It’s been a busy year on the Schedule A beat. In reflecting on the year, I’ve put together this quick round-up of ten of the top developments, in (rough) order of increasing importance. Thanks to Professor Goldman for letting me share it here, for anyone else who may be interested in a high-level view of what’s been going on in this space.

10. ABC Corp. I v. Schedule A, No. 2024-1471, 2025 WL 2354441 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 14, 2025).

There aren’t many appeals in Schedule A cases. There are even fewer that are pursued all the way through a decision. So every appellate decision is notable in that sense. This one is notable because it was the second appeal in (what is, as far as I can tell) the first Schedule A case to reach the Federal Circuit. Following a reversal in the first appeal, Judge Durkin—quite correctly—granted summary judgment of design patent non-infringement. The patent owner appealed. The Federal Circuit affirmed. All well and good. But, based on the weakness of the infringement claims, it shouldn’t have taken five years and two appeals to reach this result.

9. Dyson Tech. Ltd. v. David 7 Store, 132 F.4th 526 (7th Cir. 2025).

In this case, as in so many Schedule A cases, a number of the defendants defaulted. Dyson asked Judge Seeger for an award of “statutory damages in the amount of five thousand dollars ($5,000) per Defaulting Defendant as to certain Defendants pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) and an award of Defendants’ infringing product revenue under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) as to certain Defendants.” Judge Seeger refused; he awarded Dyson $1,000 per defendant in statutory damages instead.

At the end of his final judgment order, Judge Seeger stated:

The Court declines the request to award profits because Plaintiff offered evidence of revenue, not profits. Revenue and profits are not the same thing. The Court declines the invitation to assume that all of the revenue equals profits.

And while it’s true that revenue and profits are not the same thing, the Lanham Act specifically provides that “[i]n assessing profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove defendant’s sales only; defendant must prove all elements of cost or deduction claimed.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117. And the Seventh Circuit has previously interpreted that part of § 1117 to mean exactly what it says. See WMS Gaming Inc. v. WPC Prods. Ltd., 542 F.3d 601, 609 (7th Cir. 2008), as amended (Sept. 16, 2008) (“WMS has provided evidence of the profits that PartyGaming earned from its U.S. sales. In the absence of evidence from PartyGaming showing that deductions are warranted, WMS is entitled to the revenues supported by its evidence.”).

Dyson filed an uncontested appeal and the Seventh Circuit reversed. That part wasn’t particularly notable, given the statutory language and precedent in WMS Gaming.

What is interesting is that the Seventh Circuit seemed to go out of its way to note that “[t]he Lanham Act does give district courts the ability to modify an award of profits if the court deems the modification just” and expressly stated that “[o]n remand, if the district court wishes to award more or less than these profits, it retains the discretion to do so, as long as it makes a finding based on the facts of the case.”

And this case isn’t done yet. The Seventh Circuit issued its decision in March. The mandate of the Seventh Circuit was filed on the district court docket in April. Dyson filed a motion to modify the final judgment order in June. That is the last entry on the PACER docket. See Dyson Tech. Ltd. v. Schedule A, No. 1:22-cv-05936 (N.D. Ill.). It will be interesting to see how Judge Seeger rules.

8. Corsearch enters the game

In 2024, Corsearch (a company that is well-known to trademark practitioners) bought a company called Edison IP. Edison IP appears to be a kind of “finders firm” for potential Schedule A plaintiffs. It’s not clear from the outside exactly how many cases Corsearch is involved in. But it seems clear from their advertising, including this 2025 webinar, that they think there’s a significant amount of money to be made off these cases.

7. Geographic expansion

In its webinar, Corsearch talked about “testing acceptance” of the Schedule A model in districts outside of the Northern District of Illinois (which is currently the most popular venue):

Again, it’s not clear from the public dockets which cases Corsearch is involved in. But it’s worth paying attention to the cases being filed in new districts. In one particularly interesting example, a judge in Tennessee initially granted an asset freeze but then substantially reduced it—over the plaintiff’s objection—from over $4M to just under $900k. See Grand Isle Games, LLC v. Schedule A, No. 3:25-cv-00390, 2025 WL 3517858, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 8, 2025). In doing so, the judge also expressed skepticism about the plaintiff’s RICO (yes, RICO) theory.

6. What’s going on in Pittsburgh?

It’s difficult to track the Schedule A cases that are filed in the WDPA because (as in some other districts), they aren’t filed exactly like they are in the NDIL. Instead of listing the defendant alias on a separate document, the aliases are listed on the complaint and the entire complaint is filed under seal. Nonetheless, it appears that the WDPA is becoming another popular venue for Schedule A cases. And at least one judge isn’t happy about it. Over the summer, Judge Ranjan started issuing standing orders in his Schedule A cases which, as Professor Goldman previously noted, “issues several instructions designed to curb SAD Scheme abuses.”

Notably, large portions of Judge Ranjan’s standing order appear to have been adopted as a district-wide standing order by DNJ. As far as I can tell, there were never a lot of Schedule A cases there; just a few starting in or around summer 2025. So that’s also interesting, including for the reasons Professor Goldman discussed previously.

5. The plaintiffs’ bar plays defense

In summer 2025, a website announced the creation of a new “bar association”—the Strategic Alliance for Fair Ecommerce, or “SAFE”—which appears to have been created for the purpose of defending the Schedule A business model. SAFE’s officers are prominent Schedule A plaintiffs’ attorneys, including two from the law firm Greer, Burns & Crain.

Greer, Burns & Crain also “partially funded” a forthcoming law review article that was first posted in 2025. The article was written by an attorney and a law student—both employed by an “anti-counterfeiting center” housed at (but apparently not funded by) Michigan State. SAFE has already cited this article in at least two Seventh Circuit amicus briefs.

4. Judge-shopping in the NDIL

In 2025, a number of NDIL judges called out—and some even sanctioned—parties or attorneys for (or in relation to) judge-shopping. See, e.g., Dongguan Deego Trading Company, Ltd. v. Junyao-US, No. 1:25-cv-04962 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2025) (Tharp, J.) (covered previously here); Huang v. Shenzhen Zhaocheng Technology Co., Ltd., No. 1:25-cv-11411 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2025), ECF 11 (Pacold, J.). Concerns about judge-shopping (actual or potential) aren’t new in the Schedule A space; indeed, Judge Durkin talked about practices that “raised the specter” of judge-shopping in his first Bose decision. See 2019 WL 6210939, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 2019). Nonetheless, this seems to be a rapidly-evolving area and there have been a number of developments, including in just the past few weeks. Watch this space for more soon.

3. Rule 11

Federal judges generally do not throw around the phrase “Rule 11” lightly. So it was notable to see that rule invoked in a number of Schedule A cases this year. Judge Daniel issued a particularly interesting set of decisions in October where he warned attorneys that certain things they were doing in Schedule A cases—things he had previously let them do—raised Rule 11 concerns:

• Nike, Inc. v. Quanzhou Yiyi Shoe Industry Co., 1:25-cv-03777 (N.D. Ill. October 10, 2025) (“Even then, while facing Rule 11 sanctions, the plaintiff has not come forward with any evidence indicating that the defendants in this case infringed the LEBRON mark….The only thing that saves the plaintiff in this instance is the Court’s prior approval of such orders. The Court will take this opportunity to remind plaintiff’s counsel of its obligations under Rule 11 and to put plaintiff’s counsel on notice that, from this point forward, the Court’s prior approval of such orders will not excuse such conduct in the future.”).
• Dorna Sports, S.L. v. Schedule A, No. 1:25-cv-09740 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 2025), ECF 25 (“How the plaintiff can allege in good faith that this defendant would do certain things when plaintiff’s counsel concedes that he has not dealt with this defendant before is beyond this Court’s comprehension.…That the Court failed to appropriately scrutinize past motions to seal does not justify continued violations of Rule 11.”);
• Grumpy Cat Ltd. v. Schedule A, No. 1:25-cv-09451 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 2025), ECF 18 (“The Court finds that the plaintiff had no competent evidence to support its allegations that the defendants initially named in this lawsuit would destroy evidence or hide or transfer assets. Yet the Court recognizes that past experience in this district, including before this Court, may have created a false sense that such allegations are acceptable. They are not.”).

And it’s not just Judge Daniel. For example, Judge Ellis also sanctioned a Schedule A plaintiff for “bringing [a] lawsuit without adequate investigation or resources.” Yan v. Schedule A, No. 1:24-cv-5403, 2025 WL 2098801, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 2025). Judges Pacold and Tharp also both invoked Rule 11 in the judge-shopping decisions mentioned above.

And it’s not just the NDIL. Judge Ranjan’s standing order, discussed above, also specifically mentions Rule 11 (“[T]o satisfy Rule 11, the complaint must plausibly plead allegations of personal jurisdiction, including contacts with the forum if specific jurisdiction is invoked.”). This language also appears in the DNJ standing order.

2. Smart Study Co. v. Shenzhenshixindajixieyouxiangongsi, No. 24-313, 2025 WL 3672740 (2d Cir. Dec. 18, 2025) (the “Baby Shark” case).

In Schedule A cases, the plaintiffs usually ask for—and receive—permission to serve the defendants by email. They also often allege that the defendants are Chinese (or at least “foreign”). Just a few weeks ago, the Second Circuit held that “email service on the Chinese defendants is prohibited by the Hague Service Convention, and thus improper under Rule 4(f)(3)” (previously covered on this blog here).

Does this mean that Schedule A defendants can no longer be served by email? Not yet. In Smart Study, the plaintiff (and presumably the court) assumed that the Hague convention actually governed service over the defendant-appellees. Presumably, and in appropriate circumstances, plaintiffs will try arguing that the convention doesn’t govern service in their cases.

