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	Comments on: A Roundup of Recent Section 230 Decisions Involving Sex Abuse or CSAM	</title>
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	<link>https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2025/05/a-roundup-of-recent-section-230-decisions-involving-sex-abuse-or-csam.htm</link>
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		By: A Takedown of the Take It Down Act - Technology &#38; Marketing Law Blog		</title>
		<link>https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2025/05/a-roundup-of-recent-section-230-decisions-involving-sex-abuse-or-csam.htm#comment-4430</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[A Takedown of the Take It Down Act - Technology &#38; Marketing Law Blog]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 05 Jun 2025 18:13:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://blog.ericgoldman.org/?p=27687#comment-4430</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[[&#8230;] The Act does not exempt private messaging services, encrypted communication tools, or electronic storage providers. That omission raises significant concerns. Services that offer end-to-end encrypted messaging simply cannot access the content of user communications, making compliance with takedown notices functionally impossible. These services cannot evaluate whether a reported depiction is intimate, harmful, or duplicative because, by design, they cannot see it. See the Doe v. Apple case. [&#8230;]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[&#8230;] The Act does not exempt private messaging services, encrypted communication tools, or electronic storage providers. That omission raises significant concerns. Services that offer end-to-end encrypted messaging simply cannot access the content of user communications, making compliance with takedown notices functionally impossible. These services cannot evaluate whether a reported depiction is intimate, harmful, or duplicative because, by design, they cannot see it. See the Doe v. Apple case. [&#8230;]</p>
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