Court Greenlights Politician’s Censorship of Social Media Comments–Fox v. Faison

August 25, 2025 · by · in Content Regulation

Rep. Jeremy Faison is a Republican Tennessee state representative in what is a hugely Republican district (for example, his district includes Cocke County, which voted 83% for Trump in 2024). He also is the chamber’s Republican Caucus Chairman. He came to national attention when he lost his cool at his kid’s basketball game and tried to “pants” the referee. Say what? Some of our elected officials would benefit from maturity lessons from 8-year-olds.

His treatment of social media comments also raises some questions about his judgment. He created his Facebook profile in 2008. Then, in 2015, he created a Facebook page, “Jeremy Faison.” In 2019, he verified the page and renamed it “State Representative Jeremy Faison.” The court describes that page:

Faison uses his page to post about his family and personal interests, personal opinions and campaign efforts, and legislative initiatives and efforts. According to Faison, he controls both his Facebook profile and his Facebook page through his Facebook account, and the log-in associated with his Facebook account is a private, @gmail.com email address. He is the only person, aside from “consultants that [he] hired with campaign funds, who has ever posted on [his] page.” The state does not own or control Faison’s page, and the page will remain his after he leaves office. Faison is the only person who has ever deleted or hidden a post by a commenter or blocked another Facebook account from accessing his page….

Faison’s “Representative Jeremy Faison” page has approximately 13,000 followers. Clicking the “Send Email” link on the page opens an email to Faison’s government email address. The page does not contain any “content policy” restrictions, such as express limitations on the discussion of certain subjects or issues. Faison uses the page to “engage with [his] constituents,” though he does not typically “check the constituency” of individuals who comment on his page. One of his goals is to “reach the maximum amount of people.” He uses his Facebook page to “share what [he’s] thinking about politics and [his] opinions” and to “inform [his] constituents about legislation.”…

Faison acknowledges using his Facebook page to address constituent needs and encourage constituents to seek assistance…

No evidence suggests that these posts constitute official announcements by the state, the House of Representatives, or the Republican Caucus; nor is Faison’s Facebook page the sole (or first) place on which such information appears

Fox is a Tennessee resident, but not in Faison’s district. He commented on the Representative Jeremy Faison page. “Some of his posts were arguably inflammatory and/or disrespectful toward Faison or his supporters.” Someone (the court uses the passive voice here, but presumably Faison because he claimed he was the only person to exercise deletion/blocking authority) deleted two of Fox’s comments, then blocked him. Fox sued Faison for deprivation of his rights.

This turns into an easy and decisive defense win post-Lindke. The court contextualizes the Supreme Court guidance:

The court concludes that it must take Lindke literally. Thus, the determinative question is whether a Tennessee legislator has actual authority to make official announcements on behalf of the state or engage in any other speech on behalf of the state. The answer is no…

nothing in the record indicates that Faison’s posts on Facebook or his communications to constituents through any other medium constitute speech “on the State’s behalf,” Lindke 601 U.S. at 191, 198—regardless of whether his engagement with constituents is part of his job as an elected representative.

In other words, unlike a city manager or, perhaps, a legislative body functioning as a unit, an individual state legislator never has the authority to speak on behalf of the state, even when he is engaged in his official duties of proposing and voting for or against proposed legislation, because legislators “can take action only collectively.”…

a legislator may well purport to act in his official capacity when he engages in such activities as posting or conducting town hall meetings, polling his constituents on issues, informing his constituents through his Facebook page about legislative achievements, and so forth. But the court does not reach the second question—whether an official acted in his official capacity or in furtherance of his job duties—unless it has answered the first question in the affirmative….

while it is clearly acceptable—perhaps even customary—for legislators to communicate with their constitutes through the use of social media, legislators, in engaging in such communications, do not speak on behalf of the state.

So…the court is saying that Rep. Faison never speaks on behalf of the government, even when he is providing constituent services and otherwise performing his job using the salary paid by tax dollars. Thus, Rep. Faison can host a town hall meeting to discuss his work as state representative and yet freely cut off the mike the moment a speaker says anything he doesn’t want to hear. Similarly, Rep. Faison can set up a social media page dedicated to his official work as an elected representative, and transact government business with constituents there, and still mute/block/filter/delete any item of content he wants without any legal repercussions–even if that denies constituents the ability to request whatever government services Faison is offering to non-blocked constituents.

[In theory, voter can hold Rep. Faison accountable for any censorial abuse in the next election. In practice, Rep. Faison is in a safe Republican seat that makes him functionally immune to almost any voter opposition. For more examples of how voters routinely fail to hold their elected officials accountable, despite egregious conduct, when seats are “safe,” see the Laboratories of Autocracy book.]

In other words, this opinion shows the free speech devastation effectuated by the Lindke opinion. The Lindke opinion has ensured “censorship-free zones” where some/many/all elected officials can do official government work free from any First Amendment scrutiny. This is exactly what most elected officials want–the ability to promote and evangelize themselves and control the narratives, without any rebuttal, criticism, or debate–and some will use this unrebuttable promotional freedom (and the power of censorship) to entrench their power. In an era where our democracy is already reeling, this opinion takes us one more step away from a well-functioning democracy.

Case Citation: Fox v. Representative Jeremy Faison, 2025 WL 2406432 (M.D. Tenn. August 19, 2025). Background on the case.

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