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March 02, 2010

February 2010 Quick Links

By Eric Goldman

Copyright

* Mavericks Recording Co. v. Harper (5th Cir. Feb. 25, 2010). 17 USC 402(d) precludes an innocent infringement defense in P2P downloading case when the record companies place proper copyright notices on their works. This is consistent with language from BMG v. Gonzalez in the Seventh Circuit.

* Perfect 10 and Amazon settle on confidential terms; Perfect 10 v. Google will keep going. Previous blog coverage of this case (1, 2, 3, 4, 5).

* Veoh won in court (1, 2, 3) but still got knocked out of the marketplace.

* Project DoD, Inc. v. Federici, 2010 WL 559115 (D. Me. Feb. 11, 2010). In a 512(f) lawsuit I blogged about in December, the judge upheld the magistrate report dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction because the plaintiff had moved and no longer had ties to Maine.

* MCS Music America, Inc. v. YAHOO Inc., 2010 WL 500430 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 5, 2010). MCS sued Yahoo over infringement of its songs, and the court says that it can only get statutory damages for each song infringed. This means that if Yahoo performed 8 different covers of the song, MCS is only entitled to statutory damages for one infringed work.

Trademark

* Monex Deposit Co. v. Gilliam, 2010 WL 325570 (C.D. Cal. Jan, 25, 2010). The courts says a gripe site called "MonexFraud.com" may cause initial interest confusion of the Monex trademark. Are you kidding me?

* Typographically erroneous phone numbers always struck me as a much greater problem than "typosquatters."

Contracts

* Jacobsen v. Katzer settles.

* Asch Webhosting, Inc. v. Adelphia Business Solutions Investment, LLC (3rd Cir. Jan. 25, 2010). 3rd Circuit upholds consequential damages waiver in B2B Internet connectivity contract. Prior blog discussion.

Blogging/Social Networking Sites

* Cats & Dogs Animal Hospital v. Yelp (C.D. Cal. complaint filed Feb. 24, 2010). The plaintiffs allege that Yelp violates California B&P 17200 by using a pay-for-play scheme.

* Rick Frenkel speaks about his Troll Tracker blogging days.

* In re Perry, 2010 WL 374770 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2010). Emailing links to a third party's defamatory blog constituted "publication" of the blog for defamation purposes. The court doesn't discuss 47 USC 230 at all!

* Cunningham v. West Virginia, 2010 WL 415257 (S.D. W.Va. Jan. 26, 2010). MySpace does not impermissibly discriminate against sex offenders.

* Evans v. Bayer, 2010 WL 521119(S.D. Fla. Feb 12, 2010). A student's off-campus creation of a Facebook Group called "Ms. Sarah Phelps is the worst teacher I've ever met" may not be an appropriate grounds for school discipline.

* Snowball fight leads to a rampage at Macy's? Blame Facebook!

* Marshall v. City of Savannah, 2010 WL 537852 (11th Cir. Feb. 17, 2010). A probationary firefighter posted an official fire department photo on her MySpace page. After a reprimand, the employment relationship deteriorated and she was fired. The 11th Circuit affirms the dismissal of her discrimination and retaliation claims.

* BoingBoing gets an anti-SLAPP win--including its attorneys' fees--in a defamation lawsuit over one of its blog posts. The anti-SLAPP ruling.

* Berkery v. Estate of Stuart, 2010 WL 610631 (N.J. Super. A.D. Feb. 23, 2010). "The investigative function an author performs is not substantively different from an investigative journalist. The dispositive element is not the form of the investigative process. In an era marked by a diminution of the classic newsmedia and the print investigative journalist and the proliferation of investigative reporting in media such as cable television, documentary journalism-both televisions and movies-internet reporting and blogging, the need for protection remains the same. Whether Hornblum was writing a book, news article, a screenplay or a blog, the substance of his body of work remains the same."

Search Engines

* After some innuendo about Microsoft’s role in harassing Google on antitrust/competition issues, Microsoft effectively admits as much. Also see this Wall Street Journal article on the Microsoft-Google tussles.

* Search Engine Land: Google AdSense Using Search History In Contextual Matching

* Munger v. State, 2010 WL 537641(N.C. App. Feb. 16, 2010). Rejecting a taxpayer challenge against a NC law designed to provide financial incentives for Google to build a facility there.

* Lengthy Wired article on Google's algorithm.

* Nature: Chinese researchers don’t want to lose access to Google. My blog post on this topic.

* Business Insider: In Case You Had Any Doubts About Where Google's Revenue Comes From

Advertising

* Thomas O'Toole: Does "No Contract" Really Mean No Contract?

* MediaPost: Start-Up Links 65 Million IP Addresses To Users, Readies Targeting Platform. This is not going to end well.

* More troubling words for online advertisers from FTC BCP Director David Vladeck.

* Zelotes v. Rousseau (Conn. Grievance Committee). Attorneys participating in an Internet lead generation system that allocated leads geographically didn't violate the attorney Rules of Professional Conduct.

Online Crimes

* F.T.C. v. Pricewert LLC, 2010 WL 329913 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2010). FTC gets a default injunction against an Internet access provider that allegedly provided connectivity for activities such as child pornography, botnets, spyware, and viruses.

* US v. Little. The Eleventh Circuit disagrees with the Ninth Circuit regarding the appropriate geographic scope to measure the obscenity of Internet material.

* 3 Google executives were convicted in Italy of criminal privacy violations for a user-uploaded video to Google Video. NYT article. Google's response. A refresher on the Felix Somm conviction from 1998.

* Online ticket sellers are getting the smackdown. Criminal prosecutions of online ticket brokers who allegedly played dirty in jumping the queue. The FTC cracks down on Ticketmaster and warns other online ticket sellers.

Posted by Eric at 05:04 PM | Content Regulation , Copyright , Derivative Liability , Domain Names , E-Commerce , Internet History , Licensing/Contracts , Marketing , Search Engines , Trademark | TrackBack



March 01, 2010

Ninth Circuit: Creditor Can Execute Against Domain Name Where Registry is Located -- Office Depot v. Zuccarini

[Post by Venkat]

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling in Office Depot v. Zuccarini [Scribd link], agreeing that a creditor may levy against a domain name in the jurisdiction where the domain name registry is located. The decision is significant for two reasons. First, it affirms (or reaffirms) that domain names are property subject to the claims of creditors. Second, it allows creditors to proceed against domain names where the registry is located, thus allowing creditors to proceed against domain names in one proceeding and more importantly levy against domain names located abroad (where the registry is located in the United States). Overall, this makes getting at a domain name much easier for creditors.

Background: Office Depot originally obtained a judgment against frequent cybersquatting defendant John Zuccarini. Office Depot then assigned the judgment to DS Holdings. Office Depot obtained the judgment in 2000 and it's surprising that 10 years later the judgment is finally being enforced against something. Although Zuccarini is proceeding pro se, it seems like he was or became well versed in putting up roadblocks and delaying resolution of the litigation.

DS went after 190 .com domain names that were registered in Zuccarini's name. DS originally tried unsuccessfully to have the domain names transferred directly to it. (This was the technique successfully used by the plaintiff in Bosh v. Zavala.) Later, DS sought to have a receiver appointed over the domain names. The district court granted DS's request to have the receiver appointed, and Zuccarini appealed. Zuccarini's appeal focused on whether it was proper to appoint the receiver in the Northern District of California, since the domain names were not necessarily "located" there.

The court's ruling: The court runs through basic principles of in rem jurisdiction and what rules apply. The court then looks to federal rules to determine where the receiver should be appointed in this case. Finding no applicable federal rule, the court looks to California law. California law provides that a writ of execution may be issued "in the county where the levy is to be made." With this in the background, the two questions presented by the court are: (1) "are domain names property that is subject to execution?" and (2) "if so, where are the domain names located for purposes of execution?"

With respect to the first question, the court cites to Kremen v. Cohen, and easily concludes that (under California law) "domain names are intangible property subject to a writ of execution." Kremen undermined Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int’l, Inc., 259 Va. 759, 770 (Va. 2000), a Virginia case widely cited for the proposition that creditors cannot get at domain names because domain names are contract rights rather then property. To the extent Kremen did not refute Umbro, this decision definitely provides the necessary ammunition to creditors. (Again, collection is state-specific, and apart from the analysis of the nature of domain names, the outcome in these cases turns on the statute in question, which vary from state to state. That said, I think given the robust marketplace in domain names, Umbro's conception of the domain name as a personal services agreement seems outdated, and most courts will easily recognize this.)

With respect to the second question, the court acknowledges that "attaching a situs to intangible property is ... a legal fiction," and the determination must be made in a "context-specific" manner. Fairness was relevant to the court's determination of the appropriate situs, and the court was understandably not receptive to Zuccarini's policy arguments that allowing a court to issue an order directed to the registry would mean that every .com and .net domain name could be levied through courts in the Northern District of California. The court also looked to the ACPA, which provides for in rem jurisdiction over certain cases where the "registrar, registry, or other domain name authority" is located. Although this was not an ACPA case, the court found the structure set up by the statute persuasive and that the writ was appropriately issued from Northern District of California since VeriSign (the registry for .com domains) is located there.

My reaction: The decision clears up two things. Although post Kremen v. Cohen there shouldn't have been much dispute that domain names are property which are subject to the claims of creditors, the case clears up any lingering doubt that may have existed. (Kremen and this case applied California law, but the result shouldn't vary much across other states.) Second, the decision makes clear that a court which has jurisdiction over the registry can issue an order allowing the creditor to get at the domain names. The case also implicitly affirms that getting a receiver appointed to sell the domain names is the appropriate route for the creditor. Getting the name transferred to the creditor is not a remedy allowed under California law (Palacio Del Mar Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. McMahon). Additionally, a transfer of domain names from a cybersquatter to a judgment creditor raises some issues around potential infringement of third party rights through sales or other exploitation of the domain names. (See this post on Bosh v. Zavala for some discussion of those issues.) The method ultimately used by DS in this case (a receiver) avoids all of these issues, or at least shifts them over to the receiver rather than the creditor.

One of the more significant aspects of the case is that the ruling makes clear that regardless of whether a domain name is registered through a foreign registrar, a court having jurisdiction over the registry can issue an order directing transfer of the domain names to a receiver. With respect to .com and .net domain names, this means that creditors can try to get at these domain names through proceeding in the Northern District of California (as the court notes, VeriSign is the registry for .com and .net domain names and is headquartered in Mountain View). While the ACPA allows plaintiffs to file in rem suits where the registry is located, it's nice (for creditors) to have a similar ruling in the post-judgment context, and one from the Ninth Circuit as well.

Will this cause a rush of similar claims to be filed in the Northern District of California? It's tough to say, but even post Kremen, it does not seem like there's been a ton of post-judgment collections activity with respect to domain names. From a practitioner's standpoint, it's certainly nice to have this rule on the books.

An odd footnote: Zuccarini is a colorful character whose internet exploits have gotten him in trouble with the law. He was arrested in 2003. (Here's a post at CircleID rounding up reactions to his arrest.) According to his Wikipedia entry which contains a link to a Bureau of Prisons search, he was released in 2005.

Previous post: "Domain names as property subject to creditor claims -- Bosh v. Zavala"

Additional coverage: Mike Atkins covers the ruling in a post here.

Posted by Venkat at 06:58 AM | Domain Names , Internet History , Trademark



February 16, 2010

Kozinski and Goldfoot on Cyberspace Exceptionalism and Internet Regulation

By Eric Goldman

Alex Kozinski & Josh Goldfoot, A Declaration of the Dependence of Cyberspace, 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts 365 (2009).

Introduction

In early 1996, in response to Congress' enactment of the Communications Decency Act (the first comprehensive attempt to regulate the Internet), John Perry Barlow published his cyberspace exceptionalist screed, “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace.” The manifesto (naively, IMO) tells government regulators that they are outdated and should not—and cannot—regulate the Internet.

Judge Kozinski, chief judge of the Ninth Circuit, and Josh Goldfoot, a trial attorney in the DOJ's CCIPs division, use Barlow's article as an entry point to discuss Internet exceptionalism/regulation generally. Although the article expresses the authors’ personal views, the article amplifies some themes Judge Kozinski has been developing in his recent Internet jurisprudence, most notably the Roommates.com case and Perfect 10 v. Visa. Because Judge Kozinski plays a crucial role on the federal appellate court governing both Hollywood and the Silicon Valley, this article is worth a close look.

Internet Exceptionalism

Judge Kozinski made his distaste for Internet exceptionalism clear in the Roommates.com opinion. In this article, the authors explain this view more thoroughly:

It is a mistake to fall into Barlow's trap of believing that the set of human interactions that is conducted online can be neatly grouped together into a discrete “cyberspace” that operates under its own rules. Technological innovations give us new capabilities, but they don't change the fundamental ways that humans deal with each other....[W]hen the internet is involved in a controversy only because the parties happened to use it to communicate, new legal rules will rarely be necessary. When the substance of the offense is that something was communicated, then the harm occurs regardless of the tools used to communicate....[T]he vast majority of internet cases that have reached the courts have not required new legal rules to solve them.

While I generally agree with this, I also think it’s an antiquated sentiment. Whether or not cyberspace exceptionalist law are logical or even appropriate, legislators have found them irresistible, resulting in dozens or hundreds of Internet-specific statutes. I explore this dynamic in my article “The Third Wave of Internet Exceptionalism.” So to the extent the authors are arguing that we don’t need new cyberspace-specific laws, that ship sailed a long time ago.

The authors conclude that "the internet is doing wonderfully. It has survived speculative booms and busts, made millionaires out of many and, unfortunately, rude bloggers out of more than a few. The lack of a special internet civil code has not hurt its development."

I agree that the Internet is doing wonderfully, but I would assign causality differently. Legislatures in the 1990s passed a number of Internet-favorable laws, such as the Internet Tax Freedom Act, which kept taxing authorities from loving the Internet to death, and 47 USC 230, which provided a crucial immunity to online intermediaries. Reverse-engineering the Internet’s success is a tricky science, but my hypothesis is that the success is partially due to these “special Internet civil codes,” not due to their absence. For more on this with respect to 47 USC 230, see my talk notes from the Denver University Cyber Civil Rights event.

”Death of the Internet” and “Death of Innovation” Arguments

The authors address two common arguments that Internet defendants make to support favorable exceptionalist rulings, including that an adverse ruling (1) will end the Internet or (2) harm innovation.

They suggest that "end of the Internet" arguments can be powerful (specifically addressing Judge McKoewn’s doomsday concerns in her Roommates.com dissent):

The argument that a legal holding will bring the internet to a standstill makes most judges listen closely. Just think of the panic that was created when the Blackberry server went down for a few hours. No one in a black robe wants to be responsible for anything like that, and when intelligent, hard-working, thoughtful colleagues argue that this will be the effect of one of your rulings, you have to think long and hard about whether you want to go that way. It tests the courage of your convictions.

While end-of-the-Internet arguments can grab judges' attention, I have to assume that the litigant loses credibility if the claim is overstated. So use the argument sparingly, like when your client's loss will pry beloved Crackberries out of the judges' hands.

The authors are less impressed with the "death of innovation" argument.

[P]romoting innovation alone cannot be a sufficient justification for exempting innovators from the law. An unfortunate result of our complex legal system is that almost everyone is confused about what the law means, and everyone engaged in a business of any complexity at some point has to consult a lawyer. If the need to obey the law stifles innovation, that stifling is just another cost of having a society ruled by law. In this sense, the internet is no different than the pharmaceutical industry or the auto industry: they face formidable legal regulation, yet they continue to innovate.
There is an even more fundamental reason why it would be unwise to exempt the innovators who create the technology that will shape the course of our lives: granting them that exemption will yield a generation of technology that facilitates the behavior that our society has decided to prohibit. If the internet is still being developed, then we should do what we can to guide its development in a direction that promotes compliance with the law.

I’m sympathetic to this point. Personally, I feel like arguments that a ruling or law will harm “innovation” are often make-weight. “Innovation” is ill-defined and difficult to measure (i.e., some folks believe patent applications/issuances quantify innovation, but we know better), and it is politically incorrect to oppose “innovation” (you might as well oppose other incontrovertible ideals like freedom, Mother Teresa and puppies). Thus, the “harms innovation” argument automatically, and often unfairly, puts the opponent on the defensive—they can either try to debate what’s better for innovation or stand silently and look like they oppose innovation. But debates about what’s best for “innovation” are almost always irresolute because innovation can take many forms, and we do not know what precise mixture of government intervention and deregulation will foster socially optimal levels of innovation. For more on this, see, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren and Eli Salzberger’s analysis of Coasean allocations on innovation.

At the same time, the authors’ arguments are a little disquieting because they imply that innovation can result in only one of two outcomes—legal or illegal, with nothing gray in between. From my perspective, much (most?) Internet entrepreneurship/“innovation” exists between the two endpoints of the legality continuum. For example, in 1996, I believe many legal experts would have said that unconsented spidering and indexing of a website was probably illegal (a question that has not been definitively resolved even today)—so if we wanted to avoid possibly illegal innovation, Google would not exist today. As a result, it might sound great to channel innovation towards only clearly legal activities, but I don’t really think that’s what we want.

Secondary Liability and Anonymity

The article also has some troubling remarks on secondary liability and anonymity:

If the legal rules change, and companies are held liable more often for what their users do, then the cost of anonymity would shift away from victims and toward the providers. In this world, providers will be more careful about identifying users. Perhaps online assertions of identity will be backed up with offline proof; providers will be more careful about providing potential scam artists in distant jurisdictions with the tools to practice their craft. All this would be expensive for service providers, but not as expensive as it is for injured parties today.

I would like to see some empirical support for the last sentence’s comparison of expenses. It’s not self-evident to me. Further, if we are going to do a cost accounting, we also need to consider what socially beneficial activity is dissuaded by service provider authentication of identity.

The authors continue:

Secondary liability should not reach every company that plays any hand in assisting the online wrong-doer, of course. Before secondary liability attaches, the plaintiff must show that the defendant provided a crucial service, knew of the illegal activity, and had a right and a cost-justified ability to control the infringer's actions. This rule will in almost every case exclude electrical utilities, landlords, and others whose contributions to illegal activity are minuscule.

This argument is consistent with traditional tort principles (as well as Judge Kozinski’s dissent in Perfect 10 v. Visa regarding copyright liability). 47 USC 230’s immunity breaks these venerable principles. As I’ve noted before, bright judges imbued in the common law can have a tough time with Congress’ rejection of traditional tort principles (as well as the concomitant reduction in judicial discretion).

Meanwhile, I’m wondering about the qualifier in the last sentence (“in almost every case”). Unless specified in a statute, I can’t imagine *any* circumstances where it would be appropriate to hold people who make “minuscule contributions” responsible for third party torts—especially electrical utilities, who as regulated monopolies usually have no discretion about whether or not to provide power to their customers.

Conclusion

Although in general most Ninth Circuit Internet rulings have reached the right result, recent Ninth Circuit rulings have shown some hostility towards 47 USC 230 specifically and Internet defendants generally. I am concerned that the Ninth Circuit has become a dangerous circuit for Internet defendants, and this article does not dispel my fears. I think Internet defendants should carefully weigh the pros and cons before appealing a case to the Ninth Circuit. The wild card factor is high, and the likelihood of getting an incomprehensible legal standard is higher still.

Posted by Eric at 01:40 PM | Derivative Liability , Internet History | TrackBack



February 09, 2010

Catching Up With Wikipedia

By Eric Goldman

I recently posted the final published version of my article Wikipedia’s Labor Squeeze and its Consequences. In the course of updating the draft, I reviewed the news coverage of Wikipedia from the second half of 2009, and I thought I would share some of the more interesting tidbits that caught my eye.

Flagged Protection v. Flagged Revisions

The biggest news from the second half of 2009 was the August announcement from the Buenos Aires Wikimania that the English-language Wikipedia was rolling out Flagged Revisions for living people's biographies. It was first reported by Noam Cohen at the New York Times and then repeated in countless articles. I think the announcement took everyone by surprise because it seemed to come from out of the blue. Several other Wikipedia versions deploy Flagged Revisions, but before Wikimania, the consensus had been to try Flagged Protection and Patrolled Revisions--not Flagged Revisions--on the English-language Wikipedia.

[Some of you may be wondering: what's the difference? A lot! With Flagged Revisions, most user edits are invisible to logged-out readers until a more trusted editor approves them. Flagged Protection is a variation of Full Protection and Semi-Protection. Edits from less trusted users to protected articles are invisible to logged-out readers until a more trusted editor approves them. Flagged Protection substitutes for Full Protection, where less trusted users cannot make any edits to the protected articles whatsoever; and semi-protection, where only some users can make edits to those articles. The percentage of articles currently fully- or semi-protected is very low--I believe less than 1%--and presumably Flagged Protection would be used equally sparingly. In contrast, the media announcements indicated that Flagged Revisions would apply to all living people's biographies, a significant minority of Wikipedia entries. Patrolled Revisions is more procedural than substantive; it's merely a way for editors to communicate with each other that they have verified previous edits.]

The fact that Wikipedia apparently leapfrogged Flagged Protection to adopt the much more restrictive Flagged Revisions seemed like an ominous development and perhaps an indication that the vandals and spammers were winning more than we thought. The public angst over Wikipedia's announced move was deafening. People seemed to be genuinely shocked that Wikipedia might make a wholesale move from an open edit site to something substantially more restrictive.

However, this angst was misdirected. Despite multiple efforts to get clear information from Wikipedia (including this unbelievably confusing blog post), it turns out that the English-language Wikipedia isn't adopting Flagged Revisions at all but instead is proceeding with its trial of Flagged Protection. I think Farhad Manjoo properly captured our collective frustration in his TIME article entitled Jimmy Wales Quietly Edits Wikipedia’s New Edit Policy: “In several interviews, including many with TIME, officials at the Wikimedia Foundation, the nonprofit that manages Wikipedia, explained that the user-edited online encyclopedia would soon impose restrictions on articles about living people.” I really don't understand how or why Wikipedia successfully misdirected us for weeks, but they could have easily avoided a lot of confusion with a clearer announcement and more prompt corrections.

So the bottom line is that, despite the August drama, Wikipedia is not flipping its default to closed editing yet.

Nevertheless, as I explain in my Wikipedia Labor Squeezes article, Wikipedia inevitably will adopt more restrictive editing policies. It's just a matter of time. Accordingly, I will not be surprised when Wikipedia announces more restrictions. In contrast, judging from the reaction to the August announcement, I expect most people will be shocked when they next hear of Wikipedia's next effort to deploy a more restrictive editing policy.

Wikitrust

In late August, Wired reported that Wikipedia was adopting Wikitrust, a tool that automatically color-codes edits to an entry to show the projected credibility of those edits. Thus, at a glance, a reader can tell which parts of an entry are more likely to be accurate and which parts should be scrutinized more closely. Amazingly, though, this was also a botched announcement (read the update to the Wired article). Wikipedia is only conducting a trial of Wikitrust.

A Couple Other Interesting Factoids

From New Scientist: ""Occasional" editors, those who make just a single edit a month, have 25 per cent of their changes erased, or reverted, by other editors, a proportion that in 2003 was 10 per cent. The revert rate for editors who make between two and nine changes a month grew from 5 to 15 per cent over the same period."

From NY Times: Wikipedia contributors are 80% male, 65%+ single, 85%+ childless and 70% under 30 years old. As I explain in my article, this is a group that will experience significant life changes, which in turn will reduce or eliminate the time they have to contribute to Wikipedia. Will sufficient numbers of replacements emerge?

From an article entitled The Singularity is Not Near: Slowing Growth of Wikipedia
- "the number of active editors and the number of edits, both measured monthly, has stopped growing since the beginning of 2007"
- "The rate of reverts-per-edits (or new contributions rejected) and the number of pages protected has kept increasing. Occasional editors experience a greater percentage of reverts per edits in comparison to the more prolific editors."

The Wall Street Journal Article

On November 23, the Wall Street Journal published an A1 article entitled I spoke with the reporter in June but my remarks only made the sidebar. The lead paragraph thesis is that "unprecedented numbers of the millions of online volunteers who write, edit and police [Wikipedia] are quitting." Citing research by Felipe Ortega, the article says that the English-language Wikipedia suffered a net editor loss of 49,000 in Q1 2009 (compared with a net loss of 4,900 in Q1 2008). It's worth reading the entire article. It stirred the pot quite a bit.

Erik Moeller, Wikipedia's Deputy Director, responded to the article with (among other things) a different cut at the numbers:

Studying the number of actual participants in a given month shows that Wikipedia participation as a whole has declined slightly from its peak 2.5 years ago, and has remained stable since then. (See WikiStats data for all Wikipedia languages combined.) On the English Wikipedia, the peak number of active editors (5 edits per month) was 54,510 in March 2007. After a more significant decline by about 25%, it has been stable over the last year at a level of approximately 40,000.

My Prediction

Consider this blog post my 4+ year check-in on my prediction in December 2005 that Wikipedia would fail in 5 years. In that post, I didn't tightly define what I meant by "failure," and frankly my "failure" rhetoric has been unintentionally and unnecessarily inflammatory. In all cases, I'm not rooting for Wikipedia's failure (however defined).

However, I remain baffled by the folks who are so enraptured by Wikipedia's mystique that they believe the site will defy gravity. Whatever you take away from the data points I cite in this post, I think it's undeniable that Wikipedia is changing in material ways. Bright minds might disagree about whether those changes are good or bad. From my perspective, Wikipedia's evolution has followed a fairly predictable path. Like many UGC websites, contributor activity peaks and then declines, and the transition from first generation contributors to second generation contributors naturally has some bumps. More structurally, Wikipedia has followed an entirely predictable evolution of progressively tighter editorial policies, and I anticipate even tighter editorial controls are come (to be accompanied by shocked public outcries each time).

As for my prediction, I'm waiting to see what develops this year, especially at Wikimania in August. Whether I'm right or wrong, I'll post my 5 year assessment of my prediction in December.

Posted by Eric at 11:48 AM | Content Regulation , Internet History | TrackBack



February 02, 2010

FTC Privacy Roundtable Recap

By Eric Goldman

[Introductory note: I have repeatedly criticized the FTC on this blog, and this post may implicitly criticize them as well. At the same time, I want to share a couple of compliments for the FTC. First, the FTC did a terrific job preparing for this event. For the panel I participated on, we had two official group organizing calls, plus I had at least 3 individual calls as well. I can’t recall another event which had more pre-event preparation efforts. Second, I remain consistently impressed with the dedication of the FTC staff attorneys. The FTC attorneys I've met uniformly seem to be trying to do the right thing, even if bright minds might disagree about what that is.]

Last week, the FTC held the second of three privacy roundtables at UC Berkeley. A large crowd (I estimate 200+ people) showed up, and I know that many other people watched online. Combined with my conversations with the FTC folks prior to the event, I took away a few meta-observations:

1) The FTC is Facebook-obsessed. FTC staff kept citing Facebook examples. It's clear that the FTC is paying extraordinarily close attention to Facebook.

2) The FTC has embraced the idea of "data as currency." The concept is that online services that don't make consumers pay with cash instead make consumers "pay" by providing their personal data. This didn't come up much at the second roundtable, although I understand it was a big issue at the first.

It's a little dispiriting to see this argument gain traction. I have repeatedly criticized this concept before (see my Coasean Analysis of Marketing and Data Mining and Attention Consumption articles), so I will only briefly recap its deficiencies here. Basically, the concept treats the provision of personal data as an automatic detriment to the consumer, which creates a zero-sum game—just like the transfer of cash, the service provider wins at the consumer's expense. Although consumers may suffer negative consequences from providing their personal data to service providers, the overall concept is wrong because many service provider-consumer relationships are "win-win" where both the consumer and the service provider are better off due to the data transfer. I build some economic formulas in my articles to explain these scenarios with more rigor. Win-win can occur, for example, if the service provider can provide better services to the consumer based on access to personal data. Personalized search is one example. Ultimately, any policy proposals predicated on treating data as currency are likely to overregulate by reducing or eliminating potential win-win scenarios.

3) The term "privacy enhancing technologies" or PETs lacks a consensus definition. Because we didn't agree on what qualifies as a PET, we couldn't determine if they had been successful or not.

Construed narrowly as add-on technologies that guard against specific vectors of privacy intrusions, it's clear that PETs have failed as a mass-market offering. Hardcore privacy folks may seek out tools that advance their interests, and they may even be willing to pay for those tools, but most folks don't care enough to pursue such solutions--even those available for free. (I highlight this tension in my 2002 Forbes editorial.)

However, if we construe PETs more broadly, they have been massively successful. For example, I would consider anti-spam/anti-spyware/anti-virus software as PETs. Obviously those software programs have other benefits, such as security protection, but they solve a variety of privacy-related problems too. For example, my Gmail spam filter learns my preferences and, over time, blocks some types of unwanted emails (such as repeat emails meant for other “egoldman”s like Emma Goldman) from showing up in my in-box. Similarly, PETs have been incorporated into the browsers and provide default protection to their users. If we can get past the one-off single-vector conception of PETs, we may find lots of successful examples.

4) The online "privacy" dialogue hasn't advanced very far in the past 15 years. I felt like much of the 2010 roundtable's discussion would have been apropos 15 years ago. For example, instead of discussing cookies in 1995, in 2010 we are discussing flash cookies and supercookies. There's no real difference in the underlying principles; we're simply at a new point in the technological arms race. Just like technology evolved to provide user control over cookies, it will eventually catch up to flash cookies and supercookies and super-duper-cookies or whatever the next iteration of persistent client-side identifiers is called. Unless we look past the specific technological implementations and focus on broader concepts, we are doomed to repeat the same conversations.

5) Due to the semantic ambiguity of the word "privacy," "privacy" inquiries are guaranteed to fail. Ultimately, I found much of the roundtable discussion unenlightening because the "privacy" umbrella is too broad and ambiguous. From my perspective, the term "privacy" is always fatally ambiguous to any productive conversation; I just don't understand what it means. As a result, at the roundtable, panelists were simultaneously discussing privacy, security, anonymity and a variety of other concepts. The result was a jumbled doctrinal mess and a lot of talking past each other.

At the same time, the "privacy" umbrella hindered the inclusion of non-privacy concepts that might have helped overcome the deja vu tendency. The panel titles were:

Panel 1: "technology and privacy"
Panel 2: "privacy implications of social networking and other platform providers"
Panel 3: "privacy implications of cloud computing"
Panel 4: "privacy implications of mobile computing"
Panel 5: "technology and policy"

My latest project on reputation is relevant to the issues discussed at the roundtable, but where does "reputation" fit into these panels? Everywhere--and nowhere. Similarly, I was hoping to discuss the implications of 47 USC 230(c)(2), the immunization for filtering technologies, but where does that fit in? I hoped to discuss it in the first panel but we ran out of time. Using a classic "privacy" structure for the discussion implicitly stifles these important non-privacy considerations from emerging. As a result, this structure almost guarantees a "same old, same old" discussion by precluding new concepts from joining the discourse.

Before the panel, lame-duck Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour gave some opening remarks. She expressed displeasure with Facebook's resetting of privacy defaults and disagreed with Mark Zuckerberg's quoted remarks that the technology change reflects emerging social attitudes. She also gave a lengthy shout-out to Paul Ohm's paper on de-anonymization/re-identification of non-PII. Note that we will have an evening panel event featuring Paul Ohm at SCU on April 7. Please put that on your calendar now. Paul's paper is already affecting the considerations of FTC Commissioners; come hear what the fuss is about.

After Commissioner Harbour, David Vladeck (head of the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection) gave some opening remarks as well. He summarized three conclusions from the first roundtable:

* Consumers don’t understand commercial information-collection practices (ex: data brokers, behavioral targeting).
* Lengthy privacy policies aren’t effective, but privacy disclosures are important.
* Consumers care about privacy.

He concluded his remarks with an ominous threat. He noted that the FTC continues to bring privacy-related enforcement actions, and in particular (a quote from his prepared remarks) "we are currently examining practices that undermine the effectiveness of tools consumers can use to opt out of behavioral advertising, and we hope to announce law enforcement actions in this area this year." I'm not sure what this means. Perhaps the FTC is fed up with NAI's behavioral ad network opt-out tool? I have not been able to make the tool work properly for years.

Finally, I'll mention a few thoughts from the social networking panel, which featured Erika Rottenberg of LinkedIn, Nicole Wong of Google and Tim Sparapani of Facebook. Given all the Facebook-bashing throughout the day, Tim was in the hot seat!

One of Tim’s talking points was that 35% of users customized their privacy settings in response to Facebook's privacy default resetting and its subsequent requirement that they review the settings. 35% user participation would be a remarkably high percentage for any website, and it’s incredible for Facebook with 350M claimed users.

Tim's other talking points didn't go over as well. He claimed that there are no barriers to entry for other social networking sites. This is technically true but woefully incomplete. It could very well be that the optimal number of social networking sites that consumers can actively embrace is precisely one, and there is good reasons to believe that social networking sites experience powerful network effects. See, e.g., Reuter's article about the tipping point between MySpace and Facebook.

Further, although the friendship relations are sticky, Facebook’s real stickiness comes from the self-published content on Facebook that cannot be exported to another site. Tim completely chunked the question about data portability from Facebook, slavishly espousing his talking point that Facebook will delete user accounts on their request--a non-sequitur that made most people in the audience quietly groan. We all understand that Facebook will kill content upon request, but the question on the table was how Facebook will allow users to move their extensive content to a competitor. Tim ducked that question because Facebook doesn't enable it. Facebook does not offer a front door for data portability, and Facebook has been shutting down the backdoor by suing folks like Power.com who try to create an unsanctioned portability method. To be clear, I'm not 100% convinced that Power.com is the good guy in that dispute, but I'm pretty confident that Facebook doesn't tolerate backdoor data portability.

Even so, I think Facebook's biggest threat is itself. Few users will get so mad that they will delete their accounts (I still have my Orkut and Friendster accounts, for example). Instead, Facebook should be concerned that users will simply reduce their usage because they get burned out or lose trust in Facebook. Ultimately this will cause users to migrate elsewhere, so the end game for Facebook could be a whimper, not a bang.

