Moreover, I think you should be upset with Gawker in this case. It is you who have already noted the fact that the courts are collapsing the 1st/3rd party doctrine. It seems to me that the courts are not getting confused, they are merely reacting to new business behavior. If I were in Gawker’s shoes I’d run like hell from the idea of monetizing comments precisely because it creates 1st/3rd party confusion but Gawker didn’t run from such confusion, they embraced it. I can’t pity them at all.

I was going to make a Donald Trump joke, but my humor would probably be wasted on you at this point.

Moving on, as a matter of personal policy, I am happy to debate issues with people, subject to certain rules. One rule is to always keep an open mind. Another is to swear an oath of absolute allegiance to the search for truth. If you don’t care about truth (and that means take to the time to learn the true facts BEFORE rushing to a conclusion about what those facts mean), then you don’t live on the same planet as I do.

In short, I can’t help people who are unwilling to learn and understand the true facts before they form an opinion. I also can’t help people who think name-calling is a meaningful tool in the quest for truth.

Your comment identifies you as the sort of person who reaches a conclusion first, and then searches for facts to support that conclusion. Such folks are beyond my help, so I won’t bother trying to help you see the light — because closed eyes cannot see.

Yes, Kinderstart is a direct hit on Rule 11 in Section 230 cases! Your memory is better than mine.

I agree that this case should look differently on Rule 56, but I continue to insist that the lack of specificity in the pleading (i.e., the failure to allege that a Gawker employee wrote the specific comment that is allegedly defamatory) should have sunk the case even on Rule 12.

Eric.

Yes, the 7th Circuit likely reached the wrong result here as far as the actual merits of the case are concerned….but a Rule 12 motion doesn’t test the merits. Hence, the result here was probably procedurally correct.

Sure, it would have been nice for the court to say: “We don’t actually think Huon can prove all the stuff he’s alleged, but even if he could that wouldn’t matter because the CDA would still apply….” But that just doesn’t happen very often.

P.S. As for Rule 11 sanctions in a CDA case, Randazza asked for them in Roca Labs (denied); ROR asked for them in Small Justice (denied), and I’m sure there are plenty of other examples of how toothless that rule is.

But what about Kinderstart v. Google?https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2007/03/kinderstart_v_g_2.htm

I did read through the entire complaint and the post highlights the parts I thought were relevant here. I hope you’ll take a look and share your thoughts about whether you agree or disagree with the appellate court’s acceptance of those allegations as sufficiently non-speculative to survive Twombly. Eric.

I sought sanctions in a case involving section 230 defenses — in the Northern District of Illinois, in fact — and obtained a very substantial amount of fees in settlement of our sanctions motion. http://www.citizen.org/litigation/forms/cases/getlinkforcase.cfm?cID=604

I also note that this is a case about pleading standards, and whether the complaint in this case pleaded with sufficient specificity to make out a plausible claim. I have not yet read the complaint carefully enough to assess whether I think the appellate ruling in that regard was justified