Meta Defeats Two More Account Termination/Content Removal Lawsuits

Two more account termination/content removal cases fail, like dozens before them.

Tate v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 2026 WL 1146745 (N.D. Cal. April 28, 2026)

This case involves the manosphere enthusiasts the Tate bros, Andrew and Tristian. Instagram terminated six of their accounts for “promoting’ dangerous individuals or organizations’ or for inciting misogyny.” Due to the Tate bros’ legal entanglements in Romania, the bros claimed their deplatforming was connected to “a broader, ideologically motivated campaign, carried out under governmental and corporate pressure, to marginalize dissenting or controversial viewpoints—particularly those of prominent male figures criticizing modern social norms.” The bros sued Meta for a dozen causes of action. Meta defeats the claim based on Section 230.

ICS Provider. “Meta, as Instagram’s operator, is an interactive computer service provider.”

Third-Party Content. “the information at issue (Plaintiffs’ Instagram accounts) was provided by another (Plaintiffs).”

Publisher/Speaker Claim.

Plaintiffs challenge Meta’s decision to terminate Plaintiffs’ Instagram accounts. Meta’s conduct “can be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online,” and is therefore immune from liability under section 230.

The plaintiffs argued that 230 doesn’t apply to contract claims. Citing Barnes, the court calls their position “unpersuasive”:

The Complaint is replete with allegations challenging Meta’s decision to “deplatform Plaintiffs,” impose a “blanket ban and improper termination” thereby “sever[ing] them from critical commercial tools and millions of followers causing them substantial and irreplaceable financial loss and damage.” Plaintiffs further allege their removal was “not an isolated enforcement action grounded in neutral application of [the] Terms of Use.” So, drawing all reasonable inferences from the Complaint’s allegations in Plaintiffs’ favor, the duty Plaintiffs allege Meta violated derives from Meta’s decision not to publish Plaintiffs’ content online and thus falls squarely within Section 230.

The court also questions if the bros stated any contract breach. “Plaintiffs have not identified any contractual promise that applies to their Instagram accounts, let alone a promise not to terminate their Instagram accounts without prior notice or a promise to provide a right to appeal.”

(Later, with obvious irritation, the court notes that “despite an hour-long oral argument with many minutes of silence while Plaintiffs’ counsel scrolled through all the potentially relevant documents on his computer, Plaintiffs could not identify any provision to support their assertion of a promise of prior notice and appellate rights”).

1983/First Amendment Claim. “Meta is a private actor and thus its conduct constitutes private abridgement of speech to which the First Amendment does not apply.”

In denying leave to amend the complaint, the court emphasizes that this lawsuit wasn’t close at all:

Plaintiffs’ oral argument statements reveal neither they nor their counsel have a factual basis for alleging state actors were working in concert with federal actors and Meta to violate Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. Nor do they have a factual basis for alleging Meta violated some contractual promise to provide advance notice prior to terminating Plaintiffs’ Instagram account and not providing appellate rights, let alone a basis for alleging such breach caused $50 million in damages.

Andrew allegedly “allocated 400,000,000 of personal funds to battle Google, Meta, TikTok,” yet all that money didn’t turn the Tate bros into lawmaxxers.

The unsuccessful plaintiffs’ lawyers include Raymond Brenneman of Brenneman Apc and Thomas Maniotis of Equity Legal, PLLC. Maybe the Tate bros would have had more courtroom success if they added some women lawyers to their litigation team.

Ligon v. Meta Platforms Inc., 2026 WL 1146091 (N.D. Cal. April 28, 2026)

This is a very long and detailed opinion in response to a pro se lawsuit.

Ligon was a 2024 Republican candidate for the Georgia state senate. He got 633 votes in the Republican primary. Ballotpedia also says that he survived two lightning strikes. Wowza. It made me wonder what message God may be trying to send to him…?

Ligon placed Facebook ads for his campaign, but Facebook quickly pulled the ads and then permanently suspended his personal and campaign accounts. In a footnote, the court recaps Facebook’s emails to Ligon that suggest a plethora of reasons why his ads may have been pulled, including trademarks, fake images of others, content that put others at risk, bypassing Facebook’s ad verification system, and copyright. Ligon sued Facebook pro se for eight different claims.