As an example of this latter phenomenon, Tim’s talking points claimed that Facebook gives users control over who they want to share every piece of data at the time they publish the data. He rightly praised this granularity but I am still grumbly that Facebook killed the setting that kept my comments and likes off my profile page. Now, if I don't want those items to show, I have to manually delete each one. So I do have control over my publications as Tim touted, but the additional transaction costs cause me to comment on and like other posts less frequently than I used to. This seems like more of a bug than a feature in my book.

In contrast to Facebook, Nicole Wong hammered the point that Google embraces data portability and builds it into the design of many of its services. As she said (I'm paraphrasing her), because users can leave with a click, we have to better with every product every day, and it makes us build better products. That's the spirit! Facebook, are you listening?

Posted by Eric at 04:04 PM | Internet History , Privacy/Security | TrackBack



January 27, 2010

Utah May Repeal Its Spyware Control Act--SB 26

By Eric Goldman

It's that time of year again. The Utah legislature is back in session and cooking up new schemes to regulate the Internet. So far I only see one Internet-specific bill in queue, SB 26. Surprisingly, it does not directly attempt to regulate keyword advertising.

SB 26 is sponsored by Sen. Stephen H. Urquhart, who rocketed to national cyberlaw fame (infamy?) in 2004 when he sponsored Utah's Spyware Control Act. It was such a misguided law that it motivated me (in part) to write a 71 page magnum opus explaining its policy deficiencies. It was also hampered by its fairly obvious unconstitutionality, which was confirmed by a Utah court a few months after passage. (Note: I helped write an amicus brief in that court challenge, so you might interpret my assessment as an advocacy statement). Following the judicial thumping, then-Rep. Urquhart shepherded an amendment to the Spyware Control Act in 2005 that effectively neutered the law. Since then, I believe the law has sat largely dormant. The only court citation I know of was in the 2008 Overstock v. SmartBargains case, easily rejecting Overstock's mystifying attempt to make a claim under the superseded 2004 version of the law.

Among other items I'll discuss in a moment, SB 26 proposes to repeal the Spyware Control Act entirely. If passed, that would be a remarkable development because most legislators let their failed laws sit on the books unused. It takes some work to repeal a law, plus it can be a little embarrassing to repeal a law--especially after hyping up the law to get it passed initially (Urquhart had a lot of tough talk about spyware/adware in 2004-05, see, e.g., here). Kudos to Sen. Urquhart for having the fortitude to admit and fix his errors publicly.

While repealing the law would be a remarkable step on its own, it's even more remarkable in the context of the Utah legislature's track record of Internet regulation. By my count, repealing the Spyware Control Act would be at least the THIRD Utah Internet law that its legislature repealed in the past few years--the other two being Utah's 1995 digital signature act and its infamous Trademark Protection Act. For a legislature that meets only a couple of months a year, a trifecta of repealed Internet laws in the past couple of years is a stunning waste of scarce legislative resources. Wow.

As bad as that is, the three repealed laws don't even tell the full story of the Utah legislature's incompetence when it comes to Internet regulation. Recall Utah's failed attempt to line its coffers by taxing email (which turned into a big money-loser), and don't forget its repeated attempts to regulate Internet content that have spawned years of costly litigation (see, e.g., Free Speech Coalition v. Shurtleff). From my perspective, anyone looking objectively at the Utah legislature's track record of regulating the Internet would logically conclude that they should cut their losses and focus on other legislative priorities.

Unfortunately, SB 26 indicates that either hope springs eternal in the Utah legislature or they are doomed to forget the lessons of history. Despite doing some good by putting down the Spyware Control Act, the bill amazingly proposes more regulations of the Internet! To Sen. Urquhart's credit, the bill is largely clone-and-revise proposals from other places and not drafted from scratch, which may contribute less from a regulatory standpoint but at least they aren't quite as error prone. The proposed law has three main components:

1) anti-phishing/anti-pharming restrictions. I'm not sure where the original text came from. California has an anti-phishing law but I don't think this is a clone-and-revise of that law. Maybe it's cloned from another state's anti-phishing law. In any case, the anti-"phishing" proposal is noteworthy because the regulation doesn't restrict itself to email (presumably to avoid any risk of CAN-SPAM preemption). As a result, as currently drafted, it's an unlimited anti-pretexting law applicable to both online and offline conduct.

2) anti-spyware restrictions. After wiping out the Spyware Control Act, the new anti-spyware proposals are based on the California model of state anti-spyware laws, which have been followed by a couple dozen other states. The California model regulates various types of "intentionally deceptive" conduct regarding software activity. This is what Utah should have done in 2004-05 rather than trying to develop its own sui generis law. I generally don't have a problem with regulating intentionally deceptive software behavior, but it seems a little late to be enacting the laws now. Most of the regulations contemplate practices more common in 2003-06 and largely defunct now, so Utah is showing up late to a party that ended years ago.

3) a state version of the federal Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act. I know some other states have enacted domain name protection laws (California comes to mind), but it's not clear what benefits these state laws have. As far as I know, California's law is almost never used. Tom O'Toole speculates that this bill will make it easier for Utah trademark owners to bring in rem lawsuits, but it's not clear to me how much this law will help given the rarity of ACPA in rem lawsuits (UDRPs are usually cheaper and faster for the same results) and already expansive jurisdictional principles under ACPA. Further, I wonder if this law is preempted either by the dormant commerce clause or via field preemption of the federal ACPA.

I should add that I’ve observed that Utah bills can change radically from draft to draft with little warning, even if the law is on the legislative floor for a final vote, so we'll have to see if this law transmogrifies through the process. And I am keeping a vigilant watch for any resurrected attempts to regulate keyword advertising.

Posted by Eric at 09:58 AM | Adware/Spyware , Domain Names , Internet History , Spam , Trademark | TrackBack



January 18, 2010

File Names Can Help Predict File Content in Child Porn Prosecution--US v. Beatty

By Eric Goldman

United States v. Beatty, 2009 WL 5220643 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 2009)

This is a child porn prosecution. Using Phex P2P software, an undercover investigator accessed the Gnutella network and conducted searches using search terms known to be used by child pornographers. The investigator identified IP address 76.188.64.82 with 11 files with troubling titles such as:

* r@ygold-pedo-13yo brother fucks 11yo sister and sperm inside 61943812.mpg
* (Pthc) 14yo Isabel-(Rape and Fuck) (R@ygold).mpg
* Little young girl hardfucked by me-7 yrs R@ygold illegal pedo sex.mpg
* (Hussyfan) (pthc) (r@ygold ) (babyshivid) Jessica 11y o get fucktgood.mpg

The investigator then matched hash tag fingerprints of the 11 files with child porn files in a database maintained by the Wyoming Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) Task Force. Subsequently, the investigator connected Beatty to the IP address. Based on this information, the government got a search warrant for Beatty's home, found hundreds of incriminating files on his home computer, and got incriminating statements in an interview.

Beatty challenged the government's right to search his home computer. The judge and the litigants agree that the government can legally conduct remote warrantless searches of P2P share directories, but the government apparently argued that they were free by extension to look through Beatty's entire computer. The judge rejected such a broad position, saying:

even if the Defendant suffered no Fourth Amendment intrusion by virtue of Trooper Pearson's conduct in remotely accessing certain shared computer files, the Defendant nevertheless retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer and his home such that he possesses "standing" to challenge the merits of the subject search

This shifts the inquiry to the officers' probable cause for the warrant. Apparently, the investigator did not download the files to review them or attach the files as evidence when requesting the search warrant. I'm not sure why the investigator didn't do either step other than to avoid the toxicity of child porn generally. As a result, Beatty challenged the warrant because the warrant-approving magistrate did not see the files directly or get an affidavit from the investigator stating what he saw in the files. However, the magistrate did have the file names and the matching hash tags. Beatty challenged both.

The judge and the litigants agree that file names do not dispositively predict the actual file's content. As we know, file names can be inaccurate for a variety of reasons: plain error, semantic ambiguity, an effort to surreptitiously install malware, and as a way of increasing the content's perceived illicit value (see, e.g., the discussion in the uncited Perfect 10 v. ccBill case about websites with names like "illegal.net" and "stolencelebritypics.com"). The court correctly concludes that "common knowledge dictates that actual file content cannot be definitively determined from the file name alone."

Nevertheless, the court says that file names have some predictive value:

one can also envision circumstances where the file name is so explicit and detailed in its description as to permit at least a reasonable inference as to what the actual file is likely to show. Many, if not most, of the files at issue here had titles that contained highly graphic references to specific sexual acts-including ejaculation, sexual intercourse, oral sex, and anal sex-involving children ranging in age from 7 to 13 years. Several of the files also reference terms such as "child_sex," "pedofilia," "illegal pedo sex," "incest," or "Lolita." The unmistakable inference which arises from such highly descriptive file names, is that the content includes material pertaining to the sexual exploitation of children-i.e., evidence of criminal activity, if not outright contraband. Given the number of files in question and the pointed references in their titles to specific sexual acts involving young children-described in the most coarse and vulgar terms, this inference is a strong one.

I'm reminded of the admonishments that airport security is not a joking matter, so don't make jokes about having a bomb while going through the airport security line. (I've seen a few airports, including the New Orleans airport, post reminders about this). Similarly, child porn is so toxic that no one in their right mind would falsely use a file title suggesting the file is child porn.

The judge also credits the file titles because accurate file titles enable searches by others. So, if you want to distribute child porn in a searchable way (a seemingly illogical proposition because, as this case illustrates, doing so puts you on a fast track to Club Fed), then you need to use keywords that match search terms. The court says:

As a matter of common sense, the very fact that individuals utilize search terms with P2P software to produce results (i.e., file names ) consistent with their chosen search terms suggests a substantial degree of correlation between file names and file content; if file names were, as a general rule, completely random and bearing no relation whatsoever to their content, then there would be no point in conducting a search in the first place and the whole purpose of peer-to-peer file sharing would be frustrated because there would be no meaningful method for locating the sought-after file content.

I agree with this only superficially. It's true that searchable metadata must have some relationship to the underlying content to make a successful match, but community outsiders might think the metadata looks inaccurate or even completely random. Consider how Napster users used alternative spellings to route around the court-ordered blocks on various names. Now, go one step further: if a group of Napster users agree (in an offsite discussion forum) to tag Britney Spears' songs using "Lolita" (a not wholly inappropriate appellation given some of the videos she made before the age of majority), then a block on searches for "Britney Spears" will eliminate an obvious matchmaking route but will fail to stop matchmaking completely. Indeed, subcommunities can develop multiple synonyms that are opaque to outsiders. For more on this, look at the Urban Dictionary to see how slang can have multiple meanings, and note my article on how a single search term can have dozens of possible meanings. As a result, the search matchmaking process may be more complicated--and the value of "accurate" file descriptors is lower--than the court contemplates.

In any case, it wasn't clear how much traction Beatty expected from reducing the predictive value of file names. Ultimately, the search warrant was issued based on the combination of the file names with the fingerprint matches. It's not like the investigator or the judge had no idea what the files might contain--they had a hash value fingerprint matching a known child porn file. (Beatty unsuccessfully argued that the underlying fingerprinted files should not be credited as known child porn ) Then again, there is no reason why law enforcement isn't routinely preserving copies of suspect files they think are child porn and describing the file contents (or submitting the files) when seeking search warrants, easy steps that would have largely mooted Beatty's challenges.

Posted by Eric at 10:23 AM | Content Regulation , Internet History , Privacy/Security , Search Engines | TrackBack



January 11, 2010

Top Cyberlaw Developments of 2009 (Eric's List)

By Eric Goldman

Guest blogger John Ottaviani recently dropped by to offer his perspectives on 2009’s top Cyberlaw developments. While I like his list a lot, I independently developed my own top 10 list that has a different emphasis. You might enjoy the contrasts. My list:

#10: Louis Vuitton v. Akanoc. After the judge ordered a web host to stand trial, a jury awarded the trademark owner $32 million due to the web host’s contributions to trademark infringement by its customers. This case stands out for the big damages award and as a rare example where an online provider was held liable under a contributory trademark liability theory. Many trademark practitioners are scratching their heads trying to figure out the import of this case, however. Does this case represent a dangerous new frontier of online liability? Was this a bad jury verdict fueled by poor defense lawyering? Or was this an appropriate outcome because the web host actually engaged in bad behavior that distinguishes it from most “legitimate” web hosts? 2010 may help us understand if this case is part of a new trend or an aberration.

#9: Gordon v. Virtumundo. We’ve seen a lot of silly anti-spam litigation, including the emergence of an entirely new group of entrepreneurs called “spam litigation entrepreneurs” who try to make a living on anti-spam lawsuits. These folks have a true love-hate relationship with spam; they hate it so much that they devote their lives to fighting it, but they love getting spam because each one is a potential revenue source. In general, judges hate spam a lot too, so over the years we have seen a number of doctrinally unsupportable results where judges bent the law to make sure spammers lost.

However, the judicial pendulum has swung in the opposite direction, and in Gordon v. Virtumundo, the Ninth Circuit destroyed a serial anti-spam plaintiff’s entrepreneurial business in a doctrinally questionable but strongly worded opinion. In short order, a number of other spam litigation entrepreneurs have seen their lawsuits shut down with emphasis. Due to this ruling, the era of anti-spammers partying in courts may be on the wane.

#8: Zango v. Kaspersky. The question raised in this issue is simple to state but hard to answer: who should decide what constitutes spam, spyware or a virus? Vendors of software designed to curb these threats would like unfettered discretion to make their classifications; businesses who are classified as a threat would like judges to overturn adverse decisions. As it turns out, in a relatively obscure provision (47 USC 230(c)(2)), in 1996 Congress said that software vendors get to make classifications decisions and unhappy businesses can’t complain about them. In June, the Ninth Circuit upheld Kaspersky’s decision to classify Zango’s software as a threat and rejected Zango’s efforts to take the classification decision out of Kaspersky’s hands. This ruling gives enormous freedom to vendors of anti-spam/anti-spyware/anti-virus software to do their best to keep us safe.

#7: Columbia Pictures v. Fung. This case came out just before the Christmas holiday, so it got lost in the holiday hoopla a bit, but it’s a case of potentially significant import. First, it held that the specific torrent sites at issue induced copyright infringement. Second, the court denied the torrent sites’ eligibility for the DMCA online safe harbors. In part, the court said that an inducing website was categorically disqualified from the DMCA online safe harbors. Like the Akanoc case, it’s not entirely clear if this result was a legal aberration or an appropriate reaction to the defendants’ poor choices. Either way, it is possible that more “legitimate” websites may change their behavior to minimize their exposure based on the legal precedents in this case. If they do, this case could have a major impact on UGC websites.

#6: Lori Drew’s acquittal. Megan Maier’s suicide remains a heartbreaking tragedy, but unfortunately, overzealous prosecutors compounded the tragedy by prosecuting Lori Drew using bogus legal doctrines. The tragic facts got a jury to convict Drew of some misdemeanor crimes. Fortunately, the judge recognized the legal errors of the prosecution’s theory and the jury’s conclusions and granted Drew an acquittal despite the jury findings. The judge finally got to the right result as a matter of Cyberlaw, but the case remains a chilling testament to prosecutorial power.

#5: Harris v. Blockbuster. The rule is really clear. Service providers can't amend online user agreements in the provider’s sole discretion without notice. As the Ninth Circuit informed us in 2007, those contracts don’t fare well in court. So although these provisions are in just about every online user agreement, they don’t work--as Blockbuster found out the hard way.

As part of the litigation detritus from the Facebook Beacon experiment, users sued Blockbuster for sharing their rental transactions with Facebook and all of their friends, allegedly in violation of the Video Privacy Protection Act. Blockbuster tried to bust the class action by invoking the contract’s arbitration clause. Instead, because Blockbuster had the impermissible amendment provision in its user agreement, the court said the contract was illusory and refused to send the case to arbitration.

This case should signal the end of the ridiculous amendment clauses. We’ll see how long it takes the lawyers to give the provisions up.

#4: Battles Over the First Sale Doctrine. We have seen numerous legal battles this year over the First Sale defenses in both copyright and trademark law.

Copyright owners try to engage in price discrimination by carving up the world into geographic territories with different prices for the same product. If they can use copyright law to keep the cheap products from entering the other geographic market, this keeps the product from effectively price-competing with itself.

This year, two cases involved European textbooks which were functionally equivalent to the textbooks being sold in the United States at higher prices. Entrepreneurs were buying the cheap European texts, shipping them to the US and then selling them online. The entrepreneurs invoked the First Sale doctrine, which says that copyright law can’t prohibit the legitimate purchaser of a tangible copyrighted item from reselling the item to whomever they want at whatever price they want.

However, copyright law has another provision that allows copyright owners to block the importation of copyrighted works into the United States. In the 1998 Quality King case, the US Supreme Court said that the First Sale doctrine trumped the importation right when the goods were manufactured in the US, sold overseas, and then imported back to the US. However, in Pearson v. Liu and John Wiley & Sons v. Kirtsaeng, the judges said that the importation right trumps the First Sale doctrine when the goods were initially manufactured overseas. This issue is ripe for further adjudication, though. A similar importation case, Costco v. Omega, is pending before the US Supreme Court, which is deciding whether or not it wants to hear the case. If it does, we may get clearer instructions about the interplay between the First Sale doctrine and the copyright importation right.

Copyright’s First Sale doctrine was also at issue in Vernor v. Autodesk, where the purchaser of a software disk wanted to resell the disk on eBay despite restrictions in the software licensing agreement barring such resales. The court held that the First Sale doctrine applied and allowed the resale. There are other cases percolating through the court system involving the resale of tangible media contained copyrighted material despite contractual restrictions on resale, so this issue remains a hot one.

Trademark owners also try to prevent competition with their products that leak out of their official channels of distribution. eBay has been the site of a couple battles over the First Sale doctrine in trademark law. In Mary Kay v. Weber, the court held that the trademark First Sale doctrine may not permit the eBay resale of expired cosmetics by a Mary Kay independent beauty consultant. In Beltronics v. Midwest, a trademark owner shut down the eBay resale of radar detectors that had leaked out of the manufacturer’s channel and were being sold (at a cheaper price) without the manufacturer’s warranty.

Clearly, the First Sale doctrine matters a lot to eBay and other consumer-to-consumer e-commerce websites. With a possible pending Supreme Court case and lots of IP owners looking to stifle competition from goods they have already profited from, expect the First Sale doctrines to get lots of attention in 2010.

#3: 47 USC 230. In my opinion, 47 USC 230 is the most important Cyberlaw statute, so new 230 developments will make my top 10 list for the foreseeable future. This year, there were three federal appellate court rulings interpreting 47 USC 230(c)(1):

* in Barnes v. Yahoo, the Ninth Circuit held that 230 protected a website’s negligent delay in removing user content. However, if the website had promised removal to the user, the user could have a viable claim for promissory estoppel that would not be preempted by 230.
* in FTC v. Accusearch, the Tenth Circuit held that a website’s resale of pretexted phone records—even if those records were supplied by third party suppliers—did not qualify for 47 USC 230 protection because of their illegality.
* in Nemet Chevrolet v. ConsumerAffairs.com, the Fourth Circuit held that a consumer review website was not liable for user-supplied reviews, even when the website worked with the user to submit the review, and despite the plaintiff’s unsubstantiated claims that the website had fabricated the reviews itself.

Really, the big 47 USC 230 news in 2009 is the absence of big news. Specifically, 2009 reinforced that the Ninth Circuit’s 2008 Roommates.com decision—one of the most significant defense losses under 47 USC 230—did not rip open a major hole in the statutory protection of websites. Of the 13 cases that I have seen that have cited the Roommates.com en banc opinion, eleven have cited the case in favor of the defense. (See the list here). The two exceptions are the Accusearch case, mentioned above, and the New England Patriots’ lawsuit against StubHub over season ticket resales, an odd opinion that may not have much influence. Therefore, despite our fears about Roommates.com, the 47 USC 230 immunity remained healthy and vibrant in 2009. For more on this topic, see my special recap of 47 USC 230's year-in-review for 2009.

#2: Keyword Advertising Battles. Keyword advertising battles are another perennial topic on these year-in-review lists. A multi-billion dollar a year industry has sprung up around the sale of keyword-triggered advertising, including some keywords that may be third party trademarks, and trademark owners don’t like it at all. This has led to a multi-front battle between trademark owners, keyword advertising sellers (such as Google), and keyword advertising buyers.

One of the biggest Cyberlaw cases of the year was the Second Circuit’s ruling in Rescuecom v. Google. In the district court in 2006, Google won an easy victory against a trademark owner because the court said that Google did not make the requisite “use in commerce” of the trademark. The Second Circuit reversed the district court, sending the case back for further proceedings. The reversal does not ensure Google’s defeat; Google will now litigate other legal doctrines and might very well win on one of those. However, the Second Circuit’s opinion largely spells the end of any “use in commerce” defense by either keyword advertising sellers or buyers.

Because of the “use in commerce” defense’s demise, keyword advertising cases will now likely turn on whether the advertisements create a likelihood of consumer confusion. One case, Hearts on Fire v. Blue Nile, offered up a new and complicated test for gauging consumer confusion. If other courts adopt this test, keyword advertising cases will get even more expensive and complicated—highlighting how important it was that the Rescuecom case eliminated an easy way to end these lawsuits early.

Meanwhile, despite the fact that keyword advertising battles have been taking place for at least a decade, we have not heard what a jury thinks about the practice—until the November jury ruling in Fair Isaac v. Experian. In that case, the jury found for the defense that the keyword-triggered ads did not create the requisite likelihood of consumer confusion. It remains to be seen if other juries reach the same conclusion. If they do, keyword advertising lawsuits should slowly fade away over time because the trademark owners can’t win in the end.

As for now, keyword litigation is going strong and hardly fading away. In Spring, Google made two changes to its trademark policies where it voluntarily agrees to take down certain types of ads at the trademark owner’s request. In May, Google extended its more liberal US-based policy to nearly 200 other countries, replacing the more restrictive policies it had in place there. Shortly thereafter, Google modified its US policy to do less for trademark owners in situations involving product resales, review websites and sales of complementary/replacement parts. Trademark owners were none too pleased with these changes. In response to these changes and the door opened by the Second Circuit Rescuecom decision, Google got hit with about a dozen new lawsuits, including some class action lawsuits, of which I believe 10 are currently still active.

Finally, all of the wrangling in court and over voluntary trademark policies could be mooted by legislative action, and for the third time, the Utah state legislature considered resolving the keyword advertising issue itself. A law regulating keyword advertising passed the Utah house but died in the Utah senate. Expect the pro-regulatory forces to round up the troops for a fourth try in 2010.

#1: FTC Endorsement Guidelines for Bloggers. The Obama administration has breathed new life into a pro-regulatory FTC, and the FTC sure is interested in all things Internet. The FTC has been nosing around Internet privacy and Internet marketing practices pretty carefully, and I expect 2010 to bring more FTC pronouncements designed to tackle the Internet.

But nothing stirred up a hornet’s nest of confusion and anger in 2009 like the FTC’s Endorsement and Testimonials Guidelines. I think it’s fair to say that the FTC’s guidelines rollout was a complete failure. As usual, the FTC’s guidelines were mealy-mouthed and filled with conditional statements (the FTC hates to lay out bright line rules that might constrain their future discretion). However, the FTC’s general gist was clear: bloggers should disclose when they receive financial or other consideration for their blog posts.

Unfortunately, this general principle leaves open some fairly fundamental questions, like when is disclosure required in situations less clear than straight cash-for-posting, and where should disclosure be made, especially in space-constrained media like Twitter. Needless to say, unhappy bloggers can be very noisy, so blogger response to the FTC’s announcement was loud and vituperative. The FTC tried to backpedal a little by saying that it did not intend to pursue individual bloggers, but this announcement only reinforced that bloggers do not understand what the FTC wants from them.

Meanwhile, the FTC’s proposed guidelines also took an interesting position about an advertiser’s liability for rogue blogger’s posts. This position is generally consistent with government enforcement agencies’ views that commercial players can be legally responsible for content they endorse or link to (see, e.g., my comments on the SEC’s liability-for-linking policy), but this position runs directly contrary to 47 USC 230’s provisions that say A isn’t liable for B’s online content. As a result, I believe that part of the FTC’s proposed guidelines violate 47 USC 230 and would not survive a court challenge.

Overall, the firestorm over the FTC’s Endorsement and Testimonials guidelines is a small part of a larger effort to regulatorily separate advertising from content. The Internet has collapsed those distinctions, perhaps irreparably, so regulators may be trying to accomplish the impossible. Nevertheless, the FTC seems determined to prop up the distinction, and I expect 2010 will bring more FTC efforts on this front.

* * * * *

While that concludes my top 10 list, there were a number of other interesting developments in 2009 that are worth a brief note:

* Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel. A woman trashed her hometown in an obscure but public MySpace posting and learned there is no “do-over” for Internet content publication. My vote for the most factually interesting Cyberlaw case of 2009.

* Google’s keyword metatag announcement. Courts generally treat the inclusion of third party trademarks in keyword metatags as per se trademark infringement. But Google has confirmed that it ignores keyword metatags. Will courts get the message?

* Google Book Search settlement. If the Google Book Search settlement ever gets approved, it may reshape the book industry, redefine libraries, and make all kinds of other socially significant changes. But the list of opponents to the settlement is long and growing. Professor James Grimmelmann of New York Law School is our community’s maven for all things “GBS.”

* Kindle book deletion. The Kindle store sold e-books it didn’t have the right to sell, so it took them back. Users learned of a key factual difference between physical books and e-books—the vendor can remotely make e-books go poof.

* States’ efforts to impose sales tax efforts based on marketing affiliates. For years, states have been looking for ways to make online retailers collect sales tax for them. They are generally stopped by Supreme Court precedent, but in 2008 New York finally figured out a workaround. The New York statute said that marketing affiliates were like traveling salespeople and thus created the physical nexus required for a state to impose sales tax collection obligations. The New York statute survived its first legal challenge, which opened the floodgates of other states passing similar laws hoping to get their piece of the action. Meanwhile, online retailers aren’t just rolling over; instead, they are threatening to cut off (or actually cutting off) marketing affiliates in states that enact these laws—thus potentially costing the states income tax from the marketing affiliates’ revenue, and creating the potential for the entire affiliate industry to be torn apart.

* Maine kids privacy law. Maine thought it could pass a law banning marketing to kids. It was wrong. The state had to withdraw the law and go back to the drawing board.

* UMG v. Veoh. Veoh won another nice DMCA online safe harbor victory.

* US v. Kilbride. The Ninth Circuit says that online obscenity prosecutions need to evaluate national attitudes towards obscene content, not local community standards.

* Kentucky domain name seizure. Kentucky tried to grab 141 domain names that enabled Kentucky residents to engage in illegal gambling. But those domain names also serviced customers for whom the gambling was completely legal, so the Kentucky courts are rethinking the grab.

* FTC v. Sears. As another example of the new pro-regulatory winds blowing through the FTC, the FTC cracked down on Sears for installing spyware on users’ computers that looked at the users’ hard drives, even though Sears paid the users for the installation and disclosed the spyware’s snooping in the user agreement (though in an inconspicuous manner). This case has made a lot of lawyers concerned that adverse disclosures in user agreements won’t satisfy the FTC.

* Facebook the Drama Queen. Ah, Facebook. Love it. Hate it. Facebook is a pretty nifty site and part of my daily routine, but boy, they sure do have a knack for stirring up trouble.

- In February, they made a relatively modest change to their user agreement that caused people to freak out.
- In response to this, Facebook took the provocative step towards user self-governance. Facebook let users vote on some choices and promised to be bound by the results, but with an asterisk: Facebook decided what options users could vote on, and Facebook would honor those choices only if a prohibitively large number of users exercised their franchise. Still, it was a nice gesture towards cyberspace community self-governance.
- In summer, they tried to settle their Beacon litigation, but that also reminded folks of how much Beacon irritated them in the first place.
- Summer also brought allegations of click fraud on Facebook, and lawsuits followed.
- Finally, in Thanksgiving, Facebook rolled out some changes to its privacy options that it pitched as giving users more choices, but it also took away some choices and defaulted users into some options that surprised them.

Given this track record, is it unrealistic to expect more Facebook drama in 2010?

* Estavillo v. Sony. Speaking of self-governance, virtual world enthusiasts would love to establish the legal proposition that virtual worlds are legally equivalent to governments and therefore obligated to restrain their actions just like governments are. One virtual world enthusiast sued Sony for kicking him off the network, claiming that Sony was legally governed as a “company town” and therefore lacked the discretion to kick him off. WRONG (and it wasn’t even close).

* Wikipedia's policy change. In August, the English-language Wikipedia announced that it was going to tighten up its editorial policies, and people Freaked Out. (In fact, I have predicted that Wikipedia cannot avoid increased editorial restrictions over time, so this change should not have been surprising). However, it turns out that everyone got it wrong, and Wikipedia’s editorial changes are far less dramatic (and consequential) than initially reported. I will post a separate recap on Wikipedia shortly.

If you would like a stroll down memory lane, you can see my previous top 10 lists from 2008, 2007 and 2006. Before that, John Ottaviani and I put together a list of top Internet IP cases for 2005, 2004 and 2003.

Posted by Eric at 10:46 AM | Content Regulation , Copyright , Derivative Liability , Domain Names , E-Commerce , Internet History , Licensing/Contracts , Marketing , Publicity/Privacy Rights , Search Engines , Spam , Trademark , Virtual Worlds | TrackBack



December 21, 2009

Website Initially Denied 230 Dismissal But Gets It on Appeal--Shiamili v. Real Estate Group

By Eric Goldman

Shiamili v. Real Estate Group of New York, Inc., 2009 WL 4842470 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 17, 2009)

Unfortunately, I am only working from a short and opaque appellate memo. It appears that the defendant operated a website that "administered and chose" to publish user comments. A third party posted an allegedly defamatory comment about the plaintiff, an NYC real estate broker, to the website. On this basis, we know that the website isn't liable for the post per 47 USC 230. I don't think I could do a comprehensive census of message board/user comment cases, but similar defense wins in the past 5 years include Finkel v. Facebook, Cornelius v. DeLuca, Joyner v. Lazzareschi, Raggi v. Las Vegas Police, Higher Balance v. Quantum, Best Western v. Furber, Gregerson v. Vilana, Universal Communications System v. Lycos, Eckert v. Microsoft, DiMeo v. Max, Hammer v. Amazon and Faegre & Benson v. Purdy (wow, this list is a blast from the past!). I'm not including the pure web hosting cases or any of the Ripoff Report cases, yet I'm sure there are other cases I'm forgetting. Indeed, given the airtight nature of the precedent, I personally think plaintiffs should be sanctioned for bringing such meritless cases.

Instead, the lower court initially denied the defendant's motion to dismiss in January 2009. Because this case is in state court, I don't have easy access to the state court opinion to see how the judge got it wrong. Fortunately, in a brief and unanimous opinion, the appellate court corrected this rogue trial court judge and dismissed the case per 230. Because the appellate opinion is so brief, I'm going to quote the court's substantive application of 230 to this case in its entirety:

Plaintiff's claim is barred by the CDA. The complaint makes no allegation that defendants authored any defamatory statements. It merely alleges that defendants “choose and administer content” that appears on the Web site. This is precisely the kind of function that the CDA immunizes ( see e.g. Fair Hous. Council, 521 F3d at 1173-1174; Batzel, 333 F3d at 1031). Even accepting as true all of plaintiff's allegations and giving it the benefit of all favorable inferences ( see Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87-88 [1994] ), the complaint does not raise an inference that defendants were “information content providers” within the meaning of the CDA. Plaintiff argues that defendants engaged in a calculated effort to encourage, keep and promote “bad” content on the Web site. However, message board postings do not cease to be data “provided by another information content provider” merely because “the construct and operation” of the Web site might have some influence on the content of the postings ( see Universal, 478 F3d at 422; see also Chicago Lawyers' Comm., 519 F3d at 671-672; Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, 339 F3d 1119, 1124-1125 [9th Cir2003] ).
Where, as here, there is no allegation that defendants authored the defamatory statements, it is not appropriate to permit discovery to determine if a cause of action exists ( see Walsh v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 289 A.D.2d 842, 844 [2001]; see also Universal, 478 F3d at 425-42; cf. Fair Hous. Council, 521 F3d at 1174).

Two observations:

1) I believe there are some folks who believe that a website becomes liable for any user content it "encourages." This is one possible reading of Roommates.com, and it underlies the government enforcement agencies' (e.g., SEC and FTC) content endorsement theories. However, I don't see precedent supporting that proposition at all. This case, like so many others, doesn't care if the website encourages the allegedly tortious content. Instead, the only relevant inquiry is whether the content originated from a third party. If so, 230 applies without any need for further inquiry.

2) This is yet another case where the court cited Roommates.com in favor of the defense. The updated census of Roommates.com citations:

Roommates.com Cited for Defense (10 cases): GW Equity v. Xcentric, Best Western v. Furber, Goddard v. Google (and second ruling) Joyner v. Lazzareschi, Atlantic Records v. Project Playlist, Barnes v. Yahoo (note: although the case was a partial loss for the defendant, the Roommates.com discussion came in the defense-favorable part), Doe IX v. MySpace, Doe II v. MySpace, Dart v. Craigslist and now Shiamili v. Real Estate Group

Roommates.com Cited for Plaintiff (2 cases): NPS v. StubHub, FTC v. Accusearch

The 10th Circuit beachhead for Roommates.com is troubling, but overall I think it's entirely clear that Roommates.com has not changed 230 jurisprudence in any meaningful way--except that it may be giving plaintiffs false hope of success and causing them to overinvest in their cases.

UPDATE: The trial court opinion, which quotes some of the allegedly defamatory posts.

UPDATE 2: The complaint. This has a full list of the alleged defamatory postings. It also indicates that the venue in question was a website/blog called "shittyhabitats.com," apparently now defunct. The archive.org page from Feb. 2, 2007 and Feb. 5, 2008.