And neither the Seventh nor the Eleventh Circuits have weighed in yet. This issue is, however, up on appeal in both:

• ADIDAS AG, v. localityi, No. 25-12597 (11th Cir.)
• Kangol LLC v. Hangzhou Chuanyue Silk Import & Export Co., No. 25-2205 (7th Cir.)

It will be interesting to see whether these circuits (which include the SDFL and NDIL) will follow the Second Circuit’s lead.

1. Eicher Motors Ltd. v. Schedule A, 794 F. Supp. 3d 543 (N.D. Ill. 2025).

There’s no real competition for the top spot. Love it or hate it, Judge Kness’ decision in Eicher Motors is clearly the biggest development in Schedule A litigation this year. (And I’m not just saying that because he cited me.)

Starting in the spring, Judge Kness “imposed an across-the-board stay in all newly-filed Schedule A cases on [his] docket” and took “a fresh and close look at the propriety of the Schedule A mechanism.” In his August decision in Eicher Motors, Judge Kness announced the result of his review.

He concluded that “the Schedule A mechanism should no longer be perpetuated in its present form.” Specifically, he opined that:

[T]he routine granting of preliminary injunctive relief in the absence of adversarial proceedings; the widespread sealing of judicial documents from public scrutiny; the pell-mell prejudgment freezing of defendants’ assets to ensure the practical availability of a legal remedy; and the mass joinder of multiple defendants is unjustified under the procedural rules and should not continue.

I won’t summarize it at length; I strongly recommend you read it yourself. It is well worth your time.

Of course, Judge Kness is only one judge. But his decision in Eicher Motors has already been cited by a number of his fellow judges, in the NDIL and elsewhere. It’s even caught the attention of at least some Seventh Circuit judges, who mentioned it in a recent unpublished decision:

On a final note, we acknowledge that a flood of similar claims of intellectual property infringement with no particular ties to the Northern District of Illinois have swamped and, understandably, troubled the district courts. See generally, Eicher Motors Ltd. v. P’ships & Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified on Schedule “A”, No. 25-CV-02937, 2025 WL 2299593, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2025). District courts have broad discretion in managing these cases, which often depart from “the general rule in favor of adversarial proceedings,” especially when they result in a default judgment. Id. Cf. Dyson Tech. Ltd. v. David 7 Store, 132 F.4th 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2025) (trademark plaintiffs may receive windfall when infringer fails to offer evidence of deductions).

Dolls Kill, Inc. v. MengEryt, No. 24-2841, 2025 WL 3033729, at *2 (7th Cir. Oct. 30, 2025) (footnote omitted).

Looking ahead:

In 2026, I’ll be watching a number of appeals closely, including the design patent case that currently on appeal in the Federal Circuit (full disclosure: I’m one of the amici): Jacki Easlick, LLC v. CJ Emerald (24-1538).

The Seventh Circuit has also scheduled an oral argument double-header for Friday, February 20, 2026 in both:

• Yinnv Liu v. Monthly, No. 25-02074
• Louis Poulsen A/S v. Lightzey, No. 25-02048 (Prof. Goldman joined an amicus brief in that case).

* * *

Prior Blog Posts on the SAD Scheme

• Second Circuit Rejects Email Service on Chinese Defendants in Baby Shark SAD Scheme Case
• 11th Circuit Sidesteps the SAD Scheme’s Problems–Ain Jeem v. Schedule A
• Another Shill Article Tries to Normalize the SAD Scheme
• Court Sanctions Plaintiff’s Lawyer for Unverified Claims That the Defendant Was Hiding–Guangzhou Youlan Technology Co. Ltd. v. Onbrill World
• SAD Scheme Cases Are a Cesspool of IP Owner Overreaches–Nike v. Quanzhou Yiyi Shoe Industry
• District of New Jersey Adopts SAD Scheme Standing Order
• Court “Sanctions” SAD Scheme Judge Shopping—Crimpit v. Schedule A Defendants
• Chicago-Kent SAD Scheme Symposium TOMORROW
• Amicus Brief Urges Seventh Circuit to Award Attorneys’ Fees in SAD Scheme Case–Louis Poulsen v. Lightzey
• Court Rejects Schedule A Claims Against Sellers of Compatible Parts/Accessories (Cross-Post)
• Judge Kness: the SAD Scheme “Should No Longer Be Perpetuated in Its Present Form”–Eicher Motors v. Schedule A Defendants
• SAD Scheme Lawyers Sanctioned for Judge-Shopping–Dongguan Deego v. Schedule A
• Judge Ranjan Cracks Down on SAD Scheme Cases
• Because the SAD Scheme Disregards Due Process, Errors Inevitably Ensue–Modlily v. Funlingo
• SAD Scheme-Style Case Falls Apart When the Defendant Appears in Court—King Spider v. Pandabuy
• Serial Copyright Plaintiff Lacks Standing to Enforce Third-Party Copyrights–Viral DRM v 7News
• Another N.D. Ill. Judge Balks at SAD Scheme Joinder–Zaful v. Schedule A Defendants
• Judge Rejects SAD Scheme Joinder–Toyota v. Schedule A Defendants
• Another Judge Balks at SAD Scheme Joinder–Xie v. Annex A
• Will Judges Become More Skeptical of Joinder in SAD Scheme Cases?–Dongguan Juyuan v. Schedule A
• SAD Scheme Leads to Another Massively Disproportionate Asset Freeze–Powell v. Schedule A
• Misjoinder Dooms SAD Scheme Patent Case–Wang v. Schedule A Defendants
• Judge Hammers SEC for Lying to Get an Ex Parte TRO–SEC v. Digital Licensing
• Judge Reconsiders SAD Scheme Ruling Against Online Marketplaces–Squishmallows v. Alibaba
• N.D. Cal. Judge Pushes Back on Copyright SAD Scheme Cases–Viral DRM v. YouTube Schedule A Defendants
• A Judge Enumerates a SAD Scheme Plaintiff’s Multiple Abuses, But Still Won’t Award Sanctions–Jiangsu Huari Webbing Leather v. Schedule A Defendants
• Why Online Marketplaces Don’t Do More to Combat the SAD Scheme–Squishmallows v. Alibaba
• SAD Scheme Cases Are Always Troubling–Betty’s Best v. Schedule A Defendants 
• Judge Pushes Back on SAD Scheme Sealing Requests
• Roblox Sanctioned for SAD Scheme Abuse–Roblox v. Schedule A Defendants
• Now Available: the Published Version of My SAD Scheme Article
• In a SAD Scheme Case, Court Rejects Injunction Over “Emoji” Trademark
• Schedule A (SAD Scheme) Plaintiff Sanctioned for “Fraud on the Court”–Xped v. Respect the Look
• My Comments to the USPTO About the SAD Scheme and Anticounterfeiting/Antipiracy Efforts
• My New Article on Abusive “Schedule A” IP Lawsuits Will Likely Leave You Angry
• If the Word “Emoji” is a Protectable Trademark, What Happens Next?–Emoji GmbH v. Schedule A Defendants
• My Declaration Identifying Emoji Co. GmbH as a Possible Trademark Troll

The post Schedule A: Ten Notable Developments in 2025 (Guest Blog Post) appeared first on Technology & Marketing Law Blog.

Unsurprisingly, the clone-and-revise was done poorly. For example, the complaint cross-references a sealed Schedule A, but Schedule A was never sealed and the defendant’s name is right there on the caption.

Schedule A typically enumerates a long list of e-commerce merchants and URLs. In a single-defendant case, it becomes gratitutious. Here are the total contents of the never-sealed Schedule A, nevertheless filed as a separate docket entry:

The plaintiff easily could have incorporated these two URLs into the complaint and skipped the references to Schedule A entirely.

As usual with SAD Scheme cases, the plaintiff claims that the defendant is hiding its true name and location. It’s unclear if this is part of the bad clone-and-revise, or if the lawyer relied solely on the plaintiff’s fact representations to its lawyer. Either way, these allegations are unverified.

Judge Daniel started asking the plaintiff’s lawyer some tough questions about the defendant’s location. That didn’t go well in the initial hearing:

The Court cautioned plaintiff’s counsel that it would start asking about any investigation plaintiff’s counsel conducted with respect to his justifications for alternative service if plaintiff’s counsel continued.

Plaintiff’s counsel continued…

I mean, if a judge warns counsel to stop talking and counsel keeps talking despite the warning, they get what they get…

The question is how the plaintiff’s lawyer knew that the defendant provided a fake name and address. The short answer is that the client said that to the lawyer, and the lawyer did not independently confirm the facts. Judge Daniel is not pleased:

The Court finds that plaintiff’s counsel failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry under the circumstances prior to claiming that the defendant, “on information and belief . . . has provided false name and physical address information in its registration for the Defendant Online Marketplace Accounts in order to conceal their locations and avoid liability for its unlawful conduct.” The record shows that neither the plaintiff nor plaintiff’s counsel knew that to be the case. The record further shows that neither the plaintiff nor plaintiff’s counsel had any prior experience with the defendant, which means that neither had a basis to form any beliefs as to the defendant’s identity or location. Further, the record shows that plaintiff’s counsel did nothing to investigate the defendant’s identity or location….

plaintiff’s counsel simply took the information provided by his client and filed suit…

Rather than ask Amazon to identify who the defendant was, hire an investigator to look into the limited information provided by the plaintiff, or otherwise check to see whether the defendant provided accurate information, plaintiff’s counsel claimed—without any evidentiary foundation—that the defendant provided a false name and operated under multiple fictitious names.

