Because we conclude that the Act’s content-moderation restrictions are substantially likely to violate the First Amendment, and because that conclusion fully disposes of the appeal, we needn’t reach the merits of the plaintiffs’ preemption challenge.

In a note, the court continues:

Of course, federal courts should generally “avoid reaching constitutional questions if there are other grounds upon which a case can be decided,” but that rule applies only when “a dispositive nonconstitutional ground is available.” [citation] Here, whether or not the preemption ground is “dispositive,” […] it isn’t “nonconstitutional” because federal preemption is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of Article VI. [citation]

Although it’s a constitutional question, the question of whether federal law preempts state law has a completely uncontroversial answer. The same cannot be said for the question of whether (or which part of) SB 7072 violates the First Amendment. Shouldn’t that lead a court to prefer (1) resolving the case on grounds of preemption, leaving untouched the First Amendment issues, rather than (2) resolving the case on First Amendment grounds, leaving untouched the preemption issues? (Indeed, doing otherwise would appear to miss out on one of the key benefits of Section 230, discussed under the heading “Section 230 Facilitates Constitutional Avoidance” in your paper Why Section 230 Is Better than the First Amendment.)

From HB 20.

(3) social media platforms function as common carriers.

From SB 7072.

6) Social media platforms hold a unique place in preserving first amendment protections for all Floridians and should be treated similarly to common carriers.

The Florida declaratory text is badly phrased. A common carrier is treated similarly to a common carrier. The Court of Appeals should have ignored the declaratory text in the Florida statute.

I don’t like the definition of common carrier either in the Texas law code or in the Florida law code, but if FedEx is a common carrier according to Texas or according to Florida, every major social medium platform is a common carrier of a digital personal literary property (a message) just as a telegraph service provided common carriage in 1869.
https://uploads.disquscdn.com/images/dd13ff57ede32d5fb95b97fdd9a38125121c8a02f2d74d7920d6ca49abbc3e97.png
The caselaw is still unsettled in the 1860s because of telegraphic transmission errors. https://uploads.disquscdn.com/images/ead0dac29450e6db65fdd4b80c7e39cd9f4e400c11cf98e544560ee005f5ab04.png

In 1871 Western Union developed a protocol for error-free transmission of a writing to transfer money from a bank.

By the 1920s there is no doubt that a Telegraph company provides a digital message common carriage service and is a common carrier with respect to this service. See Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593, 46 S. Ct. 367 (1926).

In furnishing the quotations to one and refusing to furnish them to another, the exchange is but exercising the ordinary right of a private vendor of news or other property. As a common carrier of messages for hire, the telegraph company, of course, is bound to carry for all alike. But it cannot be required — indeed, it is not permitted — to deliver messages to others than those designated by the sender. We fully agree with what is said upon similar facts by Judge Ingraham in Matter of Renville, 46 A.D. 37, 43-44:

I use the hosting service that Blogger and WordPress provide. They leave me alone to do what I want with my blogs. Each blog is a pure web journal. I post content and occasionally solicit content. The comments are all sent to me first for approval, and I decide what will appear.

It’s the letter to the editor model of a print journal. Neither I nor Blogger nor WordPress does common carriage on my blogs.

Twitter provides the following three services.
1. The DM service is common carriage.
2. The Tweet service is common carriage.
3. The microblog hosting service at first impression seems more comparable to Blogger or WordPress hosting service because Twitter holds out
1. to any member of the public that Twitter will carry tweets of a microblog owner to any user, whom the microblog owner approves and who requests access to the microblog owner’s tweets
2. under uniform terms
3. for a fee.

Yet unlike the tweet service scenario of composing and sending a tweet, the microblog owner did not request carriage.Twitter’s behavior with respect to microblog service is probably discriminatory and unlawful not under common carriage law but under civil rights law (42 U.S. Code § 1981 & § 1981) and public accommodation law (42 U.S. Code § 2000a) because Twitter discriminates in performance of contract and in providing a place of public accommodation for exhibition and entertainment.

The dumb pipe comment is silly.