Posted by Eric at 09:18 AM | Derivative Liability , Internet History | TrackBack



December 14, 2009

Another Cautionary Tale of Joint Website Ownership--TEG v. Phelps

By Eric Goldman

Third Education Group, Inc. v. Phelps, 2009 WL 4544127 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 25, 2009)

Corporate divorces are ugly. They may lack the high-stakes drama associated with child custody disputes, but in all other respects they can be just as emotional and messy as spousal divorces. Fortunately, parties to a corporate marriage can avoid some heartache by forming proper "prenuptial agreements." Unfortunately, the courts are filled with examples of cases where this wasn't done (or wasn't done properly).

A year ago, I blogged on one such case, Mikhlyn v. Bove, a fine example of a web empire literally and perhaps irreparably split in two by a falling out of the principals. Today's case, Third Education Group v. Phelps, offers up another cautionary tale of corporate divorce along those lines. If you are jointly running a website or blog and you haven't properly documented your relationship with your compatriots, this post is for you.

In 2002, Phelps and Thompson decided to start an online publication focused on education policy called "Third Education Group." They effectively formed a "voluntary association" (I believe the Wisconsin equivalent of an implied partnership) to implement the journal. In 2004, on behalf of the voluntary association, Phelps registered two domain names and applied for a trademark registration, both listing only himself as the owner. In 2005, Phelps and Thompson formed a 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation to succeed the voluntary association. Phelps was president and a director of the corporation. Phelps and Thompson did not sign any type of assignment agreement to move the voluntary association's assets into the corporation.

In 2006, after an editorial dispute, the parties' relationship turned sour. In response, Phelps locked off the corporation's websites from further changes, and the corporation stripped him of his officer and director status. Phelps pointed the domain names to his new venture, also called "Third Educational Group, Inc." Meanwhile, locked out of its websites, the corporation registered new domain names, copied its old articles from the old website and then reposted them on its new website. Phelps then sent 512(c)(3) takedown notices to the new website host, which successfully put the new website offline. Cross-lawsuits ensued.

Here's a quick recap of the litigation from Thompson's perspective.

For aficionados of disputes over jointly developed online properties, you may recognize some common elements:

* the person who controls the domain name registrations has de facto control over the empire. Yet another reminder to keep domain name registration contacts up to date.

* when a business relationship turns sour, it's not unusual for one aggrieved participant to fight the other participant in every Internet venue where the other tries to resurrect the joint effort.

* it is almost impossible to imagine that the venture produces enough cash to economically justify the type of death spiral litigation it spawned. Instead, the litigation is usually about settling personal scores--typically the most expensive litigation around.

* courts often issue a "split the baby" ruling in these cases, rarely giving one side a clean victory over the other.

This case has a classic split-the-baby result. The court concludes:

* the corporation succeeded to the legal rights in the trademark "Third Education Group." Phelps had argued that the trademark rights remained with the voluntary association, which would have given Phelps joint rights to the trademark.

* Phelps violated his fiduciary duties as an officer and director when he locked everyone else out of the company's website.

* Phelps' 512(c)(3) takedown notices did not give rise to a 512(f) claim for misrepresented takedown notices because, for several reasons, Phelps had a subjective good faith belief in their legitimacy.

* although Phelps infringed the corporation's trademark rights in "Third Education Group" and violated his fiduciary duties, the corporation could not show any damages from Phelps' behavior and therefore did not get any damage awards. The court specifically rejected any claim under the Lanham Act's fee-shifting clause for exceptional cases.

* the court also rejected the corporation's emotionally punitive injunction requests and will take a closer look at the appropriate scope of injunctive relief.

So who won this ruling? Nominally, Third Education Group did because it won on the trademark and fiduciary duty claims, but it's not that satisfying of a victory without any damages or a punitive injunction. As usual, then, the only possible winner in messy litigation is the lawyers, and even then only if they get paid.

For another recent example of a well-meaning but under-documented collaboration that devolved into bitter litigation, see LunaTrex v. Cafasso, 2009 WL 4506321 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 1, 2009), involving a team that came together chasing the $20M Google Lunar X prize but didn't dot the is and cross the ts well enough to avoid a messy battle. As the court says:

After a lengthy discussion of numerous ideas that evolved, the group eventually chose the name LunaTrex. (As will be seen, with the benefit of hindsight it is clear that the group also should have spent some more time talking about organization, structure, ownership, and other legal formalities.)

I've written more about messy online divorces in my 2006 Co-Blogging Law article. I think the Third Education Group court did a good job being sensitive to the unintended consequences of a voluntary relationship going south. For example, the court says

Phelps had much more than a mere good faith belief that he was entitled to use the mark. This was not a case of an individual, for example, mistakenly believing he had a license. Rather, in the present case, the objective evidence was on Phelps' side. He was the one who undisputedly came up with the mark. He was the one who paid to register the mark. He was the one in whose name the mark was registered. And he was the one primarily responsible for establishing the use of the mark. He did this, not as one person in a large organization, but rather as an individual who had joined with another collaborator and in doing so, likely without an understanding of the legal ramifications, formed an unincorporated association. (emphasis added)

This is consistent with the hope I expressed in my Co-Blogging article:

the common law typically can handle the idiosyncrasies of blogging in a sensible and contextually sensitive manner. In that respect, judges evaluating blogs should recognize that unexpected or counterintuitive rulings could significantly destabilize the blogging community. Fortunately, many of the legal doctrines discussed in this essay, including partnership and employment law, are naturally flexible. Judges should use that flexibility to balance the many considerations around blogging

Posted by Eric at 07:33 AM | Copyright , Domain Names , Internet History , Trademark | TrackBack



December 11, 2009

Denver University “Cyber Civil Rights” Symposium Recap

By Eric Goldman

The week before Thanksgiving, I attended an unusual symposium sponsored by the University of Denver Law Review entitled “Cyber Civil Rights: New Challenges for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties in our Networked Age.” The symposium covered standard Cyberlaw topics, but the raison d'être was University of Maryland law professor Danielle Citron’s two recent articles on online harassment of women: "Law's Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment" (Michigan Law Review) and "Cyber Civil Rights" (Boston University Law Review). It is unusual for a law school to celebrate another school’s professor and her research, especially when the professor is fairly junior. Nevertheless, Danielle’s participation brought together academics from both the Cyberlaw and civil rights communities, which provided a rare and interesting mix of folks..

First Panel

Danielle Citron started off by recapping her two papers. Online participation, such as blogging, is essential to professional standing, and employers are reviewing online profiles of prospective employees as part of their hiring considerations. However, women are being targeted for abuse online. These attacks are harming women by changing their online and offline activities, reducing their job opportunities, and causing women to change their gender representations online. Further, folks are trivializing these problems. Women are underreporting the attacks, and law enforcement only intervenes when there are offline harms. New laws can serve an expressive function to communicate that online attacks against women are socially unacceptable. The new laws can validate women’s feelings that they have been harmed and encourage law enforcement to pursue more cases.

Commenting on the papers, Robert Kaczorowski of Fordham Law (and Danielle’s stepdad) made an extended analogy between the Ku Klux Klan and cybermobs.

Wendy Seltzer asked if we could deemphasize the effect of words rather than prohibit them. Danielle responded that we don’t know how seriously to take any particular threat.

An audience member asked if is there a difference between mobs and individual actors who are just taking advantage of being anonymous. Danielle answered that groups can become more extreme online. I think this point deserves more exploration: a series of uncoordinated individual decisions to “pile on” to an attack can look like a coordinated attack to the victim. This is part of why I thought the KKK references were puzzling—KKK activities are clearly coordinated, while online attacks against women can succeed without any coordination or ongoing connection between the attackers.

Paul Ohm argued that that legal solutions are better for cyber civil rights problems than technological solutions. Paul discussed what he labeled “Felten’s Third Law.” (He doesn’t know of two earlier laws named for Ed Felten; he just assumes they exist given Ed’s impressive and influential oeuvre). As articulated by Paul, Felten’s Third Law is that in Cyberlaw conflicts, lawyers love technical solutions and technologists love legal solutions. In other words, we love the solution we don’t know because we assume it has to be better than the one we do. As both a law professor and technologist, Paul picks law over technology for these problems.

Paul categorically rejects any technical solution that would create a “fully identified Internet.” For example, we should not mandate server log retention because we know the logs will be co-opted to regulate other forms of unwanted content, not just online harassment.

Wendy Seltzer discussed the unintended consequences of legal intervention. For example, mandatory Internet filtering in school libraries hasn’t stopped kids from bypassing the filters, but it has facilitated a marketplace for improving filtering technologies that has benefited repressive regimes. Another example: anti-circumvention technology fails to restrict copying but has reduced innovation around DRMed content. Wendy also noted how norms can help curb abuses. For example, while there are online cesspools, she praised Wikipedia’s evolving guidelines for living people’s biographies.

In response, Danielle admitted that her solutions need to be more surgical. She said she might consider moving from a notice-and-takedown model to a notice-and-preserve model for intermediaries.

Second Panel

This panel was composed of three women academics from the civil rights community, so it was a noticeable shift from the typical Cyberlaw academic discussion.

Mary Anne Franks is a University of Chicago Bigelow Fellow and soon-to-be full-time law professor. She expresses our collective disappointment that cyberspace isn’t a utopia that allows people to escape offline discrimination and harassment. She laments that women can lose control of their identities online, such as when someone creates a fake online profile in their names.

She then addressed how cyberspace is unique/special/different with respect to gender harassment. Many commentators try to duck cyberspace exceptionalism, so it was refreshing to see her tackle the issue squarely. Existing offline discrimination/harassment laws assume interactions between repeat players at work and school; online harassment can be divorced totally from any existing social networks. However, because the online activities still harm targeted individuals at work and school, we should treat the harms the same. Offline, there are switching costs to changing jobs or school; online, search engines’ consolidation of results for search on a person’s name creates a different type of switching cost. In terms of supervisory power, she thinks web operators have analogous control to employers or school administrators. Thus, when web operators receive notice of online harassment, they should have a duty to do something about it. Offline, employers can develop a variety of responses and policies to combat workplace harassment. Web operators should have similar latitude; for example, they can delete offending posts or suspend/ban accounts.

Helen Norton, a University of Colorado law professor, did not share Danielle’s optimism (expressed in her first article) that existing discrimination laws can curb online harassment. Instead, Helen thinks a new civil rights statute is needed, but she might limit its remedies to exclude money damages. Helen is pessimistic that there will be regulation any time soon, noting that it can take years to enact civil rights legislation. Helen would also like to see more precise definitions of the exact harms that women are experiencing only online.

Nancy Ehrenreich, a Denver University law professor, began her talk by saying that we should not overstate the Internet’s benefits. She then clarified that we should not assume that disadvantaged folks can overcome barriers online. For example, we impose cultural categories on people in every interaction, so even if people try to mask their identity online, they can’t really escape. She wondered why we aren’t talking about an anti-discrimination law for the web. Her concern is that discrimination denies individuals access to the Internet.

In Q&A, Paul Ohm observed that civil rights scholars often invoke free speech as the countervailing concern to their desired regulations, but Cyberlaw scholars are often more interested in other “generative” effects of the Internet, such as new business models, new labor models and new modes of production.

Panel 3

James Grimmelmann (see his slides) started with the Skanks in NYC case. In that case, the defendant criticized someone else in her social network on a blog, calling the plaintiff (among other unflattering things) a “skank.” The plaintiff sued to obtain the blogger’s identity. After a successful unmasking, the plaintiff dropped the lawsuit, having successfully publicly shamed the blogger.

James hypothesized that this unmasking and shaming was an appropriate remedy—the blogger got shamed (like “an eye for an eye”), and unmasking is a better outcome than other legal remedies like damage suits. James then posited a thought exercise that provided plaintiffs with an expedited unmasking procedure if they drop any damages claim. This would have a number of benefits. Unmasking curbs online harassment is especially effective at busting online mobs. Also, an unmasking remedy avoids messy debates over the First Amendment’s scope, and it may be more desirable than trying to hold online providers liable.

Having advanced his own strawman, James then cut it down. In some cases, defamation remedies may be more desirable, and plaintiffs may not know that until they learn the putative wrongdoer’s identity. In other cases, plaintiffs who just want unmasking would appreciate a lower legal hurdle. Also, we provide legal protection for anonymity for good reasons.

James’ lessons from the thought exercise: we should consider ways to decouple an unmasking remedy from litigation. At the same time, we need to protect defendants from pretextual unmasking; in some cases, retaliation is a big concern, and we should incorporate this concern into the unmasking decision.

From Chris Wolf’s talk (see his full remarks), the most interesting thing I learned is that 18 states have laws banning wearing masks in public, enacted to suppress KKK activities. This was the second speaker’s KKK reference of the day, and it made me wonder if we were experiencing some variation of Godwin’s Law.

Panel 4

Viva Moffat observed that secondary liability issues generate the most heat in online harassment discussions. She expressed concern that imposing legal duties on third parties may not help law’s norm-shaping effect, and it’s not appropriate to impose liability just because the provider has deeper pockets or the direct actor can’t be found. She also suggested that imposing liability on third parties creates a greater risk of collateral damage than direct liability. [Note: I would like to know more about this last assertion. I suspect we cannot make a utilitarian calculation a priori]. As a result, she favors focusing more efforts on sharpening direct liability.

Ed Felten talked about identifying and anonymizing online activity. He explained the usual sequence of events in chasing bad online content:

log file => IP address => identity => justice

But the IP address => identity step breaks down when users use an anonymizing proxy or the user’s network uses network address translation (used by home wireless routers or in coffee shops) and all connected devices’ requests share a single IP address. He said that a majority of Internet connections use NAT.

Because IP address tracebacks can dead-end at the intermediary, an IP address can reveal too little information. However, even when users aren’t investigatory targets, IP addresses can reveal too much information, such as geolocation. This paradox—IP addresses simultaneously reveal both too much and too little information—reflects that the IP address system was built for routing, not identification. So could we design a better authenticating technology?

He then conducted a “semi-realistic” thought experiment of a new technological “tag” that could be used instead of IP addresses. This tag could have the following attributes:

* can be placed by any intermediary
* conveys no information about the sender unless unwrapped by the intermediary (presumably for good legal cause)
* unwrapping the tag yields the best identity information the intermediary has
* the tag’s use is voluntary as a technical matter
* the tag is removable as a technical matter

I then batted clean-up. A summary of my remarks:

Today’s conversation has revisited long-standing Cyberlaw issues, such as:

* anonymity v. accountability, and who should be responsible for online content and actions
* cyberspace as a physical place. See, e.g., Noah v. AOL (an online discrimination case), National Federation of the Blind v. Target (also an online discrimination case) and Estavillo v. Sony
* cyberspace exceptionalism and cyberspace utopianism (on the latter point, see my article on search engine utopianism)
* when is the optimal time to regulate rapidly evolving technology? Early, when the technology is still in its infancy, or later, when market forces and new technological evolutions may have cured the early problems?

Danielle’s articles convinced me that women are experiencing serious harms online that men—including me—could easily trivialize. Danielle’s articles also convinced me that online harassment has strong parallels to the 1970s legal evolution of workplace harassment doctrines, where a big part of the battle was to get people to take the harms seriously.

While I find a lot of descriptive value in Danielle’s work, the normative implications are not as clear. As usual with attempts to regulate rapidly evolving technology, there are many important but overwhelmingly hard definitional challenges, such as who is an “intermediary,” what are “online mobs” and what constitutes online “harassment.” For example, I do not think the Skanks in NYC incident is an online harassment case or an “attack,” but James Grimmelmann’s talk assumed those characterizations.

While we can debate what should be the right level of regulatory intervention, we should not overlook that Congress already enacted a law squarely governing intermediary liability for online harassment: 47 USC 230. The angst that prompted this conference—bad behavior online—is the logical consequences of 230’s broad immunity. The statute enables websites to adopt policies that they will not police user content or retain server logs of user activity. These choices aren’t a surprise or a per se abuse of the immunity; instead, they are the unavoidable implications of Congress’ action.

We might question Congress’ wisdom in adopting 230, but we should not diminish its potential importance to the Internet as we know it. [In Q&A, Chris Wolf asked about the comparative experience in countries that don’t have such broad immunity. In those countries, we know that websites take down user content much more freely, and I believe that the most interesting UGC innovations are all taking place here in the US, not countries with more restrictive UGC liability.] I can, at most, only prove correlation and not causation, but I believe 230 is one of the main causal reasons why the Internet has succeeded so well.

When I speak around the country about 230, I often encounter folks who generally accept 230’s immunity scope but want just one new exception, i.e., their pet topic. If everyone got their “just one” exception, the law would be eviscerated. (I said it would be Swiss-cheesed to death; maybe I should have said it would be overcome by a thousand duck bites). I’m not rejecting new exceptions categorically (they should be each considered on their own merits), but in aggregate 230’s immunization benefits are actually quite precarious. I believe 230 works precisely because of its strength and simplicity, so adding more exceptions could significantly reduce its efficacy.

I concluded my remarks by observing that online harassment is a subspecies of bullying and incivil behavior in our society. While we can and should work to curb online harassment, I am more interested in addressing bullying and incivility in all its forms, wherever it takes place.

In this regard, I have been impressed by how my son’s school is proactively addressing bullying. See more about this effort, called Project Cornerstone. The school is teaching kids not to bully or to tolerate being bullied, and the project gives bullied kids tools to go on the offensive against bullies. There’s no guarantee that anti-bullying programs will work in the short or long run, but I remain hopeful that online harassment today partially reflects that many current Internet users never got any anti-bullying education. Perhaps, then, online harassment issues will naturally abate (without any regulatory intervention) as new generation of Internet users, better educated about bullying, come onto the Internet.

Following my remarks, we had more Q&A.

Paul Ohm Q: Some cyber folks argue against secondary liability because they believe that a victim can pursue a direct action, but Ed’s talk suggests that user anonymity will continue to be possible.

Mary Anne Franks: civil rights isn’t about individual claims because victims have to bear too high a burden to pursue claims. Instead, civil rights are about changing large-scale social norms. The goal is to achieve anti-discrimination by any means necessary. Thus, civil rights scholars have already discussed and concluded that it’s appropriate to impose liability on intermediaries like employers and schools.

Danielle: intermediaries are the lowest cost avoiders.

James Grimmelmann: no, the harassers are the lowest cost avoiders. Civil rights folks would get more support from the Cyberlaw crowd if they focused their regulatory desires towards intermediaries who are in active concert with the bad actors.

Danielle's Wrap-Up

We all agree that:

* education can make a big difference
* online communities need to self-police
* there are numerous limits to using the law as a solution, including that lawsuits don’t make sense and 230’s immunity.

We don’t agree on what to do next. There are First Amendment limits, and technology doesn’t offer any panaceas.

Posted by Eric at 07:12 AM | Content Regulation , Derivative Liability , Internet History , Publicity/Privacy Rights | TrackBack



December 02, 2009

Case Western “Signifiers in Cyberspace” Conference Recap

By Eric Goldman

In mid-November, I attended a conference at Case Western Reserve University School of Law in Cleveland, Ohio entitled “Signifiers in Cyberspace: Domain Names & Online Trademarks.” My notes:

David Fewer spoke about Canada’s WHOIS policy. The old Canadian registry policy published registrant information without restriction. Then, the registry proposed a new policy not to publish personal information in the WHOIS database for individual registrants and for organizations that can show harm from publication. To reveal registrant information in those situations, a warrant would be required. That policy got amended to allow warrantless access for cybercrime enforcement, registered IP infringement and ID theft. Fewer argued that the amended policy violates Canadian privacy laws (PIPEDA) because consumers are not given adequate disclosures, the exclusions from the privacy policy are arbitrary, and consumers aren’t given the required option not to participate.

Corynne McSherry of EFF discussed how TM owners are bypassing direct challenges against gripers and instead putting pressure on domain name registrars. She focused on the Yes Man spoof website of the New York Times, which included a parody ad of the De Beers diamond manufacturer. Humorless De Beers sought relief from Joker.com, the parodist’s registrar. EFF has responded to De Beers that the parody is legitimate because it has no commercial aspect, it’s nominative use, and the First Amendment applies. The EFF is also encouraging Joker.com to ignore De Beers because it (as the registrar) can’t be liable for the registered domain name. So why is Joker.com even entertaining De Beers’ complaint? Corynne notes the registrar’s revenue from any single domain name registration is less than legal cost of investigating and responding. Corynne discussed how parodists and gripers can minimize their legal risk (I blogged on these recommendations in May).

I remain very interested in situations where domain name registrars apply their own takedown policies to their customers. For example, I’ve previously mentioned GoDaddy’s “itchy trigger finger” when it comes to intervening with its registrants. I suspect there is significant heterogeneity among registrars’ interventionist tendencies. I think this is an area worth exploring. If you have other examples of domain name registrar intervention in its customers' content, please share them.

Stacey Dogan spoke about the aftermath of the Rescuecom ruling. Stacey is disappointed that courts aren't adopting her arguments to use the “trademark use in commerce” doctrine to insulate intermediaries (she calls it her “biggest failure in life”). She described three post-Rescuecom uncertainties: (1) what acts by intermediaries constitute TM infringement? (2) on what doctrinal basis? (direct v. contributory), and (3) what remedies do the intermediaries face?

Stacey thinks courts need to be more precise about the nexus between defendant behavior and TM owner harm. This should lead to better distinctions between direct and contributory infringement.

She offered a taxonomy of claims against intermediaries:

* General confusion = when the intermediary creates confusion through the blurring of ads and editorial content. Stacey thinks these aren’t TM issues. But if commingling is the problem, then the remedy should be an injunction requiring the intermediary to label the ads.

* Strict liability = when the search engine is automatically on the hook for its involvement with the ads. Stacey says courts should reject this approach due to the search engines' lack of proximate causation for consumer confusion. If a search engine faces any liability, it should be solely on the basis of contributory infringement (with its higher scienter bar).

* Failure to act = when the search engine fails to respond to TM owner’s takedown notice. She said we don’t see this in search engine cases [a point I disagree with given that the TM owner vs. search engine lawsuits all represent a failing of the search engines’ voluntary TM policies]; instead, she was thinking of the Tiffany case. Stacey thinks the failure of act prong is where the legal action should be. She wants courts to map out appropriate scienter levels. General knowledge of infringement isn’t enough, and courts should let defendants make reasonable judgments about whether the advertiser will qualify for any trademark defenses. If the advertiser is obviously infringing, and intermediary gets notice and fails to act, she thinks contributory liability could be appropriate.

Graeme Dinwoodie believes the ECJ will not follow the Advocate General’s opinion in the Google case. He explored two parallels between the AG’s opinion and Rescuecom: Both get away from trademark use of commerce, and both consider underlying policy values. Graeme thinks search engine defendants should move away from disputing the lack of harm to the trademark owner; instead, he thinks they will get more traction by showing the countervailing benefits of their advertising. For example, he thinks they should be showing how keyword advertising can facilitate investment and innovation.

Jeffrey Samuels shared his perspectives as a panelist in 200 UDRP proceedings. Since the UDRP’s implementation, there have been about 25,000 UDRP decisions. 40% are US registrations. 75% involve .com. 75% are defaults.

The UDRP isn’t designed to solve all domain name disputes. He gave an example of a domain name registration containing a celebrity child’s name. The UDRP isn't helpful because a 2 week old kid doesn’t have protectable trademark rights.

“The UDRP is hardly a model of clarity.” All cases are fact-dependent. If a UDRP proceeding has unusual facts, he recommends requesting a 3 member panel--these proceedings get more carefully evaluated opinions and minimize the effects of any one panelist’s idiosyncratic views.

Some issues that regularly arise in UDRP proceedings:

* What the TM owner has to do to establish its rights. The majority view is that a registration anywhere in the world suffices. Common law rights generally require presenting sufficient evidence validating the rights.
* There remains a split of authority on “sucks” sites.
* In the early days, panelists used to run through the multi-factor likelihood of confusion factors. That’s rarely done today. Now, most panelists just make sight and sound comparison.

Karl Auerbach discussed two interrelated issues: (1) ICANN lacks any political authority for its “Internet governance” role, and (2) technology does not require that ICANN monopolize DNS root services. He argues that we would benefit from competition among DNS root services. His argument reminds me a bit of the net neutrality debate. We can hypothesize many possible net neutrality problems, but most of them go away with vigorous competition. Similarly, ICANN’s often-ridiculous shenanigans would be less vexing in the face of bona fide competition for DNS root services.

Dan Hunter spoke about a new paper he’s writing with Mark McKenna. Their target is the fundamental trademark principle that trademark law protects against consumer confusion. They think consumer confusion is an imperfect proxy for our normative goal of protecting consumers. Some confusion is endemic in a complex society; and some methods of communication, like humor, require confusion to work. Therefore, they want to move away from trying to block consumer confusion and instead refocus trademark law on reducing errors in consumer decision-making. This seems like a fruitful endeavor, but they are also taking a swipe against the consumer search cost justification for trademark law, a move I didn't follow.

Bill McGeveran recapped his recent work on social networking sites and gave a preview of his next article. His target is fake online profiles such as the Tony La Russa fake Twitter account. He expects to see more pressure to create IP rights in personal identities.

I spoke about trademarks and behavioral targeting, and in particular the competition among marketers for consumer preference information. For example, I believe the anti-deep packet inspection pushback wasn’t based solely on privacy concerns. Instead, destination websites fear that an IAP will disintermediate them and use its prime access to consumer preference information to steer customers to competitors. (See this blog post for more on that point). My (very brief) slides.

Posted by Eric at 07:16 AM | Derivative Liability , Domain Names , Internet History , Publicity/Privacy Rights , Search Engines , Trademark | TrackBack



October 27, 2009

Zittrain on the Dark Sides of Crowdsourcing

By Eric Goldman

Last week, Cyberlaw expert/rock star Jonathan Zittrain of Harvard Law School (visiting at Stanford Law School this term) spoke as part of SCU's lecture series on IT, Ethics and Law. An overflow crowd of over 100 people came to the talk, and as usual Jonathan did a wonderful job. You should attend his talks if you have a chance. They are always highly entertaining and thought-provoking.

Overview

Jonathan's talk was opaquely titled "Minds for Sale: Ubiquitous Human Computing and the Future of the Internet." I think his talk really covered the Dark Sides of Crowdsourcing. Normally, such a talk would immediately raise red flags about the speaker’s intentions and net-savviness. However, Jonathan has sterling credentials as a crowdsourcing enthusiast, so he can raise concerns without sounding shrill or regressive.

He pointed to numerous examples throughout his talk, but one of his principal targets is Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk. Mechanical Turk describes itself as "a marketplace of work. We give businesses and developers access to an on-demand, scalable workforce. Workers select from thousands of tasks and work whenever it's convenient." LiveOps is also on his mind; the site hires individuals to provide live customer support for third party businesses from their homes on a flexible and dynamic basis.

The Problems

From the worker's perspective, Jonathan raised several potential concerns about Internet marketplaces for labor, including:

* surveillance. LiveOps can track and monitor every aspect of workers’ performance, including when they were online and where they connected from. This does depend on the employer’s specific technological architecture; I’m not sure if Mechanical Turk gets such deep looks into its workers' behavior.

* alienation. Online workers are often retained to do pieces of a larger project without understanding the whole project. Thus, they may apply existing rote skills but not broaden their expertise.

* moral valence. Because workers may not understand the greater project, they could help projects that are morally objectionable without realizing it. Jonathan gave some terrific examples, such as spammers distributing the work of breaking CAPTCHAs and the government asking citizens to identify folks in group/crowd photos for law enforcement or possibly dissident-busting purposes.

Jonathan also raised some systematic concerns that could arise from these online labor marketplaces, including:

* without uniform labor laws, employers could trigger a race to the bottom where the work flows to jurisdictions with the laxest worker protections. We’ve already seen an analogous situation as states try to enact “Amazon affiliate sales tax” laws designed to trigger sales tax collection obligations based on the presence of marketing affiliates in the state, which has prompted some Internet companies to dump affiliates overboard in some of those states based solely on their regulatory policy.

* crowding out. As it becomes easier for workers to monetize their time in smaller units, they may become less willing to contribute their labor to non-paying enterprises like Wikipedia. I address some of these dynamics in my Wikipedia paper.

Possible Solutions

Jonathan identified some possible solutions, including:

* revitalized labor standards, such as minimum wage laws or anti-child labor laws. As one example, he proposed that worker reputation should be “portable” so that good workers for an online enterprise can have their accomplishments follow them to future employers. Ironically, this may be unintended Internet exceptionalism because IMO worker reputation isn’t portable in physical space due to the collapse of the job reference market.

* unionize online workers. Unionization was a natural proposal given the talk’s tenor, but I found it anachronistic. How can unions be relevant to online labor markets where people can "change jobs" with a few clicks of a mouse? The Internet has much more competition among employers than any geographically restricted labor market, and the employees’ friction to change jobs online is so much lower than it is in physical space. For example, unhappy Mechanical Turkers can easily click to a large number of competitive websites that will gladly pay them for their contributions. At the same time, the Internet globalizes labor forces in ways that are unprecedented in physical space, so the value for “commodity” labor plummets. Both dynamics seem to doom any efforts to unionize online labor.

* disclosure. Employers should have to disclose who they are and why they are asking for the work to be done.

* opt-out. When people are doing work without knowing it, they should have the opportunity to opt-out. For example, the RECAPTCHA project uses human CAPTCHA-solving to correct OCR scanning errors. Zittrain thinks people should be given a choice not to provide those services.

Jonathan's final takeaway message was to express a general reservation that money is pervading our relationships and activities. He gave the example of how a Mechanical Turk employer offered to pay other Turkers to do kind acts--something, Jonathan pointed out, is oxymoronic because paying people to be kind means they aren’t actually being “kind.”

My Comments

Whether intended or not, Jonathan’s talk had a strong Marxist undercurrent that is tough for many of us to embrace. The Internet makes labor markets more efficient. It also increases the heterogeneity of ways that people can find gainful employment they can perform at the time and place of their choosing. Both generally sound like strongly positive developments to me.

I thought Jonathan’s strongest point was his dystopian view of bad actors (e.g., repressive governments and spammers) crowdsourcing socially detrimental work without workers knowing it. Disclosing the employer’s identity and motivations would be a partial but necessarily incomplete solution. More transparency would prevent people from inadvertently contributing to bad projects, but some people need cash so desperately that they will take it regardless of the moral valence. (I'm ignoring the malcontents who would gladly pay for the chance to facilitate social disruption).

Jonathan’s talk became harder to follow as he addressed examples well beyond online labor marketplaces. Specifically, a number of his examples seemed to conflate work activities, play activities and other ways that people voluntarily allocate their time. (FWIW, I’ve been accused by Timothy B. Lee of doing the same thing in my Wikipedia paper). For example, he treated Google’s use of website links for its PageRank algorithm as a form of “work” where Google gets the benefit of individual linking decisions. (In turn, he lauded Google’s nofollow link as a good example of how laborers can have an opt-out mechanism). While we collectively create value for Google by establishing links to third party sites, I don’t see how linkers are “working” for Google. Instead, I think the links are a positive externality captured by Google. We create positive externalities through our online (and offline) activities all of the time, and I think trying to characterize those as “work” is not the right direction. See, e.g., Frischmann and Lemley’s critique of regulatory overresponses to spillovers.

Similarly, Jonathan gave examples of “games” where the players provide valuable outputs to the game organizers through their ordinary gameplay. An example is where people are asked to tag photos as part of a game, where the tagging can become commercially valuable metadata. In this situation, the game organizers get an undisclosed private benefit (the beneficial work) from what is otherwise a fair market transaction (people voluntarily enjoying the game). Normally, we don’t worry about undisclosed private benefits; in fact, they occur in most economic transactions, even in efficient marketplaces. While increased disclosure about the game organizer’s motivations might help game players make more informed decisions about whether to play the game or how to price their participation, it’s not clear to me that such disclosures would actually help the game player’s make better decisions or enjoy the game more.

Terri Griffith, a colleague of mine in the SCU business school, wrote up her perspectives on the talk.

UPDATE: Mike Sardina, an SCU Law student, also wrote up a recap with commentary.

UPDATE 2: The Markkula Center provided a summary of the talk, and SCU student Courtney Meehan posted on it as well.

Posted by Eric at 12:06 PM | General , Internet History , Virtual Worlds | TrackBack



October 17, 2009

Q3 2009 Quick Links, Part 3

By Eric Goldman

Copyright

* AP v. All Headline News settles. My initial blog post. The settlement order.

* The Turnitin case has settled. My blog post on the district court ruling.

* Corbis Corp. v. Starr, No. 3:07CV3741 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 2, 2009).. Company that retained web developer could be liable for copyright infringing photos included in the developed website. David Johnson's coverage.

* Creative Commons commissioned a study of what people think qualifies as “commercial” or “non-commercial” activity. While this is relevant to how CC drafts its various license flavors, these words also have significant import to many facets of the law, including copyright (such as the fair use test) and trademark (such as the definition of “use in commerce”). The executive summary:

Both creators and users generally consider uses that earn users money or involve online advertising to be commercial, while uses by organizations, by individuals, or for charitable purposes are less commercial but not decidedly noncommercial. Similarly, uses by for-profit companies are typically considered more commercial. Perceptions of the many use cases studied suggest that with the exception of uses that earn users money or involve advertising – at least until specific case scenarios are presented that disrupt those generalized views of commerciality – there is more uncertainty than clarity around whether specific uses of online content are commercial or noncommercial.

eBooks

* Advocates for the blind sue Arizona State University for distributing electronic textbooks via the Kindle.

* Rebecca on the relationship between the Kindle 1984 debacle and the Google Book Search settlement. See also this Slate article.

Search Engines

* Train2Game v. Google, [2009] EWHC 1765 (QB): UK opinion that Google isn't liable for its search results snippets.

* CEO Bartz said Yahoo was never a search company. What??? Danny Sullivan calls her out for her "revisionist history."

* Greg Linden: Google AdWords Now Personalized.

* ThirdVoice redux: Google launches SideWiki. Let the legal games begin! (See, e.g., this BusinessWeek article). I’d be more worked up if Google had a more successful track record with non-search offerings, especially user-generated content projects. Lively, anyone?

Marketing

* Some craziness in Maine, when the legislature tried to restrict marketing to kids. PUBLIC Law, Chapter 230 LD 1183, item 1, 124th Maine State Legislature. The Maine AG said she won't enforce it, and subsequently the law was given a timeout so the Maine legislature can rethink the error of its ways.