Judge Daniel is further irritated by what looks like legacy verbiage from the bad clone-and-revise job:

More troubling is the picture plaintiff’s counsel painted of the defendant without knowing anything about the defendant. According to plaintiff’s counsel: “[d]efendant has attempted to avoid liability by both concealing both their identities”; “an order authorizing service of process by email and/or electronic publication is proper as a result of the Defendant’s intentional efforts to conceal their identifies and operate their business online”; “Defendant has engaged in many deceptive practices in hiding their identities and accounts”; “[p]ast investigation and discovery of Online Marketplace Accounts in similar cases reveal that the Defendant appears to have provided false physical address information to the online marketplaces in order to avoid full liability.” Plaintiff’s counsel has not come forward with any credible evidence that supports any of those claims. And nowhere did plaintiff’s counsel tell the Court what he actually knew—that neither his client, Mr. Shen, nor plaintiff’s counsel had any prior knowledge or experience with the defendant and that no one had verified or attempted to verify who the defendant was or where the defendant was located.

All of this culminates in a rare Rule 11 sanction. The sactions are modest–$500 and 2 hours of CLE. Still, Rule 11 is so lightly enforced that any Rule 11 sanction is a stinging rebuke. The court doesn’t mince words: “The CLE is necessary because the Court finds that plaintiff’s counsel does not comprehend what Rule 11 requires.”

Judge Daniel concludes with a reference to the Seventh Circuit’s language in the Dolls Kill case:

this Court has cautioned and, at times, sanctioned other plaintiff’s counsel who made unfounded allegations or claims in similar cases involving alleged infringement by overseas defendants. And other courts in this district have been troubled by the allegations and claims raised by plaintiff’s counsel in similar cases. See, e.g., Dolls Kill, Inc. v. Mengeryt, No. 24-2841, slip op. at 3 (7th Cir. Oct. 30, 2025) (“[W]e acknowledge that a flood of similar claims of intellectual property infringement with no particular ties to the Northern District of Illinois have swamped and, understandably, troubled the district courts . . . .”).

Is the SAD Scheme abusive or beset by bad lawyering? ¿Por qué no ambos?

Case Citation: Guangzhou Youlan Technology Co. Ltd. v. Onbrill World, Docket No. 1:25-cv-11051 (N.D. Ill. complaint filed Sep 12, 2025). CourtListener page. This order is dated November 12, 2025. The plaintiff’s attorney is Robert Michael DeWitty.

Prior Blog Posts on the SAD Scheme

• SAD Scheme Cases Are a Cesspool of IP Owner Overreaches–Nike v. Quanzhou Yiyi Shoe Industry
• District of New Jersey Adopts SAD Scheme Standing Order
• Court “Sanctions” SAD Scheme Judge Shopping—Crimpit v. Schedule A Defendants
• Chicago-Kent SAD Scheme Symposium TOMORROW
• Amicus Brief Urges Seventh Circuit to Award Attorneys’ Fees in SAD Scheme Case–Louis Poulsen v. Lightzey
• Court Rejects Schedule A Claims Against Sellers of Compatible Parts/Accessories (Cross-Post)
• Judge Kness: the SAD Scheme “Should No Longer Be Perpetuated in Its Present Form”–Eicher Motors v. Schedule A Defendants
• SAD Scheme Lawyers Sanctioned for Judge-Shopping–Dongguan Deego v. Schedule A
• Judge Ranjan Cracks Down on SAD Scheme Cases
• Because the SAD Scheme Disregards Due Process, Errors Inevitably Ensue–Modlily v. Funlingo
• SAD Scheme-Style Case Falls Apart When the Defendant Appears in Court—King Spider v. Pandabuy
• Serial Copyright Plaintiff Lacks Standing to Enforce Third-Party Copyrights–Viral DRM v 7News
• Another N.D. Ill. Judge Balks at SAD Scheme Joinder–Zaful v. Schedule A Defendants
• Judge Rejects SAD Scheme Joinder–Toyota v. Schedule A Defendants
• Another Judge Balks at SAD Scheme Joinder–Xie v. Annex A
• Will Judges Become More Skeptical of Joinder in SAD Scheme Cases?–Dongguan Juyuan v. Schedule A
• SAD Scheme Leads to Another Massively Disproportionate Asset Freeze–Powell v. Schedule A
• Misjoinder Dooms SAD Scheme Patent Case–Wang v. Schedule A Defendants
• Judge Hammers SEC for Lying to Get an Ex Parte TRO–SEC v. Digital Licensing
• Judge Reconsiders SAD Scheme Ruling Against Online Marketplaces–Squishmallows v. Alibaba
• N.D. Cal. Judge Pushes Back on Copyright SAD Scheme Cases–Viral DRM v. YouTube Schedule A Defendants
• A Judge Enumerates a SAD Scheme Plaintiff’s Multiple Abuses, But Still Won’t Award Sanctions–Jiangsu Huari Webbing Leather v. Schedule A Defendants
• Why Online Marketplaces Don’t Do More to Combat the SAD Scheme–Squishmallows v. Alibaba
• SAD Scheme Cases Are Always Troubling–Betty’s Best v. Schedule A Defendants 
• Judge Pushes Back on SAD Scheme Sealing Requests
• Roblox Sanctioned for SAD Scheme Abuse–Roblox v. Schedule A Defendants
• Now Available: the Published Version of My SAD Scheme Article
• In a SAD Scheme Case, Court Rejects Injunction Over “Emoji” Trademark
• Schedule A (SAD Scheme) Plaintiff Sanctioned for “Fraud on the Court”–Xped v. Respect the Look
• My Comments to the USPTO About the SAD Scheme and Anticounterfeiting/Antipiracy Efforts
• My New Article on Abusive “Schedule A” IP Lawsuits Will Likely Leave You Angry
• If the Word “Emoji” is a Protectable Trademark, What Happens Next?–Emoji GmbH v. Schedule A Defendants
• My Declaration Identifying Emoji Co. GmbH as a Possible Trademark Troll

The post Court Sanctions Plaintiff’s Lawyer for Unverified Claims That the Defendant Was Hiding–Guangzhou Youlan Technology Co. Ltd. v. Onbrill World appeared first on Technology & Marketing Law Blog.

The first action was filed before Judge Tharp in the Northern District of Illinois. Judge Tharp rightly asked the plaintiff to justify joinder per 35 USC 299. In response, the plaintiff dismissed all of the defendants but one. In dismissing the other defendants, Judge Tharp ordered: “Plaintiff is advised that should it seek to reassert the same claim against any of the original defendants in this case, it must file a new case and indicate on the civil coversheet that the case is related to this case.”

The second action was filed in the Western District of Pennsylvania. It includes 10 defendants who the rightsowner voluntarily dismissed in the first action, and the filing did not indicate on the coversheet that it was related to the N.D. Illinois action. The W.D. Pa. judge granted the ex parte TRO (whoops), but when the twice-sued defendants appeared, the W.D. Pa. judge transferred their claims back to Judge Tharp in N.D. Ill.

Caught red-handed, the plaintiff’s lawyers explained to Judge Tharp that they refiled against the 10 defendants in W.D. Pa. “because that district court has a favorable approach in terms of joinder” (cleaned up). Points for honesty, deductions for a blatant lack of ethics and disregard for the integrity of the court system.

Judge Tharp did not appreciate the rightsowner’s end-run, saying (cleaned up):

this was clearly an episode of not just forum shopping but also contravention and disregard for the Court’s orders. The Court also found, as a factual matter, that the plaintiff’s failure to designate the cases as related was not a simple mistake. Because the plaintiff had made a deliberate, strategic decision not to brief joinder and instead live with the consequences of voluntarily dismissal, the Court found it unlikely that its order had been simply missed or misconstrued or neglectfully not taken into account.

In the latest ruling, he reiterates that plaintiff’s counsel engaged in sanctionable conduct. Judge Tharp dismissed the 10 defendants and will award attorneys’ fees.

Judge Tharp enumerates three different bases that allow him to impose sanctions for the rightsowner’s end-run:

28 U.S.C. § 1927. This sanction applies to vexatious multiplication of litigation. “By blatantly violating a direct court order in an intentional, strategic attempt to manipulate procedural rules to curate a favorable forum, the plaintiff at the very least exhibited reckless and indifferent disregard for the law.”

Rule 11. “The plaintiff’s representation, communicated in its civil cover sheet, that the Pennsylvania action was unrelated to the original action was not “objectively warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for [its] modification.”…. Moreover, the plaintiff flatly violated Local Rule 40 of the Western District of Pennsylvania” [which defines when cases are related].

Court’s Inherent Authority.

The plaintiff’s flagrant manipulation of judicial fora to sidestep adverse joinder rulings, coupled with its reckless (at a minimum) disregard for the Court’s explicit order designed to prevent such manipulation, warrants attorneys’ fees and dismissal of the overlapping defendants with prejudice…

The need to deter future misconduct further justifies the sanction. Violations of court orders that span multiple jurisdictions are difficult to detect, particularly in Schedule A cases where forum shopping is rampant and defendants rarely appear. Such misconduct results in a disproportionate drain on court resources, outsized harm on non-appearing defendants, and, therefore, an enhanced need for robust deterrence.

The court didn’t yet determine the total amount of attorneys’ fees being awarded, but it should be tens of thousands of dollars.