Section 230

In a footnote, the court rejects Ligon’s “but the algorithms” attempt to say that his content was Facebook’s first-party content:

Defendant’s “editorial decisions” includes publishing decisions, like whether to remove published material, which are covered by section 230(c)(1) when the content was created by a third-party, but such editorial decisions alone do not constitute content creation. Plaintiff does not allege that any content was made or contributed to by Defendant, except insofar as he alleges that Defendant created the algorithm that “drives” the enforcement of Defendant’s content moderation and that this constitutes Defendant’s own content.  However, Defendant’s use of an algorithm to assist in its publishing functions does not take those actions outside the scope of its conduct as publisher so long as the algorithm is not assisting in the creation of content, which Plaintiff does not allege is the case here

The court turns to the publisher/speaker element. The Tate court applied 230 to Meta’s alleged promises to provide pre-termination notice and an appellate right. This court says those are not publisher/speaker claims:

providing notice and an appeals process, even when related to publishing decisions, is not an activity necessarily derived from the status of publisher, and sending emails or other notices about a user’s content is similarly not a traditional element of publication

As a result, the claims predicated on the failed notice and appellate rights aren’t preempted by 230. From my perspective, both the notice and appellate rights would kick in only if Meta decides not to publish the content, so I think they are inextricably linked to publication decisions. In other words, I agree with the Tate decision and disagree with this one.

Section 230 ultimately applies to the other claims. As a general statement, the court notes that “The Ninth Circuit has consistently held that decisions to publish content, or not publish content, or revoke content from publication, are quintessential publishing functions for which interactive computer services cannot be held liable under section 230(c)(1).” [Cite to Roommates.]

The court evaluates Section 230’s application to each claim in significant detail:

Plaintiff’s Claim One is a constitutional cause of action alleging that Defendant violated his First Amendment rights; his Claims Three and Four are related federal statutory claims for conspiracy to violate his civil rights and failure to prevent the conspiracy. These claims are based squarely on Defendant’s decision to remove and suspend Plaintiff’s content. The First Amendment claim is based solely on Defendant’s publishing conduct inherent to its status as publisher and remedy would require it to undertake further publishing activity by reactivating or reposting Plaintiff’s content. The conspiracy claim is essentially an allegation that Defendant coordinated with other entities to make its publishing decisions, and the tools Defendant chooses to use when making publication decisions—including potential consultation with other actors—are part of Defendant’s discretion as publisher whether to publish content. Remedy for this claim would also require Defendant to undertake specific publication actions because the alleged outcome and goal of the conspiracy is the removal of Plaintiff’s content. It then follows that the failure to prevent conspiracy claim is merely an allegation that Defendant failed to prevent a particular editorial decision from being made and enacted, whose remedy would also require Defendant to undertake specific publishing actions. It is immaterial that these claims are premised on the removal of Plaintiff’s content for political reasons—Ninth Circuit courts have consistently held that Section 230(c)(1) immunizes the removal of political content. As such, Claims One, Three, and Four are inseparable from Defendant’s status or conduct as publisher and are barred by section 230(c)(1).

[Eric’s note: the court doesn’t address the seemingly obvious problem that a statute can’t override constitutional protections.]

Plaintiff’s Claim Seven is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging that Defendant discriminated against him in the making and enforcement of contracts “by suspending his ads and accounts based on his conservative political viewpoint.” As with the above claims, this claim is based solely on Defendant’s suspension and removal of Plaintiff’s content and profiles, which is essential publishing activity routinely protected by Section 230(c)(1)’s liability limitations….

Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim does not allege that Defendant or any of Defendant’s agents made specific, enforceable promises to him related to the suspension of his content; instead, he relies on the general contractual underpinnings of his use of Defendant’s platforms and payment to Defendant. His statement that Defendant’s acceptance of his payment created a duty to publish his content does not constitute an allegation that Defendant made a specific promise to publish Plaintiff’s content which was intended to supersede its discretion as publisher to make publication decisions. Whether based on an implied contract or a document like the Terms of Service, this type of general contract-based allegation has routinely been found insufficient to overcome section 230’s bar on liability for publishing conduct. As written, Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim is premised solely on Defendant’s decision to suspend his accounts and his advertisements.