* eBay is changing to a per-click model for paying affiliates, where the per-click amount is reset daily based on actual value delivered by the affiliate.

* Ethical Quandary: Faxed attorney newsletter doesn’t violate TCPA.

Posted by Eric at 04:47 PM | Copyright , Derivative Liability , Internet History , Marketing , Search Engines | TrackBack



September 22, 2009

Google Confirms That Keyword Metatags Don't Matter

By Eric Goldman

Few Internet technologies have horked cyberlaw as much as keyword metatags. Back in the 1990s, some search engines indexed keyword metatags, which encouraged some websites to stuff their keyword metatags as a way of gaming the rankings. Judges took a dim view of this practice, largely because the surreptitious nature of keyword metatags seemed inherently sinister, regardless of their efficacy. In the interim, search engines wizened up. Some search engines stopped indexing keyword metatags, and others greatly diminished the credit they assigned to keyword metatags. As a result, for the better part of this century, keyword metatags have had either zero or de minimis effect on search engine placement.

However, the anti-keyword metatag legal doctrines developed in the 1990s have persisted, even as the technology changed. Although occasionally judges have gotten it right (see, e.g., Standard Process v. Banks). most courts still treat the presence of a third party trademark in keyword metatags as essentially a per se trademark infringement--even if the keyword metatags didn't (and couldn't) change the search results ordering or any consumer's behavior. For a quick sense of the ridiculous state of keyword metatag jurisprudence, take a look at my recent blog posts on the topic.

The current state of nature has put keyword metatag defendants in a bind. On the one hand, the law treats the inclusion of third party trademarks as per se trademark infringement. On the other hand, everyone in the industry knows they are irrelevant but search engines have been less than forthcoming about the components of their search engine algorithms, leaving scanty citable material to support that proposition. And judges, deciding between the weight of a dozen years of anti-keyword metatag legal precedence and not-from-the-horse's-mouth assessments of keyword metatag efficacy, not surprisingly continue to stick with the outdated legal precedent.

This makes Google's announcement yesterday so exciting. Google's star techie Matt Cutts says in plain language that Google's core search algorithm ignores keyword metatags. This isn't news in the sense that we've known this about Google for years, but I believe this is Google's first public confirmation of keyword metatag's irrelevancy. Matt's short video clip goes so far to tell trademark owners to quit suing over keyword metatags. Amen!

I've long believed that trademark law shouldn't intervene even if search engines index keyword metatags because merely appearing in the search engine results for a third party trademark (without more) should be legally immaterial. Even if you don't agree with me on that proposition, I trust most everyone can agree that trademark law should ignore keyword metatags if search engines do. Now that we have confirmation that the dominant search engine disregards keyword metatags, let's hope judges do the same.

Posted by Eric at 10:02 AM | Internet History , Search Engines , Trademark | TrackBack



August 25, 2009

Why More Wikipedia Editing Restrictions Are Inevitable, and Some Comments on Flagged Revisions for Living People's Biographies

By Eric Goldman

I have posted my latest article, "Wikipedia’s Labor Squeeze and its Consequences," to SSRN. The article will be published in the Journal of Telecommunications and High Technology Law in the relatively near future. The article is still in draft form, and I gratefully welcome your comments. Please take a look.

The article traces its roots to my Dec. 2005 prediction that Wikipedia will fail in 5 years. I have continued to blog informally about Wikipedia since then, but I only decided to write a more formal academic defense of my prediction late last year. This article is that defense, but you'll notice that I don't refer to "failure" in the article. In my presentations and earlier drafts of this article, I found that predicting Wikipedia's "failure" produced very emotional responses that overwhelmed consideration of my argument's merits. I still think my 2005 predictions look pretty good (using my self-selected definition of "failure"), but I deliberately directed the article towards the "why" rather than the "when."

As a result, the article explains why evolutionary changes in Wikipedia's labor supply is forcing Wikipedia to change its basic architectural design of permissive user editability. Flagged revisions is a prime example of the ongoing architectural shift. With flagged revisions, every user has the technical capacity to edit a Wikipedia entry, but submitted revisions remain hidden from public view until a trusted editor approves them for publication. Accordingly, flagged revisions significantly changes the Wikipedia experience. It delays publication of most contributions, it buries some contributions without ever being published at all, and it creates a significant workload for editors. For example, the German Wikipedia deploys flagged revisions site-wide and publication delays are up to three weeks.

Yesterday, Wikipedia announced that it is deploying Flagged Revisions for biographies of living people. Wikipedia has been on red alert with biographies since the John Seigenthaler incident in September 2005, so it's not surprising that Wikipedia will tighten the reins there first.

However, I think this change is just one more intermediate step in Wikipedia's ongoing process of restricting user editability, and it is not the final restrictive step Wikipedia will take. For reasons I outline in the article, I expect Wikipedia eventually will deploy Flagged Revisions, or some other stringent form of editorial lock-down, across the entire site, not just for living people's biographies. I explore some other possible alternatives in the paper, but I conclude that substantial restrictions to user editability are Wikipedia's only viable long-term solution to preserve site credibility.

People who have reviewed the article have asked about the article's relationship to Benkler's Wealth of Networks and its related commentary. Those works have explored the phenomenon and implications of large-scale online volunteerism, including a convincing proof that people will contribute their labor to online collaborative enterprises without any direct financial compensation. However, I've seen less attention paid to the exact reasons why people volunteer for these projects. My article focuses on the "why" in some detail, but even then, I make some assumptions and guesses. Despite extensive academic research into the Wikipedia community, we still lack a complete and clear empirical picture of why people join the community and, perhaps just as important, why people leave. I offer up my theoretical considerations, but more empirical work remains to be done.

If you want more discussion on this topic, during the paper's development, I gave a talk at University of Colorado Boulder that sparked some online responses:

* the talk itself (in the middle of the video)
* Ars Technica coverage
* ZDNet's paraphrase of the Ars Technica post
* p2pnet
* Blorge
* Thinking Spaces
* Futureismic

The presentation led to an NPR Interview with more comments and a response from What Jeff Learned Today.

Posted by Eric at 09:09 AM | Internet History , Marketing , Spam | TrackBack



August 12, 2009

2009 Cyberspace Law Syllabus and Some Comments

By Eric Goldman

I have posted my syllabus for this semester's Cyberspace Law course. This blog post describes the changes from my 2008 course reader. For more on my pedagogical approaches to the course, see my Teaching Cyberlaw article.

Trademark

* Deleted the Tiffany v. eBay case. This is a really rich and fascinating case, but it is really long and I ran out of time to cover it last year. Also, it will be mooted in the not-too-distant future by a Second Circuit opinion.

* Replaced the Playboy v. Netscape and FragranceNet keyword advertising cases with Hearts on Fire v. Blue Nile. The Hearts on Fire case isn't a perfect teaching case, but it discusses use in commerce, likelihood of consumer confusion/initial interest confusion, and a bit of the policy issues. I suspect a number of my Cyberlaw colleagues are teaching the Rescuecom case, but I chose not to. First, it is doctrinally narrow. Second, it is a confusing opinion. Third, I tried to teach it as a last-minute substitution in my IP survey course last semester and was not satisfied with the results. Finally, it involves the less common fact pattern of keyword sales rather than keyword purchases. So I decided that this year the Hearts on Fire case could cover all the necessary issues adequately.

An interesting note: this is the first time in 15 years that I am not teaching a Playboy case in Cyberlaw. Frankly, I had expected to teach at least one Playboy case in Cyberlaw forevermore!

* Added Google's trademark policy. I'm a little surprised it never occurred to me before to include this in my reader.

* Updated my all-new keyword advertising slides from my May presentation.

Copyright

* Deleted the Perfect 10 v. ccBill and Perfect 10 v. Visa cases. I have been struggling with how to teach the Ninth Circuit's Perfect 10 troika of cases for the last couple of years. The troika was over 100 pages of reading that nevertheless left students befuddled after all that work. But I felt constrained because the troika is the most definitive statement of Ninth Circuit law, and it is insightful to see the cases evolve. Nevertheless, I decided that the Amazon case was the most doctrinally significant, so I kept that and ditched the other 2.

* Added Io v. Veoh. To make up for taking out the Perfect 10 cases, I've added this case, which I think is a very clear exposition of a DMCA online safe harbor case.

* Added Parker v. Yahoo. I think this will be a good case to tie together some copyright doctrinal threads as well as provide a nice compare/contrast with the Ticketmaster v. RMG case.

Trespass to Chattels

* Replaced the Computer Fraud & Abuse Act statute with the most recently amended version.

* Included a slide that synthesizes the various trespass to chattel doctrines into a summary format.

Contracts

* Added the Harris v. Blockbuster case. It's a short case that efficiently makes several powerful pedagogical points--including perhaps most importantly, the perils of robo-drafting by copying language from other people's agreements.

Blogs and Social Networking Sites

* Replaced my old materials on blog law and social networking sites law with my most recent talk on both from February.

* Added my Third Wave of Internet Exceptionalism article

* Added the Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel case as an end-of-the-semester review case. As I said when I first blogged on the case, I think "this is one of the most interesting cases I've seen in a while," and I'm really excited about teaching it. I think it will be an excellent issue-spotting opportunity for students as well as a powerful reminder of the power of published words (and how those words can unintentionally affect the people we love).

Change to the Grading Options

My other big change this year is that I am giving students the option to write a wiki entry on a cyberlaw topic as part of their grade. This was inspired by my forthcoming paper on Wikipedia (which you'll hear more about soon). In connection with that paper, I was researching alternative labor sources that could power Wikipedia, and students working as part of a class assignment was one option I explore in the paper (with some reservations). As part of "eating my own dog food" (a terrible idiom that seems to be prevalent in the Silicon Valley), I figured I should give it a try myself. As you can see, the wiki-drafting is optional, not mandatory, so I'll be interested to see how many students choose the option. I'll also be interested to see what happens when the students actually try to submit their work to Wikipedia. I have a mental image of a massive buzzsaw, but perhaps I'm being too cynical.

Posted by Eric at 09:36 AM | Copyright , Derivative Liability , E-Commerce , Internet History , Licensing/Contracts , Search Engines , Trademark | TrackBack



August 07, 2009

An End to Spam Litigation Factories?--Gordon v. Virtumundo

By Eric Goldman

Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., No. 07-35487 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2009)

When CAN-SPAM was passed in 2003, it was fairly clear that Congress wasn’t trying to enable broad private enforcement. Everyone knew that rabid anti-spammers would seize any new statutory right for a litigation frenzy. As this court says, "lawmakers were wary of the possibility, if not the likelihood, that the siren song of substantial statutory damages would entice opportunistic plaintiffs to join the fray, which would lead to undesirable results." Although I personally think Congress would better served all of us by omitting all private enforcement rights in CAN-SPAM, unquestionably the private rights in CAN-SPAM are drafted narrowly to prevent their abuses.

That hasn't stopped some zealous anti-spammers from testing the limits of CAN-SPAM's private enforcement remedies anyway. James Gordon has been one of the most active. He is a "professional plaintiff" who has operated a spam "litigation factory" by configuring his technology to try to trap spammers. In effect, he goes out of his way to look for spam. As the court says, “the burdens Gordon complains of are almost exclusively self-imposed and purposefully undertaken."

As it turns out, this business model does not fare well in court. He lost this case in the district court and subsequently was ordered to pay over $100k in legal fees to the defendant under CAN-SPAM's fee-switching provision. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit has even less kind words for him, saying that CAN-SPAM “was enacted to protect individuals and legitimate businesses—not to support a litigation mill for entrepreneurs like Gordon." As a result, the court issues a broad but muddy opinion that shuts down Gordon’s litigation factory and presumably others like his, but has a less clear effect on other CAN-SPAM defendants.

"Internet Access Service"

CAN-SPAM's private enforcement rights only accrue to "Internet access services." This phrase is troublesome in part because it differs from other possible statutory synonyms for online actors like "interactive computer service" (47 USC 230), "online service provider" (DMCA), "electronic communication service" and "remote computer service" (ECPA), etc. This verbiage proliferation raises questions about the scope of governed entities (who’s covered and who isn’t) and why different online actors are being treated differently (if they are). I hope future legislative drafters will recognize the costs of using different terms for online actors.

In CAN-SPAM, Congress defined an “Internet access service” as "a service that enables users to access content, information, electronic mail, or other services offered over the Internet, and may also include access to proprietary content, information, and other services as part of a package of services offered to consumers. Such term does not include telecommunications services." Check out Ethan’s lengthy but irresolute deconstruction of this definition from last year.

Read literally, this definition seemingly covers all Internet services because they allow users to access their "other" services. However, the Ninth Circuit doesn’t think that's what Congress meant, although it’s not sure about the boundaries either. Instead, the Ninth Circuit "decline[s] this opportunity to set forth a general test or define the outer bounds of what it means to be a provider of ‘Internet access service.’" Gee, thanks.

Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit had no problem saying that Gordon wasn't an Internet access service. I can’t pin down a specific reason why Gordon wasn’t covered while, according to the court, his service providers (Verizon and GoDaddy) might be. Ultimately, I think the court rejects Gordon's transparent efforts to manufacture a claim.

"Adversely Affected"

A CAN-SPAM private litigant also needs to show that it was “adversely affected” by the spam. The court doesn’t offer a single definition of adverse effect, but it does try to draw some boundaries that leave Gordon out.

In general, the court tries to narrow the scope of cognizable harms in two ways. First, the court segregates consumer-related harms from service provider-related harms. I was heartened to see this because better harm delineation was a central point of my (uncited) 2004 article "Where's the Beef? Dissecting Spam's Purported Harms." Back in the earlier part of this decade, anti-spam advocates would routinely lump together a laundry list of gripes about spam in ways that would degrade policy-makers’ ability to target policy responses to the harm. For example, CAN-SPAM suffers heavily from this schizophrenia about the targeted harm. This court makes it clear that consumer-related harms aren’t part of the CAN-SPAM private litigation calculus.

Second, the court tries to distinguish between the fixed and variable costs of spam fighting and implies that the fixed costs should be ignored when calculating adverse effect. The court’s handling of this distinction is hardly deft. It says repeatedly that we have to assume that IAS providers are absorbing some spam costs as part of their normal costs of operation. For example, the court says:

the harm must be of significance to a bona fide IAS provider—something beyond the mere annoyance of spam and greater than the negligible burdens typically borne by an IAS provider in the ordinary course of business. In most cases, evidence of some combination of operational or technical impairments and related financial costs attributable to unwanted commercial e-mail would suffice

And the court says:

We expect a legitimate service provider to secure adequate bandwidth and storage capacity and take reasonable precautions, such as implementing spam filters, as part of its normal operations….network slowdowns, server crashes, increased bandwidth usage, and hardware and software upgrades bear no inherent relationship to spam or spamming practices. On the contrary, we expect these issues to arise as a matter of course and for legitimate reasons as technology, online media, and Internet services continue to advance and develop. Therefore, evidence of what could be routine business concerns and operating costs is not alone sufficient to unlock the treasure trove of the CAN-SPAM Act’s statutory damages.

Reading these quotes, it seems like the court is trying to zero out the fixed costs borne by anyone connected to the Internet, which would then focus the analysis on only those marginal/variable consequences attributable to a specific spam campaign. However, the court does not want to raise the bar that high, at least not for “legitimate” service providers (which the court thinks clearly excludes Gordon). As the court says:

the threshold of standing should not pose a high bar for the legitimate service operations contemplated by Congress. In some civil actions—where, for example, well-recognized ISPs or plainly legitimate Internet access service providers file suit—adequate harm might be presumed because any reasonable person would agree that such entities dedicate considerable resources to and incur significant financial costs in dealing with spam.

So I’m not quite sure what to make of this language. On the one hand, the court’s acknowledgement that complex societies impose some unwanted but unavoidable costs seems to raise the harm bar pretty high for CAN-SPAM plaintiffs. On the other hand, the court is willing to presume harm for “good” plaintiffs. So why won’t the court make such presumptions for Gordon? Mostly because he “came to the nuisance” (my words, not the court). As the court says:

Gordon purposefully refuses to implement spam filters in a typical manner or otherwise make any attempt to block allegedly unwanted spam or exclude such messages from users’ email inboxes...Gordon made no real effort to avoid, block, or delete commercial e-mail, but instead has voluntarily assumed the role of a spam sleuth. He expends time and resources seeking out and capturing massive volumes of spam, which he collects and then organizes for use in his prolific lawsuits. He admits setting up domains as “spam traps” with the sole purpose of snagging as many e-mail marketing messages as possible.

So my reading of this discussion is that the court sets up a bifurcated “adverse effect” analysis. If you’re a commercial email service provider, you presumptively get access to CAN-SPAM’s “treasure trove.” If you’re a spam troll, nuts to you.

Preemption of State Laws

One of CAN-SPAM's main raisons d'etre was to preempt the rapid proliferation of state anti-spam laws in the early part of this decade (especially California's opt-in anti-spam law). I naively assumed that CAN-SPAM's preemption clause would drive states out of the anti-spam regulation business altogether (a separate rant, but I'm not a fan of any state attempts to regulate Internet activity). No such luck. Following CAN-SPAM’s enactment, nearly every state enacted NEW anti-spam laws designed to fit within the preemption exceptions. This renewed activity at the state level has contributed to the anti-spam litigation frenzy, because the plaintiffs can use both state and federal claims to extract settlements and concessions from defendants.

In 2006, in Omega Travel v. Mummagraphics, the Fourth Circuit took a lot of the wind out of plaintiffs' sails by holding that state anti-spam laws survived CAN-SPAM preemption only as applied to fraud or material misrepresentations, not garden-variety errors or immaterial deception. Here, the Ninth Circuit adopts the Mummagraphics standard, which presumably eviscerates several state laws in Ninth Circuit-governed jurisdictions.

Applying the Mummagraphics’ standard to Gordon’s case wipes out his Washington state anti-spam claim. Gordon argued that, although he was not misled or deceived, Virtumundo’s “from line” violated Washington law because it does not clearly identify Virtumundo as the sender. He also argued that to avoid being deceptive, Virtumundo’s email subject lines must have either Virtumundo’s or its client’s name. The court rejects these arguments because "Gordon offers no proof that any headers have been altered to impair a recipient’s ability to identify, locate, or respond to the person who initiated the email. Nor does he present evidence that Virtumundo’s practice is aimed at misleading recipients as to the identity of the sender."

Expect to see more state laws bite the dust in the face of this preemption analysis.

Implications

This case is exceedingly interesting and important because it destroys the arguments of anti-spam plaintiffs trying to manufacture technical violations of CAN-SPAM for their profit. Not only does the opinion send an unmistakable message to the lower courts to toss these plaintiffs out on their keister, but it sends the harsh message that these plaintiffs ought to rethink their legal hubris. As the court says, “As should be apparent here, ‘the law’ that Gordon purportedly enforces relates more to his subjective view of what the law ought to be, and differs substantially from the law itself.” Ouch. The court has apparently just invalidated the fantastic laws that some anti-spam plaintiffs dream up in their heads.

This case is also important because it puts state anti-spam laws even more clearly on the ropes. It has been an impressive but pathetic display of futility watching the states trip over themselves trying to show that they are tough on spam when their efforts are all irrelevant in light of the Fourth Circuit's and now Ninth Circuit's interpretations of CAN-SPAM. Fortunately (?), most of the states have moved on to being tough on cyberbullying instead of beating up on spammers.

It is less clear to me if the court’s discussion about “Internet access services” and “adverse effect” will have broader import on private CAN-SPAM litigation. The court deliberately sidestepped definitive interpretations of both terms, so I expect the interpretive slate is mostly clean outside of the spam litigation factories.

One final point. Spam remains actively litigated in the courts and the subject of some policy discussion, but do you still fret about the spam you receive personally? I get the sense that this panel was not that impressed with Gordon’s efforts in part because spam isn’t as big a deal for the judges as it used to be. Certainly that’s true in my case. I get about 100 spams a day, 90+% of which Gmail appropriately filters into my spam folder (with very few misclassifications of legit email as spam). As a result, it takes me just a minute or two a day to burn through the spam accruals. Not surprisingly, at least for me, good spam filters have solved the problem much better than any legislative intervention.

I understand that spam is a bigger issue for email service providers, especially now that more than 100% of all emails are spam (according to the ridiculously overhyped stats put out by vendors of anti-spam solutions). CAN-SPAM partially offers a solution to these individuals, along with other doctrines like the Computer Fraud & Abuse Act and possibly the common law trespass to chattels doctrine. However, at this point, so much of the anti-spam battle has to be fought technologically, not in the courts, due to the sheer volume and dispersed nature of the putative defendants. As a result, it doesn’t really seem to matter to the overall quantum of spam in our society if courts read CAN-SPAM broadly or narrowly.

Other comments on this case:
* Venkat
* Jeff Neuburger

UPDATE: Ken Magill reports on how Gordon has lost his house belongings due to his persistence.

Posted by Eric at 12:40 PM | Internet History , Marketing , Spam | TrackBack



August 06, 2009

State of the Net West Recap

By Eric Goldman

Yesterday, the High Tech Law Institute and the Advisory Committee to the Congressional Internet Caucus co-sponsored the Third Annual State of the Net West event at Santa Clara University. The featured participants were 3 members of Congress (Boucher, Goodlatte and Lofgren) and the White House CTO Aneesh Chopra, supplemented by 8 distinguished discussants. In a jam-packed morning, we covered a lot of interesting and important ground on broadband, privacy, antitrust, immigration and open government. This blog post recaps some highlights from the discussion.

Boucher on Broadband

Rep. Boucher emphasized the importance of broadband availability to economic activity and expressed concern that the US wasn't keeping up with broadband deployment (he said, "we can do better"). He offered three policy proposals for ways the federal government could help:

* revise the Universal Service Fund to allow dollars to be spent on broadband deployment; and require USF fund recipients 5 years from now to be offering broadband or be cut off from USF
* federally preempt state laws prohibiting municipal broadband offerings (which about 25 states have)
* get the FCC to develop a broadband deployment plan

He expressed disappointment with the guidelines that NTIA and the Department of Agriculture have adopted to give away the $7.2B broadband fund that was part of the stimulus package. It appears he will be encouraging both entities to rethink their guidelines.

My colleague Al Hammond was the broadband discussant. Al made a number of good points, including noting that broadband deployment is both a rural and low-income issue (Boucher appeared to be focusing more on the former) and raising concerns about municipalities not playing fair and the FCC overcounting actual broadband availability.

Boucher on Privacy

Rep. Boucher also gave a preview of the privacy bill he is planning to introduce next month. He started off by saying he likes ad targeting, especially first party targeting (he said he buys items based on customized recommendations). So he wants to encourage "appropriate" ad targeting, not eliminate it. His bill is expected to contain the following elements:

* websites collecting data will be required to post a prominent privacy policy
* users can opt-out of first party targeted ads. This also includes data sharing necessary to enable first party ads
* websites that want to share data with unaffiliated third parties will need opt-in. However, behavioral ad networks can proceed on an opt-out basis if they allow users to see and edit their behavioral profile, except for sensitive information categories that would always be opt-in
* both the FTC and state AGs would have enforcement authority

To the extent that the mandatory privacy policy and opt-out options codifies existing industry practices, this proposal generally seems benign but not worth the effort--the costs of the inevitably poor statutory drafting outweighs any benefit we might get from regulatory codification. Requiring opt-in would likely eliminate third party behavioral ad networks, which (as I've discussed before) is more likely to be a detriment than a win.

I was especially intrigued by the proposal that behavioral networks can flip from opt-in to opt-out by letting users access a user profile. I need to see more details about Boucher's thinking, but doesn't this superficially sound crazy? The most obvious problem is authentication of the user before seeing his or her profile. How would this be done? The networks usually don't know the identity of the specific individuals they are profiling, so they can't authenticate identity. And just tying profile access privileges to a cookie or machine sounds like a recipe for disaster for all shared computers. Plus, a web interface seems to increase the security risks that the bad guys can see profiles they shouldn't be able to see. On first blush, it sounds like this part of Boucher's proposal may need a complete rewrite, with unknown consequences for the entire structure of his proposal.

Mike Hintze of Microsoft was the privacy discussant. He espoused Microsoft's standard line that there should be a comprehensive privacy law.

In the Q&A, Boucher appeared willing to consider concurrent privacy enforcement authority by self-regulatory organizations, so long as they enforced the law's minimum requirements. But any self-regulatory effort wasn't a substitute for other aspects of his bill.

Lofgren on Antitrust

Rep. Lofgren said that if the Bush administration did too little on antitrust enforcement, the Judiciary committee is now concerned that Obama and Varney will do too much. Lofgren is particularly focused on the chilling effects of the mere threat of antitrust scrutiny, not just the actual successful prosecution in court of cases. Thus, an "informal" DOJ expression of interest can deter innovative activity by high tech companies.

She also expressed skepticism that antitrust laws remain effective at protecting technology markets, which are marked by fast innovation and low barriers to entry. (I believe her exact words were "traditional antitrust measures of marketplace behavior might no longer work.") At minimum, any technology-related antitrust enforcement actions should be focused on improving innovation rather than trying to manage current marketplace prices.

Finally, she said that copyright restrictions should be considered in antitrust inquiries. Mike Masnick has more to say on this.

Michael Katz of UC Berkeley was the most colorful respondent. He shared Lofgren's concern that antitrust law may be counterproductively squelching innovation, especially when companies try to capture antitrust enforcers to hassle competitors. He had especially harsh words for the FCC, calling it much less disciplined than the DOJ and observing how the FCC can blackmail companies using its leverage. He also complained that the FCC's review of mergers takes too long, and as an example of their lack of discipline, the FCC will impose merger conditions that have nothing to do with the merger.

Tim Bresnahan of Stanford and my colleague Cathy Sandoval were the other respondents.

At the end of her talk, Lofgren praised the Google Book Search settlement, saying that in some ways it lowers barriers to entry. She also said she was grateful that Google appears to have found a back-door way to liberate orphan works given that she wasn't able to pass an orphan works bill. I'm all in favor of orphan works reform, but a class action settlement seems like a weird way to get there.

Chopra on Open Government

Aneesh Chopra is the new White House CTO, a role that never existed before, which puts Chopra at Obama's elbow on all technology issues. This was Chopra's first Silicon Valley trip since he undertook his new role. His first talk was on Tuesday night at a Churchill Club event; we were his second. Lots of people were very interested in learning more about him. He was the big draw for the press, and we got an unprecedented number of walks-in based in part (we think) on his talk. He was also mobbed before and after his talk--everyone seemed to want a piece of his attention (then again, I'd love to have a chance to kick some stuff around with him one-on-one myself!).

It's easy to see why Chopra sparks such curiosity. My impressions were that he was genuinely affable, smooth without being slick, substantive without being bookish, a big fan of crowdsourcing and an even bigger fan of assessment and measurement of outcomes.

He started off by discussing the importance of technology and how the US's rate of technological performance is lagging against other countries. He then identified three ways to "turn the ship around":

1. invest in innovation building blocks, such as a smart/secure infrastructure, more R&D and improved workforce expertise
2. healthcare reform, especially improvements to the information technology side of healthcare delivery
3. an improved education system, including distance learning and more emphasis on lifelong learning

He then discussed open government issues and gave examples of ways technology can facilitate participatory governance.

Goodlatte and Discussants on Immigration

Rep. Goodlatte laid out the Republican's high tech agenda, which includes:
* skilled workforce, including immigration reform
* patent reform
* trade issues
* taxation, including efforts to define when activity in a state triggers tax obligations
* net neutrality (don't regulate but improve antitrust enforcement)
* privacy (opt-out except for sensitive information)

The panel then drilled down on immigration reform. I was really excited to have this panel because workforce issues are so central to the Silicon Valley's "secret sauce" and yet I couldn't recall a time that the HTLI had sponsored a discussion about them. Obviously immigration issues are age-old and are well-trodden, but I nevertheless found the discussion helpful--with the one caveat that everyone on the panel agreed with everyone else, so there was a lot of preaching to the choir. I learned an interesting factoid that both Reps. Goodlatte and Lofgren were formerly immigration attorneys, so they have some front-line domain expertise in this area.

First discussant was AnnaLee Saxenian of UC Berkeley. She talked about how skilled immigrants have fueled innovation in this country. She gave a number of stats in support of this, including that a majority of Silicon Valley engineers are foreign-born, and a high percentage of technology entrepreneurs and patent applicants are foreign-born individuals. She also noted that foreign-born skilled works create net new jobs and also help build better ties to their home country.

We benefit from the best and the brightest from around the world, who come to the US because of our higher education system and historically have chosen to stay. However, she is concerned about this retention because of bureaucratic barriers. She is also concerned that companies, frustrated by their lack of access to development talent, will offshore their R&D.

Finally, she pointed out that immigration discussions kludge together the issues of skilled and low-skilled workers, even though their issues are very different.

Keith Wolfe of Google reinforced many of AnnaLee's points from Google's specific experiences.

My colleague Deep Gulasekaram was the last discussant. He pointed out that free marketplaces may require free movement of labor, which isn't consistent with our current immigration policy. He raised concerns about state and local anti-immigration policies and the negative consequences of tying foreign workers to specific jobs (by linking their visa to the job).

Rep. Lofgren added a few remarks:
* Obama told her that it's time for comprehensive immigration reform. [This led to a polite back-and-forth between Lofgren, who favors comprehensive reform, and Goodlatte, who would settle for piecemeal immigration reform]
* Immigration reform is not a substitute for educating the US workforce
* We should give permanence to people we want to keep (i.e., not keep them on some treadmill with the possibility of a forced exit, which prevents their long-term life planning)
* We need to address the family of skilled immigrants, not just the immigrants themselves

More Coverage of the Event

* ABC 7 News
* KCBS radio
* Zusha Ellison of the Recorder
* Joyce Cutler of BNA (BNA subscription required)
* Mike Masnick
* Joel West
* Colette Vogele
* Warren's Washington Internet Daily also ran a story (not web-linkable) "Boucher Promises Online Privacy Bill Draft Soon"
* The extensive Twitter discussion at hashtag #sotnw. Twitterers included @ipolicy, @caminick, @persistance, @miss_eli, @techpolicygirl, @cathygellis, @mmasnick, @nextgenweb, @marianmerritt, @larrymagid, @christinela, @mblatkin, @seangarrettnow, @vogelelaw (who didn't always use the hashtag--we will try to publish a standardized hashtag at future events). Whew! Apologies if I missed anyone. I can't recall seeing more Twitterers in an audience--everyone seemed to have their Twitter page up constantly. As usual, I didn't turn on my computer at the conference (I take notes by hand and blog them later), so my comments seem woefully out-of-date already!

We plan to post the event audio soon so you can listen for yourself. I'll announce the audio posting at my Twitter account when it's live.

UPDATE: Audio now available: Download (item 27) or Stream

Posted by Eric at 10:54 AM | Adware/Spyware , Copyright , E-Commerce , General , Internet History , Marketing , Patents , Privacy/Security | TrackBack



August 04, 2009

Wikipedia and Rules Proliferation

By Eric Goldman

I have previously mentioned how rule sets tend to expand over time. We've seen this with legislation; for example, consider how the Copyright Act has grown over time. Personally, I've seen code expansion over and over again in the context of negative behavioral restrictions in user-to-user communities. A 2008 article by Brian Butler, Elisabeth Joyce and Jacqueline Pike entitled "Don’t Look Now, But We’ve Created a Bureaucracy: The Nature and Roles of Policies and Rules in Wikipedia" provided yet another dramatic example of this phenomenon in the Wikipedia context. They write:
___________

One useful measure of increased complexity is the change in lengths in terms of word count alone of the policies from the first version to most current. All policies studied grew enormously.

• Copyrights: 341 words => 3200 words: 938%
• What Wikipedia is not: 541 words => 5031 words: 929%
• Civility: 1741 words => 2131 words: 124%
• Consensus: 132 words => 2054 words: 1557%
• Deletion: 405 words => 2349 words: 580%
• Ignore all rules: exceptional case

The first version of the Ignore all rules policy is only 23 words long, stating, “If rules make you nervous and depressed, and not desirous of participating in the Wiki, then ignore them and go about your business” [45]. The current version is actually shorter, only 16 words, and says, “If a rule prevents you from working with others to improve or maintain Wikipedia, ignore it” [45]. However, as suggested earlier in this paper, while the actual wording of this policy declined 69% and it appears on the surface to be the least bureaucratic of the policies, the supplemental page directly linked to this policy contains 579 words, indicating that the policy swelled over 3600% [45].
___________

There are some obvious detrimental consequences of this expansion. First, it facilitates wikilawyering. As the rules get more complicated, there are more ambiguities to debate and potentially more contradictory rules. Second, it becomes a bigger barrier to entry for newcomers or casual users; either they must try to master a greater and more complex rule set, or they are more likely to transgress and have their contributions reversed.

Posted by Eric at 10:35 AM | Internet History , Licensing/Contracts | TrackBack



May 03, 2009

April 2009 Quick Links

By Eric Goldman

[Just a reminder that I am posting some “quick links” exclusively to my Twitter account, so if you want to keep up with everything, follow me at Twitter or subscribe to the RSS feed.]

Marketing/Spam

* Zango is dead (and so is adware), Ken Smith, Zango's CTO, conducts a post mortem: What Zango Got Wrong and What Zango Got Right. Mike Masnick's post-mortem.

* The FDA's instructions about pharmaceutical search marketing have led to lots of confusion. See Search Engine Land and the NYT.

* NYT: "Never Mind What It Costs. Can I Get 70% Off?"

* Tsan Abrahamson on social media and marketing law.

* Asis Internet Servs. v. Consumerbargaingiveaways. A district court diverges from Mummagraphics and says CAN-SPAM does not preempt CA's anti-spam law even if there is no common law fraud.

* Jackson v. American Plaza Corp., No. 08-8980 (S.D.N.Y. April 28, 2009), A Craiglist advertiser isn't a third party beneficiary of Craigslist's contract for purposes of stopping another advertiser from breaching the contract (in this case, spamming the forum).