In summary, Judge Tharp has sharp words about this situation:

blatant forum shopping has become a regrettable staple of “Schedule A” cases, mass-counterfeit lawsuits against semi-anonymous online retailers who rarely appear and thus provide unprecedented leeway for plaintiffs to file, amend, dismiss, and re-file until they find a judge willing to permit joinder of the previously dismissed defendants in a single action

His sanctions surely won’t stop the bad behavior by SAD Scheme plaintiffs, but it’s a start.

Case Citation: Dongguan Deego Trading Company, Ltd. v. Junyao-US, 1:25-cv-04962 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2025)

* * *

A few more items of note regarding the SAD Scheme.

President Trump Adopts the SAD Scheme

President Trump’s team is using the SAD Scheme. See the complaint. This is the first time I’ve seen a Trump-affiliated entity adopt the practice, but I didn’t check if there are other cases. The Boies Schiller law firm filed this SAD Scheme lawsuit.

From my perspective, the SAD Scheme fits Pres. Trump’s brand perfectly: the SAD Scheme disrespects the rule of law, and so does Pres. Trump. The SAD Scheme is a microcosm of the broader US trend to dispense with due process. Of course Trump would love that.

New “Bar Association” Seeks to Normalize the SAD Scheme

Some SAD Scheme rightsowners’ lawyers have launched a website announcing a so-called bar association, the “Strategic Alliance for Fair Ecommerce,” a/k/a the “SAFE Bar Association.” (No link love from me, sorry). SAFE’s website seeks to normalize the SAD Scheme by…well, I’m not really sure because none of the website’s contents made sense to me, but I’m not in the target audience.

The website offers a list of seven “best practices” for SAD Scheme litigation. The website doesn’t explain who developed these “best practices” or who was consulted. For all we know, they are the product of a 2 minute ChatGPT session.

Most of the so-called “best practices” just restate what lawyers must do to comply with Rule 11. This is a major move only because the SAD Scheme has led to some lawyers treating Rule 11 compliance as optional. So if the “best practices” get SAD Scheme lawyers to follow Rule 11, yay I guess.

One so-called “best practice” recommends that each SAD Scheme case name no more than 100 defendants. Where did that number come from, and why is it better than 10 or 50 or 200 or 1M? The “best practice,” without any evidence, simply says that 100 defendants “balances judicial efficiency and allows practical case management.” From whose perspective? The joinder statutes literally tell us the right number of defendants–only defendants who are actually affiliated or working together, not just engaging in parallel independent acts involving the same plaintiff. I expect 100 always exceeds that number…by a lot. I’m also wondering if the “bar association” inaugural members have ever filed SAD Scheme cases with over 100 defendants, and how recently…

Otherwise, the “best practices” seem like an attempt by some rightsowners’ lawyers to throw other lawyers under the bus by claiming that they were “bad” lawyers if they don’t stick to the list. Thus, rightsowners’ lawyers can tell judges that the SAD Scheme community is trying to clean up its act. I don’t think the list is persuasive on either front but again, I’m not in the target audience. I think the SAD Scheme is never legitimate, so intra-plaintiffs’ bar squabbling doesn’t solve any problem. You can’t legitimize bad practices by condemning even worse practices.

In addition to the “best practices” list, the SAFE Bar Association website also includes a “resources” page with a total of two articles and four cases. You can guess the criteria used to curate this resource list.

The two articles (again, no link love here) have one thing in common: both directly attack my SAD Scheme article. I don’t mind the heat, but I do have a major problem with the piece titled “Schedule A cases. Not sad at all.”

This student note was authored by a Chicago-Kent 2L, and it won a writing competition by a student-run journal last year. During all relevant times, I believe the student was clerking for a law firm that filed SAD Scheme cases. However, the note does not disclose this fact. In other words, the note seeks to normalize the (dubious) litigation practices of its author’s employer without disclosing the employment status. I’ve often wondered if the writing competition judges (all students themselves) would have selected the note for an award if they knew this fact. At minimum, the omitted disclosure may change how readers evaluate the note.

Help Me Organize the Standing Orders Regarding the SAD Scheme.

Several judges have SAD Scheme Standing Orders, but I can’t systematically find and curate them. A bleg: if you know of any judge’s standing orders on Schedule A/SAD Scheme, please email me the URL. I need your help collecting ’em all!

* * *

Prior Blog Posts on the SAD Scheme

• Judge Ranjan Cracks Down on SAD Scheme Cases
• Because the SAD Scheme Disregards Due Process, Errors Inevitably Ensue–Modlily v. Funlingo
• SAD Scheme-Style Case Falls Apart When the Defendant Appears in Court—King Spider v. Pandabuy
• Serial Copyright Plaintiff Lacks Standing to Enforce Third-Party Copyrights–Viral DRM v 7News
• Another N.D. Ill. Judge Balks at SAD Scheme Joinder–Zaful v. Schedule A Defendants
• Judge Rejects SAD Scheme Joinder–Toyota v. Schedule A Defendants
• Another Judge Balks at SAD Scheme Joinder–Xie v. Annex A
• Will Judges Become More Skeptical of Joinder in SAD Scheme Cases?–Dongguan Juyuan v. Schedule A
• SAD Scheme Leads to Another Massively Disproportionate Asset Freeze–Powell v. Schedule A
• Misjoinder Dooms SAD Scheme Patent Case–Wang v. Schedule A Defendants
• Judge Hammers SEC for Lying to Get an Ex Parte TRO–SEC v. Digital Licensing
• Judge Reconsiders SAD Scheme Ruling Against Online Marketplaces–Squishmallows v. Alibaba
• N.D. Cal. Judge Pushes Back on Copyright SAD Scheme Cases–Viral DRM v. YouTube Schedule A Defendants
• A Judge Enumerates a SAD Scheme Plaintiff’s Multiple Abuses, But Still Won’t Award Sanctions–Jiangsu Huari Webbing Leather v. Schedule A Defendants
• Why Online Marketplaces Don’t Do More to Combat the SAD Scheme–Squishmallows v. Alibaba
• SAD Scheme Cases Are Always Troubling–Betty’s Best v. Schedule A Defendants 
• Judge Pushes Back on SAD Scheme Sealing Requests
• Roblox Sanctioned for SAD Scheme Abuse–Roblox v. Schedule A Defendants
• Now Available: the Published Version of My SAD Scheme Article
• In a SAD Scheme Case, Court Rejects Injunction Over “Emoji” Trademark
• Schedule A (SAD Scheme) Plaintiff Sanctioned for “Fraud on the Court”–Xped v. Respect the Look
• My Comments to the USPTO About the SAD Scheme and Anticounterfeiting/Antipiracy Efforts
• My New Article on Abusive “Schedule A” IP Lawsuits Will Likely Leave You Angry
• If the Word “Emoji” is a Protectable Trademark, What Happens Next?–Emoji GmbH v. Schedule A Defendants
• My Declaration Identifying Emoji Co. GmbH as a Possible Trademark Troll

The post SAD Scheme Lawyers Sanctioned for Judge-Shopping–Dongguan Deego v. Schedule A appeared first on Technology & Marketing Law Blog.

__

There would be some value to cleaning the patent database of worthless and low-value patents. So long as those patents remain in the database, they clutter it up, which raises the diligence costs and launch risks for true innovators. Traditionally, the imposition of patent maintenance fees was designed to declutter the patent database by making it too costly for low-value or worthless patents to remain. Revising the existing maintenance fee scheme might be worth considering.

Imposing fees based on a patent’s value raises at least two important questions. First, how does this fee fit into the overall taxation scheme? Is the fee just a tax, and if so, how will it interact with the existing set of taxes, and how would a change in taxes encourage or discourage socially valuable activity?

Second, imposing fees calculated based on a patent’s valuation makes no sense because the valuation is difficult and costly to estimate. Patent valuation is an art, not a science. As a result, a value-based fee will almost certainly drive patentholders to “sandbag” the PTO by understating the estimated valuation.

This inevitable valuation sandbagging risk reminds me of Pres. Trump’s frequent and well-documented personal strategy of valuing an asset low when he reported its value to the government and valuing the same asset high when seeking third-party financing. Do we really want to encourage such unethical and duplicitous gamesmanship?

Potential investigations into valuation sandbagging gives the government another discretionary enforcement tool that could be wielded to punish disfavored entities and exert leverage over them. We should not assume that any investigations into patent valuation calculations would be done in good faith to improve our country. Objectively calculated fees, like the existing maintenance fee scheme, avoid the risks of discretionary enforcement abuse.

The post Comments on Setting Patent Fees Based on Their Value appeared first on Technology & Marketing Law Blog.

Dupe culture is everywhere. Consumers seek out dupes online, in stores, and on social media, hoping to score less expensive versions of the luxury items they lust after; stores and influencers increasingly position products as dupes, a form of comparative advertising they hope will catch the attention of those consumers. But “dupe” is a term that can mean a lot of different things, from legitimate alternatives to straight-up counterfeits. Determining when a dupe seller crosses the line and a dupe infringes intellectual property rights can be tricky.

The legal issues dupes raise aren’t necessarily novel. Certain types of dupes are just an update on the concept of “house brands” or “private label brands,” which are usually deemed unlikely to cause confusion. When a chain retail store places a nationally-known brand—say, Herbal Essences shampoo—next to a generic or store brand version featuring lookalike packaging and a similar but non-identical name like “Organic Essentials,” consumers tend to understand what they are (and are not) getting. [Eric’s note: for a discussion about these physical-space adjacencies, see this paper.]

But the rise in dupes has brought a corresponding rise in dupe lawsuits, or at least lawsuits that offer up defendants’ or consumers’ use of the term “dupe” as evidence of confusing similarity or intent to deceive. The most recent of those is Lululemon’s suit against Costco. Filed June 27 in the Central District of California, the complaint alleges Costco infringes Lululemon’s trademark, trade dress, and design patent rights in its Scuba hoodies and sweatshirts, DEFINE jackets, and ABC pants.

