The district and appellate courts have created many road blocks that a case must traverse before reaching SCOTUS by means of a petition for writ of certiorari. Because the district court improperly applied the Prison Litigation Reform Act to dismiss my case before summons and service, not only was my case able to reach
1. the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and
2. SCOTUS
within seven months, but there really is not much in the way of merits to argue. Social medium public accommodation discrimination is incontrovertible and addressed in the Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Reconsideration. The act of removing a user or his content is self-evidencing denial of common carriage.

I freely admit that I probably am not the best person to argue the case before SCOTUS even if I know Title 35, Title 47, common carriage law, and propositional calculus cold.

The DC attorney, who specialized in civil rights law and who was interested in representing me, another plaintiff, or a plaintiff class, died in June 2021. I should have been an expert, who supplied a report or testimony in district court. We both agreed that social medium treatment
1. of my fiancée Olivia, who is a Palestinian Arab Muslim, and
2. of Donald Trump
is even more abominable than social medium treatment of me, who am a proud Diaspora Jew that rejects Zionism. (At least, there is much literature that analyzes in detail the vicious antisemitism that the Zionist movement directs at someone like me. In the old days the Zionist movement might assassinate someone like me just as the Zionist movement murdered Jacob Israël de Haan on 30 June 1924. Nowadays the Zionist movement mostly pressures a public forum or a public accommodation to discriminate against someone like me by exclusion. Burning Zionist hatred of Olivia and me because of our miscegenation is undeniable.)

Thanks to Zionist pressure social medium treatment of me was invariably atrocious.

In the 80s I helped develop a telecommunications conferencing service practically identical to Twitter’s tweet service. If AT&T (a private firm) had treated users as Twitter treats users, the payouts in lawsuits, which charged both denial of common carriage and also public accommodation discrimination would have bankrupted AT&T.

Nothing in 47 U.S. Code § 230 can possibly be construed to give Twitter an immunity that AT&T did not have.

I once asked an AT&T attorney whether the AT&T phone network is a place of public accommodation. The logic that makes the AT&T phone network into a state-supported public facility, which is a place of communication between distantly separated members of the public, is almost exactly the same logic that makes the Internet/WWW packet-switched public data network into a state-supported public facility, which is place of resource sharing among Internet users, who are members of the public.

The US government supported AT&T by granting it the status of a natural monopoly or public franchise. The US federal government directly supports the Internet and the businesses, which operate within the Internet, by subsidizing and by expanding Internet access. The social mediums cannot be allowed to commit public accommodation discrimination against US citizens, who like me and like my fiancée are supporting the social mediums through the taxes we pay.

How is the Internet or the AT&T phone network a place? In the parallel proceeding in the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, I explained in my reply to Twitter’s Appellee’s Brief. See the image below. Note that I meant to write: “In the language of patent claiming, a limitation can be either structural or FUNCTIONAL.”
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Justice Thomas has recently expressed the desire to re-adjudicate a test case that would seriously re-examine 230. It’s not clear that this particular case is the best example for in-depth judicial review. That being said, it is long past time for the courts to shackle — and severely punish — the tech giants for their blatant politically-motivated censorship.

Because neither Gellis nor Zuckerbrot seems to use Instagram to monetize eyes-on-a-page to their own profit, they escape common carrier obligations relative to comments on their Instagram post comment sections. (Of course, Instagram may have common carriage obligations relative to comments on such pages because Instagram is monetizing eyes-on-a-page.)

Here is the relevant page of the Reply to Twitter’s Appellee’s Brief.

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[Unlike the six Defendants in Martillo v. Twitter, neither Gellis nor Zuckerbrot seem to perpetrate public accommodation discrimination.]

Twitter has recently tried to claim that Twitter is not a common carrier even though tweet service cannot be distinguished from telegraph or telex service. (In fact, Twitter only recently ceased to use SMS to carry a tweet, which is digital personal literary property.) Twitter needs to make a greater effort to study common carriage law. Here are the relevant pages of the Reply Brief.

[Please note that on p. 21 below I meant:
If cert is granted in the parallel Supreme Court case, whose petition has been
CIRCULATED and which goes to conference on March 25, there will be a plethora
of AMICUS briefs.]

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