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	<title>
	Comments on: Can 512(f) Support an Injunction?  Novotny v. Chapman	</title>
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		<title>
		By: David Jaglowski		</title>
		<link>https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2006/08/can_512f_suppor.htm#comment-429</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[David Jaglowski]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 25 Aug 2006 07:00:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2006/08/can_512f_suppor.htm#comment-429</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Having finally had the opportunity to read the opinion in the case, I no longer think that the result is inexplicable.

You stated that the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment of non-infringement and an injunction against Chapman.  In fact, the court declined to issue a preliminary injunction, noting that &quot;this injury is not likely to reoccur since the plaintiffs neither are posting the videos-at-issue on their website, nor have they cited any interest in re-posting these videos before the underlying legal issues are resolved.&quot;  That seems perfectly reasonable, since the court has yet to fully consider the terms of the license, the defendant&#039;s alleged termination of the license, and the other substantive issues in the case.

I see nothing in the opinion that suggests that the court could not or would not issue an injunction if the plaintiffs prove their case.

]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Having finally had the opportunity to read the opinion in the case, I no longer think that the result is inexplicable.</p>
<p>You stated that the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment of non-infringement and an injunction against Chapman.  In fact, the court declined to issue a preliminary injunction, noting that &#8220;this injury is not likely to reoccur since the plaintiffs neither are posting the videos-at-issue on their website, nor have they cited any interest in re-posting these videos before the underlying legal issues are resolved.&#8221;  That seems perfectly reasonable, since the court has yet to fully consider the terms of the license, the defendant&#8217;s alleged termination of the license, and the other substantive issues in the case.</p>
<p>I see nothing in the opinion that suggests that the court could not or would not issue an injunction if the plaintiffs prove their case.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>
		By: David Jaglowski		</title>
		<link>https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2006/08/can_512f_suppor.htm#comment-428</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[David Jaglowski]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 18 Aug 2006 09:56:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2006/08/can_512f_suppor.htm#comment-428</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Oops.  I inadvertantly confused the plaintiff and the defendant, in spite of correctly calling the plaintiff the plaintiff. That does make the result rather inexplicable.

To the prior commenter: I suspect that 501(c)(3) notices would be considered to be commercial speech, if not an &quot;act&quot; rather than speech entirely.  You should also consider that, barring appeal, the issue has been fully litigated with respect to the copyright owner.

]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Oops.  I inadvertantly confused the plaintiff and the defendant, in spite of correctly calling the plaintiff the plaintiff. That does make the result rather inexplicable.</p>
<p>To the prior commenter: I suspect that 501(c)(3) notices would be considered to be commercial speech, if not an &#8220;act&#8221; rather than speech entirely.  You should also consider that, barring appeal, the issue has been fully litigated with respect to the copyright owner.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>
		By: David Jaglowski		</title>
		<link>https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2006/08/can_512f_suppor.htm#comment-427</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[David Jaglowski]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 18 Aug 2006 09:23:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2006/08/can_512f_suppor.htm#comment-427</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Perhaps you can&#039;t see the forest for the trees?  A entity holding a valid license could pursue a claim for intentional interference with prospective business advantage or other related business torts against the copyright owner, obtain a judgment and possibly damages, and request a permanent injunction barring future interference, including unjustified 512(c)(3) notices.  The 512(f) remedy is a post-hoc mechanism, and there is nothing to indicate that Congress intended it as an exclusive remedy that would preclude conventional remedies for subsequent activities that would violate a court order or injunction.

The plaintiff should have filed a declaratory judgment counterclaim to force the trial court to rule on the &quot;moot&quot; issue.  You can learn valuable lessons from the procedural issues that are commonly raised in patent litigation and appeals.

]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Perhaps you can&#8217;t see the forest for the trees?  A entity holding a valid license could pursue a claim for intentional interference with prospective business advantage or other related business torts against the copyright owner, obtain a judgment and possibly damages, and request a permanent injunction barring future interference, including unjustified 512(c)(3) notices.  The 512(f) remedy is a post-hoc mechanism, and there is nothing to indicate that Congress intended it as an exclusive remedy that would preclude conventional remedies for subsequent activities that would violate a court order or injunction.</p>
<p>The plaintiff should have filed a declaratory judgment counterclaim to force the trial court to rule on the &#8220;moot&#8221; issue.  You can learn valuable lessons from the procedural issues that are commonly raised in patent litigation and appeals.</p>
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		<title>
		By: Michael Risch		</title>
		<link>https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2006/08/can_512f_suppor.htm#comment-426</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Risch]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 Aug 2006 23:42:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2006/08/can_512f_suppor.htm#comment-426</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[A couple of comments:

1.  Perhaps a straight defamation claim is the way to go.  The person is sending out false statements of fact that are causing damage

2.  Is there is prior restraint problem?

3.  Wouldn&#039;t a declaratory ruling that the license is valid be sufficient to overcome any frivolous notices?  An injunction might be preferred, but is it necessary?

]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A couple of comments:</p>
<p>1.  Perhaps a straight defamation claim is the way to go.  The person is sending out false statements of fact that are causing damage</p>
<p>2.  Is there is prior restraint problem?</p>
<p>3.  Wouldn&#8217;t a declaratory ruling that the license is valid be sufficient to overcome any frivolous notices?  An injunction might be preferred, but is it necessary?</p>
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