According to Lululemon, with dupes, the confusion is the point: “one of the purposes of selling ‘dupes’ is to confuse consumers at the point-of-sale and/or observers post-sale into believing that the ‘dupes’ are Plaintiffs’ authentic products when they are not.” Despite the reference to post-sale confusion, though, Lululemon’s trademark and trade dress claims focus on confusion at the point of sale. And despite the assertion of “prestige and renown” of the sub-brands and products in play (renowned pants, really?), the company did not include a dilution claim, nor would it likely succeed with one. Lululemon dupes are widely sought-after—the company cites the popular #LululemonDupes hashtag proliferating on TikTok and other social media platforms—and these particular dupes have already garnered a lot of attention, including write-ups in the New York Times and Washington Post that focused on their similarity to the Lululemon pieces. But none of that guarantees a finding of infringement.

Lululemon also points out that private-label products account for over a third of Costco’s sales, but Costco doesn’t inform shoppers which of the products they sell are private-label-licensed and which are not, increasing the likelihood of confusion. In other words, if shoppers (correctly) believe that Kirkland diapers are made by the manufacturers of Huggies and Kirkland batteries come from Duracell, they might also assume that a “Kirkland 5 Pocket Performance Pant” that looks similar to Lululemon’s ABC pant is, in fact, the same pant manufactured by Lululemon under agreement with Costco and sold under a different name and at a different price point. That argument could potentially be compelling, but it’s undermined by the fact that only one of the six products at issue is sold under the Kirkland brand, and several are sold bearing trademarks from well-known clothing brands such as Danskin and Jockey.

The first product Lululemon discusses in its complaint is the DEFINE jacket, for which the company owns two federal trade dress registrations and, it alleges, common law trade dress rights.

Lulemon articulates the trade dress to comprise “a jacket having:

• approximately mirror image curvilinear ornamental lines on the front of the jacket;
• one set of the mirroring curvilinear ornamental lines on the front extend from the chest to the waist;
• another set of the mirroring curvilinear lines extending from the chest toward the neck region;
• a curved ornamental line that extends across the mid-back region of the jacket; and
• an approximately mirror image curvilinear ornamental line from below the ornamental line across the mid-back of the region towards the bottom seam of the jacket.”

Lululemon goes on to argue that the trade dress has become distinctive and source-indicating, citing examples of third-party media coverage and television appearances and including photos of celebrities wearing the product.

An accused infringer might be contemplating whether the asserted trade dress is functional. That’s probably why Lululemon is already on the defensive, including in its complaint photos of non-infringing jackets from third parties and asserting “The design features embodied by the DEFINE Trade Dress are not essential to the function of the product, do not make the product cheaper or easier to manufacture, and do not affect the quality of the product. The design elements of the DEFINE Trade Dress are not a competitive necessity for apparel products.” It includes a similar rebuttal and images of non-infringing products for each of the allegedly infringed clothing items.

But utilitarian functionality and aesthetic functionality might both be in play, and “not a competitive necessity” doesn’t adequately address the test for the latter. In most jurisdictions, courts ask whether granting one party exclusive rights to a feature puts competitors at a non-reputation-related disadvantage. That test is broad enough to encompass design elements that consumers want because they give the product a desirable look, even if they’re not “necessary.” In the case of the DEFINE jacket, the curvilinear lines might make the jacket more flattering by creating the impression of curves underneath, or they might just look cool. A jacket that lacks curvilinear lines or features them with different placement might be less appealing not because it lacks features that serve as source indicators, but because it lacks features consumers want—putting competitors who can’t use those features at a disadvantage that isn’t about brand.

The two products Lululemon accuses of infringing its rights in the DEFINE jacket are the Jockey Ladies Yoga Jacket and the Spyder Women’s Yoga Jacket, shown below side by side with the Lululemon jacket.

The horizontal curved line on the front of the DEFINE jacket is absent from the Jockey jacket and appears much lower on the Spyder jackets; the vertical curved lines are present on both, but slightly different. The horizontal curved line on the back of the DEFINE jacket is much straighter on the Spyder jacket and appears on a different spot on the Jockey one. Would either jacket create a likelihood of consumer confusion, considering not just the jackets’ similarities but also their different price points, retail channels, and distinguishing brand names?

Lululemon also asserts rights in its ABC pant. Unlike the sweatshirt and jacket, there are no registered trademark, trade dress, or design patent rights for this one—just common law rights, or as Lululemon grandly puts it, “extensive common law rights in the distinctive overall appearance and holistic design of its ABC pants.” The claimed trade dress comprises a semi-matte fabric with four-direction stretch, an “outlined area in the crotch region,” an “ornamental line extending across the rear of the pants,” and curved lines around the front pockets with metallic circles. As one of us told the Associated Press, this assertion of rights seemed like a stretch (pun intended). Is Lululemon really asserting that a curved triangle seam on the crotch of a pair of pants is non-functional, indicates source to consumers, and has acquired sufficient distinctiveness to merit exclusive rights? Can the company argue with a straight face that this matter is visible in a trademark space—a place consumers expect to see source-indicating matter?

Here, as with its other asserted products, Lululemon points to advertising for the pants, television appearances, celebrities seen wearing them (including President Obama!), and third-party media coverage. But the case law makes clear that establishing acquired distinctiveness for trade dress features is more complicated. Typically it requires “look-for advertising” that draws attention to the features claimed, rather than just sales, general advertising, and consumer familiarity with the overall product. The Lululemon pant and the Kirkland pant may look similar—they may be similar—but we are skeptical that a court or jury would find protectable elements in the first place or that Kirkland’s use of similar features could be found to create a likelihood of confusion.

The final set of products in which Lululemon asserts rights—including trade dress, trademark, and design patent rights—are the Scuba hoodies and sweatshirts. Its asserted common law trade dress covers the shape and design of the kangaroo pocket and curved lines on the front of the garment, highlighted in the complaint in red:

With this trade dress too, we can foresee arguments about functionality, distinctiveness, and failure to function as a mark. Because it is unregistered, Lululemon will bear the burden of establishing protectability.

The company also owns a federal registration for SCUBA for use in connection with hooded sweatshirts, jackets, coats, and tops. One of the sweatshirts that Costco sells is designated “Hi-Tec Men’s Scuba Full Zip,” which Lululemon argues infringes its SCUBA trademark. A quick Google search, though, yields many results for “scuba” sweatshirts or garments with “scuba” pockets from a number of different brands, implying that perhaps the term is generic for certain clothing items or styles or descriptive enough that Costco’s use might qualify as a fair use.

Lululemon also alleges common law trademark rights in TIDEWATER TEAL for a variety of products, including apparel and a belt bag, and claims that Costco has advertised and sold some of its Danskin Half-Zip Pullovers using the phrase “tidewater teal.” Assuming the Danskin pullover is teal in color, there’s a fair use argument to be made here as well. But “tidewater teal” is a lot more specific than “teal” and seems too specific to be a coincidence. A court or jury might also find that even if those uses of “scuba” and “tidewater teal” in isolation aren’t enough to support infringement claims, in the context of the similar items with which they’re used, they provide evidence of bad faith and an effort to optimize search engine results and trade on confusion. Lululemon can tell a story that consumers seeking out the Lululemon Tidewater Teal SCUBA product are likely to be led straight to the Danskin pullover in tidewater teal available at Costco, increasing the likelihood of confusion (remember the story the Ninth Circuit told in MTM v. Amazon (before subsequently reversing itself) about the consumer searching for “MTM Special Ops watches” for her brother and buying the wrong one?).

In addition to its trademark and trade dress claims about the Scuba sweatshirt, Lululemon also asserts infringement of two design patents.

Design patents are different from trademarks. The test for design patent infringement is, basically: Does the accused product look the same, in all relevant respects, to the claimed design? Let’s break that down a bit.

We start by looking at the claim. The design patents here both claim designs for garments. But they cover different garments and vary in scope.

A design patent covers what is shown in solid lines in the drawings. Anything shown in dotted lines is not part of the claimed design.

Here is a representative image from the D’219 patent. As you can see, it covers a jacket or sweater-like design without a hood. The zipper and the front pocket are disclaimed:

In the context of this case, those disclaimer lines mean that, for the purposes of infringement, the factfinder has to look at the appearance of everything but the zipper and the front pocket. If all the parts of an accused product look the same as the parts shown here in solid lines look the same, the patent will be infringed.

In the D’442 patent, there is a claimed hood but the arms are disclaimed, as well as the zipper and front pocket:

So this patent is infringed if an accused garment has the same hood shape, curved lines across the chest, bottom band, and anything else shown in solid lines.

Importantly, the test for design patent infringement—unlike trade dress infringement—does not consider whether consumers would be confused as to the source, sponsorship or approval of the garments. All that matters is visual similarity. (For those who would like a larger explanation of this point, see Part I(B)(1) of this article.) And although design patent cases use the phrase “substantially similar” to refer to the infringement standard, the test is very different than the “substantial similarity” required in copyright law. (Id. at n.64.)

And the degree of visual similarity required is high. For example, the Federal Circuit recently affirmed a district court’s decision that the pool design shown below on the right did not infringe the design shown below on the left:

This is consistent with the court’s prior decisions.

So, first we compare the claimed design to the accused product. If the designs are “sufficiently distinct that it will be clear without more that the patentee has not met its burden of proving the two designs would appear ‘substantially the same’ to the ordinary observer,” then the case is over; there is no infringement. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).

