Quick thought in response to one thing you say here:

The court summarizes Section 230 by saying “The CDA is absolute, rather than qualified, in its sweep and effectively functions as an absolute common law privilege.” I agree with the absolute language, but this is still a confusing statement. Section 230 isn’t a common law privilege; it’s a statutory immunity.

The judge here is picking up on a framing I use in cases of this kind. Here’s what he’s echoing:
https://uploads.disquscdn.com/images/0c884b6a3bd4ea8afaced5afc9da6e2a32ce01a791557775e915869e63683a5a.png

Basically, I frame things this way for two reasons. First, so that I only have to explain one analytic process (e.g., read statement assuming it’s true; determine if any privilege/230 applies; evaluate exceptions if any exist; repeat). Second, because it preempts (ha! puns!) an argument that defamation law is not conducive to categorical exceptions like this, by framing it as very similar to exceptions the press has always had to accurately repeat statements.