Google AdWords Contract Upheld (Again)–Feldman v. Google
By Eric Goldman
Feldman v. Google, Inc., 2007 WL 966011 (E.D. Pa. March 29, 2007)
Yet another click fraud lawsuit, this time involving one of the 556 plaintiffs that opted out of the Google click fraud settlement. In my prior post, I predicted a lot of chicken-scratch litigation from those opt-outs. Here’s one!
In this case, a law firm advertised via Google AdWords and allegedly was click frauded. The lawyer then sued (on behalf of his law firm) Google for click fraud in Pennsylvania. Google defended based on its AdWords contract, which has a mandatory venue provision specifying that all lawsuits shall be brought in California. We saw virtually identical facts in the initial Person v. Google case, which also involved the AdWords contract (though that lawsuit was brought in NY). The result was the same in both cases–each time, the court upheld the AdWords contract’s mandatory venue clause and transferred the case to California.
Snarky aside: There’s one more fact in common between Person and Feldman–both of them were lawyers bringing the lawsuit on their own behalf (pro se). Indeed, I can think of two more pro se lawyer v. Google lawsuits, the Field and Bradley cases. In each of these four cases, the lawyer representing himself got his clock cleaned by the court. Maybe this confirms the old maxim that “A person who represents himself has a fool for a client.” At minimum, these pro se lawyers aren’t bringing honor to themselves or our profession.
Mechanically, Google’s contract formation process is bullet-proof. As the court describes:
To open an AdWords account, an advertiser had to have gone through a series of steps in an online sign-up process. (Hsu Decl. ¶ 3.) To activate the AdWords account, the advertiser had to have visited his account page, where he was shown the AdWords contract. (Hsu Decl. ¶ 4.)
Toward the top of the page displaying the AdWords contract, a notice in bold print appeared and stated, “Carefully read the following terms and conditions. If you agree with these terms, indicate your assent below.” (Hsu Decl. ¶ 4.) The terms and conditions were offered in a window, with a scroll bar that allowed the advertiser to scroll down and read the entire contract. The contract itself included the pre-amble and seven paragraphs, in twelve-point font. The contract’s pre-amble, the first paragraph, and part of the second paragraph were clearly visible before scrolling down to read the rest of the contract. The preamble, visible at first impression, stated that consent to the terms listed in the Agreement constituted a binding agreement with Google. A link to a printer-friendly version of the contract was offered at the top of the contract window for the advertiser who would rather read the contract printed on paper or view it on a full-screen instead of scrolling down the window. (Hsu Decl. ¶ 5.)
At the bottom of the webpage, viewable without scrolling down, was a box and the words, “Yes, I agree to the above terms and conditions.” (Hsu Decl. ¶ 4.) The advertiser had to have clicked on this box in order to proceed to the next step. (Hsu Decl. ¶ 6.) If the advertiser did not click on “Yes, I agree …” and instead tried to click the “Continue” button at the bottom of the webpage, the advertiser would have been returned to the same page and could not advance to the next step. If the advertiser did not agree to the AdWords contract, he could not activate his account, place any ads, or incur any charges. Plaintiff had an account activated. He placed ads and charges were incurred.
As I teach in my Cyberspace Law class, the very best online contracts are “mandatory non-leaky clickthrough” agreements. Like this one.
To get around this, the lawyer claims he was ignorant of the mandatory venue clause because he didn’t read the contract. Hmm…a lawyer entering into a contract that he didn’t read. Even if the contracting party weren’t a lawyer, this is a pathetic argument. Every lawyer learns very, very early in their first year Contracts course that a party is bound to contract terms they assent to, even if they chose not to read the terms.
The court also slams down the plaintiff’s other attacks on the contract:
* the contract didn’t contain a definite price. However, the contract contained the exact formula for computing the price.
* procedural unconscionability. The court rejects this because the “Plaintiff was a sophisticated purchaser, was not in any way pressured to agree to the AdWords Agreement, was capable of understanding the Agreement’s terms, consented to them, and could have rejected the Agreement with impunity.”
* substantive unconscionability. The court finds many of the contract terms reasonable.
This case is a nice win for Google for two reasons. First, by upholding the mandatory venue clause, it should inhibit AdWords advertisers from suing Google all over the country. Therefore, all lawsuits will have to be in Google’s home court, which raises the costs of lawsuits for most plaintiffs and gives Google some other home-court advantages. Second, by holding that this plaintiff is bound by the AdWords contract and those terms aren’t substantively unconscionable, Google can now invoke its risk management clauses (like the warranty disclaimers, limits of liability, etc.) to cut the economic heart out of the click fraud claim.