Court Denies Kravitz’s Motion to Dismiss PhoneDog’s Amended Claims — PhoneDog v. Kravitz
[Post by Venkat Balasubramani]
PhoneDog v. Kravitz, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10561 (N.D. Cal.; Jan. 30, 2012)
PhoneDog and Kravitz are fighting over ownership of the Twitter account Kravitz used while he was working for PhoneDog. In an earlier order, the court allowed several of PhoneDog’s claims to continue, although it dismissed PhoneDog’s claims for economic interference due to Kravitz’s allegedly improper taking of the Twitter account.
The court’s initial order allowed PhoneDog’s claims for conversion and misappropriation of trade secrets to proceed, but dismissed PhoneDog’s claims for negligent and intentional interference with economic relationships. I thought PhoneDog’s claims were weak at best, and the court could have whittled down the litigation and guided the parties to their ultimate destination—settlement—by culling some of the claims, but no such luck.
With respect to intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, the court accepts PhoneDog’s theory that:
[d]ue to Kravitz’s alleged conduct, there is decreased traffic to [the] website through the [Twitter] Account, which in turn decreases the number of website pageviews and discourage advertisers from paying for ad inventory on PhoneDog’s website.
This looks like a broad theory of economic interference that would sweep up a lot of otherwise innocent conduct, but the court says that at the pleading stage, this is sufficient. The judge’s decision on economic interference seems to view traffic as an asset that can be misappropriated (even if there is no trademark claim, the economic interference claim is like a claim for diversion of traffic). The court also says that PhoneDog’s negligent interference theories also have merit at the pleading stage because “Kravitz owed a duty of care to PhoneDog as an agent of PhoneDog.”
The net result is that all of PhoneDog’s claims move forward, and Kravitz (and PhoneDog) will have to slog through some additional discovery in order to resolve PhoneDog’s claims at the summary judgment stage.
I can’t think of any new lessons to draw from this ruling, except that some sympathetic judges will let claims move forward. It would have been cheaper and quicker for everyone involved to have entered into a written agreement addressing the issue, or at least to have addressed this question up front (even if informally).
Previous posts:
An Update on PhoneDog v. Kravitz, the Employee Twitter Account Case
Courts Says Employer’s Lawsuit Against Ex-Employee Over Retention and Use of Twitter Account can Proceed
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Another Set of Parties Duel Over Social Media Contacts — Eagle v. Sawabeh
Court Declines to Dismiss or Transfer Lawsuit Over @OMGFacts Twitter Account — Deck v. Spartz, Inc.