When I make a purchase at a Target brick and mortar store, I never interact with a human. I always make the purchase at a self-serve checkout, which is a PC that runs client software to instantiate a cash register. I never carry cash. I always use a credit card or a bank card. The transaction takes place on the software self-serve checkout device at the Target and not on a server in Ohio.

[Long ago I consulted on the development of NCR software, which instantiated an electronic cash register on a general purpose computer, which sends transaction data back to a server.]

When I make a purchase at the Farmer’s market, which is temporarily set up every Friday at the Ashmont T station, the human vendor runs client software on his mobile device in order to instantiate a cash register by means of software. I never carry cash. I always use a credit card or a bank card. The transaction takes place at the software cash register at the Ashmont T station and not at some backend server, to which the mobile device sends transaction data.

ThisAV is a social medium platform, which downloads a single page application to my browser to transform my apartment temporarily by means of software, which runs on my browser, into a place of public accommodation

1. for exhibition of inventory, which is displayed in my apartment, and

2. for the retail sale of membership in this social medium platform.

I am always puzzled by the focus on the server with respect to personal jurisdiction. This focus seems to show the confusion of the Court with respect to the location where the transaction takes place and possibly a belief that assumes the World Wide Web operates by magic.

There is no reason for Internet exceptionalism except among those that do not understand Internet technology.

The Copyright Act does not expressly impose liability for
contributory infringement. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the
“absence of such express language in the copyright statute does not
preclude the imposition of liability for copyright infringements on
certain parties who have not themselves engaged in the infringing
activity.

One who knowingly induces, causes or materially contributes to
copyright infringement, by another but who has not committed or
participated in the infringing acts him or herself, may be held liable
as a contributory infringer if he or she had knowledge, or reason to
know, of the infringement. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).