit Over YouTubers&#8217; Videos&#8211;Barnes v. Sanchez</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org">Technology &amp; Marketing Law Blog</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">29011</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Cloudflare Defeats Lawsuit Over Nonconsensual Intimate Imagery (NCII) on Facebook&#8211;Doe v. Cloudflare</title>
		<link>https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/06/cloudflare-defeats-lawsuit-over-nonconsensual-intimate-imagery-ncii-on-facebook-doe-v-cloudflare.htm</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eric Goldman]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 28 Jun 2026 14:51:37 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Content Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Derivative Liability]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://blog.ericgoldman.org/?p=28999</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>This is a putative class action lawsuit. The named plaintiff provided intimate images to her then-fiance, who (after the breakup) created fake Facebook profiles of the plaintiff and uploaded her intimate images without consent (turning the images into NCII). She...</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/06/cloudflare-defeats-lawsuit-over-nonconsensual-intimate-imagery-ncii-on-facebook-doe-v-cloudflare.htm">Cloudflare Defeats Lawsuit Over Nonconsensual Intimate Imagery (NCII) on Facebook&#8211;Doe v. Cloudflare</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org">Technology &amp; Marketing Law Blog</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p data-id="para_30">This is a putative class action lawsuit. The named plaintiff provided intimate images to her then-fiance, who (after the breakup) created fake Facebook profiles of the plaintiff and uploaded her intimate images without consent (turning the images into NCII). She requested Facebook remove the images, and when that didn&#8217;t happen, she got the local sheriff&#8217;s office to serve a search warrant on Facebook, allegedly demanding removal of the images. (That doesn&#8217;t sound like how search warrants work, but perhaps we&#8217;d analogize the search warrant to another notice that the content is NCII). The opinion doesn&#8217;t say when Facebook removed the images.</p>
<p data-id="para_30">Cloudflare provides content delivery network (CDN) services to Meta/Facebook. The plaintiff claims the images remained on Cloudflare months after she demanded their removal from Facebook. The opinion doesn&#8217;t indicate if the plaintiff tendered a notice directly to Cloudflare or when (if ever) Cloudflare knew/should have known that the images were NCII. Plus, even if the plaintiff had submitted a takedown notice to Cloudflare directly, Cloudflare would have simply forwarded it to Facebook because Cloudflare can&#8217;t remove the images from Facebook&#8217;s site.</p>
<p data-id="para_30">Note how this lawsuit is trying to impose tertiary liability on Cloudflare: Alleged wrongdoer = ex-fiance. Supporter to wrongdoer = Facebook. Supporter to supporter to wrongdoer = Cloudflare as service provider to Facebook. I have <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/?s=tertiary&amp;submit=Search">repeatedly expressed</a> my concerns about potential tertiary liability. Nevertheless, some courts have illogically implied that a tertiary defendant may be liable for the primary wrongdoing and may not qualify for Section 230, even if the secondary defendant might qualify for Section 230.</p>
<p data-id="para_30"><a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022.jpg"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignright size-medium wp-image-28570" src="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022-300x300.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="300" srcset="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022-300x300.jpg 300w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022-1024x1020.jpg 1024w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022-150x150.jpg 150w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022-768x765.jpg 768w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022-1536x1529.jpg 1536w, https://blog.ericgoldman.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2022-2048x2039.jpg 2048w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a>Despite the ongoing swiss cheese-ification of Section 230, this case ends up being a fairly straightforward Section 230 dismissal for Cloudflare.</p>
<p data-id="para_30"><em>Publisher/Speaker Treatment</em></p>