Defamation

* Gardner v. Martino (9th Cir. April 24, 2009). I'm not a fan of talk radio, and the 9th Circuit apparently isn't either. The court upheld an anti-SLAPP dismissal of a defamation claim against the radio talk show host because "The Tom Martino Show is a radio talk show program that contains many of the elements that would reduce the audience’s expectation of learning an objective fact: drama, hyperbolic language, an opinionated and arrogant host, and heated controversy." Accord DiMeo v. Max. As Marc Randazza notes, rulings like this pose a challenge for those who think contextually ridiculous statements should be treated as "cyberbullying" or "cyber-harassment." Cf. the Finkel v. Facebook case involving asinine but clearly meaningless chatter on a private Facebook page.

* Some big defamation losses reported by CMLP:
- Blogger hit with $1.8M damage award.
- $12.5M defamation judgment against a gripe site.

* CMLP has a page organizing all of its 47 USC 230 material.

Intellectual Property

* Publicly republishing a private email leads to a default judgment of copyright infringement.

* Bryant v. Europadisk, Ltd., 2009 WL 1059777 (S.D.N.Y. April 15, 2009). In 2000, musicians authorized distributors to distribute their [hard copy] recordings, which the defendants ultimately ripped and allowed Amazon and Rhapsody to deliver via downloading. The resulting lawsuit turned on the interpretation of the license agreement term “internet sites.” The court says the term "is not ambiguous and does not extend to websites selling digital copies of songs. At the time the parties entered into the agreements, The Orchard sold physical copies only. As its Vice President explained by affidavit testimony, digital downloads of music did not become a “viable business” until iTunes was launched in approximately April 2004, long after Media Right and Gloryvision entered into contract."

* Octomom is seeking trademark registrations.

Miscellaneous

* GeoCities is shutting down.

* eBay will referee customer disputes.

* Wilson Sonsini's VC financing term sheet generator.

* Oddee: 10 Most Bizarre [Online] Gaming Incidents

Posted by Eric at 06:31 AM | Adware/Spyware , Content Regulation , Copyright , Derivative Liability , E-Commerce , Internet History , Licensing/Contracts , Marketing , Spam , Trademark , Virtual Worlds | TrackBack



April 11, 2009

Q1 2009 Quick Links, Part 3

By Eric Goldman

Blogging and Social Networking Sites

* A new version of the EFF Legal Guide to Blogging. While you're there, consider joining EFF as a member. The EFF does first-rate work, and they can use all the support they can get in this economic downturn.

* Red Tape Chronicles: "Blogger: Cash4Gold tried to 'bribe' me."

* Klein v. City of Laguna Beach, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2009): "many of the cases striking down ordinances that restrict sound-amplification equipment are artifacts of a bygone age that offered activists few media of mass communication. Twenty, thirty, or fifty years ago, a sound truck was an important means of spreading a message to a large group of people. Now, one must only have a computer and a printer to publish a newsletter or handbill. The Internet, e-mail, text messaging, and widespread mobile communications devices have made it easier than ever to reach a large audience on a small budget. Indeed, it might be easier for Mr. Klein to reach the youth he wishes to target by using Facebook or MySpace."

* Maybe everyone already knew this, but I learned something interesting about Blogger. Apparently in some cases they will place an interstitial warning in front of certain user-posted content.

* Doninger v. Niehoff, 2009 WL 103322 (D. Conn. Jan. 15, 2009). On remand from the Second Circuit, the district court denies damages for a student whose off-campus blog entry led to school discipline. At the same time, Wendy Davis reports on how a Conn. Bill Would Protect Students' Free Speech Online:

* Funny article on Facebook's efforts to police against people who create funny account names, which sometimes ensnares people who actually have funny names like Batman, Six, Super, Pancake and Kisser.

* Facebook Sex-Extortion Plot: a boy pretends to be a girl, gets boys to send naked photos to him, and then threatens to go public with the photos unless they consent to sex with him.

* Dynamic Sports Nutrition, Inc. v. Roberts, 2009 WL 136023 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2009). A former employee republishing confidential information via his blog is enjoined.

* We now know that Facebook settled with ConnectU for $65M. However, ConnectU might get a little more cash after this information was inadvertently disclosed by its former counsel, Quinn Emanuel, in a marketing brochure.

* Facebook gets TRO against Wallace.

* Some people gave up Facebook for Lent.

* Reuters writes up a shocking study: many teens on MySpace post things they might regret.

* State v. Hause, 2009 WL 295404 (Ohio App. Ct. Feb. 9, 2009). Facebook photos help convict a woman for allowing minors to drink alcohol in her house.

* U.S. v. Villanueva, 2009 WL 455127 (11th Cir. Feb. 25, 2009). MySpace photo and YouTube video showing defendant holding firearms contribute to sentence enhancements for firearms charges.

* John Palfrey & Adam Thierer discuss Palfrey's arguments to "improve" 47 USC 230 by reversing Doe v. MySpace.

Defamation/Cyberbullying

* JuicyCampus has shut down. LA Times, Chronicle of Higher Education, CMLP.

* Lengthy article on the AutoAdmit lawsuits. And a mixed ruling in Ciolli v. Iravani.

* Noonan v. Staples (1st Cir. Feb. 13, 2009). Truth is NOT an absolute defense to defamation in Massachusetts, which apparently also has seceded from the Union because the First Amendment no longer seems to apply.

* Neuwirth v. Silverstein, 2009 WL 294737 (Cal. App. Ct. Feb. 9, 2009). Reiterating that a website can be a public forum for purposes of anti-SLAPP laws. The CMLP writeup.

* Douchebags Lawsuit dismissed. Marc Randazza mocks the lawsuit.

* Rios v. Fergusan, 2008 WL 5511215 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2008). Connecticut court has jurisdiction to issue restraining order against North Carolina man who posted YouTube video threatening Connecticut woman.

* Fahmy v. Hogge, 2009 WL 33418 (C.D.Cal. Jan. 2, 2009). Court denies Fahme's motion to set aside the dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction because Fahme made the error that caused the dismissal.

* 24Grille v. TripAdvisor (complaint filed April 2, 2009). Restaurant sues TripAdvisor for anonymous TripAdvisor review. Hello 230!

* Censorious laws brewing in WV and NJ.

Yelp

I have been meaning to post about my experiences with Yelp as a reader and a writer, but that has been repeatedly deferred. So, instead, how about a quick recap of Yelp’s woes? Yelp has been under the microscope quite a bit in the last few months.

* Wendy Davis recaps all the Yelp-related litigation she and I could find--at least 5 known cases. CMLP recaps a couple of the lawsuits.

* This East Bay Express article about Yelp caused quite a stir. It was followed up with more attributed sources. A number of other media outlets covered Yelp, including News.com and the NYT. For a full rundown of Yelp haters, check out the Eater coverage.

Wikipedia

* 25 Biggest Blunders in Wikipedia History.

* Two books about Wikipedia I’ve been checking out.
- Wikipedia, the Missing Manual.
- How Wikipedia Works.

Pornography

* Mukasey v. A.C.L.U., No. 08-565. The Supreme Court declined the cert petition regarding the challenge to the 1998 Child Online Protection Act, officially killing the law after a decade of litigation. Putting aside the merits of the law, it would have been a huge shock to the Internet community to have a circa-1998 criminal act resurrected! I'd like to think Congress will be wiser than to try to criminalize Internet porn a third time, but the regulation of Internet porn is like a siren song to Congressmembers.

* State v. Hurst, 2009 WL 580453 (Ohio App. Ct. March 6, 2009). From the unfortunately-named Licking County courts, the defendant downloaded 14,000 pornographic photos into his work computer's local cache in a five day period (he acknowledged he spent 70% of his workday downloading porn). An expert said that about 50 of the photos were child pornographic. The defendant was convicted of possessing child pornography even though he argued that he didn't intentionally download the photos, getting a 39 month sentence and classified as a sex offender.

* Excellent article by Colette Vogele on suing over a sex tape.

Gambling

* The credit card payment systems blocked the New Hampshire Lottery due to the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006.

* Peer-to-peer gambling OKed in Washington.

Posted by Eric at 12:53 PM | Content Regulation , Derivative Liability , Internet History , Privacy/Security | TrackBack



April 10, 2009

Q1 2009 Quick Links, Part 2

By Eric Goldman

Trademarks/Domain Names

* The ridiculous Jones Day v. BlockShopper case settled. The settlement agreement. The ABA Journal and Legal Blog Watch stories. Commentary from CMLP, Paul Levy, Tom O'Toole.

* The trial court denouement of the S&L Vitamins v. Australian Gold did not turn well for the defense--$6M jury award. The S&L Vitamins v. Australian Gold and Designer Skins v. S&L Vitamins cases subsequently settled. According to Ronald Coleman: "This settles, for our clients S&L Vitamins, Inc., the Australian Gold case and the related appeal in the Designer Skin case. All money judgments are vacated and parties bear their own fees. Our client agrees to move on to another line of work, however."

* Twelve Inches Around Corp. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 2009 WL 928077 (S.D.N.Y. March 12, 2009). 17 USC 512(f) does not cover trademark takedown notices.

* Suarez Corp. v. Earthwise, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92931 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 14, 2008). Including a competitor's name in a web page disclaimer creates initial interest confusion when the competitor's name is indexed by the search engines. Compare Promatek v. Equitrac, the 2002 7th Circuit case ordering the defendant to include the plaintiff's name on its web page as a cure for initial interest confusion.

* CRS Recovery v. Laxton, 2008 WL 4408001 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2008). Another California-based court says that domain names are property that can be converted. I'm amazed that these cases are still being brought.

* North American Bushman, Inc. v. Saari, 2009 WL 211932 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2009) The parties entered into a settlement agreement that "Plaintiffs further agree not to use, and in addition, to offer up or destroy, any material that includes, but is not limited to, the names, photos, images, embroideries, of likeness of [Defendant] James Saari and any of the a above named trade names and trademarks of Defendants." The court holds that this provision wasn't breached when third party users posted comments referencing the defendants in UGC areas of websites operated by the other party.

* Advice Co. v. Novak, 2009 WL 210503 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2009). Justia page. Stupid lawsuit alert! Attorneypages.com believes Attorneyyellowpages.com infringes its trademark. Case dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. Participating in Google AdSense doesn't automatically create jurisdiction in CA.

* DSW v. Zappos, which involved allegations of trademark infringement based on Zappo's affiliates, settled.

* An update on Google's AdWords woes in France.

* Kiva Kitchen & Bath Inc. v. Capital Distributing Inc., 2009 WL 890591 (5th Cir. April 2, 2009). The Fifth Circuit upholds enhanced damages under ACPA. Good discussion of the purpose of damages in the ACPA.

* Toys R Us buys the domain toys.com for over $5M. Is any domain name worth $5M any more?

* A 2007 interview with "Pokey" of Pokey.org fame. This is one of my favorite domain name disputes from the 1990s. A very smart cyberlawyer (Ian Ballon), on behalf of the trademark owners of Pokey & Gumby, unexpectedly got into a public tangle with a 12 year old kid nicknamed "Pokey" over the domain name pokey.org. Debating 12 year old kids in the press never turns out well.

Advertising/Marketing

* Some new material on behavioral advertising: an FTC report and a CRS report.

* Latest NYT article on human billboards. See my prior blog post.

* Privacy advocates are freaking out about Google Android and its ability to deliver location-based information and ads. But location-based information and ad targeting is inevitable...and a good thing.

* Action over mobile marketing: Mobile Messenger settled a false advertising suit with Florida for $1M, and another settlement. Google's response.

* The class in the "Vista Capable" lawsuit was decertified.

* Tsan's post on the latest FTC efforts to rein in testimonials on social networking sites and blogs. Unfortunately for the FTC, some of its efforts may be preempted by 47 USC 230.

* eBay v. Digital Point Solutions, 2009 WL 481269 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2009). eBay loses an intermediate round in its cookie stuffing lawsuit against Digital Point Solutions.

* e360, a serial defendant in spam cases, sued Choicepoint for selling it email addresses that led to the suits. Apparently neither e360 nor Choicepoint got the memo that the days of email list brokering are dead.

* 10 Creative Bathroom Ads.

Search Engines

* Study: Google's search lead not matched by loyalty. A critical response.

* Is Google giving big brands extra credit in its organic search results rankings? Compare: media giants complaining they don't get enough weighting in organic results.

* Sign of improving consumer search skills: search queries are getting longer.

* Yahoo reserves the right to "auto-optimize" advertiser accounts by changing ads and advertiser bids automatically. This is not a popular move.

* Wired: The Plot to Kill Google.

Posted by Eric at 10:20 AM | Domain Names , Internet History , Marketing , Search Engines , Spam , Trademark | TrackBack



March 19, 2009

IEEE ComSoc SCV Talk: "Engineers' Role in Internet Law Development"

By Eric Goldman

Last week, I gave a talk at a meeting of the IEEE Communications Society, Santa Clara Valley chapter. I don't often get the chance to speak to a group of engineers, so I decided to go in a little different direction than my normal talks. I gave a procedure-oriented talk about how lawyers and engineers can work together to improve legal compliance. Along the way, I pointed to the Roommates.com and Cablevision cases as two case studies of how product design choices can influence the legal analysis (one good, one bad). My talk slides.

Posted by Eric at 10:25 AM | Copyright , Derivative Liability , Internet History | TrackBack



March 11, 2009

The Third Wave of Internet Exceptionalism

By Eric Goldman

[I initially wrote this as an editorial for our University magazine and republished that version through InformIT as well. Here's the original unedited version I submitted.]

From the beginning, the Internet has been viewed as something special and “unique.” For example, in 1996, a judge called the Internet “a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human communication.”

The Internet’s perceived novelty has prompted regulators to engage in “Internet exceptionalism,” crafting Internet-specific laws that diverge from regulatory precedents in other media. Internet exceptionalism has come in three distinct waves:

The First Wave: Internet Utopianism

In the mid-1990s, some people fantasized about an Internet “utopia” that would overcome the problems inherent in other media. Some regulators, fearing disruption of this possible utopia, sought to treat the Internet more favorably than other media.

47 USC 230 (a law still on the books) is a flagship example of mid-1990s efforts to preserve Internet utopianism. The statute categorically immunizes online providers from liability for publishing most types of third party content. It was enacted (in part) “to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” The statute is clearly exceptionalist because it treats online providers more favorably than offline publishers—even when they publish identical content.

The Second Wave: Internet Paranoia

Later in the 1990s, the regulatory pendulum swung in the other direction. Regulators still embraced Internet exceptionalism, but instead of favoring the Internet, regulators treated the Internet more harshly than analogous offline activity.

For example, in 2005, a Texas website called Live-shot.com announced that it would offer “Internet hunting.” The website allowed paying customers to control, via the Internet, a gun on its game farm. An employee manually monitored the gun and could override the customer’s instructions. The website wanted to give people who could not otherwise hunt, such as paraplegics, the opportunity to enjoy the hunting experience.

The regulatory reaction to Internet hunting was swift and severe. Over 3 dozen states banned Internet hunting. California also banned Internet fishing for good measure. However, regulators never explained how Internet hunting is more objectionable than physical space hunting.

For example, California Sen. Debra Bowen criticized Internet hunting because it “isn't hunting; it's an inhumane, over the top, pay-per-view video game using live animals for target practice….Shooting live animals over the Internet takes absolutely zero hunting skills, and it ought to be offensive to every legitimate hunter.”

Sen. Bowen’s remarks reflect numerous unexpressed assumptions about the nature of “hunting” and what constitutes fair play. In the end, however, hunting may just be “hunting,” in which case the response to Internet hunting may just be a typical example of adverse Internet exceptionalism. [For more, check out my 2005 editorial on Internet hunting.]

The Third Wave: Exceptionalism Proliferation

The past few years have brought a new regulatory trend. Regulators are still engaged in Internet exceptionalism, but each new advance in Internet technology has prompted exceptionalist regulations towards that technology.

For example, the emergence of blogs and virtual worlds has helped initiate a push towards blog-specific and virtual world-specific regulation. In effect, Internet exceptionalism has splintered into pockets of smaller exceptionalist efforts.

Regulatory responses to social networking sites like Facebook and MySpace are a prime example of Internet exceptionalism splintering. Rather than regulating these sites like other websites, regulators have sought social networking site-specific laws, such as requirements to verify users’ age, combat sexual predators and suppress content that promotes violence. The result is that the regulation of social networking sites differs not only from offline enterprises but from other websites as well.

Implications

Internet exceptionalism is not inherently bad. In some cases, the Internet truly is unique, special or different and should be regulated accordingly. Unfortunately, more typically, exceptionalism cannot be analytically justified and instead reflects regulatory panic.

In these cases, regulatory exceptionalism can be harmful, especially to Internet entrepreneurs and their investors. It can distort the marketplace between web enterprises and their offline competition—occasionally advantaging the website (such as 47 USC 230), but typically hindering the web business’ ability to compete. In extreme cases, such as Internet hunting, unjustified regulatory intervention may put companies out of business.

Accordingly, before enacting exceptionalist Internet regulation, regulators should articulate how the Internet is unique, special or different and explain why these differences support exceptionalism. Unfortunately, emotional overreactions to perceived Internet threats or harms typically trump such a rational regulatory process. Knowing this tendency, perhaps we can better resist that temptation.

Posted by Eric at 12:20 PM | Content Regulation , Derivative Liability , Internet History | TrackBack



February 20, 2009

Facebook User Agreement Imbroglio Recap (and Some Comments of My Own)

By Eric Goldman

I didn't have a chance to blog on the Facebook user agreement amendment flap in real-time, but now that Facebook has rolled back its amendments and everyone is catching their breath, the Monday morning quarterbacking is proceeding in full earnest. Some of the articles that caught my attention:

* CNET News.com: "Facebook's about-face: Change we can believe in?"

* InternetNews: "Experts: Facebook Must Rethink TOS Stance"

* EFF: "Facebook's reaction is a tremendous victory for its users." I guess that's true, in the way that getting back to zero at a casino sometimes can be considered a win.

* Bill McGeveran powerfully (and with irony) demonstrates that Facebook's terms weren't all that unusual. Et tu, Consumerist?

Some of my own observations:

* When you're a high-profile company living in the media fishbowl like Facebook, there is no such thing as a minor amendment to your user agreement.

* Facebook's amendments--and the news reports about them--were confusing for two independent but often correlated problems. First, lay readers often misread user agreements, especially broad license grants that users mistakenly read as statements of ownership. This is a well-known and long-standing phenomenon; see, e.g., the flap over GeoCities' user agreement from a decade ago. So initial news reports on Facebook's amendments were garbled and perhaps overly dramatic.

Second, Internet lawyers often draft user agreements using legalese in ways that make the agreements indecipherable to lay readers...and, not infrequently, to other lawyers. Having drafted a lot of them in my life, I'm a pretty sophisticated reader of user agreements, yet it took me a fair amount of time to parse Facebook's license terms to figure out what they were saying--and, even then, I wasn't quite sure. In particular, the "perpetual" and "irrevocable" terms in the license agreement were in seeming conflict with Facebook's promise in the same license grant to honor a user's privacy settings. In other words, if a user can set the configurations to remove content from Facebook's purview and Facebook will honor those instructions, then how is Facebook's license grant irrevocable? Unless I'm missing something big, this looked to me like a drafting error by Facebook. (And check out Nancy Kim's op-ed identifying this exact issue--in March 2008).

This suggests a drafting lesson we might internalize from Facebook's hassles (Jonathan Zittrain makes a complementary point). We as Cyberlawyers are used to parroting the exact words from the applicable statutes and caselaw because it seemingly increases the precision of the agreement, but frankly I think Facebook and other Internet companies would do a whole lot better--both legally and in the court of public opinion--if it junked the legalese and actually tried to write license grants in real English.

* Partially obscured in the haze is the lurking question of whether Facebook can unilaterally amend its user agreement without providing any notice to users. I don't even see this as a close question. From my reading of the precedents, I think the answer is pretty emphatically NO, both as a matter of contract law (and see more; but compare MySpace v. theglobe.com) and FTC law (see, e.g., the Gateway Learning case). Without a doubt, I wouldn't want to be Facebook trying to defend the new incremental changes in court.

* I got a few inquiries about whether a lawsuit against Facebook would have been successful. As Ethan explained recently, there may be unexpected hurdles to any such lawsuits.

* Now that Facebook has stirred the hornet's nest, it's not clear that they can simply roll back to the prior version of the user agreement and put everyone back in the happy apple. Instead, having called attention to its licensing policies, Facebook will be lucky if the pre-amendment terms survive as those undergo critical and jaundiced scrutiny from users. David Kirkpatrick touches on this.

* No matter how Facebook resolves its agreement, this episode has been damaging to its trust relationship with its users. It gives users yet another reason to question whether Facebook is a site we can trust. For users who lived through the Newsfeed and Beacon episodes, this may be a three-strike situation. For others, the fracas is yet another wedge in the users' relationship with Facebook. Trust is hard to earn and easy to lose.

Having said that, in the past couple of quarters, Facebook has been riding a strong network effects bull and seeing remarkable growth DESPITE Beacon. So Beacon clearly did not destroy users' trust in Facebook. At the same time, if users fall out of love of Facebook due to loss of trust, they will scale back their involvement with Facebook, which ultimately could negate the network effects benefits they are currently experiencing. IMO, this is the real risk created by Facebook's highly publicized problems.

Posted by Eric at 08:57 AM | Internet History , Licensing/Contracts , Privacy/Security | TrackBack



February 06, 2009

2008 Cyberlaw Year-in-Review

By Eric Goldman

It's a sign of my schedule that I'm just now getting to this, and this post will be more pithy than I initially conceived. This post recaps some of the Cyberlaw highlights from last year. Frankly, the two biggest stories of 2008 were the financial markets meltdown and the ascension of President Obama, neither of which have a lot of Cyberlaw angles. In light of those big developments, Cyberlaw in 2008 was comparatively quiet. However, there is still plenty of interesting developments to revisit.

Broad Themes

A few broad themes emerged last year:

* Ludicrous trademark claims. 2008 hardly had a monopoly on dumb trademark claims; those are perennial. But 2008 certainly saw some asinine entries, including putative Cyberlawyer Eric Menhart's claim to own a trademark in the term "Cyberlaw," Jones Day's efforts to claim that a web page referencing its name as the employer of some homebuyers violated its trademark rights, and putative Cyberlawyer John Dozier's claim that if his name is used as anchor text, the link must go to his website or it violates his trademark right.

* This was a good year for expansive readings and applications of user agreements. Some examples:
- the Lori Drew prosecution, where Lori was convicted of violating an agreement that someone else clicked through.
- Jacobsen v. Katzer, where a user of copyrighted material is bound by a contract that he/she never clicked through at all.
- AV v. iParadigms, where kids were not allowed to void a user agreement despite their status as minors (and despite the fact that some of them had no meaningful choice about whether or not to consent).
- JuicyCampus enforcement action, where the New Jersey Attorney General's office tried to treat a negative user behavioral restriction in a user agreement as an affirmative marketing representation that such user behavior would not occur on the site.

* One of the long-standing Cyberlaw memes is that websites must either be passive conduits to avoid liability or active editors to manage their liability, but if a website chooses the latter, the website is liable for any editorial mistakes. That is, if the website edits its site but misses something, it's fully liable for what it missed. This simply isn't true under 47 USC 230, which allows websites to choose to be passive, active or anything in between without varying liability. In the IP context, this passive v. active meme has had more traction, but 2008 saw two solid cases suggesting that if a website tries to police its premises and fails, courts will be sympathetic and excuse any omissions. Example #1: Tiffany v. eBay, where the court gave eBay extra credit for its VeRO program as a basis to excuse any counterfeit goods that slip through. Example #2: Io v. Veoh, where the court was more willing to excuse Veoh because it had undertaken extra policing efforts than was required for the 17 USC 512 safe harbor. Finally, although not an IP case, the court in Cisneros v. Yahoo also lauded search engines for their affirmative efforts to block gambling ads, which the court acknowledged was a hard challenge.

* Despite some adverse rulings early in the year, punctuated by the Ninth Circuit's en banc ruling in Roommates.com, the 47 USC 230 immunization is still extremely robust. We saw a number of expansive and pro-defense rulings per 230 throughout the year, including Craigslist, Doe v. MySpace, Cisneros v. Yahoo and Goddard v. Google. Perhaps more importantly, in the three 230 cases I've seen since Roommates.com that cited to the opinion, all three cited the opinion in ruling for the defense.

* Battles over keyword advertising are hardly over, even though Utah officially backed off its attempt to ban them. The ABA IP Section tried to get into the act, and American Airlines sued Google, settled, and then sued Yahoo.

Top 11 Cyberlaw Developments of 2008

#11: Utah Trademark Protection Act repealed. The Utah Trademark Protection Act had the potential to throw the entire keyword advertising business into turmoil. Instead, now that it's repealed, it just remains as a dramatic reminder of the Utah legislature's incompetence regarding Internet legislation.

# 9 and 10: Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com and Goddard v. Google. The Roommates.com en banc opinion makes the list based mostly on its potential consequences, not its actual effect. It remains one of the most significant pro-plaintiff incursions into the solidly defense-favorable interpretations of 47 USC 230, but it's so riddled with contradictory and ambiguous language that no one really knows what to do with it. I think Judge Fogel's reading of the case in Goddard v. Google has the potential to become the defining interpretation of the case, and his solidly defense-favorable reading of the precedent in excusing Google for ads placed by its advertisers may only reinforce how little Roommates.com changed the law.

#8: AV v. iParadigms. This case was a terrific win for online fair use enthusiasts because the for-profit commercialization of a database of third party copyrighted works was still deemed fair use. The upholding of the contract against the minors forced to enter into it was also significant. Before this ruling, my assumption is that any plaintiff trying to form a class action lawsuit in the face of an adverse user agreement could always form the class on behalf of any minors who had the right to void the contract. This case seems to shut down that loophole in user agreement protection.

#7: Io v. Veoh. The 17 USC 512(c) safe harbor has been law for over a decade and has produced a couple dozen rulings, but few are cleaner and more decisive for the defense than this one. It was a textbook example of a court rejecting the many different arguments plaintiffs make to kick a defendant out of the safe harbor, and as mentioned before, it was a great validation for Veoh's decision to do more than 512 required.

#6: Jacobsen v. Katzer. From a doctrinal standpoint, this case raises really difficult questions about how a copyright consumer can be bound to terms that he/she never "assented" to. Even so, this case had huge implications because it effectively validated that open source licenses can be binding on licensees, giving much more legal credibility to the entire multi-billion open source software industry. However, an odd footnote: on remand, the district court denied an injunction for the plaintiff, raising more issues about what exactly the plaintiff won at the Federal Circuit.

#5: Tiffany v. eBay. A fantastic validation of eBay's practices against a very serious and sympathetic challenger who had plenty of evidence that counterfeit goods were being sold on eBay's site. The case also shows that courts can grow tired of IP owners simply making up their own rules about how online sites should protect them and then suing the sites for breaching these artificial rules.

#4: Mazur v. eBay. A more scary case to 47 USC 230 defense enthusiasts than the Roommates.com opinion. The court says that eBay isn't protected by 230 for some of the marketing representations it makes, even if those representations are rendered untrue by third parties. While this makes a lot of doctrinal sense, it is also a green light for plaintiffs to mine a website's marketing representations as a way to bypass the otherwise-fatal consequences of 230 on a lawsuit triggered by user behavior or content.

#3: Google Book Search settlement. This makes the list for two independent reasons. First, many folks were hoping the case would establish solid precedent on online fair use, and the settlement ended that hope. Second, the proposed Book Rights Registry has the potential to reshape a number of major industries, including the book publishing business, the book retailing industry and the library industry.

#2: the Lori Drew prosecution. I think this may have been the most polarizing Cyberlaw development of 2008, exposing deep divides in people's appetite for punishing bad conduct online. It's hard to assess the overall implications of her conviction because no one rallied to praise Lori Drew's choices, and her case is still a ways from a final legal outcome. However, the possible implications of the case were so complex that it took a special three part series for me to explore its nuances (1, 2, 3).

#1: Cartoon Network v. CSC (the "Cablevision" case). Boy, the more I think about this case, the more important it becomes. The case upends our assumption that if we see it online, it's fixed, creating a new class of unfixed electronic works. Also, the court treats the users, not the service, as making the requisite copies, which reinforces the possibility that online providers can be just "dumb technology providers" for copyright law purposes and reinvigorates the possible defense that a service provider's copying is just done as a proxy for its users. However, the Supreme Court's ambiguous response to the cert petition--not yes, not no, but a request to the Solicitor General for comments--leaves this decision in a precarious position.

Other Developments of Special Note

47 USC 230

* Doe v. MySpace. The Fifth Circuit soundly rejects the argument that MySpace had an obligation to police its “premises.”

* Craigslist. Judge Easterbrook's language in Doe v. GTE had given plaintiffs some hope that the Seventh Circuit would provide a friendly venue to plaintiffs trying to overcome 47 USC 230. Judge Easterbrook may still love his language (which he quoted extensively in the Craigslist ruling), but his practical and no-nonsense ruling for the defense squelches the hope that the Seventh Circuit will become a plaintiff's haven.

* New Jersey's enforcement action against JuicyCampus. State AG offices HATE 47 USC 230.

Affiliate Liability

* Impulse Media. A jury thumped the FTC's overly expansive views of affiliate liability for spam.

* NY v. Direct Revenue. A state judge emphatically rejected the NY AG's office's expansive views of affiliate liability for adware.

Trademarks/Domain Names

* American Airlines' lawsuits against Google and Yahoo. No one I know fully understands why American Airlines sued Google for selling its trademarks for keyword ads. No one I know understands what concessions Google gave to American Airlines to settle the case. And no one I know understands why American Airlines decided to sue Yahoo after procuring the Google settlement. It's all a big mystery.

* NSI's grabbing of domain names in response to WHOIS queries. Is there any better example of ICANN's failings to police domain name retailers than to have one retailer selling a scarce good grabbing the good exclusively (blocking attempted sales by all other retailers) when a customer merely inquires about it?

* Kentucky's attempted seizure of 141 gambling-related domain names. As I wrote before, "Is a domain name property? Yes. See the Sex.com case. Can a plaintiff seize a domain name pursuant to a favorable judgment? Yes. Is it appropriate for Kentucky to seize domain names for gambling websites available in Kentucky? Of course not, because this would effectuate an extraterritorial reach by curtailing non-Kentucky residents from making possibly legal uses of the domain name."

* Eric Menhart, a lawyer who claims to practice Cyberlaw, doesn't know that Cyberlaw is a generic term.

* New gTLDs. Maybe I should reserve this development for 2009...if it happens.

Others

* McCain complains about 512(c)(3) notices taking down his YouTube videos. Surprise! 512(c)(3) notices are unforgiving. Sen. McCain, now that you've had a first-hand taste of their power, maybe you'd like to revisit the statute to see if it's producing the right incentives?

* FCC's bust of Comcast. The pro-regulatory forces were queued up to pounce on any examples where an IAP violated Net Neutrality principles, and Comcast's chicanery in forging reset packets was impossible for anyone to defend.

* NebuAd's flameout. Behavioral ad targeting is in our future unless regulators stop it. NebuAd won't be the winning provider of targeting services, but legislators will keep trying to regulate it further out of existence nonetheless.

Posted by Eric at 05:50 PM | Adware/Spyware , Copyright , Derivative Liability , Domain Names , E-Commerce , Internet History , Licensing/Contracts , Marketing , Publicity/Privacy Rights , Search Engines , Spam , Trademark | TrackBack



February 03, 2009

Social Networking Sites and Blogs Talk for Students

By Eric Goldman

Today I gave a talk entitled "Social Networking Sites and Blogs" for the on-campus Student Intellectual Property Law Association (SIPLA). My slides. In conjunction with this, I thought it might be useful to organize a bibliography of my previous postings and materials on these topics.

Blogs Generally

* Three part series on blogging: How I decide which blogs to read?, Should I blog? and If I decide I want to blog, how do I get started?

* LexBlog Q&A with Rob La Gatta, parts 1 and 2

* Bay Area Blawgers census

* Blogging, Scholarship and the Bench and Bar Panel Recap

* North Carolina Blogging Conference Recap

* Recaps of the first and third gatherings of the Bay Area Blawgers

Blog Law

* Co-Blogging Law

* Blog Law Recap

* A Guest Blogger's "Meta" Post About Guest Blogging

* Blog Content Aggregation, RSS Feeds and Copyright Law

* Steinbuch v. Cutler: New Lawsuit Over Blogging--Steinbuch v. Cutler, Steinbuch v. Cutler Update--Cutler's Motion to Dismiss, Steinbuch v. Cutler Update, Steinbuch v. Culter Update: Cox Out, Cutler Bankrupt, Steinbuch's Second Battlefront Against Cutler Shut Down

* BidZirk v. Smith: Griping Blog Post Leads to Lawsuit--BidZirk v. Smith and Blogger Wins Lawsuit Over Gripe Post--BidZirk v. Smith

* Defamation Lawsuit Against Blogger Dismissed on Jurisdictional Grounds--Fahmy v. Hogge

* Bloggers' Defamation Liability Not Dismissed--Saadi v. Maroun

* Blogger Protected by Anti-SLAPP Statute--GTX v. Left

* Connecticut Blogger Not Subject to Texas Jurisdiction--Healix Infusion v. Helix Health

* Co-Blogger Identity Isn't Disclosed via 512(h), but Takedown Letters Are Copyrightable

* Blog Defamation Lawsuit Lacks Jurisdiction--TrafficPower.com v. Seobook.com

Social Networking Sites Generally

* Social Networking Sites and the Law

Facebook

* Facebook v. ConnectU. See also Facebook's Lawsuit Against Competitive Email Harvesting Continues--Facebook v. ConnectU

* Telephone Numbers as Identity Authenticators--Abrams v. Facebook

MySpace

* MySpace Defeats Sherman Antitrust Claim for Blocking Links to Competitor--LiveUniverse v. MySpace

* Lori Drew Conviction Reflections Parts 1, 2 and 3. See also Lori Drew Prosecuted for CFAA Violations--Some Comments, and a Practice Pointer

* MySpace Gets 230 Win in Fifth Circuit--Doe v. MySpace. See also MySpace Suit for Liability for Sexual Assault Dismissed and Doe v. MySpace.com --- Continued

* Principal Loses Lawsuit Against Students and Parents Over Fake MySpace Page--Draker v. Schreiber

* MySpace v. theglobe.com

Other Social Networking Sites

* Website Isn't Liable When Users Lie About Their Ages--Doe v. SexSearch and Doe v. SexSearch Affirmed by 6th Circuit, But Not on 230 Grounds

* Xanga.com Busted for COPPA Violation

* Erika Rottenberg talk recap

Posted by Eric at 01:25 PM | Content Regulation , Derivative Liability , Internet History | TrackBack



January 26, 2009

Decay Rates of Committed Online Community Members--an Epinions Case Study

By Eric Goldman

Building on several previous blog posts, I am writing up a extended discourse explaining why Wikipedia will fail. A key part of my argument is that committed Wikipedians will turn over faster than they can be replaced. Unfortunately, I'm not aware of a study of Wikipedian turnover rates. However, I had a rough sense of turnover rates in the Epinions community, and I was able to consult some publicly available data to do a quick 'n' dirty empirical study. Here's what I came up with (I did the data review at the end of December 2008):

I looked at Epinions’ top 20 most popular authors in 1999 to see if they were still active on the site, which I defined as writing at least one opinion in the past 12 months (i.e., in 2008). I manually reviewed each of the top 20 reviewers' profile pages. According to my definition, only seven of the top 20 (35%) still actively contribute to Epinions, meaning that 65% of those early power users have turned over in 9 years.

