The Dangerous Meme That Won’t Go Away: Using Copyright Assignments to Suppress Unwanted Content–Scott v. WorldStarHipHop
By Eric Goldman
Scott v. WorldStarHipHop, Inc., 2012 WL 1592229 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2012)
Copyright law wasn’t designed as a privacy enhancing doctrine, but sometimes plaintiffs try to repurpose copyright law anyway. This case is an interesting illustration of how copyright law might be used to reverse-engineer a right to forget, using legal tactics not dissimilar to those advocated (and later renounced) by Medical Justice. As such, this case provides an early warning sign of an emerging attack on publicly available truthful information using copyright law chicanery.
In November 2010, Scott’s girlfriend and ex-girlfriend got into fisticuffs in a classroom. Scott joined in the melee and hit his ex-girlfriend multiple times. A classmate, Seymour, videotaped the altercation. Seymour then sent the video to the WorldStar website, which posted the video as “Disgraceful: College Fight In NYC Breaks Out Between A Guy, His Girl & Another Girl In Class! (Man Strong Arm’s The Student. Hitting Her With Body Shots).” Unfortunately, the opinion is cryptic about whether Seymour posted the video directly or submitted the video to WorldStar for their posting–it would make a difference to the copyright analysis. The video appears to be offline now.
Then, things get really interesting. In December 2010, Seymour assigned the video’s copyright to Scott. The opinion doesn’t say why. It could be that Scott paid Seymour for this assignment as a cheap way to get legal control over the video; or it could be that Scott coerced Seymour into transferring the copyright to settle a lawsuit threat. Once armed with the copyright, Scott sent 512(c)(3) takedown notices to the websites hosting or linking to the video. See, e.g., this one to Twitter. Scott sent a defective takedown notice to WorldStar, which didn’t respond in 12 days, at which point Scott sued. WorldStar brought a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The court rejects the dismissal motion for the copyright claim and grants it for the publicity rights claim.
Copyright. WorldStar argued that Seymour granted it a license to the video before Seymour’s copyright transfer to Scott, and thus Scott’s acquisition of the video was subject to the then-existing license. The court rejects this argument because WorldStar didn’t adequately show it had the required written license (required by 17 USC 205(e) necessary to withstand a subsequent acquisition).
WorldStar also argued that Scott sent a defective 512(c)(3) takedown notice, and thus it never got the requisite knowledge of infringement. However, WorldStar didn’t argue that it requested Scott resubmit a compliant notice as possibly required by 512(c) (given the nature of the alleged notice defects), and thus WorldStar can’t get a 12(b)(6) dismissal on this point.
Publicity Rights. Scott’s New York state publicity rights claim fails because Scott didn’t allege WorldStar used the video for advertising purposes, and WorldStar’s other activities were protected under the state law’s newsworthiness exception. While dismissal is the right outcome, relying on the newsworthiness exception is a little disquieting. The newsworthiness exception applies often in content lawsuits (see, e.g., Parisi v. Sinclair and the trademark case BidZirk v. Smith) but not always. See Fraley v. Facebook as an example of how the newsworthiness exception has its limits. A much better grounds for dismissal would be the lack of commerciality in the video; Seymour had no obvious commercial interest in the video, and WorldStar had no more commercial interest in the video’s “editorial content” than an ad-supported newspaper has a commercial interest in its editorial content.
Implications. This lawsuit provides a protocol for folks trying to suppress truthful negative information–acquire the copyrights to the content containing the unwanted information, and then use the newly created threat of copyright infringement to force that information off the Internet. While this is a disconcerting protocol, it probably won’t work in all circumstances. For example, the protocol probably works better for visual/aural content than purely textual content because (a) people need to see/hear some things with their own eyes/ears, and (b) it’s much easier for others to extract and repeat textual information without running afoul of copyrights. Nevertheless, the post-publication acquisition protocol works even better than Medical Justice’s now-retired pre-publication acquisition approach because it doesn’t rely on legally dubious pre-assignments of not-yet-extant works, plus it can be activated only in response to specific problematic content. Thus, we need to vigilantly monitor the ecosystem for potential abuses of this protocol.
UGC sites (and especially review sites) could undercut the protocol by restricting users’ ability to take down content in response to legal duress. Ripoff Report famously provides its authors with no power to delete their reviews, an aggressive and sometimes questionable move that does avoid the problems identified here. If a blanket restriction on users’ editing/deleting of their own content is too strong, UGC sites could limit this attack by restricting editing/deleting if the author assigns/transfers the copyright in the work, i.e., a kind of springing conditional irrevocability to the user’s license to the UGC site if the user transfers the copyright. I doubt many UGC sites will undertake such an effort now, but if we see widespread misuse of the protocol, UGC sites should undertake more drastic measures to preserve their sites’ integrity.
For more on the social values that this protocol threatens, see my essay on the Regulation of Reputational Information.
UPDATE: The Katz v. Google lawsuit appears to be in the same genre.