[In a footnote, the court adds: “Other courts have gone even further when barring contract claims under section 230(c)(1) to broadly find that contract claims based on the removal of content are inseparable from internet platforms’ status as publishers and are therefore barred. In contrast, still other courts have found that contract claims based on an alleged contractual duty of any kind are not barred by section 230(c)(1).” A shoutout to the Calise and YOLO panels for ratcheting up courts’ confusion on this point.]

Similarly, Plaintiff’s sixth claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is also barred by section 230(c)(1), insofar as this claim seeks to hold Defendant liable for the suspension of Plaintiff’s accounts and ads, for Defendant’s decision to continue publishing other content while removing Plaintiff’s content, and for the frustration of the contract via Defendant’s removal of Plaintiff’s content. Any implied promise by Defendant to use “good faith” or any general statements in the terms of service/use about its criteria when making editorial decisions like removing content is not the type of specific, directed promise that could take this claim out from the umbrella of section 230(c)(1)….Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant enacted the suspensions “in bad faith” does not thwart section 230(c)(1) immunity….

Plaintiff’s Claim Eight for intentional infliction of emotional distress is also barred by section 230(c)(1) to the extent that it is based on Defendant’s removal of his content from its platforms. Plaintiff cannot hold Defendant liable for preventing him from accessing its platforms to publish content or removing his content, as this would hold them liable for its quintessential publishing decisions regarding what information may be published and contained on their platforms

The court then also dismisses everything (both the 230-preempted claims and the non-preempted claims) for lack of merit.

Violations of Constitutional Rights

“Plaintiff’s constitutional claims fail because he has not alleged facts showing that Defendant Meta is a state actor for constitutional purposes.”

Contract Breach

“Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant’s acceptance of his payment created an implied contract by which they agreed to run his ads is directly contradicted by the Advertising Standards and terms of service/use, which reserve to Defendant the ability to reject or restrict advertisements “for violation of [its] policies at any time.””

Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

“Defendant is explicitly allowed under the terms of the contract to reject Plaintiff’s ads for any reason whenever it wants.”

IIED

Plaintiff has not identified any conduct by Defendant beyond the sending of five emails: two of the emails were identical, informing Plaintiff that his accounts or advertisements had been identified as and restricted for using copyrighted music; four of the messages informed Plaintiff of Defendant’s findings upon reviewing the content; and one sent “on behalf of Universal Music Group” included information about the penalties for violations of copyright law and the possibility of a lawsuit. None of this conduct plausibly rises to the level of “outrageous” behavior. There are also no facts alleged to support the contention that Defendant’s conduct was intended to injure or committed with the knowledge that sending such emails was likely to cause extreme emotional distress

Ligon has a better chance of getting and surviving a third lightning strike than winning an account termination/content removal case against Facebook.

* * *

One final point. You may have noted that both plaintiffs in this blog post could be characterized as “right-wing” (I don’t know what qualifies as “conservative” any more). I haven’t crunched the stats, but I believe that “right-wing” plaintiffs are overrepresented in the account termination/content removal genre. Some possible hypotheses about why that could be the case:

• The plaintiffs would argue that it’s because the services are systematically biased against right-wingers.
• There have been numerous studies indicating that right-wingers more frequently post content that transgresses the applicable TOS. Essentially, as civility degrades across our society, right-wingers more frequently embrace content–racism, sexism, violent statements, etc.–that crosses previously set standards for civility.
• Right-wingers are more likely to sue as part of their self-identity as victims and overall feelings of grievance.

I welcome other hypotheses. If anyone want to crunch the data to test my hypothesis, I can help. This could be a good paper topic.

My hypothesis poses some serious challenges to advocates of digital due process requirements. It’s an equity/equality dilemma. We might treat everyone equally with procedural protections for their online speech, but that may not produce equitable results. In practice, people with majority characteristics may be able to weaponize those legal tools to entrench their majority position. See, e.g., Lewis v. Google. If your goal is to raise up disenfranchised voices, watch out for any solution that can be turned around to benefit the majority.