Indeed, six of the 20 (30%) have stopped coming to Epinions at all, and thus their accounts are no longer active. An explanation of inactive Epinions accounts: Epinions generally expires accounts if the person has not visited the site within a certain number of months (I'm not sure what the period is nowadays). Among other consequences of inactivity, Epinions wipes out any earnings that haven't been cashed out before expiration. Most Epinions reviewers don't earn a ton of money, but power reviewers with very popular opinions generally should be earning enough that they would be willing to expend a minimal effort to keep the cash coming. As a result, inactive members have an incentive to keep visiting the site occasionally and cashing out earnings even if they are no longer interested in continuing to write. The fact that 30% of them gave up the cash entirely is interesting to me.

The 1999 class of power Epinions reviewers is special in part because of the unique circumstances of the dot com bubble and the very high payouts that Epinions offered to "prime the pump" of reviews. Thus, many reviewers were drawn to the site by the opportunity to earn lucrative amounts, and it may not be surprising that these users turned over (in some cases, in disgust) when payout rates were significantly reduced during the dot com bust.

For comparison, I also looked at the top 20 most popular authors in 2003, many of whom either joined after the dot com bust or had acquiesced to Epinions' reduced payouts by this time. This has been a much more stable group: 15 (75%) are still active contributors, and none of the 20 have inactive accounts.

Putting the two stats together (and acknowledging the many weaknesses of this limited empirical review), I see a community decay rate among Epinions' most committed members of:

* 25% after 5 years
* 65% after 9 years

I'm not sure if this decay rate will look anything like WIkipedia's. Among other major differences, the glue that binds these reviewers to Epinions is different than the binding force for Wikipedia, because Epinions reviewers get both paid for their contributions (even if it's not a huge amount) and get much more reputational recognition than Wikipedians. (I'll explain more about cash and credit in the paper). Also, by definition all Wikipedians joined during or after the dot com bust, so they may have different and more manageable expectations than the early Epinionators.

If you are aware of any other studies of community membership decay rates, specific to Wikipedia or more general, I would be very grateful for the referral. Please email me. Also, if you would be interested in exploring this topic with me in a more scientifically rigorous way, let me know--I might be interested in doing a real study of this phenomenon at some point.

UPDATE: In a short amount of time, I've already gotten some email from people who want me to build out the entire argument about Wikipedia--basically, to see the full paper. I'm gratified by this because most of the time people recoil in horror at the thought of reading my academic papers. (Yes, this includes my mom, who is otherwise the most sympathetic audience a son could ask for). In any case, I'll be presenting the paper at Uniiv. of Colorado Boulder in early February and then I hope to post it online in a month or two after that. Thanks for your patience.

UPDATE 2: Jason Lee Miller's comments.

Posted by Eric at 04:09 PM | Internet History | TrackBack



November 14, 2008

Just who is an Internet access service provider under CAN-SPAM?

Worded to prevent lawsuits by individual email recipients, the federal CAN-SPAM Act limits who can bring suit for a CAN-SPAM violation. In addition to state and federal enforcers, the Act allows suits by "Internet access service providers." Just who are they, and can individuals find a way back in to court under this provision?

By Ethan Ackerman

One of the most distinct differences between the federal CAN-SPAM Act and state anti-spam laws is the federal law's restrictions on who may bring suit for a violation. Like many federal laws, it's vital to consider the environment in which it passed in attempting to understand the scope and intent of its provisions.

After several years of experience with state laws allowing individual email recipients to bring suit under state laws, and both actual and exaggerated instances of 'professional plaintiffs' bringing questionable suits against email marketers, many business and marketing lobbyists were eager to limit who could bring suits under a federal spam law. While efforts to expand or limit liability under federal laws are as old as the 1st Congress, 2003 was a notable high-water mark. At the same time as, and in the same Congress as, the CAN-SPAM Act, similar Acts altering liability standards and raising barriers to lawsuits and class actions were being passed under the mantra of "tort reform." Limitations on environmental and manufacturer liability, extending sovereign immunity to vaccine developers, restrictions on class actions, preemption of state enforcement and consumer protection laws, statutorily-mandated settlements of active court litigation - these were some of the hallmarks of the 108th Congress' involvement with the judicial branch.

In this environment, it's not surprising that various provisions in the CAN SPAM Act were negotiated back and forth to expand or contract liability, standing and preemption. This blog has previously covered the preemption back-and-forth, but similar negotiation went into just who could sue, and how, and where, and for how much under the CAN SPAM Act.

The final version of s.877 signed into law in 2003 that became the CAN SPAM Act reflects the compromises on several issues necessary to get sufficiently broad political support. This post will attempt to identify each of those issues in turn.

The final bill allows suits by a broad swath of federal regulatory agencies to enforce the law, including most notably the FTC. The scope of state officials' enforcement of the federal law, and just who else could sue, was somewhat more disputed. Prior year versions of the bill allowed suits in state as well as federal court. The initial Senate version of s.877 also allowed suit in federal or state court, but the final version negotiated with the more lawsuit-averse House of the 108th Congress restricted suits to only US federal District Courts, and now redundantly also granted the relevant federal agencies additional authority to removes suits filed by States to federal courts.

The issue of caps on damages and attorney's fees was also near and dear (or anathema) to many in the 108th Congress, and extensive changes exist between various versions of the bill as conditions were horse-traded and various constituencies weighed in. State enforcement statutory damages swung from $20 to $250 over the course of the different Congresses, with treble damages being available, then dropped and replaced with discretionary 'aggravated' damages possibilities. State enforcers' attorneys fees similarly went from mandatory to discretionary between the introduced Senate version and House-approved version. Statutory damages for internet access providers saw similar swings and horse trading, ultimately with certain egregious violations triggering $100 damages and other damages valued at $25, a far mark from a proposed 'up to $10.' Damages caps were also a feature, but swung from as little as $500,000 to in some cases $3 million.

Similarly, the political demands of the House resulted in additional, heightened pleading standards for civil suits by anyone other than federal enforcement agencies. These heightened standards, absent in the initial Senate version but added in sections 7(f)9 and 7(g)2 of the final version, raised a scienter pleading requirement for state enforcers and constricted the definition of 'procure' for suits brought by Internet access providers.

But back to the big difference

As initially indicated, the biggest difference between most state and the federal anti-spam law is the absence of a private right of action for spam recipients in the federal law. In the 108th Congress, a general private right of action was a non-starter. Even the initial Senate version of the bill restricted suits to enforcement officials and Internet access providers. Contrary to the desires of state enforcers from state with such provisions, and apparently an uncomfortable concession from the minority Democrat sponsors, the absence of a private right of action was a stated minimum.

The final wording of Section 7 of the CAN SPAM Act specifies who can bring suit, listing first federal enforcement, then state enforcement, and finally granting Internet access providers the right to bring some civil suits. So who is an 'Internet access provider'?

The short answer - the definition written in the 'definitions' section of CAN SPAM - is that the "term `Internet access service' has the meaning given that term in section 231(e)(4) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 231(e)(4))." This somewhat unenlightening reference leads to the actual statutory definition of:

The term “Internet access service” means a service that enables users to access content, information, electronic mail, or other services offered over the Internet, and may also include access to proprietary content, information, and other services as part of a package of services offered to consumers. Such term does not include telecommunications services.

This broad definition originally was passed into law as part of the earlier Child Online Protection Act (not to be confused with the Childrens' Online Privacy Protection Act). Importantly, CAN SPAM also used other definitions from other prior laws defining similar terms. One example, one short line above the CAN SPAM 'internet access provider' definition, is the definition of 'Internet.' CAN SPAM defines 'Internet' by reference to the earlier passed Internet Tax Freedom Act, 47 USC 151 note. Importantly, CAN SPAM did not adopt the much narrower, more ISP-centric definition of 'internet access provider' in that Act. The Internet Tax Freedom Act defines an internet access provider as "a person engaged in the business of providing a computer and communications facility through which a customer may obtain access to the Internet..."

This definitional difference is important because CAN SPAM was written with service providers above and beyond just then-traditional modem-pooling, DNS-providing traditional ISPs in mind. Spam impacts next-generation services like online website hosts, online email providers, online proxies and filtering services, and CAN SPAM was drafted to take into account not just the dial-up AOLs of the world, but also the Rackspaces, the Hotmails, and the TUCOWs.

So courts have uniformly picked up this clear distinction, right?

If they had, what would there be to write about? While CAN SPAM was commonly understood to prevent end-user lawsuits, that portion of the law is implicit, not explicit. CAN SPAM was, however, explicitly written broadly to cover all, even the as-of-yet-uninvented, online service providers that spam negatively impacted. Unfortunately, subsequent court cases addressing the issue of whether it is an 'internet access provider' bringing suit have sometimes attempted to reinsert traditional ISP-style definitions into the Act.

A recent case getting the issue correct is Haselton v. Quicken Loans Inc.. Though anti-filtering activist Bennett Haselton, administrator of peacefire.org, sued Quicken in his individual capacity, separately incorporated Peacefire also was a named plaintiff. Defendant Quicken made much of the fact that Haselton was the sole employee of the organization and alleged Haselton was simply an individual end-user filing suit. Haselton countered, and the court agreed, that Peacefire's filter-circumventing service, even if operated only by Haselton, was clearly an 'internet access service provider' within the meaning of the Act.

Unfortunately, other courts, and commenters, have often channeled their skepticism over the litigation intentions of a plaintiff into interpreting this broad definition narrowly. For example, the Gordon v. Virtumundo court's palpable disagreement with serial plaintiff Gordon's litigation intentions and strategy led it to reach to hold, contrary to the plain wording of the definition, that Gordon's multi-user internet email service was not a " a service that enables users to access ...electronic mail... offered over the Internet." UPDATE

While they may be legitimate concerns over the capacity and legitimacy of serial plaintiffs' anti-spam suits, courts can address them without resorting to unnecessarily adjusting definitions in the statute. In Hypertouch v. Kennedy-Western University, for example, the court correctly recognized that an email service provider, even though small and providing accounts without charge, was nonetheless a 'internet access service provider.' As Eric blogged earlier, this court addressed its, and defendant's, concern that the plaintiffs allegations were inadequate and more properly addressed towards the actual marketing company in its ruling that plaintiff was an internet access service provider, but its claims were inadequate to survive a motion for summary judgment.

12/08 Update An observant Tri-cities reader gently corrects me, noting that Judge Coughenour ultimately did, contrary to what I suggested, conclude the plaintiff qualified as an Internet access service provider in Gordon v. Virtumundo. After reviewing all the criticisms and interpretation of legisaltive history and analogous cases that suggested Gorden was not intended to qualify, Judge Coughenour did ultimately conclude Gorden qualified "under the statute's capacious definition." So, my speedy reading aside, Gordon v. Virtumundo stands as an appropriate example of a court properly addressing questions about the propriety of a suit without narrowing the definition of an Internet access service provider after all.

Posted by Ethan Ackerman at 01:29 PM | Internet History , Spam | TrackBack



October 14, 2008

September 2008 Quick Links, Part 3

By Eric Goldman

eBay

* Universal Grading Service v. eBay, Inc. More fallout from the National Numismatic v. eBay case--another lawsuit alleging antitrust and defamation because eBay designated some coin rating services as preferred and impliedly devalued others.

* Windsor Auctions v. eBay has been refiled in a new jurisdiction.

* Mehmet v. Paypal, Inc., 2008 WL 3495541 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2008). Upholding the consequential damages waiver in PayPal’s user agreement.

* A company's failure in the marketplace can drive up the value of its collectibles on eBay.

Google

* Stelor Productions, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 2008 WL 4218107 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 2008). In the lawsuit alleging that Google causes reverse confusion of Googles.com [warning: annoying music ahead], the plaintiff doesn't get to depose Sergey or Larry yet. Rose Hagan, Google’s long-time chief trademark counsel, is the lucky substitute.

* Lots of rhetoric in the Google/Yahoo ad syndication deal. Google’s advocacy website. Google Chief Economist Hal Varian explains why the deal won’t raise ad prices in the auction. Randall Stross weighs in.

* Google has changed course and now allows religious groups to advertise on the keyword “abortion.”

* Kubit v. Google Groups, 2:2008cv00738 (M.D. Fla. complaint filed Sept. 29, 2008):

I then would like to sue Google Groups for not removing the posts when I repeatedly asked them to for 2 years. I believe I am entitled to at least a small amount of compensation for the emotional distress and lost business income that has resulted from them allowing these posts to remain on their Google Groups, even though I offered them VERY solid proof that I do not have HIV. If they had stopped the posts when they first occurred, they would not have proliferated to hundreds of websites. I became suicidal for a period of time after the posts started. I incurred a lot of emotional pain and fear because of the posts and had to seek psychiatric and psychological help to get my life back together. I still suffer from fears of dating, living a public business life and trusting others.

Yes, this is a pro se complaint. Yes, it is preempted by 47 USC 230.

Marketing/Advertising

* NebuAd is dead (1, 2). Even so, the lure of intermediaries aggregating deep data about consumers for commercial purposes will never die.

* Is Gator/Claria dead?

* The EU passed a non-binding resolution against sexual stereotypes in advertising.

* Celebrity branded merchandise run amok.

Miscellaneous

* Valleywag: "The 5 most laughable terms of service on the Net." For more laughs, see Mark Lemley’s Terms of Use paper.

* Murakowski v. University of Delaware, 2008 WL 4104087 (D. Del. Sept. 4, 2008). This reminded me a lot of the Jake Baker case from the mid-1990s.

* The Virginia Supreme Court reversed itself on the Jaynes anti-spam prosecution, and Jaynes walks. Does Virginia routinely pass unconstitutional laws?

* Becker v. Toca, 2008 WL 4443050 (E.D. La. Sept. 26, 2008). Ex-wife's alleged delivery of "Infostealer" program to grab passwords from ex-husband could violate the ECPA, SCA and CFAA.

* Interesting article on ESPN’s exclusive distribution and bundling agreements with Internet access providers.

* Funniest law firm names.

* Silly? Horrifying? A sign of the apocalypse?

Posted by Eric at 06:17 PM | Adware/Spyware , Content Regulation , Derivative Liability , E-Commerce , Internet History , Licensing/Contracts , Marketing , Privacy/Security , Search Engines , Spam | TrackBack



October 11, 2008

September 2008 Quick Links, Part 2

By Eric Goldman

Copyrights

* In the Harry Potter fair use case, the court declared that the Lexicon encyclopedia isn't fair use.

* The judge declared a mistrial in the Jammie Thomas case.

* Designer Skin v. S&L Vitamins has reached its denouement. Previous blog coverage of the case (1, 2). In the prior ruling, the judge denied the plaintiff damages for the copyright infringement. In the final ruling, the court enjoins cutting and pasting product shots but allows the defendant to recreate the product shots. Ronald Coleman has more here and here (noting that the court says that, per MercExchange, an injunction does not automatically follow from a finding of copyright infringement).

* Wired's 5 year retrospective on the RIAA's litigation campaign against file sharing.

Social Networking Sites, Blogs and Online Publishing

* J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School Dist., 2008 WL 4279517 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008). Upholding student discipline for creating a fake MySpace page of principal. The school initially based the discipline on the student infringing copyright (by cutting and pasting the principal's photo) but this aspect of the case wasn't mentioned at all in the court’s reasoning.

* O.Z. v. Board of Trustees of Long Beach Unified School Dist., 2008 WL 4396895 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008). Two seventh graders make a video about killing their teacher, described as:

The slide show is essentially a dramatization of the murder of Mrs. [redacted]. The first slide photo states, "Mrs. [redacted] dies." Throughout the slide show there are photos of Plaintiff dressed up in a costume, depicting a woman meant to resemble Mrs. [redacted]. There is red text on each slide photo that describes the scene. One slide says, "Jelly Donut's knife: haha fat bastard. here i come!" In this same photo, the viewer can see a butcher knife lunging at Mrs. [redacted] character from the camera's point of view. The butcher knife is then laid on the fallen victim while the text reads, "hehehe. i'm a shank yoooooooooo!" At the end of the slide show, it reads, "your [sic] dead, BITCH! :D".

I think they thought it was funny, but no one else did. One of them posted the video to YouTube. It's unclear what happens to the poster, but the co-content creator was suspended and forced to transfer to another school for her eighth grade. In this case, her TRO request is denied, even if she didn't intend the video to be publicly distributed and even if the video was not a "true threat."

* Spanierman v. Hughes, 2008 WL 4224483 (D. Conn. Sept 16, 2008). Teacher who was fired for inappropriate MySpace communications with students can't sue the school.

* An encouraging update on the Lori Drew prosecution.

* Bill McGeveran on Facebook Beacon and legal liability.

* Good NYT article on the sociology of Facebook and Twitter.

* Sam Bayard on an interesting but confusing ruling from Montana on its shield law applied to anonymous online posters.

* Verdana Partners v. Giles. Online newspaper wins anti-SLAPP claim.

* Jardin v. Datallegro, Inc., 2008 WL 4104473 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2008). A litigant's taking down a blog post and its comments is not destruction of evidence.

* Nemet Chevrolet has appealed its 230 loss. Previous blog coverage.

* Do Facebook's anti-spam policies overregulate Facebook's power users?

Posted by Eric at 07:49 AM | Content Regulation , Copyright , Derivative Liability , Internet History , Spam | TrackBack



September 23, 2008

Carterfone and Open Access in the Digital Era Symposium, October 17

By Eric Goldman

On October 17, we are having a neat event at Santa Clara University. A brief word about the genesis. I don't normally travel in telecom circles but I went to a few events in the past year or so, and at these events the FCC's 1968 Carterfone opinion and the "Carterfone principles" were heavily invoked. It was clear that Carterfone was an important opinion and of continuing relevance today, but I was having a problem--it wasn't clear that the speakers were referring to Carterfone consistently. Instead, everyone seemed to have their own idiosyncratic interpretation of the case. So the idea was to get together a group of experts to see if we could try to work through the case's meaning and implications. This also gives us a platform to talk about Net Neutrality, optimal regulatory structures for network design, open access principles and a whole bunch of other interesting academic issues.

We have a terrific and eclectic group of speakers, but I am especially excited that the opinion's author, Nick Johnson, will be joining us for a keynote talk. It will be interesting to see how he and the group survey the opinion 40 years later. A brief marketing description is below the line. As usual, admission is free unless you want CLE (and even then, it's free in some cases). Please feel free to spread the word, and I hope to see you there.
___________________

Carterfone and Open Access in the Digital Era
Santa Clara University School of Law
Sponsored by the High Tech Law Institute and the BroadBand Institute of California
October 17, 2008
9 a.m. – 5 p.m.

The FCC’s 1968 Carterfone decision—celebrating its 40th anniversary this year—is frequently cited in policy discussions about Net Neutrality and open access, but there is little consensus about how its provisions should apply to Internet access providers and emerging communications technologies. This Symposium will gather leading telecommunications policy experts to explore the opinion’s implications—past, present and future—on communications policy. Nick Johnson, the former FCC Commissioner who authored the opinion, will provide the keynote address.

Attendance is free and open to the public. Five plus hours of CLE are also available to attorneys at HTLI benefactor firms and in-house counsel for free, to Santa Clara Law alumni for $50, and to everyone else for $100. Santa Clara Law is a State Bar of California approved MCLE provider.

For speaker information and to register online, visit
http://law.scu.edu/hightech/carterfone-symposium.cfm.

Posted by Eric at 03:51 PM | Internet History | TrackBack



August 14, 2008

Fall 2008 Cyberspace Law Syllabus

By Eric Goldman

I've posted my latest Cyberspace Law course syllabus. Some changes from last year:

* added an August 2007 Search Engine Land article by Chris Silver Smith on geolocation technologies and their efficacy.

* added California Penal Code Sec. 502.

* added my slides on trespass to chattels and related doctrines (to save some classtime laying out these complex doctrines).

* added my Fair Use Cheat Sheet (I had routinely distributed it to students during the semester, but this year I finally remembered to include it in the reader).

* substituted the Second Circuit ruling Cartoon Networks v. CSC for the district court ruling in Cablevision. I deleted the Field v. Google case because it became largely redundant with the Cartoon Networks ruling for the pedagogical point about volitional activity.

* substituted the amended Ninth Circuit opinion in Perfect 10 v. Amazon.

* added the Ticketmaster v. RMG case. I'm not sure what to do with this case, but I'm thinking of using it as a mid-semester mini-review.

* deleted the Lockheed v. NSI case and added the Tiffany v. eBay case. The Lockheed case is probably more general in nature and is a 9th Circuit case (and it's a lot shorter!), so this was a tough call. On the other hand, I think the facts in the Tiffany case better reflect the modern web economy than the 1990s-era Lockheed case.

* substituted the Roommates.com en banc ruling for the 3 judge panel ruling. Fortunately, last year, by the time I got to Roommates.com, the 3 judge panel ruling had already been wiped away by the en banc grant, so I never had to teach that hairball.

* substituted the FTC's updated CAN-SPAM regulations.

* substituted the Fifth Circuit Doe v. MySpace ruling for the district court opinion.

* deleted the module on spyware/adware. I've not been able to get there in the past 2 years, and I don't see how that will change this year.

Cases from this year that barely missed the cut:

* A.V. v. iParadigms
* Mazur v. eBay
* Zango v. Kaspersky

I need to look at yesterday's Federal Circuit Jacobsen case. This may be a post-printing addition.

There are still some areas I'm not happy with:

* the Perfect 10 troika of cases regarding secondary copyright liability. They are a big chunk of reading with a low pedagogical payoff because the legal rules are incoherent.

* the keyword advertising cases. I'm still waiting for a great teaching case on keyword advertising. The FragranceNet case is an OK summary of the discussion, and the Playboy v. Netscape case has a number of useful pedagogical angles, but neither is ideal.

More on this topic:

* my Fall 2007 syllabus recap
* my Fall 2006 syllabus recap
* my Fall 2005 syllabus recap
* my Cyberspace Law course page listing all of my syllabi, exams and sample answers from the past 14 years
* my essay on Teaching Cyberlaw

Posted by Eric at 08:15 AM | General , Internet History | TrackBack



August 07, 2008

July 2008 Quick Links, Part II (Non-IP Edition)

By Eric Goldman

Search Engines

* Google explains all of the ways that it reinterprets the actual search query provided by a consumer to deliver results for words the searcher didn't use. As I've said before, Google's intermediation makes it impossible for a judge to assume that a defendant's website was ranked based on the search terms selected by the searcher.

* In the vein of In re Yahoo, Google was hit with two class action lawsuits alleging that Google failed to disclose that AdWords ads were going to be placed on undesirable pages liked parked pages. See Levitte v. Google (complaint and Justia page) and RK West v. Google (complaint and Justia page).

* Google was denied attorneys fees in the long-running Parker v. Google case. Parker v. Google, Inc., 2008 WL 2600299 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2008).

Wikipedia

* Defamation lawsuit against Wikimedia tossed per 230. I've been waiting for the actual ruling to do a complete writeup. If you see it, please pass it along.

* NYT: "Wikipedia Tries Approval System to Reduce Vandalism on Pages." Surprised?

Trespass to Chattels

* In the latest development in Oracle v. SAP/TomorrowNow, SAP has shut down TomorrowNow, the subsidiary that prompted the lawsuit from Oracle. The Second Amended Complaint expands the finger-pointing at SAP for supervising its subsidiary. Still unresolved: the size of SAP's check to Oracle, and possible jailtime for TomorrowNow folk.

* Thomas O'Toole: Illinois adds anti-scraping provision to its attorney discipline website to block Avvo's crawlers.

Marketing

* 50 Cent is back in court on another questionable legal theory (see our first deconstruction of his litigation tactics). This time, Taco Bell tried a quasi-ambush marketing stunt to get something for free that he thinks they should have paid for.

* Rebecca on the latest ruling in NetQuote v. Byrd, the "lead fraud" case. Also, the ruling has some interesting discussion about whether a competitor who clicks on a competitor's ads in AdSense is guilty of a tort of "click fraud." The court says not in this case.

* TRUSTe is converting from a non-profit to a for-profit company.

Porn

* ACLU v. Mukasey (I've lost track of the number of AGs who have been the named defendant in this lawsuit). The Third Circuit struck down COPA for the third time.

* PC Magazine: RIP Usenet, killed by the New York AG office's campaign against child porn traded on USENET.

Miscellaneous

* A bizarre article on "Internet trolling" in NYT Magazine. With its rambling and scattered discussion, I have no idea what the author defines as trolling. However, the article did bring to mind a much better 1994 article from Wired, The War Between alt.tasteless and rec.pets.cats.

* Steinbuch v. Cutler, 2008 WL 2622853 (E.D. Ark. July 1, 2008). The court denied a motion to transfer the long-running case to DC.

* If a caffeine-addicted blogger goes off about your business, it's risky to fight back.

* Mike Masnick: Keeping The Benevolent Dictators of Silicon Valley Honest

* Wed, Aug. 13, 1-2 Eastern time, David Donoghue, Evan Brown and I will be doing an ALI-ABA teleseminar about the latest developments in 47 USC 230. Details. Mention coupon code TSPV02EG and save $30.

Posted by Eric at 06:57 AM | Content Regulation , Internet History , Marketing , Search Engines | TrackBack



July 21, 2008

Teaching Cyberlaw Article

By Eric Goldman

As part of the recent St. Louis University Law Journal's issue on Teaching Intellectual Property Law, I published a short article entitled "Teaching Cyberlaw." The abstract:

"Over the past dozen years, Cyberlaw courses have become a staple of the law school curriculum. This Essay, part of a Spring 2008 St. Louis University Law Journal issue on Teaching Intellectual Property Law, explores methodological and pedagogical issues raised by these courses."

This article, based on my experiences teaching Cyberlaw for the past 13 years, organizes my thoughts about the pedagogy of teaching Cyberlaw, including course titling, doctrinal coverage, teaching materials and more. I think the article will be particularly interesting to folks teaching the course for the first time, but I expect veteran Cyberlaw professors will find a few interesting tidbits as well. I was given a limited word count cap, so I didn't intend to make this article exhaustive. Instead, I view it as a tentative and limited effort to help kick off a community discussion about how we teach the course.

On that front, I am scheduled to be the Chair of the AALS Law & Computers Section in 2009, which principally means that I will help organize the Law & Computers session at the AALS Annual Meeting in New Orleans in January 2010. (Hard to believe, but it's less than 18 months away!). One idea I've been considering is to have a panel discussion about Teaching Cyberlaw issues at that session. Comments/thoughts?

When i did my research for my Teaching Cyberlaw article, I didn't find any other law review-style articles that addressed Cyberlaw pedagogy at any length. Then, just as my article was going to press (and therefore after I could make any changes), a topical article emerged: Patrick Quirk, Curriculum Themes: Teaching Global Cyberlaw, International Journal of Law and Information Technology, March 2008. Quirk uses the article to enumerate 10 topical "themes" that are likely to be omnipresent in Cyberlaw courses both today and in the future:

"Where are we? (Jurisdiction),
Who are we? (Transacting via networks),
Who pays us? (E-money and funds transfer),
Who protects us? (Spreading and transferring transactional risk),
Who funds us? (The other type of computer ‘security’),
Who taxes us? (Who doesn’t?),
Who bugs me? (Network crimes and misdemeanors),
Who came before me? (Historical analogies for technology regulation),
Who watches (over) us? (Ubiquitous privacy issues),
The pervasive problems of intellectual property."

I definitely organize my course differently, but vetting different organizational approaches is part of the pedagogical fun.

Posted by Eric at 08:37 AM | General , Internet History | TrackBack



July 01, 2008

June 2008 Quick Links

By Eric Goldman

Trademarks/Domain Names

* Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Foundation for Apologetic Information and Research, 2008 WL 22043807 (10th Cir. May 29, 2008). CMLP writeup. Nice 10th Circuit win for a gripe site against trademark infringement and cybersquatting. This case, plus the SKI VAIL case, indicate that the 10th circuit is making progress undoing the harm it created in the Australian Gold v. Hatfield case.

* Georgia has a new anti-phishing law (16-9-109.1) that acts as a para-trademark law. See my comments on the analogous California anti-phishing law.

* After initiating a trademark lawsuit against a consumer review site and soundly losing in court, Lifestyle Lift paid $17,500 to settle its own lawsuit and avoid claims for legal fees under Rule 11 and the Lanham Act.

* Marty reports on a German case saying that white-text-on-a-white-background is a trademark use.

* Update on the battle over the trademark registration for "SEO."

* Will TLD proliferation lead to a new open era in domain name administration, or will the resulting anarchy just reinforce that top search engine placement is the really important online real estate? It seems like the currently limited number of TLDs has some benefits from a bounded rationality standpoint, and those benefits will be lost in a cacophony of unknown TLDs.

Patents

* My colleague Colleen Chien has posted "Patently Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at the International Trade Commission" (forthcoming William & Mary Law Review). She empirically demonstrates that the ITC mostly involves disputes between two domestic litigants, making it a redundant battleground with federal district court but nevertheless an attractive venue for plaintiffs due to a number of procedural advantages. She makes a number of recommendations to eliminate the litigation gamesmanship offered by having parallel venues. Check it out.

Search Engines

* Udi Manber, chief algorithm keeper for Google, reiterates why it's silly for lawyers and judges to put too much legal emphasis on the relative placement of search engine results, saying "it's definitely the case that if you do the same search on a different cluster, you may get slightly different results at a given time. It's also the case that if you do the same search on different days you may get different results, because some of the results are things we indexed five minutes ago."

(Over)Regulation

* In response to an enforcement effort by the NY AG's office, several Internet access providers have blocked access to newsgroups that are putatively sources of child pornography. See the NYT story and the NY AG press release. In practice, this means wholesale takedowns of newsgroups that may have nothing to do with child porn. For example, Verizon is killing all USENET hierarchies except comp.*, misc.*, news.*, rec.*, sci.*, soc.*, and talk.*. Wired suggests this is the death of online intermediary freedom as conceptualized in 47 USC 230. Of course, 230 never protected intermediaries from criminal exposure for child porn, and this isn't the first time that an access provider has knuckled under to the NY AG's office. See the BuffNet enforcement action from 2001.

* Ohm, Paul. The myth of the superuser: fear, risk, and harm online. 41 UC Davis L. Rev. 1327-1402 (2008). A neat article on how regulators manufacture a fake bogeyman, the unbeatable "superuser," as a justification for expansive regulatory power.

* No evidence that data breach disclosure laws actually help reduce identity theft. Surprised?

* The FTC wants civil enforcement authority for spyware actions. Haven't they heard that the adware battle is already over...and they won?

Contracts

* Mark Radcliffe expresses concern about the ALI's proposed software licensing project on open source licenses.

* Sarah Bird on a messy contract lawsuit involving an SEO contractor.

Anonymity

* Tendler v. www.jewishsurvivors.blogspot.com, 2008 WL 2352497 (Cal. App. Ct. June 10, 2008). A subpoena request to identify a blogger doesn't support an anti-SLAPP cause of action.

* In the AutoAdmit lawsuit, Doe 21's motions to squash the subpoena and proceed anonymously were both denied. David Hoffman provides an update on the case.

Event Tickets

* Chicago has moved against eBay for reselling tickets in violation of its amusement tax law.

* The Ticketmaster v. RMG case ended with a default judgment granting a permanent injunction and $18.2M in damages.

General

* Vanity Fair: How the Web Was Won.

* Paul Levy blogs about a plaintiff's effort to bypass 230 by suing the authors of complaints about the vendor and then joining the consumer complaint site as a necessary party as a cost-increasing tactic.

* BusinessWeek on emerging technological tools to protect workers' attention against unwanted/untimely interruptions.

* Text message-savvy kids educate the North Carolina DMV about the meaning of the term "WTF," which was used on a license plate example on the DMV's website.

* I have one free pass to OMMA Behavioral in San Francisco July 21. First person to send me an email asking for the pass gets it.

Posted by Eric at 12:32 PM | Adware/Spyware , Content Regulation , Derivative Liability , Domain Names , E-Commerce , Internet History , Licensing/Contracts , Marketing , Patents , Privacy/Security , Search Engines , Trademark | TrackBack



June 03, 2008

May 2008 Quick Links, Part 2

By Eric Goldman

Copyright

* Google says it isn't settling the Viacom lawsuit (I don't believe it).

* Interesting juxtaposition: (1) Chronicle of Higher Education: How It Does It: The RIAA Explains How It Catches Alleged Music Pirates and (2) BusinessWeek ran a lengthy retrospective on Tanya Andersen's battle against the RIAA, including her beefs against the RIAA’s investigation and enforcement tactics.

* A music warez trader was convicted by a jury of criminal copyright infringement.

Online Contracts

* Juanda Lowder Daniel. Virtually mature: examining the policy of minors' incapacity to contract through the cyberscope. 43 Gonz. L. Rev. 239-269 (2007/08). This article addresses the very important issue of contracting capacity of minors. See my most recent post on that topic.

