After Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. ___ (2024), a federal court probably needs to analyze evidence to determine whether Gmail is functionally a telegraph service (for federal jurisdiction), is a common carrier of messages (for California jurisdiction), or undertakes "transmission of intelligence within the commonwealth by electricity, by means of telephone lines or telegraph lines or any other method or system of communication, including the operation of all conveniences, appliances, instrumentalities, or equipment appertaining thereto, or utilized in connection therewith" for Massachusetts jurisdiction.

RE: In what seems to me to be consistently intellectual disingenuous “reasoning,” the pro-censorship crowd has an unrelenting fetish for wanting to treat emails like railroads. The court responds: “the relationship between an email sender and Google is an imperfect fit for the traditional carrier-passenger framework, and the RNC cites no authority extending California common-carrier regulations to the email context.”

California has specific statutes for the common carriage of a message. Expecting services that are functionally telegraphs to obey common carriage law is unconnected with censorship. Common carriage law arises from contract law. Pacta sunt servanda. If the government wants to carve out a technology-specific exemption for a modern telegraph, the government should be enacting new statutes. Federal courts should not be legislating.