<p data-id="para_30">The plaintiff argued that because Cloudflare doesn&#8217;t have the ability to remove the images, Cloudflare didn&#8217;t make any publication decisions and thus wasn&#8217;t being treated as a &#8220;publisher or speaker.&#8221; (The court doesn&#8217;t explore the obvious problem when the plaintiff admits that Cloudflare lacked the ability to redress the problem). The court responds that, per <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2025/08/the-ninth-circuit-finds-two-new-ways-to-undermine-section-230-doe-v-twitter.htm">Doe v. Twitter</a>, Section 230 applies to any content dissemination, which Cloudflare does.</p>
<p data-id="para_30"><em>Cloudflare Doesn&#8217;t Become an Information Content Provider if It&#8217;s Also an Access Software Provider </em></p>
<p data-id="para_30">Cloudflare claimed to be an access software provider per Section 230(f)(4). The plaintiff tried a bizarre argument that, by invoking that characterization, Cloudflare admitted it had become an information content provider of the NCII. I didn&#8217;t understand this argument, and I don&#8217;t think the court did either.</p>
<p data-id="para_30">Instead, the court treats this argument as an attempted <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/04/roommatescom_de_1.htm">Roommates.com</a> workaround, which does not succeed: &#8220;Not only did Cloudflare not encourage the development of the content, but it had no ability to directly remove it from Facebook. Instead, like <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2023/02/domain-name-sniping-covered-by-section-230-scott-rigsby-v-godaddy.htm">GoDaddy</a>, Cloudflare merely provided access to content created by a third party, which is activity protected under section 230.&#8221;</p>
<p data-id="para_30"><em>IP Exception to Section 230</em></p>
<p data-id="para_30">Although presumably the plaintiff owned the copyrights to the selfies she sent to her ex-fiance, she did not allege copyright infringement, which would have been excluded from Section 230 per the statutory exception for IP claims. Instead, the plaintiff advanced claims per the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022 § 1309, 15 U.S.C. § 6851. An 6851 claim is not an IP claim. Cite to <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/03/section-230s-application-to-account-terminations-csam-and-more.htm">Doe v. X</a>, which said &#8220;the statute under which Plaintiff sues—§ 6851—is not an intellectual property law.&#8221;</p>
<p data-id="para_30"><em>How Might the Take It Down Act Apply?</em></p>
<p data-id="para_30">The court didn&#8217;t discuss <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2025/06/a-takedown-of-the-take-it-down-act.htm">the Take It Down Act</a>, but it seems highly relevant to this case. [Note: there isn&#8217;t supposed to be a private right of action in the Take It Down Act, but I&#8217;m sure plaintiffs will try to manufacture one anyway.]</p>
<p data-id="para_30">Per the Take It Down Act, Facebook would have to remove the images within 48 hours of receiving notice.</p>
<p data-id="para_30">I can&#8217;t tell if Cloudflare would be governed by the Take It Down Act when it&#8217;s acting as a CDN. A &#8220;covered platform&#8221; is either:</p>
<ul>
<li data-id="para_30">a platform that &#8220;primarily provides a forum for user-generated content.&#8221; This does not apply to Cloudflare because it&#8217;s a B2B service to such forums.</li>
<li data-id="para_30">a platform &#8220;for which it is in the regular course of trade or business of the website, online service, online application, or mobile application to publish, curate, host, or make available content of nonconsensual intimate visual depictions.&#8221; I&#8217;m not sure if this definition is meant to cover every website or app that might have a stray depiction of nonconsensual intimate visual depictions (this would be every UGC site that permits video or graphics, and it might apply to Cloudflare as a &#8220;host&#8221;), or if the definition only reaches platforms that focus on such content, like the old &#8220;revenge porn&#8221; websites.</li>
</ul>
<p>The definition of &#8220;covered platform&#8221; excludes IAPs, email service providers, and a service that &#8220;consists primarily of content that is not user generated but is preselected by the provider.&#8221; I don&#8217;t think a CDN clearly fits into any of those exclusions. So does Cloudflare have to comply with the Take It Down Act? ¯\_(ツ)_/¯</p>
<p>If Cloudflare is a covered platform, I don&#8217;t see how Cloudflare could comply. As a CDN, it doesn&#8217;t have the ability to remove individual items. Now what? Would Cloudflare have to block all of Facebook each time it receives a Take It Down Act takedown demand covering an item on Facebook?</p>