* Adelman v. Sparks Network (Cal. App. Ct. May 20, 2008). The Jdate online dating service allegedly failed to include required language (such as notice of a mandatory cooling-off period) in its user agreement. The court dismisses the plaintiff's lawsuit nonetheless because he was a happy customer who didn't suffer any damage.

* Tom O'Toole surveys some recent online contract cases. He offers the following conclusions: (1) Contract Terms Should Be Available for Review, (2) Clickable Buttons/Links Should Clearly Signal Assent, and (3) Humans Are Not Helpful.

* I realize this point would be better explored in a full blog post, and I suspect this point has been made in the academic literature (if so, I'd appreciate some cites so I can pass them along). The issue: how might the endowment effect explain consumer antipathy towards EULAs? Wikipedia says the endowment effect means that "people value a good or service more once their property right to it has been established." This observation occurred to me when I attended a ridiculously stacked panel at the ION Game Conference on "user rights" in virtual worlds. Many of the gripes/grumbles related to very common EULA provisions that simply overrode default law. It occurred to me that maybe part of the problem was that consumers assume the defaults are appropriate rights allocations granting them the "property" right, in which case they suffer a greater psychological loss when those defaults are varied than if different defaults were set. One obvious policy consequence: as part of the considerations when setting defaults, policy makers should include the psychological costs of varying the defaults. If the interaction between EULAs and the endowment effect hasn't been written about, it would make an excellent paper topic.

Other Topics

* A military court has said that distributing a hyperlink to child porn does not constitute criminal distribution of child porn. Tom O'Toole explains the situation.

* A.B. v. State, 2008 WL 2031388 (Ind. May 13, 2008). It seems like the digital age recipe for guaranteed trouble: 8th grader + hatred towards a school principal + MySpace. How many judicial cases are we going to see with this combination? This one involves some mean-spirited and profanity-laced comments about her principal made by a 14 year old girl on a private MySpace page accessible only by 26 students. The principal saw it only because one of the students gave a printout to the principal. The court concludes that posting to a private MySpace page doesn't satisfy the criminal standards of "intent to harass, annoy, or alarm" via the Internet.

* Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 2008 WL 2001745 (D.N.H. May 8, 2008). The court denied the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration on Friendfinder's 230 eligibility for the statement "Sorry, this member has removed his/her profile."

* Another "where are they now?" retrospective on dot com boom companies, ironically running in the Industry Standard (which wiped out in the dot com bust itself).

Posted by Eric at 11:56 AM | Content Regulation , Copyright , Derivative Liability , Internet History , Licensing/Contracts , Privacy/Security , Virtual Worlds | TrackBack



May 07, 2008

April 2008 Quick Links

By Eric Goldman

Anti-Gaming

* Even though Ticketmaster won its lawsuit, Minnesota overreacted to the Hannah Montana ticket crush by banning software to circumvent an online ticket allocation process. See Sec. 609.806. Check out the hyperbole in this press release! What's next? Are legislators going to make SEO a crime?

* Google modified its relevancy algorithm 450 times in 2007. And yet courts still cite to Brookfield for how search engines operate!

* The UK cracks down on shill marketing online. ClickZ: "Under the new [UK] Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading regulations, it will be illegal to "Falsely claim or create the impression that the trader is not acting for purposes relating to his/her trade, business, craft or profession," or to "falsely represent oneself as a consumer."" See also AdAge.

IP

* Speaking of SEO....the latest pathetic attempt to grab a generic term and trademark it? "SEO." Sarah Bird is on the job.

* Do student notes of a professor's lecture constitute copyright infringement? We may find out.

* Atlantic v. Howell. More on the "making available" theory of copyright infringement.

* Sarah Bird on registering copyrights in websites and blogs.

* A for-profit T-shirt listing the names of deceased Iraq soldiers sparks a publicity rights lawsuit.

General

* Bowen v. YouTube, Inc., 2008 WL 1757578 (W.D. Wash. April 15, 2008). The court upheld the forum selection clause in YouTube's user agreement.

* eBay is ending its promotion of third party live auctions. Maybe because of this loss?

* Rebecca blogs on SuccessFactors, Inc. v. Softscape, Inc., 2008 WL 906420 (N.D. Cal.), an odd case involving the Computer Fraud & Abuse Act and an "attack PowerPoint" allegedly sent by a competitor to its prospective customers.

* Kate Kaye writes about the new Internet industry lobby group, the "State Privacy and Security Coalition," designed to fight laws like the Utah Trademark Protection Act.

* Kevin Werbach, The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself Together, and the Forces Tearing it Apart, UC Davis Law Review, Forthcoming. An interesting paper applying "network formation" theory to show how the Internet came together as a unified network and how those unifying forces are under constant stress.

Posted by Eric at 08:52 PM | Content Regulation , Copyright , Internet History , Licensing/Contracts , Marketing , Publicity/Privacy Rights , Search Engines , Trademark | TrackBack



March 02, 2008

Feb. 2008 Quick Links

By Eric Goldman

Advertising

* BusinessWeek: Monetizing social networking sites isn't as easy as everyone had hoped, clickthrough rates are through the floor (0.04%!), and ad proliferation on the sites is driving users away.

* Wilbur, Kenneth C. and Zhu, Yi, "Click Fraud" (January 2, 2008). This paper appears to argue that search engines can increase their profits by failing to disclose the true rate of click fraud on their network.

* In re Miva, Inc. Securities Litigation, 2008 WL 450037 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2008). This lawsuit alleges that Miva and some associated individuals understated or misreported Miva’s reliance on click fraud, spyware and third party distributors in its public statements and thus inflated the company's stock price. Last year, the court dismissed many of the allegations but let a couple survive. In this ruling, the court dismisses a few more defendants from some statements and lets the rest of the case proceed.

* Going-out-of-business sales are often just another scam. (HT ContractsProf). Note this is completely consistent with economists’ theoretical predictions of final-period behavior of trademark owners.

Google

* Google's stock has lost $70B in market cap in 7 weeks. Oh darn. Clickz offers some theories about why Google's clicks are declining. Could lower rates of click fraud be part of it?

* Hal Varian, Google's Chief Economist, argues that Google's marketplace success is solely due to its "secret sauce" (i.e., the advantage of learning by doing) rather than any defects in the marketplace.

Spam

* Jaynes v. Virginia (Va. Sup. Ct. Feb. 29, 2008). By a 4-3 vote, the Virginia Supreme Court upheld Jeremy Jaynes' 9 year sentence for violating Virginia’s spam law.

* Silverstein v. Experienced Internet.com, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 3364 (9th Cir. 2008). Ninth Circuit dismissed a CAN-SPAM lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction when the defendants attest that they didn't send the message and aren't local.

Domain Names

* NSI has been sued for its practice of grabbing pre-registration domain names based on WHOIS searches. The complaint. Good luck defending those practices, NSI!

* Two more breathy articles about the economics of domaining from the New York Times and Network World.

47 USC 230

* Johnson v. Barras, 2007 CA 001600 B (DC Superior Ct Feb. 1, 2008). Court dismisses a lawsuit against a website for republishing a defamatory story per 47 USC 230.

* Yet another doomed lawsuit against MySpace for facilitating communications between an adult male and an underage female that led to sex. Sam Bayard's comments.

Pornography

* NY Lawyer (login required): "Defense Bar Sees Growing Practice in Internet Sex Crimes"

* A federal obscenity prosecution for publishing graphic short stories (without pictures) on the Internet? As Tim Wu says, "astonishing."

* The Utah legislature is considering entering the marketplace again, this time through a certification mark program for Internet access providers who are willing to combat porn. See HB407. Of course, the Utah legislature has had terrific success in the past creating successful new business opportunities that the marketplace has overlooked.

User-Generated Content

* Nick Carr: "What we've seen happen with self-regulating communities, both real and virtual, is that they go through a brief initial period during which their performance improves - a kind of honeymoon period, when people are on their best behavior and rascals are quickly exposed and put to rout - but then, at some point, their performance turns downward. They begin, naturally, to decay." Like, I think, Wikipedia.

* Slate on the top-heavy nature of contributions to Wikipedia and Digg.

* Christian Science Monitor: Teachers Strike Back at Students' Online Pranks.

* Sam Bayard on a motion to quash in the AutoAdmit case.

Reputation

* eBay no longer lets sellers leave negative/neutral feedback for buyers. This putatively stops sellers from retaliating against buyers who leave legitimate complaints, but it also skews the database towards only positive reviews, which ultimately undercuts its credibility.

* In India, where courtships remain very brief by US standards and grooms can be paid dowries by the bride's families, there is an emerging trend for brides to hire "wedding detectives" to ferret out the scoop on grooms and whether their representations are correct.

* Funny article on being a secret shopper for Consumer Reports.

* Dan Solove's book, The Future of Reputation, is now available online for free. Ethan's review of the book.

Patents

* Six years later, eBay finally buys it now: eBay v. MercExchange settles with eBay buying out some of MercExchange's patents and licensing others.

* Mike Masnick: "Psst! Patent Examiners Do Not Scale"

Copyright

* Mike Masnick: “Why We Should All Want Politicians Who Plagiarize.”

* Do Not Resuscitate...My Copyrights (funny).

Miscellaneous

* Citizen Media Law Project has a useful discussion on getting insurance for cyberlaw risks.

* People v. Fernino, 2008 WL 382348 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. Feb. 13, 2008) (woman violated a no-contact order when sending a MySpace message to the person).

* Mike Masnick: "We Need A Broadband Competition Act, Not A Net Neutrality Act"

* A retrospective on some of the leading dot-coms from the 1990s.

Posted by Eric at 05:32 PM | Content Regulation , Copyright , Derivative Liability , Domain Names , E-Commerce , Internet History , Marketing , Patents , Privacy/Security , Search Engines , Spam , Trademark | TrackBack



February 21, 2008

Eric Menhart Backs Off CyberLaw Trademark Claim

By Eric Goldman

You may recall that last month we all had a good laugh over self-proclaimed Cyberlawyer Eric Menhart's trademark application for the term "CyberLaw" to describe his Cyberlaw practice. (In case it wasn't clear, we weren't laughing WITH him...). Despite his initial blustery defense of the application (which, as a reader noted to me, violated the First Rule of Holes), Menhart has now backed off his claim to own the term "CyberLaw." Instead, he has amended his application to seek a trademark registration only in his stylized CyberLaw logo. (Thanks to Tricia Bishop at the Baltimore Sun for calling my attention to the amendment and sending the copy). Unfortunately, I won't dare display the logo here because it would likely make me his next enforcement target; but you can see the design in the amended application.

With this amendment, I'm inferring that all of us--even Michael Grossman, the victim of Menhart's efforts to enforce his purported trademark rights in the term "CyberLaw"--are now free to use the term "Cyberlaw" for its dictionary meaning without fear of getting sued by Menhart. However, Menhart doesn't appear to have changed his tune about the merits of his initial application. Instead, the Baltimore Sun quotes him as saying that he amended his application because:

It was very clear that this was not going to be an academic argument, it was going to be more of a shouting match, and I didn't think it was worth my time to get involved in a shouting match with people that were going to shout louder and had more ammunition in their holsters than I had

Funny--I would have thought it wasn't worth his time because the application was completely unmeritorious.

What Eric Menhart might characterize as a "shouting match" is actually online word of mouth in action. (Note: the Baltimore Sun article incorrectly quoted me as saying that the blogosphere "gang-heckled" him. Actually, I said that we "gang-tackled" him, but the imagery of gang-heckling is perhaps nevertheless appropriate). Historically, it has been fairly rare to see bona fide public evaluations of a lawyer by his or her peers; that kind of reputational information was often well known among lawyers practicing in the geographic/doctrinal area and effectively unavailable to everyone else. Now, through the Internet, everyone--including Menhart's prospective clients--can easily find out what his peers think of Eric Menhart's choices, enabling this reputational information to have a much greater effect at rewarding or punishing marketplace participants as appropriate.

UPDATE: More coverage of this topic:
* Brett Trout
* Ron Coleman
* Sam Bayard
* Techdirt

Posted by Eric at 11:32 AM | Internet History , Trademark | TrackBack



February 14, 2008

Classic Article on "Cybermediaries"

By Eric Goldman

Mitra B. Sarkar et al., Intermediaries and Cybermediaries: A Continuing Role for Mediating Players in the Electronic Marketplace, J. COMPUTER MEDIATED COMMUNICATIONS, 1995

I've been working on my Brand Spillovers paper, which in part addresses the trademark legal principles that govern intermediaries including retailers and search engines. The Sarkar article is one of the most prescient and clear-sighted articles assessing the role of online intermediaries. In particular, it provides a terrific checklist of ways that intermediaries can provide valuable services to consumers and producers, thus continuing to add value to the distribution chain even as transaction costs generally decrease due to electronic mediation. This article is even more remarkable because it was written in the mid-1990s, at the height of cyberspace exceptionalism and at the time when conventional wisdom was that the Internet was going to create widespread disintermediation. A refreshing read, even today.

Posted by Eric at 11:09 AM | Derivative Liability , E-Commerce , Internet History | TrackBack



January 18, 2008

Who Owns "CyberLaw"(TM)? Eric Menhart, a DC IP Attorney, Thinks He Does

By Eric Goldman

Every now and then, we see comical efforts to claim trademark rights in common Internet-related terms. You might recall that the word "Internet" itself was once a trademark (see a list of registrants dated 1994); the term "listserv" is also a trademark that the owner is trying to preserve (bonne chance!), and Hormel has protested the use of its "Spam" trademark in connection with email. Typically, the trademark owner is trying to prevent the genericism of its trademark. Those battles are almost always futile, but I can see why they are fought.

The latest would-be-funny-if-it-wasn't-so-sad attempt to assert trademark rights in a common Internet term involves the term "Cyberlaw." But unlike the anti-genericism efforts, Eric Menhart--a self-described "recognized leader" in intellectual property--is seeking to fence in the generic term "Cyberlaw" to convert it into his own property. He has filed a federal trademark application (application 77341910) in the term "CyberLaw" for the following services:

Legal document preparation and research services for attorneys; Legal research; Legal services; Legal services, namely, preparation of applications for trademark registration; Consulting and legal services in the field of privacy and security laws, regulations, and requirements; Expert witness services in legal matters in the field of intellectual property and information technology; Providing a website that features information on the development of international law, regulations, legal policies, and legal practices in a manner that promotes global governance by all types of organizations; Reviewing standards and practices to assure compliance with intellectual property and information technology laws and regulations; Attorney services; Litigation services; Legal services, namely, trademark maintenance services; Copyright management; Copyright management consultation; Registration of domain names for identification of users on a global computer network; Arbitration; Arbitration services; Consultation in the field of data theft and identity theft; Intellectual property consultation; Intellectual property watch services; Licensing of advertising slogans and cartoon characters; Licensing of computer software; Licensing of intellectual property; Litigation consultancy; Mediation; Patent licensing; Preparing and filing incorporation papers; Providing information relating to legal affairs

He claims a priority date of Feb. 22, 2007. Mysteriously, his website displays the circle-R next to the term "CyberLaw" even though it's only a pending application (the application was just filed Dec. 1, 2007).

Fortunately, I'm 100% confident that the TM Office will reject this application because the term "Cyberlaw" has become a generic description for the law of the Internet and related fields--see the Wikipedia entry on the topic. In fact, the term "Cyberlaw" has been around over 15 years. I did a search in Westlaw's News Database and the earliest reference I found was a Macweek article discussing Jonathan Rosenoer's AOL "Cyberlaw" column--from 1992. I'm reasonably confident we could find earlier references. For example, I found a 1993 National Law Journal article ("A Shingle in Cyberspace: Lawyers Online Find Clients--and Some Risks" by Rosalind Resnick) that discusses the "burgeoning field of cyberlaw, those legal issues confronting the online world."

Unfortunately, the improbability of this trademark hasn't stopped Menhart from asserting his perceived rights against third parties. The EFF writes about one such demand against Michael Grossman, a Chicago attorney who runs a blog entitled "CyberBlawg." I'm wondering how many other people have been the unlucky recipient of a demand letter from Menhart asserting similar claims over "CyberLaw." Perhaps those demands will stop once the TM application gets bounced by the TM Office, but the harm done in the interim could be substantial.

One final observation (and I apologize in advance for any snarkiness here, but I know I'm saying what most of us are thinking). It's impossible to ignore that the trademark applicant is a lawyer claiming expertise in Cyberlaw. What kind of Cyberlawyer doesn't know that the term "Cyberlaw" isn't trademarkable for Cyberlaw services, *especially* not by one who claims a priority date of 2007?

Coverage from around the web:
* Boing Boing
* Slashdot
* Techdirt
* Dvorak
* Las Vegas Trademark Attorney (with a careful analysis of precedent trademark applications)
* Groklaw
* Freedom to Differ
* Lex Ferenda (finding a Cyberlaw reference as early as 1987)
* Likelihood of Confusion
* Your Name is My Business
* NameWire
* Life on the Wicked Stage
* Joho

UPDATE: The Baltimore Sun ran an interesting feature on Eric Menhart in 2004. The article notes some critics said that Menhart's "enterprising nature has led him into another pursuit that some people describe in harsh terms -- like 'extortion' or 'blackmail.'"

UPDATE 2: Mr. Menhart has blogged a response to EFF that reinforces that he really doesn't get it. Two unavoidable facts of life for him:

1) The PTO will bounce his TM application
2) If he ever attempts to enforce his purported trademark rights in "CyberLaw" again, he will be met by a buzzsaw of opposition from some very determined folks.

In light of these facts, most savvy lawyers would realize that the absolutely wrong approach is to dig in his/her heels.

Posted by Eric at 03:59 PM | Internet History , Trademark | TrackBack



November 16, 2007

The Victorian Internet

By Eric Goldman

Tom Standage, The Victorian Internet (1998). Find it at Half.com and Amazon [the Amazon link is an affiliate link]

As you might infer, I'm not at the cutting-edge of reading books. I don't read that many books in general; and I tend to read books well after everyone is done talking about them. But I enjoyed this book so much, and it has aged so well over the past decade, that I thought it was worth a shoutout. One side bonus: given that the book is no longer a hot release, you should be able to get this book used for well less than $10.

The book discusses the history of the telegraph. The book explains the technologies preceding the telegraph, the battles between the inventors of the telegraph, the telegraph's role in spawning new technological innovations (and creating enormous wealth for some of those folks) and the ways that the telegraph did--and did not--change society.

Its thesis is that many phenomena we associate with a global electronic network first occurred in the 19th century, not the 20th, which has made our celebration of the Internet's novelty (a topic at its zenith in 1998 when the book was published) ahistorical. The book thoroughly delivers on this thesis. One particular anecdote really hammered this point home. The book talks about a telegraph-mediated "online wedding" that first occurred...before 1848. (Indeed, the book "Wired Love" was published in 1879 and an article "The Dangers of Wired Love" ran in 1886). Yet, numerous newspaper articles from the mid-1990s marveled at Internet-mediated weddings as if they were completely unprecedented.

More generally, the book broadly makes the case that some things never change. For example, the book describes the arms race between telegraph companies establishing pricing schemes to curb attempts to send more information at a lower cost, just to have telegraph senders coming up with new gaming strategies. The book discussed the paranoia of major institutions in response to telegraphy, including governments that sought to control the use of cryptography in telegraphy and newspapers that assumed that the telegraph would destroy their business. (In the latter case, the newspapers adapted and thrived in response to telegraphy). The book also described how the telegraph contributed to feelings of information overload.

The book ends on a bittersweet note. It observes that people thought that the borderless telegraph communication network would contribute to world peace by breaking down barriers to communication. It didn't. If anything, the telegraph played an important role in 19th century imperialism and contributed to some of the bloodiest wars in history. Similarly, 150 years later, many similarly romanticize how the Internet can make the world a better place. Perhaps the Internet is truly different from the telegraph in this respect, or perhaps, we are just ahistorically proclaiming the latest technology innovation as our savior. As the book says, "That the telegraph was so widely seen as a panacea is perhaps understandable. The fact that we are still making the same mistake today is less so."

From my perspective, the only thing "missing" from this pithy and efficient book was a more thorough discussion of how lawmakers reacted to the rise of the telegraph. I would like to know more about how 19th century regulators coped with--or, more likely, freaked out about--the technological assumptions changed by the telegraph.

It seems safe to assume that some legislators misunderstood the technological underpinnings of telegraphy. The book gives numerous examples of how people didn't understand that the telegraph sent only electronic signals and wasn't a teleportation technology, such as the story of a woman in 1870 who sought to "telegraph" sauerkraut to her son. Again, some things never change; in 2003, a member of the House of Lords had a similar misunderstanding about spam. [the exact quote: "Will the Minister explain how it is that an inedible tinned food can become an unsolicited email, bearing in mind that some of us wish to be protected from having an email?"]

In this vein, the book offered one possible explanation for Sen. Stevens' explanation that the Internet is a "series of tubes." [the exact quote from Wired: "the internet is not something you just dump something on. It's not a truck. It's a series of tubes. And if you don't understand those tubes can be filled and if they are filled, when you put your message in, it gets in line and its going to be delayed by anyone that puts into that tube enormous amounts of material, enormous amounts of material."] Many telegraph operators built out a network of pneumatic tubes to move messages over short distances because this was quicker and more accurate for those messages. So perhaps Sen. Stevens was thinking of the telegraph when he referred to the "series of tubes."

The book was published before Western Union sent its last telegram. At the time I knew this represented the end of an important era, but after reading this book I better understand the significance of that event. Some day, someone will send the very last TCP/IP enabled http message...an event that will also probably pass with a whimper, not a bang.

Posted by Eric at 05:54 PM | Internet History | TrackBack



November 13, 2007

Geolocation and A Bordered Cyberspace

By Eric Goldman

I recently gave a talk on the general theme of the future of e-commerce, and I was allowed to take the topic in any direction. I decided to talk a little about the propagation of geolocation technology and its consequences for a borderless Internet. My notes from the talk:
______

A constant problem in Cyberlaw: the difficulties of authenticating users for age and geography. With respect to geography, in the mid-1990s, there was a strong belief that cyberspace was borderless. Examples:

* John Perry Barlow's 1996 Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace

* 1997: ALA v. Pataki, where a state anti-Internet porn law (a baby CDA) was struck down as violating the dormant commerce clause. In that case, Judge Preska said: "Geography is a virtually meaningless construct on the Internet."

But there are ways to restore geographic borders to the purportedly borderless Internet:

1) Ask users to self-report. Users may want to self-report geography, especially in the e-commerce context where they want physical goods delivered or need to report their address to authorize a credit card purchase. But the law could force online actors to compel users to self-report geography and then act on the reported information. Examples:

* LICRA v. Yahoo. The French court envisioned that Yahoo could do 90% effective geographic authentication through a combination of IP address analysis and user self-reporting if Yahoo popped up windows asking users to self-report before being allowed to access the website.

* Alaska SB 140, an anti-adware law. To combat pop-up ads, the statute requires software vendors to display pop-up windows asking users to self-report geography.

A world with compelled requests for user self-reporting of geography would be a pop-up filled world constantly asking "where are you now? where are you now?" [see the analogous Verizon ad campaign] This makes user self-reporting undesirable, in addition to being unreliable.

2) IP address analysis. IP addresses are allocated on an International scheme. Yahoo used this scheme to display local ads, a fact noted in the LICRA court. IP address analysis can be more regional; for example, Google does geo-targeting on a more granular basis. Ex: if I search for "mercedes" in Google, I get local Mercedes dealers in the Bay Area. But IP address analysis is incomplete/imperfect.

So if the only geographic authentication tools were IP address analysis or user self-reporting, the Internet would remain more borderless than bordered. However...

3) Geolocation technology. In the future, Internet access devices will be coupled with GPS technology that will automatically report user geography. For example, many mobile phones already have GPS technology in them, and consumers use other mobile devices (e.g., Blackberries) that have geolocation technology. Inevitably, the boundaries between computers and these geolocated mobile access devices will dissolve, meaning that Internet access devices will be geolocated and will automatically self-report user geography as part of interacting with other online actors.

A geolocated Internet will have some benefits. Most obviously, ads can be geographically targeted in ways that can help consumers (i.e., a driver searching for gas can get ads from nearby gas stations). It will also enable other localized content where that matters (weather, directions, location of friends).

But a geolocated Internet will also enable governments to force online actors to "honor" the geographic information. Thus, states could legitimately enact state-specific laws and require online actors to customize their offerings for state residents. Governments could also use the geolocation information to created walled environments, including more highly filtered/screened content. We've already seen this in China and some other countries. In these situations, Internet users will have very different Internet experiences based on their geography. Thus, a geolocated Internet should contribute to the demise the Internet utopianism. Instead of bringing people together over a borderless network, a geolocated world reenables borders that will keep us further apart.

Posted by Eric at 05:44 PM | Content Regulation , E-Commerce , Internet History | TrackBack



October 21, 2007

Ticketmaster Wins Big Injunction in Hannah Montana Case, But Did the Public Interest Get Screwed?--Ticketmaster v. RMG

By Eric Goldman

Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. RMG Technologies, Inc., 2007 WL 2988403 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2007)

You may remember Ticketmaster's multi-year battle against Tickets.com over data aggregation and deep linking. Ticketmaster never got a solid win in that case, but here Ticketmaster successfully advances the same legal theories against someone gaming its allocation of tickets. Hannah Montana fans might cheer this ruling, but some of the court’s analysis makes this a troubling Cyberlaw development.

Introduction

This case involves what I'll call "ticket sniping"--the practice of quickly snapping up highly-sought-after tickets when they first go on sale and then reselling them at higher prices. When it comes to hot concerts--such as the upcoming Hannah Montana tour--Ticketmaster's price may be well below the prices people are willing to pay in the secondary market. Why don't event promoters use auctions or other dynamic pricing scheme to capture this upside on the first sale? I'm reminded of the odd pricing systems for IPOs--just like that market, perhaps Ticketmaster (as an intermediary) deliberately underprices below the market-clearing price to increase its profits.

In any case, initial ticket buyers from Ticketmaster can get an economic windfall, which naturally motivates people to game the initial first-come, first-served ticket allocation system. RMG was one such gamer. They developed software that helped its customers beat other buyers in the rush to get hot tickets. Ticketmaster sued RMG to stop their gaming activities; the court issues a preliminary injunction:

Copyright

The court says that RMG directly infringed Ticketmaster's copyright in its web pages by browsing them to test the operation of its software tool. Effectively, then, the court says that web browsing is copyright infringement. This isn't the first time a court intimated as much, but it's troubling every time we see it.

The court overlooks any implied license to browse because Ticketmaster's "browsewrap" on its home page (which says "Use of this website is subject to express Terms of Use which prohibit commercial use of this site. By continuing past this page, you agree to abide by these terms") acts as an express restriction on browsing, so any access in contravention of those terms constitutes copyright infringement.

One of the key Qs is how RMG's software differs from other search engine robots. The court skirts this Q, simply pointing to Perfect 10 v. Amazon as excusing the cache copies made by web users who follow search engine links. Of course, search engine robots make lots of other copies, and we think these copies are excused because the final presentation (the display of search results snippets) doesn’t infringe. The court doesn't address this at all.

The court also says that RMG is indirectly infringing based on a Grokster inducement theory because RMG's marketing said it's offering "stealth technology [that] lets you hide your IP address, so you never get blocked by Ticketmaster." This is a pretty expansive interpretation of copyright inducement because the marketing references IP address blocks, not copyright infringement, but it's very consistent with the court's moral condemnation of RMG's behavior.

Anti-Circumvention

The court says that website pages are protected by copyright, and the website used a CAPTCHA to restrict access to these copyrighted works. Thus, distributing the software tool designed to circumvent the CAPTCHA to access the copyrighted website violates 1201(a)(2) and 1201(b)(1). Not only does this give unexpected copyright protection for CAPTCHAs, this ruling seems inconsistent with several precedents holding that bypassing a password protection system doesn't violate 1201.

Breach of Contract

As indicated above, the court upholds Ticketmaster's browsewrap. Admittedly, Ticketmaster has improved its contract formation processes since it litigated against Tickets.com, but I'm not sure this was as easy as the court treated it.

Computer Fraud & Abuse Act

Surprisingly, the court denies relief for this claim because Ticketmaster couldn't allege $5,000 of loss. I tell my students that if they can't construct $5,000 of loss under the CFAA, then they aren't thinking creatively enough.

Conclusion

It's easy to point at RMG and its customers as the bad guys. After all, they are trying to get an unfair advantage in the first-come, first-served allocation of scarce tickets for their economic benefit, with the result that later comers have to pay more to get the same tickets.

But what about Ticketmaster's role in this situation? They haven't designed a technologically gaming-resistant allocation of tickets, so they need legal help to solve that deficiency. I also remain suspicious about Ticketmaster's incentives here, both in setting prices and in policing against ticket allocation gaming. Their motives may not be nearly so consumer-friendly as they try to portray.

And this opinion is hardly pro-consumer either. This ruling won't be a problem if future courts limit this ruling solely to a company's efforts to legally protect a competently designed anti-gaming strategy. But some of the more dramatic rulings are anything but consumer-friendly, such as the implicit holding that browsing is copyright infringement and the upholding of Ticketmaster's browsewrap. If other courts apply these principles more broadly, Hannah Montana concertgoers may have gotten a benefit at the expense of us all.

Posted by Eric at 03:45 PM | Copyright , Derivative Liability , E-Commerce , Internet History , Licensing/Contracts , Privacy/Security | TrackBack



October 10, 2007

Pandora Founder Westergren Speaks at SCU

By Eric Goldman

I *love* Internet radio. I typically listen to it all day long while I'm pounding out emails, articles and blog posts (like this one). I've tried a number of services, including Accuradio, Sky.fm and Last.fm. However, now I listen exclusively to Pandora, which in my opinion is the best of the bunch. Pandora really does get better based on the feedback I give it, which gives me enough incentive to customize it to my tastes. (I won't embarrass myself by exposing my idiosyncratic music preferences here, other than to say that I don't think I've seeded Pandora with any band that started after 1990. Hey, I'm a product of my time.)

In any case, when the High Tech Law Institute was contacted by the Santa Clara University's Center for Innovation and Entrepreneurship to co-sponsor a talk by Tim Westergren, one of Pandora's founders, we jumped on the opportunity. Tim gave an outstanding talk last night to an enthusiastic audience of at least 200 people.

Pandora was founded in 1999 and raised $1.5M in early 2000. That money ran out in 2001 when no more VC money was available. For the next 2 1/2 years, the company went on 300+ VC pitches with no luck, but was able to run on fumes in large part by mostly deferring employee salaries (a total of $1.4M deferred). This is an amazing feat for a number of reasons, including the fact that most employees need to put food on their table, plus I don't think the labor laws really tolerate employee salary deferrals. In any case, in 2004, the company raised new money and revamped the business model. In October 2005, the company launched a consumer-oriented Internet radio, and the rocket ship took off.

This roller-coaster ride was partially tied to the company's search for a viable business model. Pandora first thought it would be an online music retailer (typical thinking circa 1999). Then, it focused on B2B licensing of its services to other online retailers (typical thinking circa 2001). By 2004, there had been enough external changes to contemplate a consumer radio service--broadband had become more widespread, and the webcasting license fees were set at a more palatable level. In their October 2005 relaunch, they first started with a consumer subscription model but quickly realized the futility of getting people to pay for Internet radio. Now, they are effectively ad-supported, and Tim thinks that they can reach profitability at the end of next year assuming the webcasting royalty rate will be reset. (After the tribunal issued the new webcasting rate, the company held a board meeting to decide if they should just fold up their tents and give the remaining money back to investors--instead, they pushed for a listener grass-roots campaign, which was wildly successful).

Pandora's main competitive differentiator is its "Music Genome Project." 50 trained musicians with at least a college degree in music (called "music analysts") listen to songs all day long and rate each song on 400 different musical attributes. See the 2005 WSJ article discussing them. By profiling songs this way, the system can predict that a person who likes an artist's song might like other songs with similar musical attributes. From listening to Pandora for many, many hours, IMO the system isn't perfect, but it does a pretty good job, and it has definitely hooked me on music that I wouldn't have listened to otherwise.

However, the human capital required to build this database is significant and expensive. Sure, the supply of people with a music degree willing to be paid to listen to music all day long should be favorable, but still, a low salary multiplied by 50 people is still a big number. As Tim acknowledged, this is the opposite of scalability--a song can take up to 1/2 hour to catalog--which reduces Pandora's ability to comprehensively catalog the "long tail." On the other hand, they already have a database of 500,000 profiled songs, and they are adding 15,000 songs a month. Plus, having found a way to survive while building such a large database, the database is now a big barrier to entry, because any competitor seeking to take a similar approach (patents permitting) would have to incur serious upfront costs to replicate a competitive system.

Pandora does a little search engine marketing, but principally they rely on viral marketing--build a better product and let the customers evangelize it to their friends. They claim 8.5M registered listeners, growing at the rate of 500k new registrants per month. Listeners interact with Pandora on average 7-8 times per hour to give feedback or configure things (that sounds about right from my personal experience), which is remarkable as a stickiness measure. The result of this interaction is a database of 1B thumbs up/down opinions, a gargantuan database of user preferences. Tim said that Pandora uses this database for some collaborative filtering, but it sounds like this database is could be a globally important resource if made available more widely. (I'm sure the privacy folks are running through all the ways this data could be misused.)

A couple of other interesting factoids:

* at peak hours, Pandora's traffic represents 1.5% of global Internet data
* they block International users because of the lack of Internet webcasting statutory licenses parallel to the rights enacted in the DMCA
* 94% of their database of 500,000 cataloged songs are played every day--powerful evidence of the long tail effect that consumers will enjoy otherwise obscure content if the transaction costs are low enough
* Tim said Pandora's biggest competitor is ClearChannel. Clearly, they want to own the entire radio industry, not just the Internet radio market.

Check out Pandora and see what you think. If you want a jump start and you promise not to laugh at my tastes, I can email you my heavily customized stations.

