It’s Hard to Win a Schedule A Case Without Filing the “Schedule A”–Speedy Simulator v. Schedule A Defendants

October 30, 2026 · by · in Copyright, E-Commerce

Hanlon’s razor says, “Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by [incompetence].” (Consistent with a standard substitution, I’ve replaced “stupidity” with “incompetence”).

This adage is constantly on my mind when I read SAD Scheme opinions. On the one hand, the plaintiffs routinely exhibit, at most, a gross disregard for due process and the rule of law. On the other hand, I often see a lot of flat-out bad lawyering.

But must it be either one or the other? ¿Por qué no los dos?

* * *

This SAD Scheme case was filed by the copyright owners of Steal a Brainrot, a game in Roblox. As usual, the plaintiffs sought an ex parte TRO. The plaintiffs supplemented the complaint with at least two filings:

  • Exhibit 1 to the TRO motion: “a declaration filed by Yingchun Hou in support of the motion for a TRO (“Hou Exhibit”) that, as Hou attests on the public docket, demonstrates Plaintiffs’ inability to verify a current physical address associated with any of the fourteen Defendants.”
  • Exhibit 2 to the complaint: “[s]creenshot evidence showing each Defendant on Schedule A selling infringing [c]ounterfeit [p]roducts.”

Putting aside the Exhibit [#]/Schedule [Letter] labeling conflict, notice what’s missing: the actual Schedule A. The court says succinctly: “without the “Schedule A” referenced in the complaint, the Court cannot confirm who, in fact, the defendants are whom Plaintiffs seek to restrain.”

In other word, it’s hard to win a Schedule A case without actually, you know, filing the titular Schedule A. The court denies the motion for an ex parte TRO for now.

It is easy enough for the plaintiffs to cure this defect by filing the Schedule A. Still, how should we classify this crucial omission per Hanlon’s razor? An attempt to bend/break the rules? Sloppy? Embarrassing? All of the above and worse?

[Personnel note: the complaint is still under seal, so I cannot see who filed it. However, the opinion references Shengmao Mu of Whitewood Law as Plaintiff’s counsel.]

In a footnote, the court adds:

At least one court has ruled in a similar context that the practice of “incorporat[ing] the names of . . . [d]efendants by reference . . . ‘does not satisfy Rule 10(a) or achieve its intended purpose.’” Rule 10(a) “is not a mere procedural nicety,” but rather “protects the public’s legitimate interest in knowing which disputes involving which parties are before the federal courts.”

Amen. I wish more judges would adopt this view!

* * *

On the assumption that the fatal omission will be cured, as a courtesy, the court provides some freebie tips about other potential problems with this case:

Personal Jurisdiction. The plaintiffs submitted a declaration from a consultant, Jay Harvey Paragoso, stating in conclusory fashion that “[a]ll the injuries and damages described above are taking place in the United States, including in New York.” This does not impress the court:

Plaintiffs have made no allegations, submitted no evidence, and advanced no arguments that the original event which caused their injury was in New York. And even if the allegation from the Paragoso Declaration were enough to show that each Defendant caused an injury in New York, it does not establish that any Defendant “regularly does or solicits business . . . in the state” or “expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from . . . international commerce.”

To establish jurisdiction, the plaintiffs also tried:

the barebones allegation that, “[a]ccording to Plaintiff[s’] test purchases, Defendants’ internet-based stores offer for sale and accept orders of Counterfeit Products from and offer to ship such Counterfeit Products to New York addresses.” The declaration from Plaintiffs’ counsel Shengmao Mu (“Mu Declaration”) qualifies that the statement in the complaint is made only “upon information and belief” and adds, “I do not state that counsel or counsel’s staff completed purchases from every Defendant because the declarations and Complaint on which I rely do not establish that fact.” The Paragoso Declaration merely attests that “numerous fully interactive e-commerce stores, including those operating [Defendants’] [s]eller [a]liases, . . . were offering for sale and/or selling infringing products embodying [Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works] to consumers in this Judicial District and throughout the United States.” The Paragoso Declaration refrains from making the assertion that any of the Defendants, much less all of them, actually sold any infringing products to consumers in the State of New York—or even entered into any transaction at all with such consumers.

So did the plaintiffs make test buys or not? If the complaint alleges test buys but the supporting declaration does not, that discrepancy like another Hanlon’s razor and a possible basis for sanctions. I doubt we’ll see such sanctions, though. Courts routinely tolerate mistakes like this from SAD Scheme counsel. But they should not, especially in ex parte proceedings, where the defendants are not around to defend themselves and any factual errors by the lawyer pose a greater risk of causing pernicious judicial errors.

Irreparable Harm. The plaintiffs tried at least three justifications for an ex parte TRO:

  • it’s needed to prevent the “loss of control of reputation, loss of trade, and loss of goodwill.” The court says: where’s the supporting evidence?
  • the defendants may abscond the funds. “Plaintiffs must make a showing that the harm that they will suffer before judgment is issued cannot be repaired through a money judgment.”
  • it’s needed to “preserve their right to an equitable accounting of Defendants’ profits,” but the court responds “Plaintiffs must still demonstrate that their ability to obtain that accounting would be irreparably harmed without a prejudgment asset freeze.” (In a footnote, the court wonders if copyright damages are an equitable remedy).

The court’s bottom-line: “This is all to say, “a temporary restraining order is an extraordinary remedy that will not be granted lightly.”” 🙏 Yet, sadly, after thousands of SAD Scheme cases, ex parte TROs have turned into routine, everyday events.

Case Citation: Speedy Simulator Gaming, LLC v. Schedule A Defendants, 1:26-cv-08931-LJL (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2026)

Prior Blog Posts on the SAD Scheme