<p data-id="para_30"><em>Case</em> <em>Citation</em>: <a href="https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/XFHSTMSPQI84NBMPEU1I7J03CT">Doe v. Cloudflare, Inc.</a>, 2026 WL 1805000 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2026)</p>
<p data-id="para_30">UPDATE: The court denied the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint:</p>
<blockquote>
<p data-id="para_30">Having considered Plaintiff&#8217;s motion and proposed second amended complaint, the Court holds that the proposed amendment would be futile. The amended claim for violation of 15 U.S.C. § 6851 is still barred by <span id="co_term_5521" class="co_searchTerm">47</span> U.S.C. § <span id="co_term_5534" class="co_searchTerm">230</span>(c)(1).</p>
<p data-id="para_30">Plaintiff alleges that “Cloudflare assists Facebook with, and facilitates, the disclosure of [nonconsensual intimate images (“NCII”)] by making <span id="co_term_5853" class="co_searchTerm">content</span> accessible.” “This dissemination of <span id="co_term_6289" class="co_searchTerm">content</span> is a clear function of a publisher as required for immunity under section <span id="co_term_6539" class="co_searchTerm">230</span>.”</p>
</blockquote>
<div class="co_paragraph">
<blockquote>
<div class="co_paragraphText">Plaintiff also alleges that Cloudflare has a duty not to disclose NCII. <em>See</em> Proposed SAC ¶¶ 126–27 (“In disclosing the Plaintiff&#8217;s &#8230; intimate visual depictions, Cloudflare knew that Plaintiff did not consent to such disclosures or recklessly disregarded whether Plaintiff consented to such disclosures. As a consequence, Plaintiff [is] &#8230; entitled to recover liquidated damages &#8230;.”). This duty “would necessarily require [Cloudflare] to monitor third-party <span id="co_term_7856" class="co_searchTerm">content</span>,” which triggers Section <span id="co_term_8158" class="co_searchTerm">230</span>(c)(1) immunity.</div>
</blockquote>
<div>Doe v. Cloudflare, Inc., 2026 WL 2606984 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2026)</div>
</div>
<p data-id="para_30"><em>Selected Prior Posts Relating to Cloudflare/CDNs</em></p>
<ul>
<li data-id="para_30"><a title="Using a CDN May Contribute to Finding Personal Jurisdiction–R18 v. ThisAV" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2022/09/using-a-cdn-may-contribute-to-finding-personal-jurisdiction-r18-v-thisav.htm" rel="bookmark">Using a CDN May Contribute to Finding Personal Jurisdiction–R18 v. ThisAV</a></li>
<li data-id="para_30"><a title="Cloudflare Isn’t Liable for Providing Services to Alleged Infringers–Mon Cheri Bridals v. Cloudflare" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2021/10/cloudflare-isnt-liable-for-providing-services-to-alleged-infringers-mon-cheri-bridals-v-cloudflare.htm" rel="bookmark">Cloudflare Isn’t Liable for Providing Services to Alleged Infringers–Mon Cheri Bridals v. Cloudflare</a></li>
<li data-id="para_30"><a title="The Legal Implications of Datacenter Location (Guest Blog Post)" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2021/10/the-legal-implications-of-datacenter-location-guest-blog-post.htm" rel="bookmark">The Legal Implications of Datacenter Location (Guest Blog Post)</a></li>
<li data-id="para_30"><a title="Data Center Avoids Copyright Liability By Forwarding DMCA Notices to Its Customer–ALS Scan v. Steadfast" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2020/08/data-center-avoids-copyright-liability-by-forwarding-dmca-notices-to-its-customer-als-scan-v-steadfast.htm" rel="bookmark">Data Center Avoids Copyright Liability By Forwarding DMCA Notices to Its Customer–ALS Scan v. Steadfast</a></li>
<li data-id="para_30"><a title="Bittersweet DMCA Safe Harbor Defense Win in Ninth Circuit–Ventura v. Motherless (Catch-Up Post)" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/05/bittersweet-dmca-safe-harbor-defense-win-in-ninth-circuit-ventura-v-motherless-catch-up-post.htm" rel="bookmark">Bittersweet DMCA Safe Harbor Defense Win in Ninth Circuit–Ventura v. Motherless (Catch-Up Post)</a></li>
<li data-id="para_30"><a title="Ad Network Defeats Secondary Copyright Claims–ALS Scan v. JuicyAds" href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2016/10/ad-network-defeats-secondary-copyright-claims-als-scan-v-juicyads.htm" rel="bookmark">Ad Network Defeats Secondary Copyright Claims–ALS Scan v. JuicyAds</a></li>
</ul>
<p>The post <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2026/06/cloudflare-defeats-lawsuit-over-nonconsensual-intimate-imagery-ncii-on-facebook-doe-v-cloudflare.htm">Cloudflare Defeats Lawsuit Over Nonconsensual Intimate Imagery (NCII) on Facebook&#8211;Doe v. Cloudflare</a> appeared first on <a href="https://blog.ericgoldman.org">Technology &amp; Marketing Law Blog</a>.</p>
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