If the designs are not “plainly dissimilar,” then—and only then—the factfinder can consider the prior art in the analysis. Id. Importantly, the prior art cannot be used to expand the presumptive scope of the design patent. See Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc., 796 F.3d 1312, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (rejecting a patentee’s attempt to do that). It can only be used to narrow the presumptive scope of the claim where the claimed and accused designs are already visually close. (For some visual examples, see Chapter 12 here.)

Now, let’s look at Lululemon’s infringement claims. The complaint contains these images showing the D’219 patent and an accused product. Recall that the shape of the front pocket and the shape of the zipper don’t matter here—we look only at what is shown in solid lines.

A court applying the Egyptian Goddess test might well decide this accused product is plainly dissimilar and end the analysis there. While the design concepts here are similar, the actual design differs in a number of not immaterial respects. For example, the main visual design element on the front—the pieced portions extending from the neck to the underarm areas—are notably different shapes. In the Lululemon design, they’re curved. In the accused design, they’re not. The curves on the back have the same issue. And the wedge-shapes on the back are also noticeably different. That’s enough to defeat a finding of infringement.

The hoodie claim suffers from the same issues:

This patent also raises another issue: The shape of the hood. It’s difficult to accurately depict the shapes of certain soft articles with line drawings. But based just on these drawings, the hoods may also differ in visually meaningful ways.

These accused products are certainly similar, at a conceptual level, to the Lululemon designs. But that’s not enough to infringe the patents.

One might ask whether validity is an issue here. After all, patentable designs are supposed to be novel, nonobvious, and ornamental. The statutory requirements might sound difficult to meet but, in practice, they are not. (See here and here.) The Federal Circuit’s 2024 en banc decision in LKQ v. GM gives Costco new arguments that they could make if they wanted to challenge one or both designs as nonobvious. But it’s not yet whether these new arguments—and the new LKQ standard—will actually result in more successful obviousness challenges.

At this point, readers who have stuck with us this far (thank you!) may be asking: But didn’t Costco copy Lululemon? Quite possibly! But even if Costco copied, that doesn’t mean that it infringed any of the IP rights asserted here. At the same time, this lawsuit seems to have inspired a lot of interest—in the Costco products. Other brand owners thinking about taking similar enforcement actions might want to spend some time meditating on that.

The post Analyzing the Lululemon v. Costco Dupe Suit (Guest Blog Post) appeared first on Technology & Marketing Law Blog.

This is a design patent SAD Scheme case before Judge Jeremy C. Daniel in the Northern District of Illinois. (He’s a Biden appointee from 2023). Immediately after the plaintiff filed its papers on November 1, Judge Daniel sua sponte issues an order that starts:

experience has shown that not all defendants named in a Schedule A case work together. More importantly, experience has shown that joinder under Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 is rarely appropriate in Schedule A cases.

Hello! The joinder problems should be obvious even without any past litigation experience, but at least the judge is now preemptively asking the right questions. Perhaps Judge Daniel feels a little burned by past SAD Scheme plaintiff gamesmanship?

Judge Daniel rejects the standard boilerplate allegations about joinder:

the complaint alleges that, “On information and belief, Defendants are an interrelated group of infringers working in active concert to knowingly and willfully make, use, offer for sale, sell, and/or import into the United States for subsequent sale or use the same product that infringe the **552 Patent in in a series of occurrences.” This is a conclusory statement that does nothing to establish the propriety of joinder. Moreover, experience has shown that, while some individual defendants may operate several online stores, and while some individual defendants may coordinate with other defendants before or after the filing of the infringement action, rarely, if ever, have all defendants named in a Schedule A case worked together.

As a result, Judge Daniel gives the plaintiff a choice: file a brief justifying joinder, or amend the complaint to reduce the defendants down to those who are properly joined.

* * *

Most SAD Scheme complaints contain some variation of this allegation: “Defendants are an interrelated group of infringers working in active concert.” However, the complaints rarely or never back up this claim with any defendant-specific supporting facts. Instead, the only “supporting” evidence eventually provided by plaintiffs is that the merchants sold the same (allegedly infringing) item in parallel with each other on the online marketplaces, which does not satisfy joinder standards (especially for patent cases, where Congress has imposed higher standards for joinder). Nevertheless, the plaintiffs hope the judges will take the joinder allegations on faith, then forget to double-check as the facts in the case actually emerge.

In this order, Judge Daniel instead “requires counsel for the plaintiff to show cause why the allegation that ‘defendants are working in active concert’ does not violate [FRCP] Rule 11(b)(3).” In other words, Judge Daniel calls BS on the joinder allegations and is prepared to hold the plaintiff’s lawyer (Robert Michael Dewitty of Dewitty And Associates) accountable for trying. (To be clear, if Judge Daniel is unsatisfied with the explanation, I expect the most “severe” sanction will be dismissal of the case, nothing more).

I haven’t looked to see if Judge Daniel has questioned joinder in other SAD Scheme cases. Either way, it seems like he’s now fully alert to the SAD Scheme joinder problem and should be inclined to similarly interrogate every future SAD Scheme case that makes it to his courtroom. Maybe that will inspire other N.D.Ill. judges to proactively do the same. And while they are at it, maybe the judges can preemptively probe other individualized fact-based questions like jurisdiction. #StoptheSADScheme

Case Citation: Dongguan Juyuan Precision Technology Co., Ltd. v. The Partnership and Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A, No. 1:24-cv-11301 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2024)

UPDATE: Shocker…the plaintiff dismissed the complaint entirely rather than show joinder. The judge accepted the dismissal rather than pursuing the Rule 11 violation. This becomes a no-harm, no-foul situation, even though there was a foul and the judge should have held the plaintiff to account.

Prior Blog Posts on the SAD Scheme

• SAD Scheme Leads to Another Massively Disproportionate Asset Freeze–Powell v. Schedule A
• Misjoinder Dooms SAD Scheme Patent Case–Wang v. Schedule A Defendants
• Judge Hammers SEC for Lying to Get an Ex Parte TRO–SEC v. Digital Licensing
• Judge Reconsiders SAD Scheme Ruling Against Online Marketplaces–Squishmallows v. Alibaba
• N.D. Cal. Judge Pushes Back on Copyright SAD Scheme Cases–Viral DRM v. YouTube Schedule A Defendants
• A Judge Enumerates a SAD Scheme Plaintiff’s Multiple Abuses, But Still Won’t Award Sanctions–Jiangsu Huari Webbing Leather v. Schedule A Defendants
• Why Online Marketplaces Don’t Do More to Combat the SAD Scheme–Squishmallows v. Alibaba
• SAD Scheme Cases Are Always Troubling–Betty’s Best v. Schedule A Defendants 
• Judge Pushes Back on SAD Scheme Sealing Requests
• Roblox Sanctioned for SAD Scheme Abuse–Roblox v. Schedule A Defendants
• Now Available: the Published Version of My SAD Scheme Article
• In a SAD Scheme Case, Court Rejects Injunction Over “Emoji” Trademark
• Schedule A (SAD Scheme) Plaintiff Sanctioned for “Fraud on the Court”–Xped v. Respect the Look
• My Comments to the USPTO About the SAD Scheme and Anticounterfeiting/Antipiracy Efforts
• My New Article on Abusive “Schedule A” IP Lawsuits Will Likely Leave You Angry
• If the Word “Emoji” is a Protectable Trademark, What Happens Next?–Emoji GmbH v. Schedule A Defendants
• My Declaration Identifying Emoji Co. GmbH as a Possible Trademark Troll

The post Will Judges Become More Skeptical of Joinder in SAD Scheme Cases?–Dongguan Juyuan v. Schedule A appeared first on Technology & Marketing Law Blog.

Section 299 should cast a long shadow over SAD Scheme patent cases, which routinely attempt to join defendants who are engaging in parallel but independent acts of alleged infringement–exactly what Section 299 doesn’t permit. Indeed, if judges reliably raised Section 299 objections in SAD Scheme patent cases sua sponte, I think SAD Scheme patent cases would simply not exist.

We recently saw how Judge Pacold used Section 299 to cause a SAD Scheme patent case to fall apart. (Note: I have previously criticized Judge Pacold for providing online SAD Scheme templates that encourage plaintiffs to make factually threadbare filings). The plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ dining chairs or barstools infringed two of plaintiff’s design patents. It was obvious that the defendants’ products were not the “same” product:

although many of the defendants’ barstools share some common features, there are numerous substantial differences between them. Perhaps most significantly, although many of the defendants’ barstools exhibit some similarity in the design of the seat and backrest, the bases of many of the barstools vary widely. Some of the barstools have legs; others are supported by a single, central column with a wide base. Even considering only the barstools with legs or only the barstools with a central column, the bases of the barstools within each subcategory still vary with respect to their width, height, materials, and shapes. Even narrowing the court’s examination to just those barstools with a central column that appear to have a swiveling capability, some differences remain—such as the presence, placement, or shape of either a footrest or what looks to be a handle for adjusting the height of the barstool. Moreover, in addition to these more obvious differences in the bases of the barstools, even the seats and backrests of some barstools appear to contain some variances in the amount of cushioning present, the size of the backrest and seat, and possibly the materials used in the construction of the barstools.

These points are well-taken, but Section 299 shouldn’t require this kind of complicated fact analysis. The plaintiff has the burden of explaining how the defendants’ products are all the same, not similar. Thus, the judge adds that even if some of the accused items  fully embody all of the patent claims, the statute specifies that doesn’t mean they are the same product. This is not a hard call.