Posted by Eric at 06:00 PM | Copyright , Internet History | TrackBack



October 07, 2007

September 2007 Quick Links Part II

By Eric Goldman

Contracts

* Manasher v. NECC Telecom, No. 06-cv-10749 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 18, 2007). NECC included the following language on its invoices: "NECC's Agreement 'Disclosure and Liabilities' can be found online at www.necc.us or you could request a copy by calling us at (800) 766 2642." Not surprisingly, an arbitration clause in the referenced document wasn't incorporated into the contract because (among other deficiencies) there was no "call to action" that communicated that the referenced document was part of the agreement. HT: Tom O'Toole.

* Hofer v. The Gap Inc., No. 05-40170 (D. Mass. Sept. 28, 2007). 2 friends decide to vacation together in Jamaica. Friend 1 books the travel arrangements for both of them through Expedia. Friend 2 suffers a personal injury at the resort and wants to hold Expedia liable. Expedia invokes the liability protections in its user agreement, but Friend 2 never consented to or even saw that user agreement. No problem, says the court--Friend 1 was Friend 2's agent and therefore automatically bound Friend 2 to Expedia's agreement. For an analogous case involving software installed on a home computer, see here. HT: Tom O'Toole.

Web 2.0

* Video Professor, Inc. v. Doe (D. Colo.). Video Professor believes a bunch of individuals are committing false advertising, disparagement and other torts by bashing Video Professor's products. Video Professor knows it can't sue the intermediaries per 47 USC 230, so instead it's seeking subpoenas to unmask the gripers. This lawsuit seems misarchitected from a legal standpoint (at least, the Lanham Act portions), but it's also a really bad idea from a business standpoint--the chance of this lawsuit rehabilitating their online reputation is near-zero, and the chance of raising the profile of the gripers' comments in the search engines is near-one. Fortunately, Paul Levy is fighting back. HT: Consumer Law & Policy Blog.

* Michael Erdman reports that the Chicago Lawyers Committee v. Craigslist appeal is moving again. For a while, the case was deliberately sitting idle at the Seventh Circuit, presumably to facilitate settlement, but the Seventh Circuit has now issued a briefing schedule.

* Gary Price reports on the move in Wikipedia Germany to have all page edits reviewed by "trusted editors." More on this from the New Scientist. Yet more evidence that Wikipedia is looking increasingly like other editorially controlled content databases.

* Want to see a user community in the midst of turmoil? Check out the troubles at RateItAll. The consequence: 4 power users are gone, taking 20,000 items of content with them.

* News.com: 9 Fun Ways Web 2.0 Startups Can Commit Legal Suicide

Search Engines

* Jayne v. Google Internet Search Engine Founders, 2007 WL 2852383 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2007). This was a ridiculous pro se lawsuit that the court easily dismisses on its face. The interesting aspect is that the court says that Google isn't a state actor. This isn't the first court to say so, but it reinforces that Google and other search engines aren't subject to Constitutional restrictions.

* Google filed a motion to dismiss the American Airlines lawsuit. HT Gary Price.

* MediaPost: Personalized search results expand the number of search results that users look at and strongly improve clickthrough rate.

Content Regulation

* I missed this when it was first filed: Interactive Media Entertainment & Gaming Association v. Gonzales (D.N.J. complaint filed June 5, 2007), a First Amendment challenge to the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006.

* American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression v. Strickland, 2007 WL 2783678 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 24, 2007). Another state level anti-Internet porn law was struck down (this time in Ohio), but only on First Amendment grounds. Influenced by the upholding of state anti-spam laws, the court rejects a challenge to the law on dormant commerce clause grounds. This is a rare opinion saying that a baby CDA state law didn’t violate the DCC.

For Fun

* Happy birthday, smiley!

Posted by Eric at 08:33 AM | Content Regulation , Derivative Liability , Internet History , Licensing/Contracts , Search Engines , Trademark | TrackBack



September 07, 2007

August 2007 Quick Links, Part II

By Eric Goldman

* e360 Insight v. Spamhaus Project, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 20725 (7th Cir. Aug. 30, 2007). An email marketing company was listed on Spamhaus' ROSKO and sued for defamation and other torts in Illinois. Spamhaus took the position that US courts have no authority to render a judgment on a UK-based operation. The district court ultimately awarded $11.7M in damages and various equitable relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the default judgment but vacated the damages and equitable relief, sending those back to the district court to reevaluate the appropriate remedies. I understand that Spamhaus wanted to make a philosophical point by not fighting the lawsuit in the US, but had they overlooked their philosophical objections, they should have won a quick victory per 47 USC 230(c)(2).

* Perfect 10 has appealed its Ninth Circuit 230 loss in ccBill to the US Supreme Court.

* Search Engine Land had a good overview/recap article on geolocation technology. It provides a clear and easy-to-read explanation why the folks who think online businesses can just stay out of a state that enacts dumb regulations are full of crud.

* Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp, No. 06-3817 (7th Cir. Aug. 23, 2007). Another court (this time, the Seventh Circuit) says that consumer fretting about possible future identity theft isn't enough harm to support a lawsuit. See the analogous JetBlue, Acxiom and Key cases.

* Wikipedia Scanner--an automated tool to determine who is editing Wikipedia pages. Katie Hafner's NYT article on the matter. David Hoffman does a little sleuthing on law firm edits.

* NYT: In the 1990s, a lot of people sought to build an infrastructure for micropayments. Consumers resisted them, but today those efforts seem a little silly--AdSense advertising can generate the same financial benefits for a web publisher without the overhead. Meanwhile, the credit card systems are being stretched to cover micro-transactions because merchants are aggregating a consumer's orders and processing them in bulk (rather than processing each one individually) as a way to reduce the transaction costs.

* NYT: "As video games have surged in popularity in recent years, politicians around the country have tried to outlaw the sale of some violent games to children. So far all such efforts have failed."

* AP: Chinese animated cops will be patrolling the Information Superhighway beat.

* Tired of negative reviews on Yelp, a San Francisco restaurant put up a sign saying "no Yelpers." I wonder if a sign like that lessens or exacerbates negative publicity.

* NYT: Book authors obsessively check Amazon sales rankings and try to game them.

* Facebook accidentally posted some of its source code to a public website. Surely an interesting development for ConnectU's discovery team!

* Another Internet company hires its own in-house economist--this time, virtual world Eve Online.

* A nice retrospective on the Cleveland Free-net, which at one point was a prominent component of the Cyberspace community.

* I have one free guest pass to the CLE International New Media Law conference in SF on Oct. 1-2. Free to the first person who sends me an email request. [SORRY--TAKEN!]

Posted by Eric at 09:48 AM | Content Regulation , Derivative Liability , E-Commerce , General , Internet History , Privacy/Security , Virtual Worlds | TrackBack



August 13, 2007

2007 Cyberspace Law Syllabus

By Eric Goldman

I've posted my 2007 Cyberlaw syllabus. Unlike the past few years, which were a little slow cyberlaw-wise, the past 12 months saw a lot of important developments. Let me recap some of changes I made to my reader reflecting these developments:

Additions

Copyright: I added the Cablevision case (after editing out some of the mind-numbing description of cable technology), which provides an interesting exposition on how the source of bits matters in copyright law (we'll reinforce that message with the Amazon.com "server test"). I companioned the Cablevision with the Field case to show a very different philosophy about "volitional" server activity, so I'll ask the students to see if they can reconcile the two cases.

I struggled with how to handle the Ninth Circuit's troika of Perfect 10 opinions. The opinions are long, complicated and irresolute, but it's hard to discuss one without discussing the other two. I decided to include all three but I don't feel great about that decision, given that it takes 115 pages (about 1/6 of my total reader) to work through the three cases, and I'm not sure students will come away any smarter about Ninth Circuit online copyright law after reading all three.

Trademark. I substituted the FragranceNet case for the 1-800 Contacts v. WhenU case. The 1-800 Contacts case remains a very important keyword law precedent, but as a teaching case it was just so-so. The adware subject matter increased the complexity, and it punted on the most interesting question of search engine liability. However, most of the other recent keyword law cases have been even less teachable. Fortunately, the FragranceNet case does a pretty job of recapping the 1-800 Contacts case as well as other recent decisions, and it frames the policy issues nicely. I've paired it with the Playboy v. Netscape case, which will make a good compare/contrast. However, if the Second Circuit gets off its duff, I'd be thrilled to substitute in the court's opinion in the Rescuecom appeal. (I'd be even more thrilled if the court reaches the "right" result!).

I also updated my materials to reflect the Trademark Dilution Revision Act.

230. I continue to stick by the seminal Zeran case, which remains both powerful precedent and a colorful teaching case. However, this year I added the Ninth Circuit hairball Roommates.com opinion. I really didn't want to--it's such a messy opinion--but I think for now the case represents a vitally important incursion into 230 law that any good Cyberlawyer needs to know about it (even if they don't know what to do about it). If we're lucky, perhaps the Ninth Circuit will rehear the case en banc and issue a new and more lucid opinion before I have to teach the existing opinion.

In addition, I created a new module on "blogs and social networking sites" and added the Doe v. MySpace case, a great opinion for exploring the differences between online and offline "premises."

Spam. I teach spam at the semester's end, when time is running out, so we'll see what I'm actually able to cover this year. I've added two recent cases: the Mummagraphics case, which wiped out a lot of state anti-spam laws and has a nice interplay with trespass to chattels, and the MySpace v. theglobe.com case, which has an odd contrast with Mummagraphics on the state anti-spam statutory analysis; plus it shows how online contracts can substitute for legislative rights.

Other. I added some explanatory material, including my standard dog-and-pony CLE presentations on keyword law and blog law and my brief distillation of social networking site law. I also updated the CRS on Spyware.

Other Changes

* I eliminated my standalone section on "search engines" and folded the material into the rest of the reader. I think there's pedagogical value to isolating and deeply exploring search engine issues, which is why I initially segregated the material. However, search engine issues crop up throughout the foundational material, so I'm not sure that segregation worked.

* I deleted the following material:
- Corbis v. Amazon. This was an excellent case to teach 512, but I think the ccBill case superseded it in a number of respects.
- the district court opinion in Perfect 10 v. Google, which was superseded by the Perfect 10 v. Amazon Ninth Circuit opinion.
- 1-800 Contacts v. WhenU (as discussed above)
- Alaska SB 140, which I ran out of time to discuss last year.

Deliberately Excluded

* The Utah anti-keyword advertising law represents one of the most important statutory changes of the year, but I omitted it because I anticipate Utah will modify it, and there's no point teaching a moot law.

* I skipped the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act. I've generally shied away from teaching online gambling in Cyberlaw; the topic requires a lot of time to teach, making it hard to squeeze into a semester-long survey course. Plus, the new law is an analytical mess, so I'm not sure what the students would get out of the discussion.

* We were so excited to get the California Supreme Court's Barrett v. Rosenthal ruling, but the actual opinion doesn't add much to Zeran, so I thought it wasn't worth the time.

Posted by Eric at 07:57 AM | Adware/Spyware , Copyright , Derivative Liability , Internet History , Search Engines , Spam , Trademark | TrackBack



August 04, 2007

Taking Intangible Electronic Files is Criminal Fraud--NM v. Kirby

By Eric Goldman

New Mexico v. Kirby, 2007-NMSC-034 (N.M. June 13, 2007)

This is a very confusing case, so maybe you can help me figure out what it means. At minimum, this case highlights the problems that can be arise when a web design/development relationship goes sour. More broadly, it also contributes to the already confused case law about when intangible electronic records can be "stolen," but this lesson comes at a high cost--in this case, 18 months of jailtime for the defendant.

Facts

According to the Supreme Court's statement of facts, Kirby retained Collett, a website designer, to "develop[] and/or improv[e] a World Wide Website to be installed on the client's web space on a web hosting service's computer." I believe the site at issue is environmentalbenefits.com. The agreement specified that Collett retained the copyright "to the finished assembled work of web pages" and Kirby would be "assigned rights to use as a website the design, graphics, and text contained in the finished assembled website" after Kirby paid the contract price of $1,890 plus tax.

But Kirby never paid Collett--although, according to this site, Kirby paid with an allegedly bum check. Kirby also changed the password for the designed website, which effectively cut off Collett's ability to access those files--the files that, per the contract, Collett still owned.

If Kirby stiffed Collett, it seems like Collett had several legal options, including breach of contract and copyright infringement. Instead, this case went to state prosecutors, who prosecuted Kirby for criminal fraud based on Kirby having taken "a Website Design belonging to Loren Collett, by means of fraudulent conduct, practices, or representations." The jury convicted Kirby, and the Supreme Court affirmed. According to this site, Kirby was sentenced to 18 months in jail.

Questions

This case raises some tough issues, including:

* Why did NM prosecutors pursue this case? On its face, this looks like a garden-variety $2000 commercial dispute. Heck, it could have been handled in small claims court. Instead, Kirby get a felony conviction and jailtime. Huh?

* Did Collett retain a duplicate copy of his files in his possession? If so, how did Kirby "take" non-rivalrous electronic files?

* In that vein, why isn't this crime preempted by copyright law? Copyright preemption is inherently confusing, so I don't feel too bad about being confused here. Indeed, on its face, a commercial fraud crime should be sufficiently removed from copyright law to avoid preemption easily. But in this case, Kirby was prosecuted for converting Collett's intangible files. This sounds a lot like copyright infringement to me. Of course, this ruling isn't completely unprecedented: cases like Kremen v. Cohen and Thyroff have held that intangible electronic records can be converted, though I think the copyright preemption analysis in these cases is hardly satisfying (plus, the recent Utube case held that an intangible asset could not result in trespass to chattels). Though the case talks about copyright a lot, there's no reference at all to preemption--perhaps it wasn't raised by the public defender?

Lessons

1) This case reminds us of the importance of drafting a website development agreement properly. For example, the contract's provision that Kirby would be "assigned rights to use" the website is fatally ambiguous. I wrote a lot on the issues associated with web development agreements in the 1990s; see, e.g.,
* A Fresh Look at Web Development and Hosting Agreements (1998) with sample web development agreement
* Top 10 legal issues for clients of Web developers (1996)
* Pitfalls in Outsourcing Your Website (1996)

In particular, the excerpted contract language indicates that the parties were struggling with defining their respective ownership interests. This is a typical area of confusion; I racked up a fair amount of billable hours in the late 1990s on this very point with people (including opposing lawyers) who didn't get it. Even when the deal value is low, a savvy lawyer can add significant value, at relatively low cost, helping the parties understand this topic.

2) This case reminds us that, unless the contract specifies otherwise, the web designer owns his/her web development work product even if the retaining party pays for the work. This isn't new either (web development lawsuits from the 1990s addressed this point), and here the parties actually expressed addressed ownership in their contract. Nevertheless, caveat emptor!

3) This case extends the meme that intangible electronic records are just as tangible as chattel for conversion purposes. I remain concerned in general about this trend. We may benefit from a careful rethinking about the implications of rivalrousness on conversion doctrines.

4) I'm trying to figure out how broadly this case could apply. For example, would it apply in other circumstances where a party cuts off another party's access to electronic files by changing a password? With little effort, I can think of two: (1) divorcing spouse cuts off spouse's access to shared account containing copyrighted works, and (2) website terminates customer by changing the password, cutting off access to copyrighted material stored in the account (I'm assuming the contract doesn't expressly grant this right). Each fact pattern appears indistinguishable from the elements at issue in this case, although there may not be the requisite scienter to find fraud. if there were (for whatever reason), this case could expand the realm of criminality much further than we might have anticipated.

5) No matter what, the Supreme Court opinion and some of the source materials at this site strongly indicate that the New Mexico judicial system still doesn't understand Internet technology very well. If this were a typical civil case, that would be a shame; if this technological confusion directly led to jailtime for the defendant, it may have produced a travesty.

Posted by Eric at 04:05 PM | Copyright , Internet History , Licensing/Contracts | TrackBack



August 01, 2007

July 2007 Quick Links, Part II

By Eric Goldman

Virtual Worlds

* After a remarkable run as media darlings, Second Life is now experiencing some of the inevitable backlash. Case in point: Wired's "How Madison Avenue Is Wasting Millions on a Deserted Second Life." In this respect, Second Life reminds me a little of Keen.com--both provide fantastic platforms for monetizing user-generated content, but that powerful economic platform is likely to take root primarily in the sin businesses (porn, gambling, etc.). (FWIW, Keen.com appears to have cleaned up the dial-a-porn and is now focused exclusively on dial-a-horoscopes). As a result, it will be interesting to see what happens to Second Life's numbers in response to their anti-gambling crackdown. Meanwhile, lawyers--the classic late adopters--are gushing about Second Life's potential as a business generator--an interesting counter-perspective to the Wired article.

* World Copyright Law Report: "Some residents have been using a rogue version of a program called CopyBot to make a copy of anything in the Second Life world, thus threatening to undermine the whole basis of the Second Life economy."

Wikipedia

* More marketers wake up to the value of inserting links into Wikipedia despite Wikipedia's nofollow tag. See my earlier explanation of this. Meanwhile, a Wikipedia administrator talks about what Wikipedians consider white hat practices for marketers.

* Willing to cite to Wikipedia in your legal briefs? Need some custom-tailored authority to support your argument? Edit Wikipedia to say what you want!

* Mike Godwin has become Wikimedia’s GC. You may recall that Mike and I bet about Wikipedia’s future; it appears he has raised the stakes on that bet substantially!

User Generated Content

* "GC's Client from Hell": Whole Food's CEO John Mackey pseudonymously posted about his company's stock and his competitor's stock on Yahoo Finance. The WSJ article has some of the juiciest postings. The NYT on CEO "sock puppetry."

* A restaurant owner used consumer reviews from Yelp as part of deciding to fire employees.

* Interesting interview with the pseudonymous founder of a pay-for-Diggs business.

Blogs

* The ABA Journal has entered the crowded field of blawg directories with one of their own.

* Blawgworld 2007: 77 blawgers chose their favorite posts, which were compiled into an e-book. The compilation turns out to be a great way to get noisy blawgers to promote their brilliant contributions to the e-book, which generates traffic and link love for the publisher, which in turn creates a nice delivery vehicle for sponsored content/advertising.

Miscellaneous

* Asch Webhosting, Inc. v. Adelphia Business Solutions Investment, LLC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52932 (D. N.J. July 23, 2007). IAP terminates customer based on complaints that customer was a spammer. Court holds that the consequential damages waiver applies, effectively negating customer's alleged damages. Rejecting the customer's argument that the termination was in bad faith, the court says: "Plaintiff’s arguments about the accuracy of the spamming complaints do not change the Court’s determination because regardless of the ultimate accuracy or veracity of the spamming complaints, defendant was entitled to rely on those complaints so long as it did so in good faith, and plaintiff has not demonstrated any bad faith by defendant." HT: Technology Law Update.

* Consumer Law & Policy Blog: "companies in two recently filed federal cases explicitly invoke [the recent Supreme Court decision in] Leegin as a justification for terminating the eBay auctions of competitors that charge lower prices online."

* Declan on whether anti-spyware vendors are screening for "fedware" (government keystroke loggers designed to capture data before it's encrypted).

Fun

* More proof that technology can save lives: During a power outage at a hospital, doctors were able to complete a surgery using the light of open cellphones.

* I’m a new fan of Oddee. Some recent posts (it helps to think about sexual connotations when interpreting the photos):
- "15 Unfortunately Placed Ads."
- "Most Unfortunate Logos Ever"
- "Unfortunate Business Names.”

Posted by Eric at 11:06 AM | Adware/Spyware , E-Commerce , General , Internet History , Marketing , Spam , Virtual Worlds | TrackBack



July 31, 2007

July 2007 Quick Links, Part I

By Eric Goldman

Search Engines

* According to this study, up to 40% of search queries are "re-finding queries" (i.e., the searcher is trying to re-find previously viewed information). The implication: "Because people repeat queries so frequently, search engines should assist their users by providing a means of keeping a record of individual users' search histories, perhaps via software installed on the user's own machine." As I've said before, search engines necessarily will need client-side software to see more consumer behavior if they want to improve relevancy for consumers. HT Greg Linden.

* People are spoofing the Googlebot.

* Hal Varian, a first-rate scholar at Berkeley's SIMS, is now Google's chief economist. I don't know how many other Internet companies have economists-on-staff, but I could see this as a growth area.

Intellectual Property

* Prediction: at least one person will go to jail for prereleasing the new Harry Potter book. It's just too conspicuous for the feds to ignore. Indeed, at this point, it seems unavoidable that every launch of an eagerly anticipated copyrighted work will also involve criminal prosecutions for unauthorized prereleasing (see, e.g., this post). Meanwhile, BusinessWeek is marveling at how many websites are now cooperating with copyright owners rather than fighting them.

* Capitol Federal Sav. Bank v. Eastern Bank Corp., 2007 WL 1885134 (D. Kan. June 29, 2007). Kansas TM owner lacks jurisdiction in Kansas over New England bank allegedly committing TM infringement, even though the New England bank bought keyword ads on the trademark (but, those ads were geo-targeted to Massachussetts). Along the way, the court (as usual) cites to Zippo but rejects the "website doing business" prong, instead requiring the plaintiff to show that the website was doing business in the forum jurisdiction.

* Masterson Marketing, Inc. v. KSL Recreation Corp., 2007 WL 1975425 (S.D.Cal. April 13, 2007). Oh man, what a crazy lawsuit. Freelancer takes product shot of hotel and licenses photo to hotel. Hotel then provides photo to third party websites (such as Expedia) as a way of promoting the hotel. The freelancer claims the hotel breached the license and proceeds to sue what seems like every website in the travel industry. This case is now going on 5 YEARS...over a product shot. (Disclosure note: I worked a little on the case when I was affiliated with Epinions, which is one of the defendants. Yes, it's that old). This ruling deals with the hotel's attempt to recreate the product shot with a different photographer. The court grants SJ to the defendants on the copyright infringement of a recreated shot (per ETS-Hokin). The court also makes it clear that the plaintiff isn't going to get any of the plaintiff's profits, which I assume means the plaintiff is going to get bubkus damages (plaintiff isn't eligible for statutory damages).

* From the NY Times: Mr. Skin is a website that provides subscribers with access to pictures and videos of naked actresses taken from movies. Mr. Skin doesn't normally get permission from copyright owners, seemingly making it a prime target of a business-ending copyright lawsuit. It tries to justify the wholesale republication of clips and stills under the guise of fair use because it claims to be a movie review site, but I doubt that many judges would find that argument very persuasive. However, movie studios have realized that promotion via Mr. Skin increases demand for the movies ("sex sells"), even if Mr. Skin is already showing the "money shot" on its site. As a result, instead of getting lots of C&D letters, Mr. Skin gets lots of promotional copies from movie studios.

* Microsoft is trying to patent what Ars Technica describes as the "mother of all adware." Microsoft is also trying to patent a system for tracking people to deliver relevant advertising. People may find these patents a little creepy, but I see them as both inevitable and ultimately a good thing.

* Washington Post: a new website is trying to position the purchase and resale of exclusively branded fashion items (e.g., Birkin purses) as an investment. And to stabilize the investment decisions, the website screens out the knock-offs and certifies authenticity.

* Domaining to become a $4B/year industry?

Posted by Eric at 12:40 PM | Copyright , Domain Names , Internet History , Patents , Search Engines , Trademark | TrackBack



July 02, 2007

June 2007 Quick Links

By Eric Goldman

Email

* Spam cases are coming at a regular clip, and it's tricky divining the latest state of the law. Two recent cases that caught my attention:
- US v. Impulse Media Group, 2007 WL 1725560 (W.D. Wash. June 8, 2007). This case involved a porn site that used affiliate marketers who didn't comply with the porn spam labeling requirements. The government argued that the advertiser should be strictly liable for this breach, but the court fairly emphatically rejected that (same as Cyberheat). But the news isn't all good for the defense, as the court also rejected its SJ motion, showing that the question of scienter about affiliate behavior remains a tough one for courts. Venkat's writeup.
- Kleffman v. Vonage Holdings Corp., No. 07-2406 (C.D. Cal. May 22, 2007). A nice complement to the Facebook v. ConnectU case, each holding that aspects of California's anti-spam laws are preempted by CAN-SPAM. In this case, the targeted behavior was the fact that the emailer may have used multiple email addresses to bypass electronic spam filters, but there wasn't anything false/deceptive about each email itself. See the BNA write-up and Venkat's writeup. I've lost track of the preemption cases, but it seems like state anti-spam laws are really getting munched after the Mummagraphics case.

* NYT on the pros/cons of captchas.

* Goodmail has expanded its pay-to-email system to Comcast, Cox, Roadrunner and Verizon.

Intellectual Property

* In Explorologist v. Sapient, involving the posting of a video deconstructing Uri Geller's act, the defendant is arguing (per CCBill) that 47 USC 230 preempts British copyright law.

* A rushed high school yearbook editor downloads lots of Facebook photos and adds them to the yearbook to fill space. Not a good idea!

* Techdirt: Who owns the right to license the design of military weapons to toy manufacturers?

* Marty on intellectual property protection for sexual activity.

Contracts

* A California man claims he bought a Gateway computer that never displayed text properly. Is he bound to the clickthrough agreement displayed on bootup? If this is the only way Gateway presented its contract, the answer should be no.

* At a conference at Southwestern Law School, I heard Prof. Lon Sobel talk about "idea submission" law. He illustrated the phenomenon that "where there's a hit, there's a writ": he suggested that hit TV shows produce an average of 6 "you stole my idea” demand letters. The great 1980s movie Coming to America produced 12 such letters, which resulted in 7 actual lawsuits. Interestingly, Prof. Sobel made the case (implicitly, not explicitly) that there is no separate law of "idea submissions," but rather any such doctrines are subsumed within standard contract law.

eBay

* eBay has changed its stance towards fighting counterfeiters, and it now does more policing itself.

* eBay shill bidder pays $400k to settle with NY AG.

Social Networking/Blogs

* The NCAA kicked a reporter out of the stadium for live-blogging the event. Tip to NCAA: It’s neither possible nor wise to control the flow of real-time information. Get over it. HT: Techdirt.

* Just came across this article: Stacey Schesser, MySpace on the record: The admissibility of social website content under the Federal Rules of Evidence, First Monday, volume 11, number 12 (December 2006).

* Wired: 7 MySpace sex offenders busted.

Marketing/Advertising

* AMCO Ins. Co. v. Lauren-Spencer, Inc., 2007 WL 1795970 (S.D. Ohio June 20, 2007). Insured offers jewelry from a website. Third party claims that the insured's jewelry constituted copyright infringement. Insured tenders the lawsuit to her insurance company under the advertising injury policy. Insurance company seeks a DJ of no coverage. The court says that the website constitutes advertising for the products, and so the policy applies to photos of the allegedly infringing jewelry items, even if the photos themselves were created by the insured. Observation #1: The advertising injury policy is very helpful to web businesses. Observation #2: Due to cases like this, I suspect insurance companies are reducing their willingness to offer advertising injury coverage to web businesses.

* Taylor v. XRG, Inc., 2007 WL 1816142 (Ohio App. Ct. June 21, 2007). The defendant was a vendor retained by bulk fax senders that handled consumer responses, including opt-outs from future faxes. Court held that the vendor wasn't liable for any TCPA/state anti-junk fax laws allegedly broken by the fax sender.

* Newish ad format: ads running 2 seconds in duration.

Search

* It's taken me a while to digest some of Google's new efforts. First, Google released two tools (a new toolbar button and a new personalized tab) to anticipate searchers' needs based on their past searches. Second, Google expanded its search history to incorporate all aspects of a user's searching through its services (what it calls "web history"). Meanwhile, Google has reduced its storage of personalized search data from 18-24 months to 18 months before that data gets anonymized. FWIW, I've been using Google personalized search since November 2005 (presumably, some of my data will be flushed any time now). Google has now captured almost 12,000 searches (with a high so far of 255 searches in a single day). Despite this, Google still doesn’t do a good job making predictions for me.

* Another great study from Jim Jansen (see the last one I blogged about). This one presented identical search results branded from different search engines and found that consumer ratings of relevancy varied based on the brand (Yahoo and Google came out on top). The logical inference--branding does matter to perceptions of relevancy. HT: SEL.

* Matt Cutts on the various ways humans affect Google search.

Domain Names

* Denmark's .dk TLD registry has enacted rules targeted at wiping out domainers. See here (Sec. 8.3.6).

* What's hotter than iPhones? iPhone-related domain names.

Adware/Spyware

* Declan on the latest legislative rally against spyware, the Senate's Counter SPY Act.

* The FTC issued final approval for the DirectRevenue settlement of $1.5M. Commissioner Leibowitz dissented, saying the cash payment was too light.

Online Reputations

* Avvo has filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit over its ratings of attorneys. The motion is very heavy on the 1st amendment and very light on 230. HT: WSJ Law Blog.

* The Washington Post gushes about Reputation Defender and its competitors, without really acknowledging the value of reputational accountability or the potential for takedown/pushdown abuse.

* Entrepreneurs figured out a way to game FICO scores. Fair Isaac will try to close the loophole.

* Ed Magedson of Rip-Off Report was the victim of a vicious harassment campaign demanding that he remove complaints from the site.

* Lengthy NYT article on Wikpedia. Not much new there, but it does hint at the young age of Wikipedians, and it talks about how "pride of ownership" motivates Wikipedians.

Other

* June 26 was the 10 year anniversary of the classic Reno v. ACLU Supreme Court opinion.

* The NYT has launched a new technology blog called BITS.

Posted by Eric at 02:37 PM | Adware/Spyware , Content Regulation , Copyright , Derivative Liability , Domain Names , Internet History , Licensing/Contracts , Marketing , Search Engines , Spam , Trademark | TrackBack



June 03, 2007

May 2007 Quick Links

By Eric Goldman

Spam

* MySpace Inc. v. The Globe.com Inc., No. CV 06-3391 RGK (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2007). This case has some personal interest because theglobe.com was one of my flagship clients before I left the law firm in 2000. This ruling held theglobe.com liable under CAN-SPAM, California's anti-spam law and the user agreement for spamming within the MySpace network. See the BNA writeup. Among other remarkable angles of this ruling, the court upholds the liquidated damages clause based on the anti-spam restrictions in the contract. Based on this adverse judgment, in April the parties settled for over $2.5M —basically, all of theglobe.com’s remaining cash, leaving its survival in serious jeopardy.

Domain Names

* Domainers are hot. Business 2.0 article on Kevin Ham, a major domainer who has wildcarded Cameroon's .cm TLD. NYT article on NameMedia, which owns 725,000 domains.

* From the AP: Entrepreneurs loaded up on Virginia Tech- and victim-related domain names following the massacre.

Marketing

* Broadway producer Scott Rudin was annoyed that the New York Times' website published user-submitted reviews of his play. To tweak them for doing so, the play cherry-picked some comments from the users' submissions and ran them in ads for the play with the attribution "The New York Times Online." An NYT editor objected to that attribution because it connoted an editorial judgment of the paper, rather than the paper's readers. Read the fun back-and-forth between Rudin and the editor.

* From the Washington Post: Billboards are the second-fastest growing ad category (after the Internet) due to increased traffic congestion and new digital billboard technology. And a technologist has developed eye-tracking technology that may let billboard advertisers accurately count eyeballs.

* Optima Funding, Inc. v. Strang, 2007 WL 1430699 (Cal. Ct. App. May 16, 2007). A mortgage company said it never sent unsolicited faxes or authorized anyone to do so on its behalf, but it did use lead generation companies. Strang sued Optima repeatedly in small claims court for TCPA violations. Optima struck back with a 17200 claim, basically saying that Strang was falsifying evidence to connect Optima to the faxes. In this ruling, the California Appellate Court upholds Strang's anti-SLAPP motion to strike.

* NYT: Custom postage stamps haven't really caught on. (Note: I just tested on them in my IP course exam).

* NYT: "The High Price of Creating Free Ads." Advertisers may not save any money by relying on user-generated ads. See my previous blog post about the legal costs of UGC ads.

* Rebecca discusses false advertising developments in one of our least favorite 1201 cases, Static Control v. Lexmark.

* AP: Wisconsin bar owner gets a ticket for serving Coors Light beer using a Miller Lite-branded tap. He should have known better than to cross the only major brewery still in Brewtown by serving Colorado beer.

Search Engines

* Brodsky v. Yahoo (C.D. Cal. complaint filed May 11, 2007). A stockholder derivative lawsuit against Yahoo alleging that Yahoo inflated its stock price by hyping its ad businesses. I read through the lengthy complaint and found it mostly nonsensical. For example, consider this allegation of wrongdoing: "whereas Yahoo!’s rivals were paying high-traffic vendors to route traffic through their Web sites, Yahoo! was charging large vendors for access and was dependent on that revenue to make its revenue targets, making Yahoo!’s Web site a less desirable location for vendors to drive traffic to." Huh? Search Engine Land has more.

* Google has blacklisted all term paper websites from its AdWords program. Reminds me a little of Macellari v. Carroll

Intellectual Property

* Grisman v. YouTube, Inc., C-07-2518 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2007). Second class action lawsuit against YouTube (and third major broadside, including the Viacom lawsuit). Appears to be highly derivative of the Football Association Premier League lawsuit (see the WSJ Law Blog for more on this).

* Clark v. Amazon.com, CIV S-05-2187 (E.D. Cal. May 10, 2007). Clark published a book, sold 187 copies and gave away 234. He sued Amazon (and other online booksellers) claiming that he alone had the exclusive right to distribute the book, so their resales were infringing. Amazon responded that the resales were covered by the First Sale doctrine. Clark responded by saying that Amazon sold more copies than he sold/gave away, but that's because Clark mistakenly believed that a seller's lifetime transactions rating were all based on sales of his book. Summary judgment for Amazon.

* Like other content producers, pornographers are feeling the sting of online competition--especially due to the low barriers to entry of amateur-produced content.

* From Washingon Post: Appraisers are going to war over recycling of data they generate during appraisals, which they claim violates promises made to them. When I was guest-blogging at Concurring Opinions, I blogged on the possible IP angles of this dispute.

* BusinessWeek: "Faking out the Fakers: Faced with a tidal wave of counterfeit goods, companies are turning to secretive sci-fi technology. But crooks catch on fast." It's like the analog version of DRM.

* The USPTO's collection of aural TMs.

Miscellaneous

* Bray v. QFA Royalties LLC, 2007 WL 1306517 (D. Colo. May 3, 2007). Posting a