I have pointed out the following both to SCOTUS and also to the Court of Appeals.

The Internet/WWW is a state-supported establishment that has a definite identifiable structure that can be mapped to a location that has sublocations all over the planet. The Internet/WWW has premises that have buildings with grounds or appurtenances throughout the United States of America. The premises of the Internet/WWW may temporarily include premises of a user, whose device connects to the Internet/WWW. Since the 1950s the Internet/WWW, which has evolved from the ARPANET, was intended to become a place of accommodation for resource sharing. Now it is public.

I also pointed out the following.

In 1969 the ARPANET connected four independent network nodes located in the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), in the Stanford Research Institute (SRI), in the University of California-Santa Barbara (UCSB), and in the University of Utah. The ARPANET was a place of accommodation that one entered at each of these four locations. The Internet, into which the ARPANET expanded, hardly ceases to be a place because it has become larger and open to the public.

If the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit finds my argument reasonable, the United States District Court, Northern District of California, may have wrongfully dismissed Gomez v. Gates Estates, Inc., C 21-7147 WHA (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2022), To me qua expert, a website certainly defines a physical place within the Internet and has a definite nexus to said physical place.

My Original Complaint did not include a state action count, and I have not been impressed by any complaint that argued a violation of the First Amendment under state action doctrine. Yet the US federal government has put a vast amount of money into the development of the Arpanet since 1960, and the US federal government continues to put a vast amount of money into the Internet, which expanded and evolved from the Arpanet.

I wonder whether the precedent of Burton v. Wilmington Pkg. Auth, 365 U.S. 715, 81 S. Ct. 856 (1961) applies.

1661 cases cite Burton. If a social medium platform does not wish to be a state actor according to Burton, it need only remove itself from the Internet.

Such removal from the Internet is straightforward. Twitter used to run on top of SMS (Short Message Service). Any social medium platform could run on top if MMS (Multimedia Messaging Service) instead of within the Internet.

If state action doctrine applies, Lindke v. Freed, 2022 WL 2297875 (6th Cir. June 27, 2022) was probably wrongfully decided.

If the Appeals Court considered the lawsuit frivolous, the Appeals Court could have affirmed the District Court with a single sentence.

After 5 months A Medium Corp. finally seems to have realized that I filed a lawsuit, whose counts are based on

1. federal public accommodation discrimination,
2. federal civil rights discrimination, and
3. Massachusetts Commonwealth common carriage discrimination (Diversity Jurisdiction)

because A Medium Corp. has added an experienced civil rights litigator to its legal team.

I explicitly argued that the Internet is a physical place of public accommodation for resource sharing. I wonder whether the argument has received any traction with the panel. I am the only person

1. that is an expert in Internet technology and
2. that has filed anything in a case, which is related to a social medium platform.

A tremendous amount of commerce takes place within the Internet, which to an expert like me is obviously a physical place. I always wonder what a Court believes in asserting that the Internet is not a physical place. Does the Court believe that the Internet operates by magic?