This misjoinder dictates either dismissal of the misjoined parties or severance where the plaintiff has to pay the filing fees for each severed action. The judge gives the plaintiff the choice between these options. Given that plaintiffs often need the filing fee savings to make SAD Scheme cases cost-effective, I expect this lawsuit to dissolve completely.

Because the cases conflict with Congress’ express directions, I hope other judges will vigorously police Section 299 when confronted with SAD Scheme patent cases, even if the defendants aren’t around to raise the issue. Furthermore, statutorily extending Section 299 to cover trademark and copyright cases would almost certainly permanently end all SAD Scheme cases.

Case Citation: Wang v. Schedule A Defendants, No. 24-cv-759 (N.D. Ill. April 24, 2024)

Prior Blog Posts on the SAD Scheme

• Judge Hammers SEC for Lying to Get an Ex Parte TRO–SEC v. Digital Licensing
• Judge Reconsiders SAD Scheme Ruling Against Online Marketplaces–Squishmallows v. Alibaba
• N.D. Cal. Judge Pushes Back on Copyright SAD Scheme Cases–Viral DRM v. YouTube Schedule A Defendants
• A Judge Enumerates a SAD Scheme Plaintiff’s Multiple Abuses, But Still Won’t Award Sanctions–Jiangsu Huari Webbing Leather v. Schedule A Defendants
• Why Online Marketplaces Don’t Do More to Combat the SAD Scheme–Squishmallows v. Alibaba
• SAD Scheme Cases Are Always Troubling–Betty’s Best v. Schedule A Defendants 
• Judge Pushes Back on SAD Scheme Sealing Requests
• Roblox Sanctioned for SAD Scheme Abuse–Roblox v. Schedule A Defendants
• Now Available: the Published Version of My SAD Scheme Article
• In a SAD Scheme Case, Court Rejects Injunction Over “Emoji” Trademark
• Schedule A (SAD Scheme) Plaintiff Sanctioned for “Fraud on the Court”–Xped v. Respect the Look
• My Comments to the USPTO About the SAD Scheme and Anticounterfeiting/Antipiracy Efforts
• My New Article on Abusive “Schedule A” IP Lawsuits Will Likely Leave You Angry
• If the Word “Emoji” is a Protectable Trademark, What Happens Next?–Emoji GmbH v. Schedule A Defendants
• My Declaration Identifying Emoji Co. GmbH as a Possible Trademark Troll

The post Misjoinder Dooms SAD Scheme Patent Case–Wang v. Schedule A Defendants appeared first on Technology & Marketing Law Blog.

* * *

A copyright owner, Viral DRM, brought SAD Scheme cases against YouTube uploaders in the Northern District of California (not the more typical N.D. Ill. venue). “Plaintiff alleges Defendants downloaded and copied Plaintiff’s copyrighted materials from YouTube, and then re-uploaded infringing versions of Plaintiff’s copyrighted media content to their YouTube channels.” Viral DRM sued 20 defendants enumerated in a Schedule A and got an ex parte TRO. In a plot twist, the court denies Viral DRM’s preliminary injunction request and orders Viral DRM to explain its bases for jurisdiction and joinder or else the case will fall apart.

Jurisdiction. Four defendants submitted 512(g) counternotifications and thus agreed to jurisdiction in YouTube’s home court (N.D. Cal.). That leaves open the jurisdictional basis for the other 16 defendants.

Viral DRM argued:

Defendants committed the following intentional acts expressly aimed at California: (1) downloading Viral DRM’s works from YouTube, Instagram, Facebook, or Twitter; (2) removing Viral DRM’s copyright management information from Plaintiff’s videos; and (3) uploading infringing works to YouTube

These kinds of generic arguments might fly in N.D. Ill, but not N.D. Cal. The court says that uploading videos to YouTube doesn’t create jurisdiction in YouTube’s home court. Without jurisdiction, the court vacates the TRO for the 16 defendants.

Joinder. The court rejects a standard joinder argument used by SAD Scheme plaintiffs:

Plaintiff does not allege each defendant is jointly, severally, or in the alternative liable for the infringement of another defendant arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. And it does not appear that it could do so as Schedule A to the Complaint alleges the Defendants have different websites and different names, and Mr. Rollins’ declaration in support of the TRO indicates Defendants are from different countries. There are no allegations suggesting the claims against each separate Defendant arise out of the same transaction or occurrence; rather, they allege separate acts of copyright infringement.

Implications

The court concludes that the defendants without jurisdiction or misjoined will be dismissed. Odds are high that Viral DRM will abandon the case or whittle it down to one or just a handful of defendants.

This is a good outcome, but I’m once again troubled by how we got here. The jurisdictional and joinder defects were apparent from the complaint. In other words, the court could have–AND SHOULD HAVE–called out these issues during the ex parte TRO hearing. If the court had done so, the court would not have granted the ex parte TRO against most/all of the defendants. Instead, Viral DRM got an ex parte TRO it never deserved. The judge doesn’t issue a mea culpa for her avoidable mistake or excoriate Viral DRM for getting an undeserved TRO. I reiterate my view that ex parte hearings are notoriously error-prone and should be viewed as an extreme option.

Worse, even if the court fixed the problem at the preliminary injunction stage, SAD Scheme plaintiffs typically do much of their damage using the ex parte TROs (though it’s not clear from the court’s opinion if that happened in this case). Accordingly, the court’s erroneous issuance of the TRO had dangerous real world consequences. For this and many other reasons, I reiterate: #StopTheSADScheme.

Case Citation: Viral DRM LLC v. YouTube Uploaders Listed on Schedule A, 2024 WL 189013 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2024)

* * *

Bonus 1: The court issued a related ruling, Viral DRM LLC v. Onyshchuk, 2024 WL 189011 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2024). The CourtListener page. Similar to the case above, the court denies default judgment against 8 defendants (3 of whom had counternoticed) because of jurisdictional and joinder concerns.

* * *

Bonus 2: Tang v. Schedule A Defendants, 1:23-cv-04587 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2024). This is a design patent SAD Scheme case. Patents (whether utility or design) are ill-suited for the SAD Scheme because the AIA Invents Act raised the bar on joinder in ways that conflict with the SAD Scheme. Despite that, as we saw above, courts may not adequately superintend patent joinder standards at the ex parte TRO stage. In this case, defendants actually appear in court and–surprise!–the court recognized that the rightsowner overreached, but only after hearing from the other side.

As evidence of the defendants’ relationships with each other, the rightsowner argued that the online storefronts share numerous similarities. The court says:

Insofar as the defendants use the same words and images, they are generally descriptive of the function of the shelves being sold (e.g., images of irons on the selves, use of “ironing board hanger”), and the prices range significantly….Even if the webpages were identical, it would not necessarily suggest the defendants are connected. To the contrary, it would hardly be surprising that multiple, independent sellers of similar products would parrot each other’s webpages or match each other’s prices.

The court summarizes:

Essentially, Plaintiff’s complaint boils down to a claim that the defendants infringed on his design patent in the same way. That is not sufficient to link one defendant’s infringement to another as part of “the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.”

Thus, the moving defendants get dismissed from the case due to misjoinder.

The court is correct that parallel independent marketplace infringements don’t support joinder, just as the Viral DRM court also held. Yet, the opinion takes a sour turn when the judge tries to explain why the joinder analysis might be different with trademark cases. In a prior opinion:

The Court described how a “swarm” of counterfeiters attacking Bose’s trademarks fit the bill, contrasting this game of “whack-a-mole” with the analogy offered in AF Holdings: individuals who play at the same blackjack table, with the same strategy and maybe even the same dealer and winnings, at different times. The “swarm” was the occurrence from which Bose sought shelter, not any one act of counterfeiting.

“Shelter from the swarm” might resemble a Dylan-esque lyric, but it’s terrible jurisprudence. How exactly does the alleged “swarm” differ from the parallel independent infringements that the Viral DRM court and this court (in the design patent context) rejected? I think that the “counterfeiter swarm” construct instead is a judicial fiction that improperly ignores the plain text of joinder rules. This is one of many maddening corner-cuts that plague the N.D. Ill. SAD Scheme jurisprudence–and contribute to significant victimization of SAD Scheme defendants.

* * *

Prior Blog Posts on the SAD Scheme

• A Judge Enumerates a SAD Scheme Plaintiff’s Multiple Abuses, But Still Won’t Award Sanctions–Jiangsu Huari Webbing Leather v. Schedule A Defendants
• Why Online Marketplaces Don’t Do More to Combat the SAD Scheme–Squishmallows v. Alibaba
• SAD Scheme Cases Are Always Troubling–Betty’s Best v. Schedule A Defendants 
• Judge Pushes Back on SAD Scheme Sealing Requests
• Roblox Sanctioned for SAD Scheme Abuse–Roblox v. Schedule A Defendants
• Now Available: the Published Version of My SAD Scheme Article
• In a SAD Scheme Case, Court Rejects Injunction Over “Emoji” Trademark
• Schedule A (SAD Scheme) Plaintiff Sanctioned for “Fraud on the Court”–Xped v. Respect the Look
• My Comments to the USPTO About the SAD Scheme and Anticounterfeiting/Antipiracy Efforts
• My New Article on Abusive “Schedule A” IP Lawsuits Will Likely Leave You Angry
• If the Word “Emoji” is a Protectable Trademark, What Happens Next?–Emoji GmbH v. Schedule A Defendants
• My Declaration Identifying Emoji Co. GmbH as a Possible Trademark Troll

The post N.D. Cal. Judge Pushes Back on Copyright SAD Scheme Cases–Viral DRM v. YouTube Schedule A Defendants appeared first on Technology & Marketing Law Blog.

Then, the case fell apart. After a couple of defendants showed up, the judge denied a TRO extension because of the possible lack of merit in the plaintiff’s infringement allegations. When defendant Hyponix appeared, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed them (without prejudice) and unfroze their Amazon account. The plaintiff eventually dismissed all of the defendants within 5 weeks of filing the complaint.

The court ruled on Hyponix and NinjaSafe’s requests for damages from the bond, dismissal with prejudice, and attorneys’ fees. The court pays out some of the bond but rejects the other relief. While the moving defendants got a tiny amount of compensation for their troubles, it’s hard to say the system fixed its mistakes.

* * *

Damages from the Bond

Wrongful Enjoinment. The court noted the deficiencies in the defendants’ alleged infringement. As a last-ditch argument, the plaintiff argued doctrine of equivalents. The court responds: “Plaintiff’s post hoc reliance on the doctrine suggests only that Plaintiff failed to adequately investigate Defendants’ alleged infringement before seeking a TRO; it does not establish that Defendants’ enjoinment was otherwise valid.” Invoking the doctrine of equivalents is usually a red flag that a plaintiff is overclaiming its patent.

Proximate Damage. The court awards the lost profits and labor costs incurred due to the Amazon account freeze, but no other collateral damages. This works out to $3,600 for Hyponix and nearly $15k for NinjaSafe. The court essentially uses up the $20k bond, leaving almost nothing for other defendants (as usual, the court doesn’t consider if any of the other defendants may be similarly situated).

Sanctions/Dismissal With Prejudice

“The Court is troubled by Plaintiff’s conduct in this case” and “aspects of Plaintiff’s conduct in this litigation suggest possible misconduct” because:

• “the ‘clear discrepancies’ between the protected elements of the ’673 Patent and the products of many of the parties against which Plaintiff secured a TRO…The Court listed dozens of other parties whose products, according to Plaintiff’s submissions plainly lacked elements of the ’673 Patent.”
  • In a prior ruling, the court said it had “serious doubt . . . as to whether plaintiff and its counsel performed adequate investigation into the 163 defendants’ supposed infringement.”
• “Plaintiff represented that most of the 163 parties were difficult to find and contact. See ECF No. 6 at 8 (“Many defendants, if not all, have obfuscated their physical location on their respective Amazon storefronts.”); see ECF No. 5 at 4 (“[A]ddresses provided on the e-commerce stores indicate that the registrants are in China and other neighboring countries.”). In practice, however, contact information for many of the parties was readily available. Hyponix, for example, was a prior distributor for Plaintiff, so its information should have already been known to Plaintiff. In any event, the Court was easily able to locate Hyponix’s business address online, along with the addresses of several other parties. Plaintiff does not indicate that it tried with any diligence to locate these parties before seeking a TRO.”
• “Plaintiff’s timing in filing and dismissing its lawsuit suggests an improper purpose….Plaintiff’s delay in filing the TRO undercuts its supposed urgency, suggesting instead that Plaintiff timed its filing to sideline its competitors during a busy sales season. So too does the speed with which Plaintiff dismissed Hyponix from its case. The pace and prevalence of Plaintiff’s dismissals suggest to the Court that Plaintiff used Rule 41 as part of a broader strategy to freeze the accounts of its competitors, then withdraw its claim against any party that happened to object” (emphasis added).
• “Plaintiff disregarded the Court’s order by disclosing the TRO to four other companies besides Amazon. The TRO clearly stated that it applied only to Amazon.”
• “Plaintiff failed to provide Hyponix with documents necessary for its defense. In its TRO, the Court instructed that its order, Plaintiff’s complaint, ex parte TRO application, and supporting declarations would be sealed only until “Amazon restrains Defendants’ assets and accounts pertaining to the Infringing Products . . . or April 18, 2023.” Hyponix requested these documents after Amazon froze its account, but Plaintiff provided only a copy of certain website pages of Hyponix’s product. Without access to any of the other records that had been sealed, Defendants could neither ensure their compliance with the TRO nor respond to Plaintiff’s arguments in opposing its extension.”

This all sounds pretty sanctionable, right? Restating the court’s assessment, the plaintiff overclaimed its patent, didn’t adequately diligence the defendants, gamed its competitors, weaponized the ex parte TRO, and disregarded the court’s instructions to provide the materials necessary to fight a case when the key filings were all sealed and thus unchallengeable. Any one of these violations should be sanctionable; and collectively, the court ought to send a strong message to the plaintiff and its counsel that such misbehavior is impermissible.

Not so fast, says the court. “Despite these concerns, the Court does not lightly award sanctions and will not do so in this case.”

It would not be lightly awarding sanction when a plaintiff has committed so many violations. How much egregious abuse will the court tolerate before it thinks sanctions are justified???

The court explains:

Plaintiff holds a valid patent for its Hanging Exercise Product, its claim was colorable against at least some of the parties, and it dismissed its lawsuit voluntarily at a very early stage in the litigation (presumably in light of the issues raised by the Court at the order to show cause hearing), before any of the defendants responded to the Amended Complaint. Defendants here were made whole for their losses under the bond

The references to other defendants are a non-sequitur. The only question on the table is whether the plaintiff’s conduct towards Hyponix and NinjaSafe is sanctionable. The fact that the other defendants haven’t requested sanctions, and in fact may have been infringing, is completely irrelevant. This is like saying that because a doctor properly diagnosed some of their patients, the doctor didn’t commit malpractice towards any improperly diagnosed patients. Here, there’s no question about the misdiagnoses. The court already enumerated a serious list of abuses directed towards the moving defendants.

For purposes of this section of the opinion, the defendants are simply asking that the court dismiss the case with prejudice against them. The court’s basic response is that the plaintiff can continue to sue these defendants if it chooses. In other words, the plaintiff can completely abuse their litigation but get more chances. That’s unacceptable.

(Prof. Sarah Burstein has some similar comments in her Mastodon thread).

Attorneys’ Fees

The court rejects the patent statute’s fee shift because the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case. It’s extremely unfortunate when plaintiffs wreck defendants and can still avoid compensating them for their attorneys’ fees by voluntarily dismissing the case. This is a good example of how bond compensation did NOT make the defendants whole. The court doesn’t care.

Implications

Notice some of the questions the court didn’t ask:

• How much money did the plaintiff collect in settlements before voluntarily dismissing the case entirely, and how much did gaming its competitors at the online marketplaces temporarily increase the plaintiff’s profit? It’s entirely possible the SAD Scheme was lucrative despite the bond damages.
• Has the plaintiff filed other SAD Scheme cases, and did it commit similar abuses in those cases?
• How many other defendants in this case suffered from the same abuses the court identified, and what steps will be taken to remediate those abuses? (The short answer: if they never show, the court doesn’t care; and because the court won’t award attorneys’ fees, the harmed defendants won’t incur the costs to show up and make their case).
• Given the misrepresentations about the defendants’ identities, was jurisdiction appropriate?
• Was joinder appropriate? Patent cases have a narrowed basis for joinder, and it seems like the plaintiff couldn’t satisfy that.

In total, the plaintiff sued and froze the accounts of 163 defendants, many of whom probably weren’t infringing, and apparently did so to game some of its competitors. The plaintiff’s negative consequences so far is that it has to pay less than $20k out of its bond–and it can revive the lawsuit against numerous defendants, including Hyponix and NinjaSafe, any time it wants. Not exactly much disincentives for plaintiffs to keep shotgunning SAD Scheme lawsuits. #StopTheSADScheme

Case Citation: Jiangsu Huari Webbing Leather Co., Ltd. v. Schedule A Defendants, 1:23-cv-02605-JLR (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2024)

Prior Blog Posts on the SAD Scheme

• Why Online Marketplaces Don’t Do More to Combat the SAD Scheme–Squishmallows v. Alibaba
• SAD Scheme Cases Are Always Troubling–Betty’s Best v. Schedule A Defendants 
• Judge Pushes Back on SAD Scheme Sealing Requests
• Roblox Sanctioned for SAD Scheme Abuse–Roblox v. Schedule A Defendants
• Now Available: the Published Version of My SAD Scheme Article
• In a SAD Scheme Case, Court Rejects Injunction Over “Emoji” Trademark
• Schedule A (SAD Scheme) Plaintiff Sanctioned for “Fraud on the Court”–Xped v. Respect the Look
• My Comments to the USPTO About the SAD Scheme and Anticounterfeiting/Antipiracy Efforts
• My New Article on Abusive “Schedule A” IP Lawsuits Will Likely Leave You Angry
• If the Word “Emoji” is a Protectable Trademark, What Happens Next?–Emoji GmbH v. Schedule A Defendants
• My Declaration Identifying Emoji Co. GmbH as a Possible Trademark Troll

The post A Judge Enumerates a SAD Scheme Plaintiff’s Multiple Abuses, But Still Won’t Award Sanctions–Jiangsu Huari Webbing Leather v. Schedule A Defendants appeared first on Technology & Marketing Law Blog.

If you read the earlier version of this paper, I added a bunch of new details to the article that you may find interesting. The paper also benefited from the thorough vetting by the journal editors.

Although the publication concludes my 2-year-long research project, I am still actively working to combat the SAD Scheme. I welcome your suggestions of how I can best direct my advocacy. You can help me by raising public awareness of the SAD Scheme. I still find that almost everyone–even sophisticated IP litigators–is not aware of the scheme and the problems it creates, despite the massive volume of defendants subjected to SAD Scheme claims.

The abstract:

The post Now Available: the Published Version of My SAD Scheme Article appeared first on Technology & Marketing Law Blog.